Art. 1. Sect. 6.

Exclusion from

Art. 1. Sect. 7.

Revenue bills. Ibid.

Manner of passing

Ibid.

26. The congress shall have power,

Art. 1. Sect. 8.

Loans.

actually going to, or returning therefrom. Lewis v. Elmendorf, 2 Johns. Cas. 222. See Colvin v. Morgan, 1 Ibid. 415. Corey v. Russell, 4 Wend. 204. Respublica v. Duane, 4 Yeates 347. But one who goes to Washington, duly commissioned to represent a state in congress, is privileged from arrest, eundo, morando et redeundo, and though it be subsequently decided by congress that he is not entitled to a seat there, he is protected, until he reaches home, if he return as soon as possible after such decision. Dunton v. Halstead, 2 Clark 450. See Hoppin v. Jenckes, 8 R. I. 453.

(i) The acceptance by a member of any office under the United States, after he has been elected to, and taken his seat in, congress, operates as a forfeiture of his seat. Van Ness's Case, 1 Cong. Elect. Cas. 122. So does the acceptance of a military commission in a volunteer regiment mustered into the service of the United States. Yell's Case, 2 Cong. Elect. Cas. 93. Byington v. Vandever, Ibid. 395.

(k) Continuing to execute the duties of an office under the United States, after one is elected to congress, but before he takes his seat, is not a disqualification; such office being resigned prior to the taking of the seat. Hammond v. Herrick, 1 Cong. Elect. Cas. 287. Earle's Case, Ibid. 314. Mumford's Case, Ibid. 316.

(1) Every bill takes effect as a law, from the time when it is approved by the president, and then its effect is prospective and not retrospective. The doctrine that, in law, there is no fraction of a day, is a mere legal fiction, and has no application in such a case. Matter of Richardson, 2 Story 571. People v. Campbell, 1 Cal. 400. But this is denied to be law. Matter of Welman, 20 Vt. 653. Matter of Howes, 21 Ibid. 619.

(m) On the 7th July 1856, the senate of the United States decided, by a vote of thirty-four to seven, that two-thirds of a quorum only were requisite to pass a bill over the president's veto, and not twothirds of the whole senate. 9 Law Rep. 196. In the ratification of treaties, it is expressly provided, that two-thirds of the senators present shall concur. And see Cushing's Law of Legislative Assemblies, § 2387. 9 Opin. 410.

(n) A joint resolution, approved by the president,

or duly passed without his approval, has all the effect of law. But separate resolutions of either house of congress, except in matters appertaining to their own parliamentary rights, have no legal effect to constrain the action of the president or of the heads of departments. 6 Opin. 680.

(0) The power to levy and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, is coextensive with the territory of the United States. Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317. And see Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616.

(p) Congress is not empowered to tax for those purposes which are within the exclusive province of the states. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 199. A tax for a private purpose is unconstitutional; a public use or purpose is essential to the idea of tax. Whiting v. Sheboygan Railway Co., 25 Wis. 167.

(q) The states have no power to tax the loans of the United States. Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 465. People v. Commissioners of Taxes, 2 Bl. 620. Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall. 200. Carroll v. Perry, 4 McLean 26. Nor an officer of the United States for his office or emoluments. Dobbins v. Erie County, 16 Pet. 435. See Melcher v. City of Boston, 9 Law Rep. 110. But congress has no power to exempt property from taxation, unless it be made so by the constitution. People v. Hoffman, 37 N. Y. 9. As to taxation of ferry companies between states, see Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Penn., 114 U. S. 196.

(r) The power of congress to regulate commerce is exclusive, at least, in all cases where the subjects over which it is exercised are, in their nature, national, or admit of one uniform system or plan of regulation. Kaeiser v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., McCreary 496; and for that purpose it reaches the interior of every state of the Union. Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434. This power, like all others vested in congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the constitution. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 196. Pacific Coast Steamship Co. v. Commissioners, 9 Sawy. 253. Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, can mean nothing more than intercourse with those nations, and among those states, for the purposes of trade, be the object of the trade what it may; and

Art. 1. Sect. 8. Naturalization. Bankruptcy.

