1827. BENNETT V. EDWARDS. refusing. Holroyd, J. If the plaintiff had gone to the vestry, he would have been no nearer seeing the rate, because it was in the defendant's house]. The defendant was an assistant overseer, appointed under the 58 Geo. 3, c. 69, and 59 Geo. 3, c. 85, by which the custody of the rates is taken from the overseers, and given to the select vestry. [Littledale, J. But here the defendant, in fact, had the custody of the rate; it was in his own house; and there was no proof that the vestry had ordered him not to shew it there]. Then, secondly, this action, being founded upon one act of Parliament, is not maintainable against the defendant, who is an assistant overseer, appointed under a different act of Parliament. At least, the plaintiff has not gone far enough with his proof, for he has not shewn that an assistant overseer is a person within the description in the 17 Geo. II., c. 3, whose duty it is to give inspection of the rates. The modern statutes under which the defendant was appointed, empower the vestry to determine, and to specify what duties the assistant overseer shall perform. The plaintiff, who was referred to the vestry by the defendant, should have applied to them, and have ascertained the nature and extent of the defendant's duties. The defendant had given bond to the vestry for the due discharge of his duties; he was bound to obey the directions of the vestry: and having acted bona fide in obedience to their orders, he is not liable to this action. The plaintiff's only remedy is against the officers named in the 17 Geo. II., c. 3, which does not name assistant overseers, nor indeed could, because there were, , at the date of that act, no such officers in existence; and even if an assistant overseer could be deemed to come within the description of "other person or persons authorized to take care of the poor," which he cannot, still the defendant is not so described in the declaration, and is therefore not brought within the operation of that act. Campbell and Phillpotts, contrà. First, the plaintiff was a party aggrieved within the meaning of the 17 Geo. 2, c. 3. Spenceley v. Robinson (a), was a very different case from the present, and is by no means decisive of it on this point. There was no pretence for bringing that action. The refusal there, which was made, once only and in a qualified manner, was taken the most hasty and unfair advantage of; and the real ground upon which the Court seem to have decided in favour of the defendant, was, that the plaintiff, did not make his demand at a reasonable time and place. The observations of the learned Judges, therefore, which have been cited on the other side, are inapplicable to this case, though one of them, namely, that respecting the power of appeal, seems capable of an answer. The notice of an appeal against a rate, must specify the particular grounds of appeal (b); but unless a party obtains an inspection of the rate, it is impossible for him to ascertain whether he has grounds of appeal against it or not; the mere refusal, therefore, is a grievance, because it deprives him of the means necessary for the exercise of his right of appeal. Secondly, the defendant is within the descriptive words of the 17 Geo. 2, c. 3, and liable to this action. The words are, "" overseers, or other persons authorized to take care of the poor." Now, though the defendant is an assistant overseer, he is, nevertheless, an overseer, and a person appearing and acting in that character; but even if he were not, at least he is a person authorized to take care of the poor: and, in either view of the case, he is within the provisions of the statute. He may be for some purposes subject to the control of the vestry, but still, as between the parish officers and the parishioners at large, he clearly stands in the situation of an overseer. If he is not liable to this action, this injustice will follow-that the plaintiff has no remedy at all; for it would be difficult to say that any other per 1827. BENNETT v. EDWARDS. 1827. BENNETT › son is in default, the defendant being the person who had possession of the rate, and, in fact, refused to exhibit it. BAYLEY, J. Upon the first point in this case, we none of us entertain any doubt. We are all clearly of opinion, that the plaintiff is a party aggrieved within the meaning of the act of Parliament, inasmuch as the defendant's denial of his right to inspect the rate was a grievance in itself. We also consider the defendant's refusal quite absolute enough to constitute such a denial; because, as he had by law no right to impose the terms which he attempted to impose upon the plaintiff, those terms cannot operate as any qualification of his refusal. Upon the second point, which raises a somewhat novel and considerably important question, we shall take time for deliberation. 1 BAYLEY, J., who, after shortly recapitulating the facts of the case, and the nature of the question, thus proceeded :-If we could have seen clearly and satisfactorily that the defendant was such an assistant overseer, that it was a part of his duty to afford inspection, and deliver copies of the rates, upon demand, we should all have been of opinion that he was liable in this action, and that the verdict ought to be entered for the plaintiff But the statutes which authorize the appointment of assistant overseers, do not specify their particular duties; they merely declare that they shall have such powers as the select vestries shall confer upon them at the time of their appointment. For all that appeared in this case, it was possible, either that the defendant had all the powers, and was liable to all the duties of an overseer, or that he had only limited powers, and was liable to certam speci fied duties only. There was no evidence to shew what were his powers, or what were his duties, as an assistant overseer, or that the refusal to allow an inspection of a rate, for the neglect of which the action was brought, was one of those duties. We are, therefore, of opinion, that we ought not to direct a verdict to be entered for the plaintiff, but that we ought to send the case to a new trial. 1827. BENNETT บ. EDWARDS. HUDSON V. RICHARD SMITH, Gent., one, &c. To debt on tioned to re- dends "which the date of the bond," DEBT six pleas, setting out stock-jobbing transactions, upon months' notice, the three months' notice to re- stock, with which would have become due for the date of the bond. Replication alleged, that more than three months before action, 1827. HUDSON v. SMITH. which issues were taken. Seventh plea, Onerari non; because he saith that plaintiff did not give to said John Smith three months' notice in writing, to transfer to, and replace in, the name of plaintiff, in the books of said Governor and Company, the said sum of 9007. three per cent. Reduced Annuities, with the dividends, which would have accrued upon the same from the date of the said supposed writing obligatory, but wholly neglected and refused so to do. (Conclusion as before). 8th pleaNo notice from the plaintiff to the said John Smith to transfer and replace the sum of 900l. three per cent. Reduced Annuities, or to pay him the dividends, &c. 9th plea―That plaintiff did not give to John Smith such notice as is in the said condition of said supposed writing obligatory in that behalf mentioned, but wholly neglected and omitted so to do. 10th plea-That plaintiff did not give such notice as in the said condition of said supposed writing obligatory is in that behalf mentioned, but wholly neglected, and omitted so to do. Replication to 7th plea, precludi non, because he says, that after the making of the said writing obligatory, and more than three months before the commencement of this suit, to wit, on the 30th day of June, 1826, at, &c., plaintiff did give to said John Smith a certain notice, in writing, bearing date, &c.; and did thereby require said John Smith, at the expiration of three months from the date of said notice, to transfer to, and replace in, the name of plaintiff, in the said books, &c., the said sum of 9007. three per cent. Reduced Annuities, with all the dividends which had accrued due on the same from the 5th day of November, 1818, being the day of the date of the said writing obligatory. Nevertheless, plaintiff, for assigning a breach of the said condition of the said writing obligatory, according to the form of the statute in such case made and provided (a), saith, that although three months, from the time of giving said notice to the said John (a) 8&9 Will. III. cap. 11, sec. 8, which directs, that if after judgment any further breaches are committed, the plaintiff may sue out a sci. fa. |