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govern: Stewart v. Baltimore etc. R. R. Co., 33 W. Va. 88; as it is the summons in justices' courts, like the writ in courts of record, that must be looked to to determine the plaintiff's claim upon the question of jurisdiction: Todd ▼. Gates, 20 W. Va. 464. In all actions sounding in damages, the amount named in the declaration, and not that found by the court or jury, determines the jurisdiction: Murphy v. Howard, 1 Hemp. 205. In a suit for damages for the breach of an official bond, the amount of damages claimed, and not the amount of the penalty in the bond, determines the jurisdiction: Fowler v. McDaniel, 6 Heisk. 529. So it is the value of property as alleged in a replevin suit, and not its value as found, that determines this question as between different courts: Stevens v. Chase, 61 N. H. 340; Higgins v. Deloach, 54 Miss. 498; Kirkpatrick v. Cooper, 89 Ill. 210.

Where plaintiff's demand consists of several distinct items, it is the aggregate which constitutes the sum demanded, and confers jurisdiction: Moore v. Nowell, 94 N. C. 266. And the actual value of the thing demanded determines the jurisdiction, and not the price last paid for it: Oakey v. Aiken, 12 La Ann. 11.

The amount in controversy as fixing the jurisdiction of the court has further been determined as follows: In attachment proceedings, the amount of the judgment and costs, and not the value of the property attached: Hoppe v. Byers, 39 Iowa, 573; Paul v. Arnold, 12 Ind. 197; in actions for torts generally, the amount of damages claimed, and not the amount of damages suffered: Linduff v. Steubenville etc. Co., 14 Ohio St. 336; De Camp v. Miller, 44 N. J. L. 617; Cooke v. Woodrow, 5 Cranch, 13; in an action on a bond, the sum claimed, and not the penalty in the bond: United States v. McDowell, 4 Cranch, 316; Brown v. Shannon, 20 How. 55. On the trial of an indictment for larceny, it is the value of the property as alleged in the indictment that determines the jurisdiction as between different courts: State v. Church, 8 Iowa, 252.

The only limitation or exception to the principles set forth is, that the demand for the sum made must be made in good faith: Moore v. Nowell, 94 N. C. 266. If it appears that the plaintiff erroneously and fraudulently stated his case in order to give the court jurisdiction, judgment should not be rendered in his favor, but his suit should be dismissed: Wiseman v. With erow, 90 N. C. 140; Griffin v. McDaniel, 63 Miss. 121; Fenn v. Harrington, 54 Miss. 733; Griffin v. Lower, 37 Miss. 458; Paul v. Burton, 32 Vt. 155; Field v. Randall, 51 Vt. 33. The rule has been thus stated: "Jurisdiction, so far as matter or amount in value is concerned, must be determined by the petition, and the question is concluded by its averments in so far as they relate facts in relation to the thing in controversy, unless it otherwise appears that an attempt has been made to confer jurisdiction by averments improperly and fraudulently made. In actions sounding in damages, the amount of damages claimed, and not the amount of the verdict, determines jurisdiction. In actions ex contractu, the amount claimed determines jurisdiction, if it is not made to appear that a fraud upon jurisdiction has been attempted by improper averments in the petition": Dwyer v. Basseth, 63 Tex. 274; Ratigan v. Holloway, 69 Tex. 468; Tidball v. Eichoff, 66 Tex. 58; Bridge v. Ballew, 11 Tex. 269; Tarbox v. Kennon, 3 Tex. 7; Sherwood v. Douthit, 6 Tex. 224.

If items are fraudulently included in a petition for the purpose of giving a certain court jurisdiction to which it is not entitled, the question can only be raised by proper averments presenting that issue: Dwyer v. Bassett, 63 Tex. 275; Tidball v. Eichoff, 66 Tex. 58.

