since become a citizen, and did he possess the other necessary qualifications to be a Delegate in Congress?

Third. Was he a polygamist at the time of his election; and, if so, is that a disqualification?

At the threshold of this case we were met with a certificate held by Mr. Campbell, the contestee, from the governor of Utah Territory. We decline to enter into a discussion of the prima facie right of Mr. Campbell to take his seat as a Delegate on this certificate, because we construe the action of the House in passing on it as a decision adverse to Mr. Campbell, and, being compelled to report on the whole case, we deem it a piece of supererogation to reopen the case of the prima facie right, being satisfied with the action of the House thereon. We dismiss that part of the case from further consideration.

The next question that meets us is a question of practice raised by the contestee; which is, that there is no competent evidence before the committee relative to the number of votes cast for Mr. Cannon at the last election, and it is therefore contended that, on the certificate issued by the governor to Mr. Campbell, he is entitled pro confesso to the seat on the final hearing.

The facts before us are as follows: A certified transcript made by the Secretary of the Territory, under the seal thereof, was filed by Mr. Cannon with the Clerk of the House of Representatives on the day of November, 1880, and was duly referred to this committee under a resolution of the House adopted on the day of December, 1881. It did not reach the committee at the same time that the other papers in the contest came into its possession; but shortly thereafter it was sent by the Clerk of the House to this committee. These certificates purport on their face to be certified transcripts of the returns made by the county canvassing boards to the secretary of the Territory, under the laws of Utah.

We therefore hold that certificates of election made by county canvassing boards to the secretary of the Territory (under the Territorial law relative to the election of other Territorial officers of the Territory-see sections 22, 23, and 38, et seq.) constitute the proper mode to be pursued in the Territories in respect to the election of Delegates; and that that mode gives effect to the law, which makes it the duty of the governor to canvass the votes, and to give a certificate to the person receiving the highest number of votes for Delegate in Congress. It has been the practice of this committee to receive all records duly authenticated by a seal, without having them first introduced before the magistrate who takes and certifies the depositions. We know of no other practice that has obtained since the foundation of the gov ernment. This class of evidence has never been held to fall within the meaning of the law passed by Congress relative to contested-election cases. The testimony there referred to is the testimony of witnesses, or the introduction of such documents as need identification or further proof before their competency is admitted; and we hold that it does not apply to records and evidence which a seal may make perfect with out further identification. If the contestee has been or is surprised at the introduction of this testimony, his proper course is to make application for a continuance, so that he may be allowed to take further testimony. Not having made such application, we presume that he does not wish to avail himself of that course in this case. McCrary seems to hold the better practice to be otherwise (section 362), but section 353 so modifies the doctrine first laid down that it is not in conflict with the view the committee take.

We therefore find that the evidence establishes that Mr. Cannon received 18,568 votes; that Mr. Campbell received 1,357 votes; and that there were scattering 8 votes. Mr. Cannon, therefore, received a majority of all the votes cast at the November election of 1880, and is duly elected a Delegate from the Territory of Utah, unless he is disqualified from holding a seat for one or more of the reasons alleged in the answer of the contestee.

CITIZENSHIP.

We next examine the question as to citizenship. The following are the statutory provisions relative to the naturalization of aliens :

Any alien, being a free white person, may be admitted to become a citizen of the United States, or any of them, on the following conditions, and not otherwise:

First. That he shall have declared, on oath or affirmation, before the supreme, superior, district, or circuit court of some one of the States, or of the Territorial districts of the United States, or a circuit or district court of the United States, three years at least before his admission, that it was, bona fide, his intention to become a citizen of the United States, and to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty whatever, and particularly, by name, the prince, potentate, state or sovereignty whereof such alien may, at the time, be a citizen or subject.

Secondly. That he shall, at the time of his application to be admitted, declare on oath or affirmation, before some one of the courts aforesaid, that he will support the Constitution of the United States, and that he doth absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to every foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty whatever, and particularly, by name, the prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty whereof he was before a citizen or subject; which proceedings shall be recorded by the clerk of the court.

Thirdly. That the court, admitting such alien, shall be satisfied that he has resided within the United States five years at least, and within the State or Territory, where such court is at the time held, one year at least; and it shall further appear to their satisfaction, that during that time he has behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same; provided that the oath of the applicant shall, in no case, be allowed to prove his residence. (2 Stat., 153.)

