was estimated at the beginning of the year. The ordinary revenue has improved in twenty years by Rx 13,800,000; the accounts for debt services, irrigation, and railway earnings by Rx 3,720,000, making the total improvement Rx 17,520,000, which has been absorbed by the loss of opium revenue, amounting to Rx 3,680,000; the loss by exchange, amounting to Rx 4,730,000; the army services, which cost Rx 5,470,000 more; the administration of Upper Burmah, costing Rx 450,000; and the charges of provincial administration, amounting to Rx 3,770,000. The drawings of the Secretary of State on India for 1899 were £19,000,000, the largest ever made. In 1900 he expected to draw £17,000,000. During 1899 the treasury received Rx 2,620,000 of gold in exchange for silver and placed in the reserve kept for the protection of the paper currency. The final estimate of the cost of the famine to the revenue of the Government, including both expenditure for relief and loss of revenue, was Rx 16,649,399, of which Rx 9,313,987 fell upon the year 1898. The cost of the frontier military operations was Rx 3,887,000.

The Army. The European army in India in 1899 had an established strength of 3,616 officers and 70,672 noncommissioned officers and men, comprising 9 cavalry and 52 infantry general officers, 29 general officers unemployed, 914 officers in the staff corps, 5 officers and 9 men in the invalid and veteran establishments, 491 officers and 12,916 men of the Royal Artillery, 261 officers and 5,409 men of the cavalry, 347 officers and 158 men of the Royal Engineers, and 1,508 officers and 52,180 men of the infantry. The native army of British India had an established strength of 1,578 European officers, 3,209 native officers, and 135,853 noncommissioned officers and men, comprising 33 European and 54 native officers and 2,001 men in the artillery, 358 European and 619 native officers and 21,955 men in the cavalry, 65 European and 488 native officers and 3,142 men in the sappers and miners, and 1,122 European and 2,048 native officers and 108,755 men in the infantry. The total effective force was 219,369 officers and men, of whom 56,889 were in Bengal, 68,806 in the Punjab, 47,022 in Bombay, and 46, 652 in Madras. The European and Eurasian volunteers in India numbered 29,570 on March 31, 1898. The imperial service troops, maintained by native princes and trained under the inspection of British officers, numbered 16,618 in 1898, consisting of 7,553 cavalry, 8,754 infantry, and 311 artillery. The coasts are defended by fortifications at Aden, Karachi, Bombay, the Hugli, and Rangoon, mounting modern breech-loading guns, built at a cost of Rx 4,500,000, and by the ironclads Magdala, of 3,340 tons, and Abyssinia, of 2,900 tons, each carrying 4 8-inch guns in turrets, the Lawrence, of 1,154 tons, the torpedo gunboats Assaye and Plassey, of 735 tons, and 7 90-ton torpedo boats. A vast sum has been expended on the defenses on the northwest frontier, including the fortified camp at Quetta and the advanced position covering it, strategic railroads and wagon roads, protective works for bridges and tunnels on the Sind and Pishin Railroad and various other defenses for railroad bridges, the fortification of the passages over the Indus at Attok and Sukkur, an entrenched position at Rawal Pindi, a defensible post at Multan, an arsenal at Ferozepore, and other works.

Commerce and Production. For the improvement of agriculture the Government has established in each of the provinces a public department which collects and publishes information concerning crops, conducts experimental stations

and model farms, imparts advice to private indi viduals who essay improved methods, introduces new cultures, processes, and appliances, organizes agricultural schools and colleges, and sends Indian students to the agricultural colleges of Europe. Experiments in the use of fertilizers, rotation of crops, the raising and storing of fodder, the cultivation of new products, the introduction of superior breeds of cattle, and the grading up of the native breeds of horses are beginning to bear fruit. Out of a total area of 732,506,734 acres shown by the survey department reports were made in 1897 respecting 537,346,026 acres, of which 153,895,056 acres were not available for cultivation, 63,969,955 acres were covered by forest, 95,080,728 acres were waste lands suitable for tillage, 46,943,358 acres were fallow land, and 177,456,929 acres were under crops. The area devoted to rice was 66,234,485; to wheat, 16,183,987; to other grains, 78,237,544; to sugar cane, 2,651,721; to tea, 423,932; to cotton, 9,458,842; to oil seeds, 10,531,864; to indigo, 1,583,808; to tobacco, 1,000,230; to jute, 2,215,105; to other fibers, 591,996; to various food crops, 6,017,127; to coffee, 147,158 acres. Double crops were grown on 22,904,618 acres, making the total area cropped 199,862,373 acres, of which 29,365,493 were irrigated by canals, tanks, wells, etc., counting twice the lands irrigated for both crops. The area served by the major irrigation works was 10,172,493 acres, paying Rx 3,386,183 for irrigation dues; the area served by minor works, 6,706,531 acres, paying Rx 1,786,658. The irrigation works paid 6.4 per cent. on their capital cost, and enabled crops to be grown of the estimated value of Rx 46,000,000.