This

this intercourse must include all the means by which it can be carried on, whether by the free navigation of the waters of the several states, or by a passage over-land through the states, where such passage becomes necessary to the commercial intercourse between the states. Corfield v. Coryell, 4 W. C. C. 378. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421. Columbus Ins. Co. v. Peoria Bridge Co., 6 McLean 70. Columbus Ins. Co. v. Curtenius, Ibid. 209. Jolly v. Terre Haute Draw-Bridge Co., Ibid. 237. United States v. Railroad Bridge Co., Ibid. 518. Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35. Clinton Bridge, 10 Wall. 454; s. c. 16 Am. L. R. 149. See Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Commonwealth, 3 Grant 128. clause confers the power to impose embargoes. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 191. The William, 2 Hall. L. J. 255, 272. To punish crimes upon stranded vessels. United States v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 72. And to prohibit the slave trade. United States v. Butes, Pamph. 129. It does not, however, interfere with the right of the several states to enact inspection, quarantine and health laws of every description, as well as laws for regulating their internal commerce. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 203. New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102. Commissioners of Pilotage v. Steamboats, 28 Ala. 185. Shuster v. Ash, 11 S. & R. 92. Biddle v. Commonwealth, 13 Ibid. 405. Nor with their power to regulate pilots. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299. Ex parte McNeil, 13 Wall. 236. Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U. S. 572. The Clymene, 9 Fed. Rep. 164; s. c. 12 Ibid. 346. The Charles A. Sparks, 16 Ibid. 480. The Alzena, 13 W. N. C. 63. Nor to protect their fisheries. Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71. McCready v. Virginia, 94. U. S. 391. Dunham v. Lamphere, 3 Gray 268.

(s) A state law which requires the masters of vessels engaged in foreign commerce to pay a certain sum to a state officer, on account of every passenger brought from a foreign country into the state, or before landing any alien passenger in the state, conflicts with the constitution and laws of the United States. Smith v. Turner, 7 How. 283. And see Steamship Co. v. Portwardens, 6 Wall. 31. Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 259. Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, 107 Ibid. 59. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 Ibid. 275. Edye v. Robertson, 112 U. S. 580. People v. Pacific Mail Steamship Company, 6 Sawyer, 640. So does a state law authorizing the seizure and imprisonment of free negroes brought into any port of the state on board of any vessel from any other state or foreign port. Elkison v. Delliesseline, 2 Wh. Cr. Cas. 56. The Cynosure, 1 Spr. 88. The William Jarvis, Ibid. 485. 1 Opin. 659. And so does a state law which requires an importer to take a license and pay $50, before he should be permitted to sell a package of imported goods. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419. Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566. Biddle v. Commonwealth, 13 S. & R. 405. But a state law imposing a tax on brokers dealing in foreign exchange is not repugnant to this clause of the constitution. Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. 73. Nor is one imposing a tax on legacies payable to aliens. Mager v. Grima, 8 How. 490. Nor are the license laws of certain states, forbidding the sale of spirituous liquors, under less than certain large quantities. Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 5 How. 504. State v. Almond, 2 Houst. 612. See California v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46-7. Nor a law imposing a license tax upon all drummers or travelling agents. Ex parte Rudolph, 6 Sawyer 295. Machine Co. v. Gage, 100 U. S. 676. Otherwise, if it discriminate against non-residents. Ex parte Watson, 15 Fed. Rep. 511. Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275. S. P. Guy v. Baltimore, 100 Ibid. 434; 116 Ibid. 446.

See

(t) The non-exercise by congress of its power to regulate commerce among the several states, is equivalent to a declaration that it shall be free from any restrictions. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275. Congress have power to prevent the obstruction of any navigable river, which is a means of commerce between any two or more states. Works v. Junction Railroad, 5 McLean 426. Jolly v. Terre Haute DrawBridge Co., 6 Ibid. 237. Devoe v. Penrose Ferry Bridge Co., 3 Am. L. R. 79. Woodman v. Kilbourn Manufacturing Co., 1 Biss. 546. But a court of the

