(311 Il. 66, 142 N. E. 554.) distinct as to cause a contrariety of opinion as to whether acts were or were not ethical. It seems, however, as used by the commissioner, "unethical" is substantially synonymous with unprofessional, for there was nothing immoral in conducting the quiz courses by respondent. What, then, characterizes it as unprofessional? It should be borne in mind that the quiz courses were independent of, and had no connection with, respondent's relations with his clients. His classes were not clients who sought his services in the transaction of business, and he did not solicit clients to become members of his classes. He did not pretend to aid members of his classes in their preliminary qualification to enable them to take the examination. They were composed of men who had already qualified by preliminary education and by study of the law to be admitted by the board to take the examination for admission to the bar. For ten weeks he conducted a quiz course of instruction or review of the subjects which the students had already studied in their law course, and upon which the rule of this court required them to be examined, to better prepare them for the examination. Respondent should not and must not advertise or represent that he can or will furnish his students with a question or questions which will be used by the board of law examiners in the examination of students for admission to the bar. Such advertising is wholly improper. The commissioner reports the work respondent was doing was of the same nature as that carried on by several other persons in Chicago, some of whom are attorneys at law. What we have said on the subject of what conduct is unethical is equally applicable to what is or what is not unprofessional. Where the conduct of an attorney is such that all right-minded people would conclude that it is not honorable, it must necessarily be unprofessional. The grounds upon which counsel for relator base their argument that respondent's conduct was dishon- No doubt respondent represented to his students that such a course as he conducted would be of great aid in enabling them to successfully pass the examination, and there is no doubt that was the object of the students in taking the ten weeks' course under his tuition. Does that render respondent's conduct unprofessional to such an extent as to justify revoking his license to practise law? It does not appear before this time to have been so regarded by the bar or the courts. The commissioner reports that other attorneys at law in Chicago are doing the same kind of work, and, after a somewhat extensive investigation, we have been unable to find a decision of any court upon the question. No one would contend that a lawyer should be disbarred who, instead of opening an office and practising his profession, devoted all his time to teaching law. Many very able and well-known lawyers have done that very thing, and many well-known lawyers devote a part of their time to teaching in law schools. There is this difference in that kind of teaching and respondent's teaching: That in law schools covering the period a student is required to study law, the object is to make the student acquainted with the fundamental principles of law to prepare him to practise his profession, while respondent's course was given to supplementing the work already done by giving the student a ten weeks' review or quiz on the subjects he had studied in the law school, in order to refresh his memory and better prepare him to pass the examination for admission to the bar. A lawyer who has succeeded in establishing himself in a paying practice of the law might consider it would be beneath his dignity, or that it would be unprofessional in him, to conduct such courses as respondent conducted, but the views of such a lawyer cannot be the sole criterion for determining what is unprofessional conduct. It would not seem strange if in some respects the successful lawyer's ideas of professional conduct should differ from the ideas of those less fortunate. Of course, the ideals of the lawyer struggling to make enough to support his family can no more be accepted as the standard than those of his more fortunate brother. Common sense and a spirit of fairness must, in the absence of adjudication, be relied upon for guidance in determining the question. Attorney and client-conducting quiz classes -unprofessional conduct. repute. It is a vital necessity to the well-being of society and the administration of justice that attorneys, who are officials of the court and a part of our judicial system, should exhibit the most scrupulous care in conducting themselves and their business in such manner as will secure and maintain the respect and confidence of the public in the attorney and the profession generally. The trust and confidence which must necessarily be reposed in an attorney by clients who confide to him most intimate secrets and their most sacred rights require in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts, and the public. We feel very little charity for an attorney who is so morally obtuse as not to recognize the sacredness of his duties and the necessity for irreproachable conduct in his profession. His failure to live up to the requirements for a proper discharge of the duties of his office is only a little less injurious to the public than the failure of the judge on the bench in the proper conduct and discharge of his official duties. The right to practise law is not an absolute right. It is a privilege, which may be revoked when the attorney's misconduct makes him an unfit person to be allowed to hold a license to practise. An attorney can properly be disbarred only upon good cause shown, in a judicial proceeding. There is here no contro -right to revoke license. -right to disbar. (311 Ill. 66, 142 N. E. 554.) versy about the fact as to what respondent's conduct was. This court has frequently considered the sufficiency of the proof required to authorize disbarment. In People ex rel. Deneen v. Matthews, 217 Ill. 94, 75 N. E. 444, the court held disbarment was only justified upon clear and satisfactory proof. In People ex rel. Burnap v. Harvey, 41 Ill. 277, the court said the proof must be clear and free from doubt, not only as to the act charged, but also as to the motive. In People ex rel. Shufeldt v. Barker, 56 Ill. 299, the court said slight evidence would not warrant disbarment. An attorney is entitled to practise his profession, and should not be denied the right to do so "except. upon clear proof of wilful and corrupt professional misconduct." Many more of our decisions are to be found citing and approving the cases above referred to. Practically all the disbarment cases we have examined charged conduct of the attorney which was fraudulent or dishonest. A few charged soliciting