The forests demarcated and reserved by the Government in 1897 had an extent of 19,259 square miles in the Central Provinces, 12,986 in Bombay, 14,058 in Burmah, 5,876 in Bengal, 13,138 in Madras, 3,822 in the Northwest Provinces and Oudh, 3,681 in Assam, 1,681 in the Punjab, and 4,179 in the Berars.

The number of cotton mills in operation in 1897 was 154, with 37,303 looms and 3,975,719 spindles, employing the average number of 148,997 persons. The jute mills numbered 31, with 12,784 looms and 258,154 spindles, employing 91,389 persons. There were also 5 woolen mills, with 548 looms and 19,856 spindles. The coal mines number 145, producing 4,063,127 tons in 1897, and giving employment to 59,859 persons.

The foreign trade of India has increased from Rx 14,342,290 in 1835 to Rx 198,972,505 in 1898, although, owing to famine and plague, exports, which in 1896 reached Rx 111,295,697, having doubled in twenty years, fell off 8.16 per cent. in 1897 and 3.80 per cent. in 1898. The value of imports in 1898 was Rx 94,191,077; of exports, Rx 104,781,428. The merchandise imports were Rx 73,660,460; imports of treasure, Rx 20,530,617; merchandise exports, Rx 97,632,781; exports of treasure, Rx 7,148,647. The imports of treasure consisted of Rx 7,281.222 of gold and Rx 13,249,395 of silver; exports of treasure, Rx 2,372,733 of gold and Rx 4,775.914 of silver. Excluding Government stores and treasure, the total value of imports was Rx 89,896,406, consisting of Rx 69,420,120 of merchandise and Rx 20,476,286 of treasure; exports, Rx 104.671,442, consisting of Rx 97,537,273 of merOf the chandise and Rx 7,134,169 of treasure. merchandise exports Rx 93,786,101 were domestic products and Rx 3,751,172 were re-exports of foreign merchandise. The share of Bengal in the trade, excluding Government stores, was Rx 31,301,745 of imports and Rx 46,312,032 of exports; of Burmah, Rx 5,866,397 of imports and Rx 9,006,

980 of exports; of Madras, Rx 6,745,010 of imports and Rx 11,468,961 of exports; of Bombay, Rx 40,972,117 of imports and Rx 33,262,251 of exports; of Sind, Rx 5,011,137 of imports and Rx 4,621,218 of exports.