United States has no power to restrain, by injunction, the erection of a bridge over a navigable river, lying wholly within the limits of a particular state, when such erection is authorized by the legislature of the state; though a port of entry has been created by congress above the bridge. Milnor v. New Jersey Railroad Co., 6 Am. L. R. 6. And see Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713. Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 459. Woodman v. Kilbourn Man. Co., 1 Biss. 546. A state law granting the exclusive privilege of navigating a part of an unnavigable stream, which is wholly within the state, on condition of rendering such part navigable, is not repugnant to the constitu tion. Veazie v. Moore, 14 How. 568. And see Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 251. But a state law that imposes additional restrictions on vessels licensed for the coasting trade is unconstitutional and void. Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227. Foster v. Davenport, Ibid. 245. So is a state law imposing a special tax on railroad companies for every passenger carried through the state, by the ordinary modes of travel. Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35. Minot v. Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad Co., 2 Abb. U. S. 323; s. c. 7 Phila. 555. Clarke v. Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad Co., 4 Houst. 158. This clause does not confer on congress the right to establish and regulate ferries over rivers which are the boundaries of two or more states. Conway v. Taylor's Executors, 1 Bl. 604. Congress may legalize a bridge over a navigable river, which would otherwise be a public nuisance, by declaring that it shall be a lawful structure, and be recognized and known as a post-route. Clinton Bridge, 10 Wall. 454. Miller v. New York, 109 U. S. 384. The office license tax imposed under the act 7th June 1879, upon a foreign railroad corporation engaged in interstate commerce, is in violation of this section. Railroad Co. v. Comm'th, 26 W. N. C. 189; the act 4th June 1883, forbidding discriminations by common carriers, is unconstitutional so far as it undertakes to regulate interstate commerce. Wigton v. Railroad Co., 8 C. C. 191. The right to import liquor into a state and sell it therein in its original packages cannot be interfered with by prohibitory or license laws. Leisy v. Hardin, 38 P. L. J. 35; see notes in 26 W. N. C. 205, 289; whether a barrel of beer or whiskey in pint bottles can be sold in single bottles as original packages was not decided. Comm'th v. Zelt, 27 W. N. C. 131; Comm'th v. Smihart, Ibid. 135; Comm'th v. Pendergast, Ibid. 135. The act 21st May 1885, prohibiting the sale of oleomargarine, does not apply to a person who has received it from another state and sold it in its original package. Comm'th v. Paul, 48 L. 1, 4; the Virginia state flour inspection law was declared unconstitutional in Voight v. Wright, 141 U. S. 62. The act 8th April 1861, prohibiting the buying of produce in Berks and Franklin counties without a license, with intent to send the same for sale to outside markets, is valid as respects the purchase of goods for sale within this state. Rothermel v. Meyerle, 26 W. N. C. 422.

(u) Under the power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, congress have power to prohibit all intercourse with them, except under a license. United States v. Cisna, 1 McLean 254. See People v. Dibble, 21 How. 366.

(e) The power to pass naturalization laws would seem to be exclusively in congress. Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 268. United States v. Villato, 2 Dall. 372. Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 5 How. 585. Smith v. Turner, 7 Ibid. 556. Golden v. Prince, 3 W. C. C. 314. A bankrupt, revenue or naturalization law, which, by its terms, is made applicable alike to all the states, without distinction or discrimination, is not unconstitutional, merely because its operations may be wholly different in one state from another. Darling v. Berry, 13 Fed. Rep. 659.

(w) See Mitchell v. Great Works Milling and Manufacturing Co., 2 Story 648. The states have authority to pass bankrupt laws, provided they do not impair the obligation of contracts, and provided there be no act of congress in force to establish an uniform system of bankruptcy, conflicting with such laws. Sturges v. Crowinsheld, 4 Wheat. 122. McMillan v. McNeill, Ibid. 209. But an act of a state

Art. 1. Sect. 8.

Coin.

To establish post-offices and post-roads :(a)

Counterfeiting. Post-offices.

Courts.

To provide and maintain a navy :(i)

Navy.

legislature which discharges a debtor from all liability for debts contracted previously to his discharge, on his surrendering his property for the benefit of his creditors, is invalid, so far as it attempts to discharge the contract. Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank v. Smith, 6 Wheat. 131. A mere insolvent law, however, is not within the prohibition. Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213. Mason v. Haile, Ibid. 370. Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet. 348, 635. Beers v. Haughton, 9 Ibid. 329. And see Suydam v. Broadnax, 14 Ibid. 67. Cook v. Moffatt, 5 How. 295. Felch v. Bugbee, 48 Maine 9.

(z) Congress have power to issue paper money and make it a legal tender in payment of pre-existing debts. Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457. And that as well in time of peace as in time of war. Julliard v. Greenman, 110 U. S. 421.

(y) This does not extinguish the right in the states over the same subject, until congress shall have exercised the power conferred. Weaver v. Fegely, 29

Penn. St. 27.

(z) This power is limited to the coining and stamping the standard of value upon what the government creates or shall adopt, and to punishing the offence of producing a false representation of what may have been so created or adopted. Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 433. But congress may provide for punishing the offence of bringing into the United States, from a foreign place, false, forged and counterfeit coins, made in the similitude of coins of the United States; and also for the punishment of the offence of uttering and passing the same. United States v. Marigold, 9 How. 560. The power to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the current coin of the United States, may be exercised by the several states concurrently with congress. Harlan v. People, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 207. Ex parte Trueman, 44 Mo. 181.

