Gambar halaman
PDF
ePub
[blocks in formation]

workers as a result of imports in 1960. Many of these jobs have never existed in the United States because some of the products have traditionally been imported in response to American consumer preferences based on price, quality, or style.

Nor can this figure be viewed in any sense as additional employment that would be created by producing the $6.8 billion of competitive imports in the United States. If these imports were elimipated, there would be a loss of U.S. employment in the transportation and associated activities involved in bringing these goods to the United

1 Transporting imports on, and unloading them from, U.S. planes, trains, and flag-flying ships.

Insurance of imports by U.S. insurers. • Transportation from port of entry to processing factory or to distributing wholesaler.

• Distribution of both supporting and competitive imports.

• Furnishing fuel and supplies to U.S. industries engaged in the transportstion, insurance, and distribution of imports.

8 Raw materials and semimanufactured products, as classified by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of International Programs; see text for definition.

; Employment required to replace plant and equipment used up in the course of U.S. transportation, insurance, and distribution of all imports and in first-stage processing of supporting imports.

TABLE 2. HYPOTHETICAL EMPLOYMENT REQUIRED TO

PRODUCE AND MARKET IN THE UNITED STATES IMPORTS OF ALL FINISHED MANUFACTURES AND OTHER PRODUCTS CONSIDERED COMPETITIVE With DOMESTIC PRODUCTS 1

U.S. Jobs and Competitive Imports

Employment (thousands)

Industry group

[blocks in formation]
[blocks in formation]

Farm.
Mining.
Manufacturing

Food and kindred products..
Tobacco manufactures.
Textile mill products.
Apparel and other finished products.-
Lumber and wood products, except furni-

ture.
Furniture and fixtures.
Paper and allied products
Printing, publishing, and allied industries.
Chemical and allied products...
Petroleum refining and related industries.
Rubber and miscellaneous plastics prod-

ucts..
Leather and leather products..
Stone, clay, and glass products.
Primary metal industries.
Fabricated metal products
Machinery, except electrical.
Electrical machinery, equipment, and sup-

plies..
Transportation equipment.
Professional, scientific, and controlling in-

struments
Miscellaneous manufacturing and ord.

nance.
Trade.
Transportation.
All other
Replacement of plant and equipment con-

sumed. Transportation and distribution of imports from factory to wholesalers.

Trade
Transportation...
All other 5.

[blocks in formation]

In estimating the number of jobs required to produce in the United States those imported goods considered competitive with domestic goods, the BLS used the competitive import classification of the U.S. Department of Commerce. The value of such imports in 1960 was approximately $6.8 billion, landed at U.S. ports.

To produce, in the United States, the equivalent of these finished manufactures and other imported products considered competitive with domestically produced goods would require, the BLS estimated, about 1 million workers (table 2). This estimate includes direct employment of about 440,000, of which three-fourths would be in manufacturing establishments. Indirect employment of some 475,000 would be required for the production and transportation of raw materials, component parts, and supplies to the producing plant. Nearly 75,000 jobs would be attributable to the replacement of plant and equipment used up in the preceding stages. In addition, about 80,000 workers would be required to transport and distribute the products from the factory to wholesalers and retailers.

The figures in this portion of the study should be interpreted cautiously and with due regard to certain qualifications. The most important of these is that the hypothetical employment figure of 1 million does not represent jobs lost by American

20.0 17.4 33.7 69.0 31, 2 40.1

[blocks in formation]

1 Competitive imports as defined by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of International Programs; see text for explanation.

? Employment which would be required to produce, transport, and dis. tribute goods in the form in which imported.

3 Employment in the industries which produce, transport, and distribute the raw materials, parts and components, etc., which would be used to make the products imported. * Insurance, forestry, fisheries, and agricultural services. * Estimated as an aggregate and not distributed among separate industries.

States. More significant quantitatively, the loss of income by foreign nations would curtail U.S. exports, with resulting declines in domestic employment. Also, part of the employment estimated to be required to produce competitive imports already exists in the United States, engaged in producing raw material exports which are embodied in imported manufactured products. For example, imported cotton textiles are made in part from cotton exported from the United States.

In this case, replacement of the import by U.S. production would not create additional farm employment. The same situation may exist to a lesser extent in the case of other commodities. Finally, the hypothetical employment of 80,000 workers that would be involved in transportation and distribution from the factory if the competitive imports were produced in the United States does not represent additional employment because these jobs currently exist in the transportation and distribution of actual imports.