Where the case admits of reasonable doubt as to whether the amount in controversy is within the jurisdiction, and where the plaintiff might have had reasonable grounds to believe that he could recover a sum within the jurisdiction, the suit will not be dismissed, as all intendments in a doubtful case are in favor of the jurisdiction: Dwyer v. Bassett, 63 Tex. 274

The plaintiff must claim a sum sufficient to give the court jurisdiction, as it will not infer jurisdiction from the nature of the case: Stephen v. Eiseman, 54 Miss. 535; Wade v. Loudon, 30 La. Ann. 660; Gouhenant v. Anderson, 20 Tex. 459. And if it appears from the pleadings that the real sum to which plaintiff is entitled is insufficient to confer jurisdiction, although a sufficient amount is claimed, the case should be dismissed: Breidert v. Krueger, 76 Ind. 55; Hunt v. Rockwell, 41 Ind. 51; Gamber v. Holben, 5 Mich. 331. If the plaintiff bona fide claims an amount sufficient to give the court jurisdiction, and an unintentional error is discovered at the trial, which reduces the claim below that sum, the court need not dismiss the case: Scott v. Moore, 41 Vt. 205; 98 Am. Dec. 581. And a prima facie intention to evade the law, raised by a verdict for less than the jurisdictional amount, may be overcome by an affidavit of good faith on the part of the plaintiff: Johnston v. Frances, 13 Ired. 465.

When, by the pleadings, a claim is made for an amount in excess of the jurisdiction of the court, the case should be dismissed: Stevers v. Gunz, 23 Minn. 520; Henks v. Debertshauser, 1 Mo. App. 402; McQuade v. O'Neil, 15 Gray, 52; Ball v. Biggam, 43 Kan. 327, where the amount claimed in the bill of particulars was held to fix the jurisdiction. If the amount claimed by such bill is, however, within the limit of jurisdiction, the latter is not ousted, although the complaint claims an amount in excess thereof: Second National Bank v. Hutton, 81 Ind. 101.

As a general rule, it may be stated that when the principal sum claimed, exclusive of interest, is within the jurisdictional limit, the fact that accrued interest is due thereon, and that such interest and the sum claimed exceed the jurisdictional limit, does not deprive the court of jurisdiction, and judgment may be entered for the sum sued for, with the interest: Trego v. Lewis, 58 Pa. St. 463; Hedgecock v. Davis, 64 N. C. 650; Jackson v. Whitfield, 51 Miss. 202; Inhabitants of Township No. 11 v. Weir, 9 Ind. 224; Welsh v. Karstens, 60 Ill. 117; Bell v. Ayres, 44 Conn. 35; Solomon v. Reese, 34 Cal. 28. A coutrary rule is, however, asserted in Butler v. Wagner, 35 Wis. 54. It seems that the plaintiff cannot sue for both principal and interest, and thus confer jurisdiction when the principal alone is less than the jurisdictional limit: Fisher v. Hall, 1 Ark. 275.

The plaintiff may waive or remit his interest, and thus reduce his demand, for the purpose of bringing his claim within the jurisdiction of the court so as to recover judgment: Raymond v. Strobel, 24 Ill. 114; Wright v. Smith, 76 Ill. 216; Evans v. Hall, 45 Pa. St. 235; Bower v. McCormick, 73 Pa. St. 427.

Costs are not added to the principal sum sued for in determining the question of jurisdiction: Watson v. Ward, 27 Miun. 29. Where a note sued on provides for the collection of an attorney's fee in addition to the principal sum in case of suit, and such sum and fee together inake an amount beyond the jurisdictional limit, the jurisdiction of the court is ousted: Baxter v. Bates, 69 Ga. 587.

It seems to be perfectly well settled that though the jurisdiction of a court is limited to a certain sum, and the original indebtedness sued upon exceeds that amount, still, the jurisdiction of the court is not ousted if the original tum has been reduced below the jurisdictional limits by bona fide credits:

Hugunin v. Nicholson, 1 Scam. 574; Dillard v. Noel, 2 Ark. 449; Fowler v. Bishop, 32 Conn. 199; Peter v. Schlosser, 81 Pa. St. 439; Perkins v. Rich, 12 Vt. 595. The jurisdiction is ousted, however, if the credits are feigned: Todd v. Gates, 20 W. Va. 464.