Any alien, being a free white person and a minor, under the age of twenty-one years, who shall have resided in the United States three years next preceding his arriving at the age of twenty-one years, and who shall have continued to reside therein to the time he may make application to be admitted a citizen thereof, may, after he arrives at the age of twenty-one years, and after he shall have resided five years within the United States, including the three years of his minority, be admitted a citizen of the United States, without having made the declaration required in the first condition of the first section of the act to which this is in addition, three years previous to his admission; provided such alien shall make the declaration required therein at the time of his or her admission; and shall further declare, on oath, and prove to the satisfaction of the court, that for three years next preceding, it has been the bona fide intention of such alien to become a citizen of the United States; and shall, in all other respects, comply with the laws in regard to naturalization.

Mr. Cannon presented to the committee, and it is also in evidence, the following certificate of naturalization:

United States first district court for the Territory of Utah.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Territory of Utah, Great Salt Lake County, 88:

Be it remembered, that on the seventh day of December, A. D. 1854, George Q. Cannon, a subject of Queen Victoria, made application and satisfied the court that he came to reside in the United States before he was eighteen years of age; and thereupon the said George Q. Cannon appeared in open court and was sworn in due form of law, and on his oath did say, that for three years last past it has been his bona fide intention to become a citizen of the United States; and to renounce and abjure, forever, all allegiance and fidelity to every foreign prince, potentate, state, and sovereignty whatever. And thereupon, the court being satisfied by the oaths of Joseph Cain and Elias Smith, two citizens of the United States, that the said George Q. Cannon for one year last

past has resided in this Territory, and for four years previous thereto, he resided in the United States; that during that time he has behaved as a man of good moral character; that he is attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order of the inhabitants thereof, admitted him to be a citizen of the same. And thereupon the said George Q. Cannon was in due form of law sworn to support the Constitution of the United States, and absolutely and entirely to renounce and abjure, forever, all allegiance and fidelity to every foreign prince, potentate, state, and sovereignty whatever, and particularly to Victoria, Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, whose subject he heretofore has been.

In testimony whereof I have hereunto subscribed my name and affixed the seal of said court this seventh day of December, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-four and of the Independence of the United States the seventy-ninth.

[L. S.]

W. I. APPLEBY, Clerk.

It will be observed that this certificate is in due form, purports to be issued out of a court of competent jurisdiction, and is duly signed and sealed. On its face it is a transcript of a record of a court of competent jurisdiction; and, if nothing be shown to overcome its efficacy, it must be taken like all other records of judicial proceedings as absolute verity. It is attempted to be overcome by the contestee in two ways: First, by showing that there was in fact no record of such proceedings in the court out of which it purports to be issued; and, second, that Mr. Cannon had not been a resident of any of the States or Territories of the United States for five years next preceding the date on which it shows him to have been naturalized. As to the first point (that there was no record), several witnesses were examined who now have the custody of records of the court held at that time, and a summary of the testimony may be given as follows:

A book was presented before the notary public who took the depo sitions in this case, and was identified as one of the records of the court of Utah in 1854. It was then the first district court of the Territory of Utah. Subsequently it became the third district court. On the fly-leaf of this book were written the following words: "Records of declarations of intention to become a citizen of the United States. Also, of citizenship in the supreme and first judicial courts of the United States in and for the Territory of Utah, Great Salt Lake City. W. I. Appleby, clerk. September 20, 1851." On the outside of this book was printed in a large character the letter A. It has always remained in possession of the proper officers of that court, and is now in the possession of the supreme court of said Territory as one of its records. Many hundred naturalization papers (including that of the contestant, Mr. Cannon) were made from this book and are now scattered throughout the Territory. It appears to have been printed in double columns, so that the outer portion of its page might be separated from its inner portion, leaving the record on the inner portion or stub. The outer portion was torn off and given to the person naturalized. This was sealed with the seal of the court. There was thus left on the stub an exact record of what was done by the court, and certificate or transcript was given to the person naturalized.

It is objected that this was not signed by the judge, and was there. fore not a proper record of the court, and that the naturalization papers thus issued are void. We cannot agree to that proposition. In some of the States of the Union the signing of the record by a judge is made mandatory, in others it is made directory only, and in others still it is not required at all. At common law no judgment-roll was required to be signed by the presiding judge. Hence it is purely a statutory provision. We are inclined to the opinion that the law is not mandatory, as applied H. Mis. 35-39

to the Territory of Utah, requiring the judge to sign the record. But however this may be, we are inclined to hold that this was a sufficient naturalization under the laws of the United States, especially where it is affirmatively shown by Mr. Cannon that the proceedings in court were regular in form; that witnesses were duly sworn who testified to necessary facts, and that judgment was orally pronounced by the court from the bench. It is the judgment of the court which makes its action efficacious, and not the accuracy with which the clerk writes it down. (Stephen Pl., 138; Whitney rs. Townsend, 67 N. Y., 40; Rollins vs. Henry, 78 N. C., 342; Van Vleit vs. Philips, 5 Iowa, 558; Childs r8. McChesny, 20 Iowa, 431; Jorgenson vs. Griffin, 14 Minn., 464.

