was told by Secretary Blaine, some time about the middle of May, in decided terms never to speak to him again about the Paris consulship as long as he lived; that persisting in his application he said to Mr. Blaine, "I will see the President, and ask him to remove Mr. Walker," the then incumbent, and that he understood Mr. Blaine to reply, "Well, if Sewell wil! indorse your application I have no objection to you having the place"; and that he inferred from this answer that if President Garfield would remove Mr. Walker, Mr. Blaine would not object to giving him the position; that he then applied to President Garfield to give him the Paris consulship, and made appeals to prominent politicians in Washington to aid him in this enterprise, and believed that they intended themselves to help him to forward his application; that he finally thought he would have the matter about the Paris consulship settled one way or the other, and addressed a note to the President in which he said, among other things, "Can I have the Paris consulship?" that he was informed, as he had been before repeatedly, that "the President could not see him to-day." Assume that four days after his alleged conception of the idea of removing the President he wrote to the President; that he dwelt upon this subject for two weeks, and at the end of this time, on or about June 6, 1881, he inquired of a dealer in guns and pistols for the largest caliber, strongest force, and most accurate pistol made; that two days thereafter he returned and purchased that pistol, having in the mean time borrowed money to pay for it; that after purchasing the pistol he inquired as to where he might practice with it; was informed that he could practice with it outside the city limits, and went outside the limits on three occasions, firing ten shots each time and hit the mark; that he followed the President from time to time for the purpose of shooting him-once to a church, which he examined for the purpose of shooting the President through a window, once to a depot, but the sight of a sick wife clinging to the President's arm prevented him from shooting him then, and once followed him to the house of a friend, and while the President was in the house concealed himself in an alley where he examined his pistol, intending to shoot him when he came out; but when he did come out he was accompanied by his friend, and they walked arm in arm closely together, so that he could not shoot him then; that finally, on the 2d day of July, 1881, he arose in the morning, took his pistol and took a walk in the park, then took breakfast, went to a depot, where he was informed by the newspapers, and had ascertained, the President would be at about the hour of nine o'clock in the morning, and that going there before this hour he waited for the President, and before his arrival left a bundle of papers at the news-stand addressed to Byron Andrews and his co-correspondents of newspapers; that he went into a water-closet, took out his pistol and examined it; that he went outside the depot, had his boots blacked and inquired for a hackman whose services he had engaged two weeks previous, but, he not being there, he engaged another hackman, agreeing with him for a stipulated price, conditioned that he should drive rapidly in the direction of the Congressional Cemetery, which was near the jail; that he saw the President arrive at the depot in a carriage with a friend, which he recognized as the carriage of the friend and not the carriage of the President; that he saw him in earnest conversation with his friends and waited until the President alighted from the carriage and walked into the depot a few feet; then, approaching the President from behind in a manner which did not attract the President's attention, when within a few feet of the President aimed the pistol at the hollow of his back and fired upon him twice, intending to kill him, and inflicting a mortal wound. Assume that after the shooting he made an effort to reach the carriage he had previously engaged, with a view to get to the jail as rapidly as possible, and thereby avoid the appre

hended fury of the populace; that he was intercepted by an officer while endeavoring to reach his carriage; that he had written a letter to General Sherman, which was in his hand when intercepted by the officer, and which, he said, he was anxious to reach the general at once, and which was found to contain a demand for troops to protect him from mob violence, which he greatly feared. Assume that some time in the month of June, 1881, he wrote a letter in which he uses this language: "I have just shot the President; his death was a political necessity, because he proved a traitor to the men who made him, and thereby imperiled the life of the republic"; that in another letter, dated June 20, 1881, he used the following language: "The President's nomination was an act of God, his election was an act of God, his removal is an act of God"; that in a document addressed "To the American People," and dated as early as June 16, 1881, he used this language: "I conceived the idea of removing the President four weeks ago. I conceived the idea myself and kept it to myself"; that in the same document he says, "In the President's madness he has wrecked the once grand old Republican party, and for this he dies." And again: "This is not murder; it is a political necessity." Assume that he now claims that on several occasions during his life he has claimed to be inspired-once in connection with his entering the Oneida Community; once preceding his attempt to establish "The Theocrat"; once in connection with the writing of his lectures and his book, "The Truth," and that subsequent to the attempt to procure office, and some time after the shooting of the President, while in confinement in jail and awaiting trial, he said that he was inspired by the Deity to do that act, and said that the idea came to him one night about the 18th of May, which was about five days after the interview with Secretary Blaine about the Paris consulship, in which he was told by Secretary Blaine never to speak to him about the Paris consulship again, and after again visiting the White House and being refused admission, that he struggled against the idea, but that he finally worked himself up to it and nerved himself to do the shooting. Assume that for years previous to the shooting he procured a precarious living, often leaving his board-bills unpaid, borrowing money and going from place to place on the railroads, evading, when he could, the payment of the usual railroad fare; that on two or three occasions he was arrested for not paying his board-bills, and that he was once arrested and placed in the Tombs in New York city, and was once confined in jail in the city of Chicago for retaining money collected by him which did not belong to him. Assume that under oath, as a witness in his own behalf on trial for murder, he said he felt remorse so far as his personal feelings were concerned, and regretted the necessity for the act, but said he claimed that his duty to the Lord and to the American people overcame his personal feelings and personal regrets as to the act.