There is some controversy on the question whether or not the plaintiff can voluntarily remit part of his claim so as to bring the case within the jurisdiction of the court. In the following cases it was decided that he had a perfect right to do so, and the jurisdiction was sustained: Carpenter v. Wells, 65 Ill. 451; Raymond v. Strobel, 24 Ill. 453; Wright v. Smith, 76 Ill. 216; Culley v. Laybrook, 8 Ind. 285; Long v. Bakefield, 48 Ala. 608; Hapgood v. Doherty, 8 Gray, 373; Hempler v. Schneider, 17 Mo. 258; Matlack v. Lare, 32 Mo. 262; Fuller v. Sparks, 39 Tex. 137; Wilhelms v. Noble, 36 Ga. 599; Litchfield v. Daniels, 1 Col. 268. While in the following cases the right was denied, and it was decided that the court could not thus obtain jurisdiction: Peter v. Schlosser, 81 Pa. St. 439; Todd v. Gates, 20 W. Va. 464; Bower v. McCormick, 73 Pa. St. 427; Askew v. Askew, 49 Miss. 301; McDonald v. Dickens, 58 Ga. 77.

Where the claim upon which suit is brought is one entire transaction or account, the plaintiff cannot split up the sum due thereon so as to give a certain court jurisdiction: Milroy v. Spurr Mountain etc. Co., 43 Mich. 231; Fuller v. Sparks, 39 Tex. 137; Thompson v. Sutton, 51 Ill. 213; Lucas v. Le Compte, 42 Ill. 303; Askew v. Askew, 49 Miss. 301; Caldwell v. Beatty, 69 N. C. 365; Magruder v. Randolph, 77 N. C. 79; Ash v. Lee, 51 Miss. 101.

If a party, however, holds several distinct notes or demands against the same party, he may bring separate suits on each of such notes or demands, and if the demand sued upon is within the jurisdictional limit, separate judgments may be rendered in each of such suits, although the aggregate amount thereof exceeds the jurisdiction: Luce v. Shoff, 70 Ind. 152; Ash v. Lee, 51 Miss. 101; Wilson v. Mason, 3 Ark. 494; Collins v. Woodruff, 9 Ark. 463; Boyle v. Grant, 18 Pa. St. 162; Howard v. Mansfield, 30 Wis. 75.

Different and distinct causes of action cannot, in a few of the states, be joined in one declaration so as to make the aggregate value claimed within the jurisdiction of a particular court: Toledo etc. R'y Co. v. Tilton, 27 Ind. 71; Berry v. Linton, 1 Ark. 252; Nichols v. Hastings, 35 Conn. 546; Denison v. Denison, 16 Conn. 34. Nor can different causes of action against different parties be thus joined: Broadwell v. Smith, 28 La. Ann. 172.

The limit of a court's jurisdiction generally applies as well to the amount of defendant's set-off as to the plaintiff's demand; and if the set-off is in excess of the jurisdictional limit, it cannot be allowed: Milliken v. Gardner, 37 Pa. St. 456; Deihm v. Snell, 119 Pa. St. 316. This rule has been denied in Murphy v. Evans, 11 Ind. 517; but this case is overruled by the subsequent case of Pate v. Shafer, 19 Ind. 173; and in accordance with the general rule is Derr v. Stubbs, 83 N. C. 539.

When, upon appeal, it appears that the claim in dispute was not within the jurisdiction of the trial court, the judgment will be reversed: Collins v. Collins, 37 Pa. St. 387; McClure v. Lay, 30 Ala. 208; Butler v. Wagner, 35 Wis. 54; Cooban v. Bryant, 36 Wis. 605; Dartez v. Lege, 28 La. Ann. 640; McQuade v. O'Neil, 15 Gray, 52.

The total omission of an ad damnum clause in the writ, or laying it too small, is a fatal defect after the rendition of judgment; but until the judg. ment is rendered, the writ may be amended by inserting a proper or sufficient sum to give the court jurisdiction: McLellan v. Crofton, 6 Me. 307; Merrill v. Curtis, 57 Me. 152; Flanders v. Atkinson, 18 N. H. 167; Taylor v. Jones, 42 N. H. 25; Cragin v. Warfield, 13 Met. 215. So the amount claimed

may be reduced in the trial court, by amendment, at any time before the rendition of judgment: Converse v. Damariscotta Bank, 15 Me. 431; Hart v. Waitt, 3 Allen, 532.

An amendment of the ad damnum clause has been allowed in the trial court, by increasing it to give the right of appeal: Taylor v. Jones, 42 N. H. 25; Danielson v. Andrews, 1 Pick. 156. The sum claimed, however, cannot be amended in the appellate court so as to give the lower court jurisdiction: McQuade v. O'Neil, 15 Gray, 52; Ladd v. Kimball, 12 Gray, 139. The amount claimed in the ad damnum clause determines the right of appeal, and not an erroneous judgment in excess thereof: Hemmenway v. Hicks, 4 Pick. 497; nor the amount set out in the declaration: Chamberlain v. Cochran, 8 Pick, 522.