Our attention has been called to the decision of Judge Hunter, of Utah Territory, in a proceeding involving the question here presented. We have no disposition to comment on this opinion. We deny, however, that it goes to the length claimed for it by the contestee. On this point, therefore, we hold that the certificate is valid and binding, and that Mr. Cannon, for the purpose of this contest (so far as that point is involved), is a naturalized citizen.

The other point made, that Mr. Cannon had not been a resident of any State or Territory of the United States for five years next preceding the date of naturalization, involves quite a novel question. We hold, however, on this point, that the record cannot be collaterally questioned, and that therefore it is incompetent to show by evidence in this proceeding that the certificate is null. (Pruit vs. Cummings, 16 Wend., 616; State vs. Penny, 10 Ark., 616; McCarthy rs. Marsh, 1 Seld., 263; In re Colman, 15 Blatchf., 406; Spratt vs. Spratt, 4 Pet., 393.

A statement of the facts, however, may not be out of place: It appears that Mr. Cannon came to the United States from Great Britain and settled at Nauvoo, in the State of Illinois, in the year 1842. He left that town when the colony known as the Mormon colony was driven out of Illinois by the State authorities. He started with them across the "desert," and in 1847 arrived at the place now known as Salt Lake City, in the Territory of Utah. It was then a Territory owned by the Government of Mexico, which was by treaty, on July 4, 1848, ceded to the United States. He staid in that locality a short time, hav ing bought a town lot and engaged himself to be married to Miss Hoagland. He then left for California, where he staid a year engaged in goldmining. He then went to the Hawaiian Islands with several other persons, as a missionary for his church. He remained there until September or Octobor, 1854, when he returned to Salt Lake City and married Miss Hoagland, and he has ever since resided in that Territory. On these facts the contestee stoutly claims that the court had no authority to issue the naturalization paper held by Mr. Cannon. But, as we have already said, it is unnecessary to go into an analysis of those facts, as we hold that the records of the court cannot be attacked collaterally. It requires a direct proceeding to set aside the record which Mr. Cannon now has. We therefore hold that Mr. Cannon is a naturalized citizen of the United States, and that he is not disqualified, on the ground of alienage, from holding his seat as Delegate.

POLYGAMY.

The next inquiry which presents itself is that of polygamy. On the oral argument of this case before the committee the following admission (as it appears in the printed Record at page 60) was referred to, and was, as the committee then understood, and now understands, admitted

to have been made by Mr. Cannon in this contest as an admission of fact for the purpose of saving the time and expense of taking further proof on that point. It was at least not denied by Mr. Cannon or his counsel, and this was affirmed by the contestee in the oral argument. The admission is as follows:

In the matter of George Q. Cannon. Contest of Allen G. Campbell's right to a seat in the House of Representatives of the Forty-seventh Congress of the United States as Delegate from the Territory of Utah.

I, George Q. Cannon, contestant, protesting that the matter in this paper contained is not relevant to the issue, do admit that I am a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, commonly called Mormons; that, in accordance with the tenets of said church, I have taken plural wives, who now live with me, and have so lived with me for a number of years and borne me children. I also admit that in my public addresses as a teacher of my religion in Utah Territory I have defended said tenet of said church as being in my belief a revelation from God.

GEORGE Q. CANNON.

We are now brought face to face with the question whether this House will admit to a seat a Delegate who practices and teaches the doctrine of a plurality of wives, in open violation of the statute of the United States and contrary to the judgment of the civilized world. There are several clauses in our Constitution which may have some bearing on this subject.

Section 2, Article I, of the Constitution is as follows:

The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States, &c.

SECTION 5.

Each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members; and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do business. *

CLAUSE 2.

*

*

Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with a concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member.

ARTICLE I, SECTION 1.

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.

ARTICLE IV, SECTION 3, CLAUSE 2.

The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States.

These are the provisions of the Constitution which may be held to have some bearing on the question of the qualifications of Delegates. In the first place, is a Delegate from a Territory a member of the House of Representatives within the meaning of the Constitution? The second section of the 1st article says: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States; and the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors in the most numerous branch in the State legislature." There is no provision in the Constitution for the election of Delegates to the House of Representatives or to the Senate. They are entirely the creature of statute. They are clearly not within the clause of the Constitution last above quoted, for the House is "composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States;" and nothing is said of the Territories. Delegates have never been re