Second hypothesis: Suppose that in addition to the foregoing it is shown that this man went from place to place leaving unpaid board-bills behind him; that he borrowed money on false representations, using the names of prominent men as references without their knowledge or consent to secure the money; that he abandoned his practice of the profession of law, as he said it did not pay, and went to lecturing on theological subjects in imitation of prominent evangelists who, he said, had made money; that while he was professing religion and a church-member he was guilty of deception and lasciviousness; that in the character of a Christian gentleman he traveled through the country borrowing money and contracting indebtedness for his personal support, which he seldom if ever paid, though profuse in promises, evasions, and misrepresentations; that he published a book called "Truth," a large part of which was stolen from a book published many years before, called "The Berean"; that he represented and sold this book

"Truth" as his own literary production and ideas; that, failing in this, he returned to the practice of law and collected money for clients, which he retained; that he associated himself with the Young Men's Christian Association, had his letters addressed in their care, and used his relations with them as a passport to secure confidence, which he grossly abused; that he fraudulently obtained money by burnishing an oroide watch and passing it off for gold, and boasted of it; that he declared that he would secure notoriety by good or evil, even if he had to kill some prominent man and imitate Wilkes Booth; that as far back as 1872 he took part in the Greeley campaign, declaring that he expected by so doing to secure the Chilian mission; that in order to procure a divorce from his wife, who had labored for him and sent money to him for his support, although he was at the time a lawyer and officer of the court, he yet deliberately, in accordance with his own statement, committed adultery with a prostitute, and appeared as a witness against himself in the divorce proceedings by which a decree of divorce was granted against him; that during his married life, while a member of the church and professing religion and engaging in the public exercises of the church with which he was connected, he got his wife to borrow money from the pastor, and afterward was accused of immoral conduct and vicious and dishonest practices, and in addition to having a loathsome disease he admitted the truth of the accusation; that he went again into politics, because neither the law nor theology would pay; that he used each and all the schemes he undertook, which have been presented as evidences of his insanity, for the purpose of dishonestly obtaining money; that during the political campaign of 1880 he wrote a speech which was delivered but once; that on this speech and his so-called services in the cam

paign he claimed and asked for an important foreign appointment, and for that purpose came to Washington; that immediately before coming to Washington he was getting a precarious subsistence in New York by soliciting life insurance; that in order to get to Washington he borrowed ten dollars, and arrived in Washington without funds; that he stopped at the Ebbett House one day, and left without paying his

bill; that he went from one boarding-house to an other in Washington, leaving the board-bills unpaid in each, and falsely representing that he was expecting money and would soon pay; that he borrowed fifteen dollars from a friend, stating that he wanted money to pay a board-bill, but really used it to purchase a pistol with which to shoot the President of the United States; that he boarded at a respectable house in the city of Washington for more than five weeks, leaving it only two days before the shooting, and only then because the landlady demanded payment for board, which he promised to pay in a few days, but which was never paid; that during this time he was on friendly relations with his fellowboarders, conversing with them daily at the table upon religious and general topics, attending church, reporting and discussing sermons with the pastor, as well as the revision of the New Testament, and the situation as represented by the senatorial contest at Albany, and exhibiting nothing unusual in his manners, conduct, or conversation; that while stopping at occasions for the purpose of shooting him, once watching him from Lafayette Park, but seeing him ride out with several friends desisted from shooting him; that once he followed him to the depot, but seeing a sick wife leaning on his arm refrained from shooting on that occasion, and that during all this time he never mentioned the subject of inspiration, or that he had any extraordinary relation with the Deity, or had any divine commission to perform; that he went to the Riggs House the day before the shooting, and left that board-bill unpaid; that, failing to secure the offices he sought, and disappointed in the expectations which he had frequently said he confidently entertained, he