(a) It is under this power that congress have adopted the mail regulations of the Union, and punish all depredations on the mail. Sturtevants v. City of Aiton, 3 McLean 393. The power to establish postroads, is restricted to such as are regularly laid out under the laws of the several states. Cleveland, Painesville and Ashtabula Railroad Co. v. Franklin Canal Co., 1 P. L. J. 24 Dec. 1853. United States v. Kochersperger, 9 Am. L. R. 148. But see Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421. This power is not confined to the instrumentalities of the postal service, known in or in use when the constitution was adopted, but keeps pace with the progress of the country, and adapts itself to new developments of time and circumstances; therefore, congress may provide for the erection of telegraph lines, and confer the right to extend the same through the several states, free from state interference. act for that purpose (1 R. S. § 5263) is not limited in its operation to such military and post-roads as are upon the public domain. Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U. S. 1.

The

(b) Patents are entitled to a liberal construction, since they are not granted as restrictions upon the rights of the community, but "to promote the progress of science and useful arts." Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 Sum. 535; s. c. 2 Story 164. Grant v. Raymond, 6

Pet. 218. Hogg v. Emerson, 6 How. 486. Brooks v. Fiske, 15 Ibid. 223. Waterbury Brass Co. v. New York and Brooklyn Brass Co., 3 Fish. 43. Union Sugar Refinery v. Mathiesson. 2 Cliff. 304. The power of congress to legislate upon the subject of patents is plenary, by the terms of the constitution, and as there are no restraints on its exercise, there can be no limitation of their right to modify them at their pleasure, so that they do not take away the rights of property in existing patents. McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. 206. Therefore, congress has the power to grant the extension of a patent which has been renewed under the act of 1836. Bloomer v. Stolly, 5 McLean 158. And see Jordan v. Dobson, 2 Abb. U. S. 398. Their power to reserve rights and privileges to assignees, où extending the term of a patent, is incidental to the general power conferred by the constitution. Blanchard's Gun-Stock Turning Factory v. Warner, 1 BI. C. C. 258.

(c) In the United States, an author has no exclusive property in a published work, except under some act of congress. Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591. And see Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. Cas. 815. Dudley v. Mayhew, 3 N. Y. 9. Palmer v. De Witt, 47 Ibid. 532. Bartlett v. Crittenden, 5 McLean 32. Clayton v. Stone, 2 Paine 383. Stowe v. Thomas, 2 Wall. Jr. C. C. 564. Boucicault v. Hart, 13 Bl. C. C. 47. Donnelly v. Ivers, 20 Ibid. 383. As to the question of copyright in reports of legal decisions, see note to 8 Pet. 393.

(d) See American Insurance Company v. Canter, 1 Pet. 546.

(e) The crime of piracy is defined by the law of nations with reasonable certainty. United States v. Smith, 5 Wheat. 153.

(g) As a consequence of the power of declaring war and making treaties, the government possesses the power of acquiring territory either by conquest or by treaty. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 542. When the legislative authority has declared war, the executive authority to whom its execution is confided, is bound to carry it into effect; he has a discretion vested in him, as to the manner and extent; but he cannot lawfully transcend the rules of warfare established among civilized nations. Brown v. United States, 8 Cr. 153.

(h) Congress have a constitutional power to enlist minors, in the navy or army, without the consent of their parents. United States v. Bainbridge, 1 Mas. 71. Case of Emanuel Roberts, 2 Hall L. J. 192. United States v. Stewart, Crabbe 265. Commonwealth v. Murray, 4 Binn. 487. Commonwealth v. Barker, 5 Ibid. 423. Comonwealth v. Morris, 1 Phila. 381. Ex parte Brown, 5 Cr. C. C. 554. Public policy requires that a minor shall be at liberty to enter into a contract to serve the state, whenever such contract is not positively forbidden by the state itself. Commonwealth v. Gamble, 11 S. & R. 94. The King v. Rutherford Greys, 1 Barn. & Cres. 345.

(i) See Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65.

(k) The act of 1795, which confers power on the president to call forth the militia in certain exigencies, is constitutional; and the president is the exclusive and final judge whether the exigency has arisen. Mar

Art. 1. Sect. 8.

Exclusive legislation.

Laws for carrying

Art. 1. Sect. 9.

Slave trade.

Ibid.

Habeas corpus.

Ex post facto laws.

tin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19. See Tyler v. Defrees, 11 Wall. 331.

