therefor. Therefore one in the course of whose business a libel is published by his agent may be joined with an agent in an action for the publication": Cooley on Torts, 194.

There was testimony in the case sufficient to be submitted to the jury upon the question whether Minchener published, or caused to be published, the publication alleged to be libelous, and the court erred in taking the case from them.

The judgment must be reversed, and a new trial granted.

LIBEL-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS-COMMERCIAL AGENCIES. — General publications purporting to disclose the business standing of men, and which are circulated among all the patrons of the publisher, are not privileged communications; but a commercial agency may impart such information to any particular patron who has a particular interest in the affairs of the person whose business standing is given: Note to McAllister v. Detroit Free Press Co., 15 Am. St. Rep. 348, 349; Lowry v. Vedder, 40 Minn. 475; Bradstreet Co. v. Gill, 72 Tex. 115; 13 Am. St. Rep. 768.

PEOPLE V. GORDON.

(81 MICHIGAN, 306.]

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ORDINANCE REGULATING REMOVAL OF GARBAGE. - Under a statute authorizing a city council to provide by ordinance for the manner of removal of garbage from a city, and to impose and enforce appropriate penalties, an ordinance requiring the garbage to be removed through and out of the city in closed, water-tight carts or wagons, marked "Garbage," is reasonable and valid.

Edwin F. Conely, for the appellant.

John W. McGrath, Charles W. Casgrain, and Charles S. MoDonald, for the people.

MORSE, J. The defendant was convicted, under an ordinance of the city of Detroit, for "unlawfully and willfully engaging in collecting and removing, in an open wagon, of garbage within the city of Detroit, . . . . not being authorized so to do by permit from the health-officer of the city."

It is contended in his behalf that this conviction is illegal and unwarranted, because the ordinance is unreasonable, partial, and unequal in its operation, and was adopted for the purpose of creating, and does create, a monopoly. The ordinance is as follows:

"Sec. 1. It is hereby made the duty of the occupant or occupants of every dwelling-house or other building in the city of Detroit to provide a suitable and water-tight box or other vessel, of a convenient size to be handled by the garbage col

lector, in which said occupant or occupants shall cause to be placed or deposited all offal, garbage, and refuse, animal and vegetable matter, of the premises. Such occupants shall keep such box or other vessel at a place on the premises most accessible to the person collecting the garbage and offal, and it shall be unlawful to put any but refuse animal and vegetable matter in the vessel used for garbage and offal.

"Sec. 2. All garbage and offal shall be collected in watertight, closed carts; and each cart shall be purified as often as the health-officer may direct, and shall have painted thereon the word 'Garbage.'

"Sec. 3. No person shall engage or assist in collecting, removing, or disposing of garbage or offal within the city of Detroit except as provided in this ordinance, and also so authorized by a permit from the health-officer of the city; and it shall be unlawful for any person to interfere in any manner with the collection or disposal of garbage and offal by the person or persons authorized to do so.

"Sec. 4. It shall be the duty of any person contracting with the city for the collection or disposal of garbage to comply with the ordinances of the city, and also with such order and regulations as may be made by the board of health. Such contractor shall remove and dispose of all dead animals found within the city limits.

"Sec. 5. No person except the city contractor or his agents shall carry, convey, or transport any garbage through the streets, alleys, or public places of the city, except upon permission of the board of health; and that the common council have power, from time to time, to designate the hours during which the collection of garbage may be conducted."

Section 6 subjects offenders to punishment by fine not exceeding twenty-five dollars, or by imprisonment in the Detroit house of correction not to exceed ten days.

The charter of the city of Detroit as amended by the Local Acts of 1889 (at page 819) empowers the common council to enact and provide, by appropriate ordinance, for the manner of collecting, transporting, conveying, and handling of garbage, and all animal and vegetable matter and refuse, in said city, and to require all persons in said city to dispose of the same in the manner provided by said common council in said ordinance for the removal and destruction thereof, and to impose and enforce appropriate penalties for any violation of said ordinance.

It is stated in the brief of respondent that this amendment was procured by a prominent citizen and ex-official of Detroit for purposes of his own private gain, and that he is now the contractor with the city for the removal of the garbage of the city, and that he has a practical monopoly of the business, out of which there is likely to come a fortune at the expense of many people who have hitherto made respectable and honest livings in the same business. Of this, however, the record gives us no hint. It is stated in the brief of the city counselor that the city has entered into a contract for the removal of this garbage and refuse matter at an expense of thirty-five thousand dollars annually. But we must look at Gordon's case as it is stated in the record, and from the record it appears that he was properly and legally convicted. We do not propose to inquire into what would be the rights of the owner of the refuse matter, or any other persons, attempting to remove offal and garbage from the premises of the owner to a place outside of the city, if such owner or other person was doing so in a wagon or vehicle in conformity with the provisions of the ordinance. That question is not involved here, and it will be soon enough to discuss it when a proper case comes before us.