this house he followed the President on at least two

followed the President from place to place, seeking the opportunity to shoot him; and finally, learning that the President was to go to Long Branch on a certain day, he went to the railway-station to waylay him, and there, stealthily approaching him from behind, treacherously murdered him by shooting him in the back; that, arrested and charged with this crime, he justified it as a patriotic act and claimed that it was a political necessity, and that the President was guilty of the blackest ingratitude by going back on the men who made him; that by removing the President he took but the life of one man, which cemented the Republican party and prevented another war which might have cost thousands of lives, as our last war did, and that the prominent men connected with the Republican party whom he supposed would be benefited by his crime would protect him from the consequences of his act; that when he learned that these men had expressed their abhorrence of his crime he appeared to be "struck dumb" and in great mental agony," and after collecting himself he repeatedly used the words, "Most astounding!" and exclaimed: "What does it mean? I would have staked my life that they would defend me," and again repeated the words Most astounding," and that shortly thereafter he, for the first time, used the words or expressed the idea of "inspiration" in referring to his crime; and that only since that time has he claimed "inspiration" as a defense for the murder. Assuming all these propositions to be true, I will ask you to state whether in your opinion the person was sane or insane at the time of shooting President Garfield?

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The reply of the witness was that, in his opinion, the prisoner was sane. When asked on cross-examination what had changed his opinion as to the sanity or insanity of the prisoner, Dr. Worcester replied: "Mainly his own testimony, and my interview with him in the jail, supported by the evidence which I heard." On the following day, Dr. Theodore Damon, of Auburn, New York, was examined, and, in response to the hypothetical question and other inquiries, expressed the opinion that the prisoner was sane. On the 23d Mr. Charles H. Reed, of Chicago, joined the counsel for the defense, in spite of some criticism on the part of the prosecution, Judge Cox stating that he saw no impropriety in his doing so, notwithstanding the fact that he had been a witness in the case. The same day two more expert witnesses-Dr. S. H. Talcott, of Middletown, New York, and Dr. Henry P. Stearns, of Hartford, Connecticut-were examined, and confirmed the view that the prisoner was sane. The same line of evidence was continued on the 24th, by Dr. Jamin Strong, of Cleveland, Ohio; Dr. Abram M. Shaw, of Middletown, Connecticut; and Dr. Orpheus Evarts, of College Hill, Ohio. An adjournment was taken to December 27th, and on that day Dr. A. E. Macdonald, of New York, was examined. His opinion was that the prisoner was sane, and had been playing a part in support of the theory of insanity.

The prisoner had for some days indulged in constant interruptions, not only contradicting witnesses and criticising counsel, but denouncing both with opprobrious epithets. On the 28th of December, during the further examination of experts, Drs. Randolph Barksdale, of

Richmond, Virginia, and John H. Callender, of Nashville, Tennessee, having followed Dr. Macdonald, a motion was made by Mr. Porter that the prisoner be removed from the counsel-table, where he had thus far sat, and placed in the dock. After this had been argued with considerable warmth on both sides, the judge decided to remand the prisoner to the dock. It was hardly necessary to say, he remarked, that the conduct of the prisoner had been in persistent violation of order and decorum. In the beginning, the only methods which could be resorted to to suppress this disorder were such as must infringe the constitutional rights of the prisoner, and that was conclusive argument against them. Until Saturday the 25th no other method had been proposed. Then this proposition (which he had already had in mind) was submitted. It had hitherto been an impression shared by the court and counsel, that the prisoner's conduct and language in court would afford the best indication of his mental and moral character, and contribute largely to the enlightenment of court and jury on the question of his responsibility. It was therefore on the express desire of the District Attorney that the court had allowed such latitude of conduct, in order to furnish the experts an opportunity of diagnosing the prisoner's case. As it now appeared, the opinions of the experts had been largely founded on the exhibitions which had taken place on the trial, and, if they had contributed to enable those experts to reach their conclusions, it would be a complete vindication of the view of the District Attorney as to the proper course to be pursued. At this stage of the trial, however, this object seemed to have been accomplished. The trial was now approaching its close. The experts had had ample opportunity to make up their judgments and pronounce them before court and jury. It was incumbent on the court now to impose such restraint as the circumstances of the case admitted, and which would conduce to the orderly conduct of the case. The prisoner had a right to hear the testimony of witnesses. He could not be gagged or sent out of court. The proper place for a prisoner on trial for felony was the dock. He could only come within the bar to be arraigned and to receive sentence. If the court granted him the privilege of sitting beside his counsel, it was a privilege which could be withdrawn summarily. While the prisoner had the undoubted right to act as his own counsel or to appear by counsel, he could not exercise both rights simultaneously. Having accepted counsel, the prisoner had waived his right to appear as such in person. On the consideration of all the circumstances the court thought that the motion would have to be granted, and that the prisoner should be placed in the dock, but he did not mean that the prisoner should be exposed to any danger. He should have the fullest protection.