business as an attorney in a manner which was unprofessional and tended to bring the bar into contempt. We have already referred to the fact that there was no connection between respondent's quiz classes and his practice of the profession, further than the fact of being a lawyer enabled him to secure students for his courses. We are unable to see the ethical difference between what respondent did, and substantially the same thing which it is generally understood is being practised by some colleges and universities. This court said in People v. Palmer, 61 Ill. 255, that it was not its province to pass on the style of manners becoming to an honorable member of the profession. We are not to be understood as commending respondent's actions in conducting his quiz courses. After careful consideration and deliberation we only hold that in doing so he was not guilty of unprofessional conduct of so serious a character as to justify the destruction of his professional life by disbarment. The rule is discharged. Dunn and Cartwright, JJ., dissenting: The rules of the court prescribe the qualifications of general and legal education and of character and general fitness requisite for admission to the bar, and provide the method by which these shall be ascertained. The examination which must be sustained in the various subjects presented is intended to ascertain the fitness of the applicant, by reason of his mental training acquired by study, and his legal knowledge, to undertake the practice of law. The respondent is not engaged in the preparation of students for the bar, but for the bar examination, and this not by a study of the legal principles involved in the subjects on which the examination must be conducted, but by the memorizing of answers furnished by the respondent to questions which he has also furnished, with the statement that he is furnishing a large proportion of the questions to be asked at the examination, together with the answers. He advertises, systematically and extensively, his great success in thus enabling applicants to pass the bar examination, and a considerable proportion of the applicants at each examination are those who, under his tutoring, have prepared to pass an examination by the study of questions and answers, of which a large proportion-possibly a half-of the particular questions have been furnished to the applicants in advance. This is a clear evasion of the rule, which contemplates an examination which will not be merely a test of memory, but will test the mental training, reasoning powers, knowledge of legal principles, mental capacity, and general educational fitness of the applicant. The work of the respondent interferes with such an examination and makes the result depend largely upon the superficial acquaintance with a subject which a good memory will enable the applicant thus examined temporarily to retain and display, and not upon any real knowledge. It not only lowers the educational standard for admission to the bar, but also the moral standard. The entrance of a lawyer upon his profession ought not to be attended with an evasion of the rule providing for his admission. The conduct of the respondent should be condemned instead of condoned, and he should be required to desist from it, and from giving courses of the character of those which he does give in preparation for the bar examinations. ANNOTATION. Conduct in respect of coaching law students as ground for disbarment. The reported case (PEOPLE EX REL. CHICAGO BAR Asso. v. BAKER, ante, 737) is apparently one of first impression, an extensive search having revealed no other cases presenting a similar state of facts. Generally, as to disbarment for misconduct outside of strictly professional relations, it is said in 2 R. C. L. p. 1099: "It is generally held that misconduct of an attorney, even though outside of his professional dealings, may be sufficient to justify his disbarment. An attorney may be guilty of disreputable practices and gross immoralities in his private capacity, and without the pale of the court, which render him unfit to associate with gentlemen, disqualify him for the faithful discharge of his professional duties in or out of court, and render him unworthy to minister in the forum of justice. When such a case arises, from whatever acts or causes, the cardinal condition of the attorney's admission to the bar-the possession of a good moral character -is forfeited, and it becomes the solemn duty of the court, upon a due presentment of the case, to revoke the authority given to the offending member as a symbol of legal fitness and moral uprightness, lest it be exercised for evil or tarnished with shame. But the courts generally have made a distinction between acts and conduct as an attorney and as a person, and unless the attorney shows such a want of professional honesty as renders him unworthy of public confidence, or has such a bad character that he is an unsafe and unfit person to be intrusted with the powers of the profession, he will not be disturbed." To the annotator it seems that the decision of the court in the reported case, to the effect that it was not unprofessional for a member of the bar to conduct quiz classes to prepare law students who had completed the required course of study for their bar examination, is consonant with reason, and was in effect a holding that the accused lawyer was not guilty of such a want of professional honesty as would justify his disbarment. It will be observed, however, that the court makes the significant statement: "We are not to be understood as commending respondent's actions in conducting his quiz courses. After careful consideration and deliberation we only hold that in doing so he was not guilty of unprofessional conduct of so serious a character as to justify the destruction of his professional life by disbarment." R. P. D. 1. A cestui que trust may maintain a suit in equity against a bank for (— Iowa, —, 194 N. W. 957.) funds deposited by the trustee, and applied by the bank to its own claim against the trustee with notice of the claim of the cestui que trust. [See note on this question beginning on page 756.] mission house deposits the proceeds of sales and transmits the proceeds by check, it will be charged with notice that the only interest which it has in deposits from the proceeds of sales is its commission and the expenses necessary to the handling and disposition of consignments. Bank - duty to pay checks of commission merchant. 9. A bank in which a commission merchant deposits the proceeds of goods consigned to him, to be transmitted to the owners by check, is charged with notice of the trust character of the funds and bound to pay checks drawn by the merchant so long as there are funds on deposit for that purpose. [See 3 R. C. L. 549; 1 R. C. L. Supp. 851.] |