(1) The militia of the several states are subject to martial law, from the time they are called into the service of the United States. Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19. So far as congress has provided for organizing the militia, the legislative powers of the states are excluded. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 51. Moore v. Houston, 3 S. & R. 164. But a state legislature may lawfully provide for the trial by courts-martial, of drafted militia, who shall refuse or neglect to march to the place of rendezvous, agreeable to the orders of the governor, founded on the requisition of the president of the United States. Ibid.

(m) This includes the power of taxation. Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317. The charter of the city of Washington did not authorize the corporation to force the sale of lottery-tickets in states whose laws prohibited such sale. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264.

(n) The right of exclusive legislation carries with it the right of exclusive jurisdiction. United States v. Cornell, 2 Mas. 60, 91. 6 Opin. 577. But the purchase of lands by the United States for public purposes, within the territorial limits of a state, does not, of itself, oust the jurisdiction or sovereignty of such state, over the lands so purchased. United States v. Cornell, 2 Mas. 60. The constitution prescribes the only mode by which they can acquire land as a sovereign power, and, therefore, they hold only as an individual when they obtain it in any other manner. Commonwealth v. Young, Bright. 302. People v. Godfrey, 17 Johns. 225. See United States v. Travers, 2 Wh. Cr. Cas. 490. People v. Lent, Ibid. 548. It seems, however, that the states have not the right to tax lands purchased by the United States for public purposes, although the consent of the legislature may not have been given to the purchaser. United States v. Weise, 2 Wall. Jr. C. C. 72. Elliott v. Van Voorst, 3 Ibid. 299. 7 Opin. 628. 9 Ibid. 291. 117 U. S. 151. See Act 13 June 1883, P. L. 118.

(0) This does not mean absolutely necessary, nor does it imply the use of only the most direct and simple means calculated to produce the end. Commonwealth v. Lewis, 6 Binn. 270-1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 413. But it requires that the means used in the exercise of an express power should be appropriate to the end. Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603. 1 Story Const. § 1253. Therefore, congress had power to charter the bank of the United States, as a necessary and useful instrument of the fiscal operations of the government. 4 Wheat. 316, 422. So, also, they have power, under this general authority, to provide for the punishment of any offences which interfere with, obstruct or prevent commerce and navigation with foreign states, and among the several states, although such offences may be done on land. United States v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 78.

(p) This section has no application to the state governments. Butler v. Hopper, 1 W. C. C. 499.

(9) The president has no power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus without an act

of congress to authorize it. Ex parte Dec. 248. McCall v. McDowell, 1 Dea Benedict, 4 West. L. Mo. 449. The ef sion of the privilege of the writ of ha confer on the executive the power im cised by the British Crown, before th habeas corpus act, 31 Car. II. (but w forth taken away by that statute), na to arrest by warrant, for treason in ge picion of treason or treasonable pr specially expressing the nature of the charged, as required by the habeas co imprison the party so arrested on such indefinite period, without bail or trial pl. 305. 1 Hallam Const. Hist. 252. such a power, there must be a warrant for treasonable practices. A suspensi corpus does not oust the civil courts o quire into the legality of the detent claimed to have been enlisted into th fraud or duress. Such power is incor existence of a free government; it is dent to justify it; it is against the spi tution, and of all the foundations on wh Binney on Habeas Corpus, Part III. held, that a soldier illegally enlisted, with an offence against the governmen held against a writ of habeas corpus, 1863, suspending the privilege of th v. Gaul, 44 Barb. 98. See Ex parte Ke Ex parte Fagan, 2 Spr. 191. Ex par C. C. 63. Commonwealth v. Frink, 13 Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U cago, R. I. and P. R. W. Co. v. Me A suspension of the privilege of the corpus does not suspend the writ it issues as a matter of course; and on court decides whether the applicant is of proceeding any further. Ex par Wall. 4.

(r) Where no other time is fixed fo of a penal statute, it takes effect from passage; and ignorance of the exister forms no legal excuse for a violation o Ann, 1 Gall. 62. Ex post facto laws are or aggravate crime, or increase the change the rules of evidence for the p viction. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 390. Missouri, 4 Wall. 278. King v. Misse 221. Hoyt v. Utah, 110 Ibid. 589. TH applies to penal and criminal laws, whi feitures or punishments, and not to cit which affect private rights retrospecti v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 110; s. c. 1 Watts 356. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 463. Fletcher 138. Society for the Propagation of Wheeler, 2 Gall. 138. United States v C. 366. Commonwealth v. Lewis, 6 Bi dart v. Smith, 5 Ibid. 363-4. Hess v. 364. There is nothing in the constitut bids congress to pass laws violating the contracts, though such a power is denie Evans v. Eaton, Pet. C. C. 323.