Gambar halaman
PDF
ePub

1827.

The KING

บ.

HEADLEY.

the greater part of them." Now it is to be observed,
that possibly some ambiguity, although I think not
much, might arise, if that charter of Charles I. had
stood alone; because it says, "of which chief burgesses
some are called, known, or distinguished by the name
or distinction of chief burgesses councillors." But in
the prior charter of James I., which, one would sup-
pose, referred to the ancient antecedent usage of the
borough, it does not there say, "of which chief burgesses
some are called, known, or distinguished by the name
or distinction of chief burgesses councillors." There it
only says, that they are to "choose, nominate, and as-
sign, an honest and discreet man, of the number of
twelve chief burgesses councillors." Therefore, the re-
cognition in the time of Charles I., goes further than
it does in that of James I. These words in the charter
of Charles I., are not sufficient to make the distinction
contended for, and to constitute them an integral part
under that charter, when they were not so under the
charter of James I. There is also another distinction
between the two charters. In the charter of James I.,
when it comes to the power to impose fines for not
accepting offices, and also to make bye laws, then the
power is given to the mayor and town-clerk, and
chief burgesses councillors and common council of the
borough. In the charter of Charles I., there is nothing
said about chief burgesses councillors and the common
council. It there says, "it shall be in the mayor,
the recorder of the borough;" and, therefore, there
certainly is an ambiguity in the charter of James. It
is, at all events, an inaccurate expression to say, "chief
burgesses councillors and common council of the bo-
rough," because the common council of the borough was
before declared to consist of thirty-six (a). It seems to
exclude the other, by saying the common council, after
mentioning the burgesses. There are also in this charter,
various powers given to the mayor, and to the twelve
(a) Ante, 347.

burgesses councillors, as distinct from the rest of the council; and there being that distinction, and some powers given to them to do particular things, when in the power of electing the mayor and other officers, they are designated as an entire body of thirty-six, it seems to me, that we are not to consider the thirty-six as being composed of two integral parts. This is not the way in which integral parts are usually mentioned. If it had been said, "the mayor and the recorder, and the chief burgesses, and the chief burgesses councillors of the borough," that would clearly have made them a distinct integral part, and it would have required a majority of each. Instead of that, it is put in even the charter of James I., "the chief burgesses of the borough" generally; and in the other, the chief burgesses of the borough, of whom some are called or distinguished by the name or distinction, not as having any distinct office, but called or distinguished by the name of the chief burgesses councillors; not mentioned as constituting an integral part. That being so, the charter does not go on to give the power to the chief burgesses councillors, and the rest of the chief burgesses; but it is to the thirty-six chief burgesses; by that expression, putting it on the number itself, and not on the two constituent parts. All that is required there is, that there should be a majority of the thirtysix. That having been the case in this instance, it appears to me the rule should be discharged, except as to claiming the franchise between the 1st of August and the 8th of October.

Campbell-It would be of no advantage to my client to make the rule absolute as to that.

BAYLEY, J.-Then the better way will be, to discharge the rule, without costs.

(b) And see Rer v. Grampound, 6 T. R. 301, 2; Rex v. Morris, (Borough of Weymouth), 4 East,

Rule discharged (a).

17; Selw. N. P. 8th edit. 1154;
Rex v. R. Davies (Town-Clerk of
Wells), post.

1827.

The KING

บ.

HEADLEY.

1827.

In trover for

a ship "with the apparel and appurtenances thereto belonging," the plaintiff cannot set up

a distinct title and cordage.

to a new boat

SHANNON V. OWEN, CHAMBERLAYNE, LLOYD, DON-
NOLLON, COHEN, FROGLEY, AND COLLYER.
TROVER, for "two fishing-smacks, with the apparel
and appurtenances thereunto belonging." Plea-
not guilty.
not guilty. The record contained the entry of a nolle
prosequi as to Chamberlayne, and a suggestion of the
death of Donnollon. At the trial of the cause at the last
Chelmsford Spring Aseizes (a), before Alexander, C. B.(b),
it appeared that the plaintiff was the registered owner of
the fishing-smack, Alexander, of the port of London.
The first three defendants, Owen, Chamberlayne, and
Lloyd, were the assignees of the defendant Cohen, who
was formerly owner of the Alexander. The defendant
Donnollon was the solicitor to the commission issued
against Cohen, on the 20th of May, 1813, and also solici
tor to the assignees. The defendant Frogley, had been
formerly master of the vessel, and defendant Collyer was
Donollon's clerk. In March, 1813, defendant Cohen sold
the Alexander to Phillips, for 9007. The bill of sale bore

(a) Counsel for the plaintiff, Taddy, Serjt., and Chitty; for the defendants, Marryat, and Gurney.