* In 1960, the value of these imports represented about one-third the value of U.S. merchandise exports, including mutual security military and economic aid.

-Eva E. JACOBS AND RONALD E. KUTSCHER

Office of Economic Growth Studies

If American capital which is being attracted out of the country can produce goods cheaper abroad than similar goods in America, to that extent production will be cut down in America. Instead of doing the producing in this country with immigrant labor, which has been excluded, production will take place at the source of supply of labor. As this newer competition with American goods takes place, it takes no wild imagination to foresee the possibilities of American capital in Japan with the use of cheap labor producing cotton goods so cheaply as to drive out of business home capital in America invested in the cotton mills in this country, or at least making inevitable the same demand for lowered standards from southern mills as now emanates from the northern textile mills. It would look as if it were high time for some one to step in to defend competitors from the destructive effects of their own efforts.

-Leifur Magnusson, “International Competition in Labor Conditions and the Main.

tenance of Labor Standards," Monthly Labor Review, August 1927, p. 27.

Wage Chronology:
North Atlantic Longshoring

Supplement No. 3—1953-611

arbitration machinery. The agreement was rejected by the union membership on December 10, primarily because of the no-strike and arbitration clauses. By December 31, the union's wage scale committee approved a new 2-year agreement that was essentially similar to the one rejected, but with modifications in the controversial provisions and a guarantee that existing port practices would remain unchanged. The agreement was ratified by the members, by a vote of almost 3 to 1, on January 5, 1955, and signed on February 24, 1955.

[ocr errors]

FOR THE International Longshoremen's Association (ILA), the period 1953 through 1960 was one of uncertainty, characterized by the regulation of hiring activities by the bistate Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, strikes, legal actions, and representation elections. Collective bargaining, particularly with the New York Shipping Association, was influenced by developments ordinarily outside the scope of industrial relations. The period was also highlighted by expulsion of the union from the American Federation of Labor in 1953, conditional reaffiliation with the merged American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations in 1959, and unconditional affiliation with the AFL-CIO in January 1961.

In the fall of 1953, when the existing agreement was scheduled to terminate, a representation challenge by the newly chartered AFL International Brotherhood of Longshoremen and other problems made negotiations in the New York area impossible. However, negotiations proceeded in the other North Atlantic Coast ports, and by February 1954, new 2-year agreements had been reached in six ports. They provided an 8-centan-hour general wage increase and an additional 2 cents an hour for the welfare and insurance funds. In August 1954, the ILA was certified as the collective bargaining agent for the New York dockworkers after a long contest for representation and a repeat election. In October, the New York locals settled for an 8-cent-an-hour increase, retroactive to October 1, 1953. The employers also agreed to a 2-cent-an-hour increase in welfare payments, effective April 1, 1954, in return for a 45-day no-strike pledge, pending negotiations on a new contract.

On November 25, 1954, negotiations for a new 2-year agreement were concluded by the New York Shipping Association, the other port stevedoring associations, and the ILA. The tentative agreement, retroactive to October 1, 1954, provided for a 17-cent-an-hour package, the union shop, virtual elimination of the shapeup, a nostrike no-lockout clause, and grievance and

I See Monthly Labor Review, August 1951, pp. 170-176, October 1952, pp. 410-412, and November 1953, pp. 1207–1208, or Wage Chronology Series 4, No. 17.

* Settlement was also reached at a number of smaller ports not covered by this chronology.

• With the establishment of the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor by concurrent action of the New York and New Jersey legislatures in 1953, the longstanding "shape" system for hiring longshoremen was modified. The need for reform was dramatically pointed up by the findings of a special committee appointed by the Governor of New York on the misuse of hiring authority. The "shape" continues to be used in other ports of the North Atlantic Coast except Baltimore.

Although the commission's responsibility was limited to the elimination ot unsavory practices in the port area, the accomplishment of this objective required some regulation of the Individual workers and of hiring practices. Many of the problems in the area existed only because of the large excess of workers over available jobs. The commission's approach to the problem was to require registration of all longshoremen and to refuse certification to individuals with serious criminal records or with only irregular attachment to the industry.