The change, however, did not put a stop to the interruptions of the prisoner. Dr. Walter

Kempster, of Winnebago, Wisconsin, was examined December 29th and 30th, and the last expert witness for the prosecution, Dr. John P. Gray, of Utica, New York, on the 30th and 31st. With regard to Dr. Gray's testimony, it was publicly stated that he was called to Washington by the Government to make a thorough examination of the prisoner's condition, with a view to ascertaining whether there was real ground for the plea of insanity. If such should be the case, the Government preferred to have it substantiated, regarding it better as a matter of policy to have the accused shown to be a lunatic, and sent to an asylum, than to have him convicted. Dr. Gray made a thorough examination of the man in jail, and attended the trial from the opening day, and, against his inclination, and the preference of the prosecuting authorities, was forced to the conclusion that he was entirely sane. His testimony related to his study of the case, the various phases of insanity, and the grounds of the conclusion at which he had arrived. His evidence, which was finished on the 3d of January, concluded the testimony for the prosecution. The defense introduced some unimportant evidence in surrebuttal, that of the sculptor in regard to the cast of the prisoner's head being, however, excluded by the court, and applied for the privilege of bringing in new evidence. After argument, this was denied by Judge Cox. He said:

That if any new fact were developed now that struck his mind as having an important bearing on the defense or as necessary to a fair presentation of the case, he would deem it his duty (notwithstanding that the testimony for the defense was formally closed) to allow that fact to be given in evidence. Part of the testimony now proposed to be introduced was offered in the character of surrebutting testimony and part not. The first was the opinion of a medical expert as to the condition of the prisoner's mind. He understood the law and practice to be simply this: The law presumed sanity, and the first affirmative testimony on that issue had to come from the defense. Expert testimony was a part of the evidence in chief for the defense on that issue, and all the expert testimony on which the defense relied must be offered in chief. Part of it could not be reserved to be offered by way of surrebutting testimony. After that testimony was in, it then became the duty and the right of the prosecution to offer vidence on the general question of insanity. The prosecution was not confined to the mere contradiction of witnesses for the defense, but it might go at length into the question and offer independent and affirmative proof on that question. A part of that testimony was that of medical experts. That testimony was not offered strictly in contradiction of the opinion was not a contradiction of another man's opinmedical testimony for the defense, because one man's ion, but it was offered as independent testimony. When this testimony was closed on the part of the Government, then the defense was restricted to a contradiction of facts that may have been testified to on tradict an expert on the part of the prosecution by the the part of the prosecution. It was not allowed to contestimony of another expert who had a different opinion. If that was allowed, there would be no end to the trial. It would run on to rejoinder and surrejoinder, and to all the innumerable issues which the ingenuity of counsel might devise; so that the privilege of producing expert testimony was limited to the evidence in chief for the defense, and to the evidence

in chief for the prosecution. He therefore thought that the testimony of Dr. McFarland could not be received on the question of the prisoner's sanity.