(b) This cause was first tried before Park, J., at the Chelmsford Summer Assizes, 1822, when a verdict was found for the plaintiff, the defendants not having proved petitioning creditor's debt to the satisfaction of the learned Judge. That verdict having been set aside, the cause came down for trial at the Spring Assizes, 1823, when the trial was postponed on account of the illness of the defendant's attorney. At the ensuing Summer Assizes, a verdict was found for the defendants; but a bill of exceptions was tendered to the opi

nion delivered by the learned Judge, Mr. Serjt. Onslow, as to the sufficiency of the act of bankruptcy, which consisted in Cohen's absenting himself from his counting-house, and directing his clerk to say, that he had been there at the time he was so absent. Upon a writ of error in the Exchequer Chamber, that Court was of opinion, that though there was sufficient evidence that Cohen had absented himself with intent to delay his creditors, that intent ought to have been found by the jury, and should not have been decided by the learned Judge, as a point of law; and a venire de novo was awarded.

date, 23d April, 1813, and on the 29th of that month, Phillips obtained register in his own name, on delivering up to be cancelled the former register granted to Cohen. Cohen's assignees conceiving this sale to be fraudulent, in June, 1814, seized the vessel, the possession of which was, however, given back to Phillips, upon his depositing the bill of sale, to abide the decision of the question, as to the validity of his purchase. The vessel remained in the possession and employ of Phillips for nine months, at the expiration of which, he sold her to the plaintiff for 7351. A bill of sale was accordingly executed, and a fresh register obtained in the name of the plaintiff, in whose employ the vessel continued about two years and a half; during which period, the plaintiff supplied her with a boat and some new cordage, which remained coiled on the deck till the vessel was again seized by the defendants; and upon this seizure, the action was founded. The vessel was afterwards removed by the defendants into the Surrey Canal, where she lay until she was sold for her expenses.

On the part of the defendants it was contended, that the transfer to Phillips was fraudulent; and they proved also an act of bankruptcy overreaching the bill of sale.

On the part of the plaintiff, however, it was insisted, that he was, at all events, intitled to recover for the value of the boat and cordage; the former of which was only three months old, and the latter quite new. The learned Judge being of this opinion, a verdict was returned for the plaintiff for the amount.

In Easter Term, Marryat obtained a rule nisi for a new trial, on the ground that the plaintiff by his declaration claimed nothing but what was appurtenant to the ship, and passed with it-against which

Taddy, Serjt., and Chitty, now shewed cause (a). The

(a) Taddy, Serjt., wished to put in affidavits; but this was not

allowed, the defendants having
moved without affidavits.

1827.

SHANNON

v.

OWEN.

1827.

SHANNON

v.

OWEN.

jury have found a verdict for the plaintiff, as to the boat, sails, and cordage; and the words, "apparel and appurtenances," are a sufficient description of these articles, and are so used in declarations in the Pleader's Assistant, and the old entries. The terms used in 53 Geo. 3, cap. 159, sect. 7, for limiting the responsibilities of shipowners, are "the value of the ship or vessel, with all her appurtenances." They are merely the "adjuncta," of the civil law. If they had been inseparable from the vessel, it may be admitted, that the plaintiff could not, by adding to the principal, have prevented the assignees from asserting their rights, founded upon the invalidity of the sale from Cohen to the plaintiff. The articles in question were not substituted for others which had been. worn out, but were additions made by the plaintiff.

Marryat, contrà, was stopped by the Court.

LORD TENTERDEN, C. J.-This is an action for the recovery of a "smack and its appurtenances." No one could suppose that the plaintiff was suing for any thing distinct from the vessel. For the purpose of sustaining his declaration, the plaintiff is obliged to admit that the articles belonged to the vessel.

Rule absolute.

Where B.

accepts a bill

for the honour

of the drawer,

on the refusal of A., the

drawee, it must be pre

ANN WILLIAMS v. GEORGE GERMAINE the elder.

ASSUMPSIT, on a (third) bill of exchange, drawn 29th
1BX.485
April, 1826, by George Germaine the younger, at Sierra
Leone, on Pugh and Redman, for 717. 11s. 9d., payable
thirty-six days after sight to the order of Henry Williams,
for disbursements of the ship Edward, under the drawer's

sented again to A. for payment at maturity, before B. can be charged on his acceptance; eyen in the case of a bill payable after sight.

« SebelumnyaLanjutkan »