BELKNAP V. BALL.

[83 MICHIGAN, 583.]

LIBEL. — CRITICISM IS DISCUSSION; or as applicable in libel cases, a censure of the conduct, character, or utterances of the person criticised. LIBEL-CRITICISM OF OFFICIAL CANDIDATE. - When one becomes a candidate for public office, he thereby deliberately places his conduct, character, and utterances before the public for their discussion and consideration. They may be criticised according to the taste of the writer or speaker, and the law will protect them in so doing, provided their statements of or reference to the facts upon which their criticisms are based observe an honest regard for the truth. In such discussion the law gives a wide liberty. Within this limit public journals, public speakers, and private individuals may express opinions and indulge in criticisms upon the character or habits or mental and moral qualifications of official candidates. LIBEL FALSE STATEMENT OF UTTERANCES OF OFFICIAL CANDIDATE. — A false and malicious published statement that a candidate for public office gave utterance, either in writing or in speech, to certain language, implying his ignorance and unfitness for office, is neither privileged criticism nor expression of opinion, but is libelous. Such statement is a statement of fact, for the falsity of which the publisher is answerable. LIBEL FALSE STATEMENT OF UTTERANCES OF OFFICIAL CANDIDATE. — A false and malicious publication in a newspaper, in a coarse and blotted imitation of the handwriting of a candidate for office, purporting to be a fac-simile of the words, "I don't propose to go into debate on the tariff differences on wool, quinine, and all the things, because I ain't built that way. Charles E. Belknap." or such publication of a report of a speech made by him in which he is made to give utterance to language to the same effect, is libelous.

LIBEL.

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- CHARACTER AND REPUTATION OF CANDIDATES for public office are protected from malicious attack by the same rules as are those of private individuals. Greater latitude is allowed in the case of the former than in the latter; and beyond this the same rule applies to both. LIBEL. — PUBLICATION OF FALSEHOOD IS NEVER PRIVILEGED. No public interest can be subserved by its publication and circulation. If false statements are published in good faith, with an honest belief of their truth, damages may be reduced to a minimum. No other rule will protect the freedom of the press and the rights of individuals.

Taggart, Wolcott, and Ganson, and Butterfield and Keeney, for the appellant.

Blair, Kingsley, and Kleinhans, for the respondent.

GRANT, J. This is an action on the case for libel.

Plaintiff was a candidate for election to the office of representative in Congress. The first count in the declaration, after the usual allegations as to the character of plaintiff and his reputation among his neighbors, alleges that the defendant falsely, wickedly, and maliciously did compose, print, and publish, and cause to be composed, printed, and published, in the Daily Democrat, a daily newspaper having a large circulation in the district from which plaintiff was a candidate, and in other parts of the state, and also in the Weekly Democrat, the following libelous words:

"I don't propose to go into debate on the tariff differences on wool, quinine, and all the things, because I ain't built that way. CHARLES E. BELKNAP."

That said words were printed and published in a coarse and blotted imitation of the handwriting of the plaintiff, with certain of said words wrongly spelled and with an imitation of the genuine signature of the plaintiff below the words, thereby meaning that the plaintiff had written said words, and that they were written in the uncouth, blotted, and illy spelled form represented in the publication, and that said words as printed and published were a fac-simile of the words written and signed by the plaintiff.

The second count alleges that at a public meeting held in the city of Grand Rapids, plaintiff made a speech. The defamatory matter complained of is, that the defendant published in said paper a report of this speech, in which he said: "Mr. Belknap spoke first. He assured his neighbors that he was not there as a candidate begging for votes; . . . . that he would refrain from discussing the tariffs on wool, quinine, etc., because, as he said, he was n't built that way."

The innuendo is, that defendant meant by this language that plaintiff was too ignorant and imbecile to discuss said. question, or to express in a decent way his intention not to discuss it.

The defendant demurred, and as causes of demurrer says: 1. That the declaration does not allege that in said publication there was anything touching or affecting the moral character or integrity of the plaintiff; but that said publications

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