In 1953, after the initial registration and some reduction in the available labor force, the commission established a prevalidation hiring system. Under this system, employers were required to submit advance lists of permanent workers needed for a week and to inform the commission of needs for casual workers for the following day. Employers were also required by their con. tract with the union to notify the men on the day prior to commencement of employment. This applied to both the weekly and daily lists. Under the commission's rules, the list of permanent employees could be extended from week to week and the daily list from day to day. Only workers applying for 611-in jobs were required to report to the port employment offices.

By permitting hiring agents and others to expand the lists until excessive numbers of men were eligible for jobs, the employers largely invalidated the advantages of the system.

A somewhat different approach, designed to rectify the deficiencies of the prevalidation method, was instituted by the commission in 1955. Regulations issued by the commission required ste vedores to certify the names of regular workers; these were posted at the pierhead and in the employment center for the area. Stevedores hired men from day to day at the pierbead and reported hiring information daily to the area employment center where it was recorded. At the end of each month, stevedores removed from their lists the names of workers who had not been hired regularly. Regular gangs not employed at their own pier, extra gangs, and casuals were hired for fill-in work through the commission's employment centers.

Despite these measures, primary responsibility for fair employment procedures rests on the representatives of labor and management. A measure of this responsibility was met by the negotiation of a quasi-seniority system in 1955 that implemented the commission's regulations. Gangs or individuals who were attached to a particular pier or who received preferred employment at locations where gangs were not regularly used were designated as "regulars" and given preferential job rights. Gangs and individuals without such attachments were designated as “extras" and could be hired by a stevedore only after the supply of regular gangs and individuals had been exhausted. “Regulars" became "extras" when work was not available at their pier and they sought employment at other locations. “Regulars” working away from their home pier were obligated to return when needed.

3

The major deterrent to agreement in the 1956 negotiations was the union's insistence on a master contract for all North Atlantic and Gulf Coast ports. Earlier agreements had been on a port-byport basis, with the New York contract setting the pattern. After prolonged negotiations and two contract extensions, some 60,000 longshoremen, in ports extending from Portland, Maine, to Brownsville, Tex., went on strike November 16 to protest the employers' refusal to agree to an industrywide contract. The national emergency provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act were invoked, and 6 days after the strike began a Board of Inquiry was appointed. The November 24 report of the three-man Board concluded that the union's demand for an industrywide contract had prevented agreement. However, paid holidays, improved vacations, an 8-hour work guarantee, and limitations on sling loads were also listed as disputed issues. By November 26, all longshoremen were back at work under a 10-day Federal court restraining order, later extended to the full 80-day statutory period and modified to provide that any negotiated increases in wages, pensions, and welfare contributions would be retroactive to October 1. In midDecember 1956, the same court, at the request of the National Labor Relations Board, issued a temporary injunction barring the union from industrywide bargaining for Gulf and Atlantic Coast ports. With the expiration of the 80-day injunction on February 12, 1957,4 the strike resumed in Middle and North Atlantic ports; settlements had been reached in southern ports. Five days later, the New York Shipping Association and the ILA signed an agreement providing that all ports from Maine to Virginia would have uniform wages, hours, and employer contributions to the welfare and pension funds. The contract, which was to run to September 30, 1959, increased wage rates 32 cents an hour over the 3-year period and included a "one shot” escalator provision. Employer welfare contributions were increased 5 cents an hour. Under the terms of the new agreement, local negotiations were to deal with working conditions, vacations, holidays, and welfare and pension benefits. In the negotiation for this agreement, the New York Shipping Association acted for the industry under authorizations from the associations in the other North Atlantic ports.

Late in 1958, a dispute arose between the New York Shipping Association and the ILA, when union members refused to handle containers loaded away from the pier by non-ILA labor. The dispute was referred to the port arbitrator when the union extended its ban to all shipperloaded containers handled by companies not using this system prior to October 1, 1956. A temporary solution was reached when the New York Shipping Association assured the arbitrator that no loss of jobs would result from the use of the containers during the term of the contract. With this assurance, the union agreed to handle containers for all companies using them on November 12, 1958; however, companies not using containers were to notify the union if they contemplated such operations.

Since it was evident that the stevedoring industry was changing, the parties also agreed on the need to direct the course of automation and containerization in the port so as to increase productivity without materially depressing the economic status of the longshoremen. In addition, future expansion of containerization was made the subject of negotiations to begin early in 1959.