The offer was also made to prove that immediately after the assassination the prisoner claimed to have acted under inspiration. When the prisoner was on the stand as a witness he testified that he had committed this act under what he called, indifferently, inspiration or pressure. To rebut that testimony the prosecution had put on the stand Mr. Reynolds, who testified that he had an interview with the prisoner two weeks after the assassination, and that in that interview the prisoner did not claim to have acted under inspiration, but assigned, exclusively, political motives. It was not the object of the Government to prove that he did not claim inspiration, but simply to ask the jury to infer that the prisoner never did claim this inspiration until several weeks after the assassination, and after he had discovered that these men, whom he supposed he was benefiting by his deed, had repudiated it and were denouncing him. The hypothetical case, put by the prosecution to the experts, assumed that no claim of having acted under inspiration was made by the prisoner until two weeks afterward and up to the time of this interview of Mr. Reynolds with him. It would be an answer to that to show that on the very day of the assassination the prisoner did claim inspiration. As surrebutting testimony that evidence ought to be received. It struck him as strictly surrebutting testimony. As to the other testimony offered, which was not in reply to anything on the part of the Government, the commonlaw practice was that the Government should summon all the witnesses whose names were indorsed on the indictment, and it was really incumbent on the Government, as a matter of fairness, to summon all the witnesses who had been present at the transaction and had seen it. The Government was not bound, however, to examine all the witnesses so summoned; but as soon as the case for the Government was closed those witnesses were at the disposal of the defense. The proper time for the defense to call upon them was when the rebutting testimony was in course of presentation. In this case the defense had occupied two weeks in the presentation of its rebutting testimony, and it was at that time that, strictly speaking, this evidence should have been offered, if offered at all. The next question was, what consideration should influence the court in allowing additional evidence which might have been produced if known at the proper time. Such evidence ought not to be admitted if it was purely cumulative. For example, the mental condition of Luther W. Guiteau had been so thoroughly canvassed on both sides that anything more in addition to that seemed purely and exclusively cumulative. Besides, it was not a direct fact in issue, but a somewhat collateral issue. The proof of Luther W. Guiteau's insanity did not prove that of the prisoner. It did nothing more than merely tend to corroborate the direct testimony on that point. He did not think that it ought to be admitted. As to the proposition to offer witnesses who had seen the prisoner in a public park a few days before the assassination, and had gathered from his couduct the impression that he was out of his mind, such testimony was of a very vague and uncertain character, and he did not think it sufficiently definite to warrant him in opening the case again. The only thing that he felt any uncertainty about was in reference to the testimony of detective McElfresh, who conducted the prisoner to the jail immediately after the occurrence. He would like more definite information as to what McElfresh could prove.

The prisoner: I had a talk with McElfresh going in a carriage to the jail. He wanted to know why I did it. I said it was on account of the political situation. I said, "Are you a stalwart?" and he said "Yes." He said, "There are a great many people who feel just like you in regard to the Republican party." The point was, it was the political situation

which drove me on the President. The prosecution wanted to show that it was because I was a disappointed office-seeker. I was not a disappointed office-seeker, and I would not have taken the Paris consulship after the 1st of June. Under the circumstances, therefore, I have a right to show that, on the day of the shooting, I told McElfresh that the cause was the political situation, and that without the political situation the President would not have been removed-and he would not have been removed, any way, if the Lord had not crowded me into it.

Judge Cox (getting a chance to finish his ruling) said that if he had an affidavit as to what McElfresh would testify to he might be able to decide more satisfactorily, but that at present it seemed to him too vague. He thought, however, that the testimony as to the claim of inspiration, made on the day of the assassination or on the day after, was admissible as rebutting testimony.

The evidence was completed on the 4th of January, and the prosecution, through Mr. Davidge, presented the following requests to the court for rulings on the law points involved:

1. The legal test of responsibility where insanity is set up as a defense for the alleged crime is whether the accused, at the time of committing the act alleged, knew the difference between right and wrong in respect of such act. Hence, in the present case, if the accused, at the time of committing the act charged, knew the difference between right and wrong in respect of such act-that is, if he knew what he was doing, and that what he was doing was contrary to the law of the land-he is responsible.

2. If the accused knew what he was doing, and that what he was doing was contrary to the law of the land, it constitutes no defense, even if it were true, that when he committed the act he really believed that he was thereby producing a public benefit, or carrying out an inspiration of divine origin or approval. Such belief would not afford any excuse, nor would such excuse be afforded by the fact that, in the commission of the act, he was impelled by a depraved moral sense, whether innate or acquired, or by evil passion or indifference to moral obligation.

3. Insanity would, however, constitute a defense if, by reason of disease, the accused, at the time of committing the act charged, did not know what he was doing, or, if he did know it, that what he was doing was contrary to law.

4. The only evidence in the present case tending to show an irresistible impulse to commit the homicide is the claim of the accused that his free agency was destroyed by his alleged conviction that the death of the President was required for the good of the American people, and was divinely inspired; but such conviction, even if it really existed, could not afford any excuse, when the party knew what he was doing, and that it was contrary to law. No mere delusion or error of judgment, not even a fixed belief that what is prohibited by the law is commanded or approved by divine authority, can exempt the accused from responsibility for breaking the law. To have such effect, the commission of the act charged must have been the result of an insane delusion, which was the product of disease, and of such force as to deprive the accused of the degree of reason necessary to distinguish between right and wrong in respect of the act, so that at the time of committing the act he either did not know what he was doing, or if he did, that the act was wrong or contrary to the law of the land.

the defense time to prepare their requests, The court adjourned until the 7th, to allow which were as follows:

1. The legal test of responsibility, when insanity is set up as a defense for alleged crime, is not merely whether the accused knew at the time what he was doing, and that the act was contrary to law, for an ir