The evidence shows that Gordon was taking swill from the Griswold House in a light wagon, with a tight box, but uncovered, through the streets of the city, to his farm, outside the city limits. When he was in the rear of the Griswold House, a policeman saw him, and told him it was unlawful for him to remove it in that manner, and that he should make complaint against him if he took it away, but would not if he did not take it away. Gordon replied that he had bought the stuff, and wanted to feed it to his hogs, and he should take it away, and did so. Gordon testified that he was a farmer, and his business was raising hogs; that he had contracted with the proprietor of the Griswold House for the swill of the house at six dollars per month, Gordon to take it away; that he did not know that he was violating any ordinance of the city until that day when he was notified by the policeman, the day mentioned in the warrant. The same day he went to the health-officer, Dr. Duffield, for a permit, but it was refused him.

-

We think it competent for the common council to prescribe, reasonably, the manner of removing garbage and offal through and out of the city, and that the requirement that such refuse

shall be removed in water-tight, closed carts or wagons, and that the same shall be marked "Garbage," is a reasonable regulation. Gordon did not come within this regulation, and was guilty of violating the ordinance. Had he been provided with a wagon that substantially complied with section 2 of the ordinance, and had he been refused a permit by the health-officer for no other reason than that he was not the city contractor, or an agent or employee of such contractor, the interesting questions so ably discussed by counsel relative to the authority of cities to virtually grant a monopoly of garbage collection and removal, or to do the whole business through their officials or contractors, would have been legitimately before us for determination. As the case stands, we decline to consider the validity of this ordinance any further than is rendered necessary by the facts in the case. In so far as Gordon transgressed it, it must be sustained. That the vehicle of transportation of this filth should be water-tight, closed, and marked so that it will be known is, in our opinion, not only a reasonable regulation, but a judicious one, as affecting the public health.

The conviction is affirmed.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ORDINANCES. - Municipal ordinances must be reasonable, to be valid: Village of Carthage v. Frederick, 122 N. Y. 268; 19 Am. St. Rep. 490; People v. Armstrong, 73 Mich. 288; 16 Am. St. Rep. 578, and note.

EDWARDS V. LAKE SHORE AND MICHIGAN SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY.

181 MICHIGAN, 364.]

CARRIER OF PASSENGERS-COMPLIANCE WITH CONDITION OF EXCURSION TICKET NECESSARY TO RIGHT TO TRANSPORTATION. — A round-trip excursion ticket, sold by a railroad at less than the regular rate from one place to another, and conditioned that to be good for return passage it must be signed by the purchaser and stamped and dated by the ticket agent at the latter place, is reasonable and valid. The purchaser of such ticket is not entitled to return passage thereon until he has complied with the conditions named therein; and for a failure to so comply, he may be lawfully expelled from the train, without unneces sary force, upon a refusal to pay his fare, without an investigation on the part of the conductor to whom the ticket is presented as to his identity.

Cahill and Ostrander, for the appellant.

R. A. Montgomery, George C. Greene, O. G. Getzen-Danner, and C. E. Weaver, for the respondent.

CHAMPLIN, C. J. On September 13, 1887, Daniel Edwards purchased a ticket from defendant entitling him to transportation from Lansing to Chicago, Illinois, and return. The ticket was called the "Chicago Interstate Exposition Excursion Ticket," and was sold to Edwards at a reduced rate from that of regular passenger-tickets. It was good for going only on date of sale, and returning only to and including Monday immediately following the date of sale. It entitled the purchaser to one first-class continuous passage to Chicago, Illinois, and return, subject to the following conditions, printed upon the face of the ticket, viz.: "In consideration of the reduced rate at which this ticket is sold, it will be good for going passage only on date of sale. It is good for return passage only up to and including Monday following the date of sale, and when stamped and dated on back by ticket agent of Lake Shore and Michigan Southern railway at Chicago, and signed by me. The holder will identify himself or herself as the original purchaser of this ticket by writing his or her name, or by other means, if necessary, when required by conductor or agent. No stop-over allowed. Not transferable."

Beneath the above conditions upon the ticket are the words: "I agree to the above conditions," which was signed, by D. Edwards, purchaser, in his own handwriting. The face of the ticket contained a description of the passenger, indicated by punch-marks made by the ticket agent at Lansing opposite the characteristics printed thereon, which described Mr. Edwards as a slim, middle-aged man, with dark eyes and hair. On the back of the ticket there is printed the following:

"In compliance with my contract with the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company, I hereby subscribe my name as the original purchaser of this ticket.

1887."

"Dated Chicago, Illinois, And there is a blank line for the signature. There are also printed directions to the agents at Lansing and Chicago to stamp in the space below. There were three coupons attached to the ticket, one for a passage to Chicago, one for admittance to the exposition, and one for passage from Chicago to Lansing, "limited as per contract."

Edwards took passage to Chicago on September 13, 1887, and made one continuous trip. On Saturday, September 17th, he went to the depot of the Lake Shore and Michigan South