In the negotiations which began January 5, 1959, the union continued to be concerned with the direct effect of containerization on the number of jobs and earning power of its members, as well as its indirect effect on the pension and welfare funds. The New York Shipping Association agreed in principle that regular employees should be given some indemnification for loss of job opportunities because of containerization but demanded unrestricted use of containers and the sole right to determine the size of the working force. The parties were unable to resolve their differences, and containerization became a major issue in bargaining for a new contract.

Negotiations on a new agreement, to replace the contract due to expire September 30, 1959, began on August 10. With the approach of the expiration day, it became evident that a work stoppage was imminent. In attempts to forestall a strike, the Secretary of Labor, the Governor of New York, and the Mayor of New York City each requested the parties to continue negotiations.

4 After extended legal proceedings, the National Labor Relations Board on January 15, 1961, ordered the case closed.

On September 30, the day the requests for continuation of negotiations were received, the ILA and the New York Shipping Association agreed to a 15-day contract extension with the understanding that adjustments in wage rates and contributions to the welfare and pension funds would be retroactive to October 1.

On October 1, when Gulf Coast employers refused to agree to retroactivity, the ports in that area were struck and later in the day the walkout spread to the entire Atlantic Coast. Some 70,000 workers were affected.

Six days after the men left the docks, a TaftHartley Board of Inquiry was appointed by the President of the United States. On October 7, the Board reported that the unresolved issues were "wage rates, procedures for installing mechanical devices and effecting containerization, gang size, and certain fringe benefits, including pension, health, and welfare." The following day, on application of the National Labor Relations Board, a Federal district court issued a temporary order restraining the union from striking, and on October 17, this was extended for the full statutory period.

The parties resumed negotiations on October 19, 1959, with a new employer proposal relating to containerization which the union labeled inadequate. By November 4, the union had proposed royalty payments on containers and the New York Shipping Association had restated its earlier proposal for a 25-cent-a-ton payment on containerized cargo loaded or unloaded on the docks. Coupled with this, the shippers wanted the right to install automatic equipment and to regulate the size of gangs. Both offers were rejected.

On December 10, the ILA and the New York Shipping Association agreed on a 3-year contract covering North Atlantic Coast ports. It provided a 46-cent-an-hour package over the contract period, with rates for handling general cargo increased 12 cents an hour, retroactive to October 1, 1959, and 5 cents more on October 1 of both 1960 and 1961. A paid holiday was to be added in each contract year, bringing the total to 8 from 5. Eligibility requirements for vacations were liberalized and pension and welfare contributions were increased.

On the issue of containerization, the parti agreed to retain the standard gang size, to use IL members when containers were loaded and u loaded at the pier, and to discuss further th question of penalty payments for shipment loaded or unloaded off the pier. It was agreed that the question of these penalty payment would be submitted to arbitration if the parties could not settle the problem within 2 weeks.

In August 1960, when negotiations failed to produce agreement, the issue was submitted to a board of arbitration consisting of one member each representing labor and management and an impartial chairman. The board, on November 22, 1960, handed down an award that would indemnify ILA members for loss of work resulting from the movement of containerized cargo through the port of New York. The award required employers to pay into a jointly administered fund a royalty for each ton of "containerized” cargo shipped, with the amount ranging from 35 cents to $1 per gross ton, depending on the proportion of ship capacity fitted for vans or containers. Payments into the fund were made retroactive to July 1, 1960, and were to continue for the duration of the existing collective bargaining agreement, with the provision that either party could seek adjustments on October 1, 1961. The method of distributing the fund among the work force was to be agreed upon by the parties. Although the award covered only the New York Shipping Association, all other associations and locals were urged to study the award because of its effect on waterfront operations.5

The following tables give the details of the agreements negotiated by the New York Shipping Association and other North Atlantic Coast employer associations with the ILA during the years 1953-61. In addition, some of the sections (noted in the tables) have been revised to incorporate more detail than was included in the basic chronology and previous supplements.

"The Boston Shipping Association and the Steamship Trade Association of Baltimore have accepted the principle of a containerization fund but have not agreed to the details with the International Longshoremen's Association. Current agreements in Hampton Roads and Philadelphia make no provisions for a containerization fund.

« SebelumnyaLanjutkan »