The imports of live animals in 1898 were Rx 227,631 in value, and exports Rx 141,422; imports of articles of food and drink Rx 10,740,816, and exports Rx 25,068,456; imports of hardware and cutlery Rx 1,477,811, and exports Rx 18,070; imports of metals Rx 6,189,912, and exports Rx 120,595; imports of machinery Rx 2,861,108, and exports Rx 119; imports of railroad material Rx 2,876,451, and exports Rx 4,561; imports of chemicals, drugs, etc., Rx 2,060,544, and exports Rx 10,366,802; imports of oils Rx 4,148,566, and exports Rx 651,675; imports of raw materials Rx 2,828,688, and exports Rx 37,101,481; imports of textile yarns and fabrics Rx 28,950,314, and exports Rx 14,433,400; imports of clothing Rx 1,226,629, and exports Rx 164,136; imports of all other articles Rx 5,833,650, and exports Rx 5,715,384. The principal imports of private merchandise were cotton manufactures for Rx 26,395,008, metals, hardware, and cutlery for Rx 7,667,722, sugar for Rx 4,784,479, oils for Rx 4,146,566, railroad plant and rolling stock for Rx 2,876,451, machinery and mill plant for Rx 2,861,108, silk and silk manufactures for Rx 1,819,032, provisions for Rx 1,705,721, liquors for Rx 1,588,494, drugs and chemicals for Rx 1,292,938, woolen goods for Rx 1,148,427, salt for Rx 868,718, dyes and tans for Rx 767,606, spices for Rx 744,773, grain and pulse for Rx 610,792, glass for Rx 576,671, coal for Rx 537,352, umbrellas for Rx 335,374, and paper for Rx 332,047. The principal exports of private merchandise, the produce of India, were rice for Rx 11,705,842, raw jute for Rx 10,129,992, raw cotton for Rx 8,871,313, seeds (mainly oil seeds) for Rx 8,594,100, hides and skins for Rx 8,317,534, cotton manufactures for Rx 8,151,338, tea for Rx 8,058,623, opium for Rx 6,097,563, jute manufactures for Rx 5,930,856, indigo for Rx 3,057,402, coffee for Rx 1,519,130, wool for Rx 1,356,537, wheat for Rx 1,341,151, timber for Rx 1,079,061, lac for Rx 1,070,920, oils for Rx 651,675, provisions for Rx 531,667, raw silk and cocoons for Rx 514,850, dyes and tans for Rx 482,047, spices for Rx 471,628, saltpeter for Rx 398,745, sugar for Rx 292,453, wool manufactures for Rx 223,899, and silk manufactures for Rx 126,041. Of the rice exports Rx 6,950,861 came from Burmah, Rx 3,001,664 from Bengal, Rx 1,277,260 from Madras, and the rest from Bombay and Sind. Of the wheat exports Rx 1,091,284 came from Sind and the rest mainly from Bombay. Of the exports of opium Rx 3,893,956 came from Bengal and Rx 2,203,607 from Bombay. Of indigo Rx 1,755,104 came from Bengal, Rx 1,066,445 from Madras, and the rest from Bombay and Sind. Of the cotton Rx 6,321,196 came from Bombay, and the rest from Sind, Madras, and Bengal, except a small quantity from Burmah. Of seeds Rx 4.671,395 came from Bombay, Rx 2,964,179 from Bengal, and the rest from Sind and Madras. On rice Rx 723,731 export duties were paid in 1897. The import duties amounted to Rx 6,302,983, of which salt produced Rx 2,556,073. Of the total imports in 1898 the value of Rx 57,820,879 came through the Suez Canal, and of the exports Rx 57,186,788 in value passed through the canal. The share of Calcutta in the import and export trade of 1898 was Rx 71,994,608; that of Bombay, Rx 52,063,062; that of Rangoon, Rx 12,346,725; that of Madras, Rx 10,161,018; that of Karachi, Rx 9,228,432. The coasting trade amounted in 1898 to Rx 75,859,238

The overland trade, which is not included in the statistics already given, is considerable, and is growing in importance. The value of the imports of merchandise by the land frontiers in 1898 was returned as Rx 5,022,500, and that of the exports by land as Rx 9,101,400. The largest trade is with Nepaul, amounting to Rx 1,914,200 of imports and Rx 1,491,400 of exports, after which come Kashmir, with Rx 769,700 of imports and Rx 560,100 of exports, and then the Shan States, Kandahar, Kabul, Bajaur, China, Tibet, Karenni, Zimme, Khelat, Lus Bela, Sewestan, Ladakh, and Siam.

The foreign trade of India in 1899 showed a remarkable recovery from the depression of the preceding two years. The exports, including treasure, exceeded Rx 120,000,000, the largest figure ever attained, and the imports amounted to Rx 90,000,000, which had only been twice exceeded. The surplus of Rx 30,000,000 had only been exceeded in three previous years. The net imports of treasure were Rx 10,484,192, of which Rx 6,500,000 represented gold, the highest amount of this metal ever absorbed by India in a year.

A bill imposing a duty on bounty-fed sugar imported into India was introduced in the Legislative Council on March 10, 1899. The sugar industry of India, in which 2,000,000 people are engaged, and which has yielded a crop worth £20,000,000, has declined in consequence of the unrestricted importation of beet sugar from Europe, which has been sold at a lower price than the normal cost of production of the Indian cane sugar. The Legislative Council unanimously passed the bill on March 20. In the British House of Commons a motion calling upon the Imperial Government to disallow the act was lost by a majority of 293 to 152. Numerous refineries had already been closed, and the area of production reduced 9 per cent. in the two years immediately preceding the recent increase of the bounties in France and Germany, which threatened to have a still more disastrous effect on the industry. Imports of beet sugar into India increased between 1895 and 1898 from 250,000 to 8,000,000 hundredweight as the result of doubling the bounties in 1896. Mauritius had felt the effect of the action of the Continental governments even more severely than the sugar-growing districts of Madras, northern India, and Bengal. The bill was framed on the lines of the United States tariff act of July, 1897, imposing a countervailing duty on sugar coming

from countries granting bounties. The Indian Government urged its claims for consideration on the Brussels sugar conference of 1898, where its views were opposed by the representatives of Russia and France. The new duty, unlike the salt tax, will fall mainly on the well-to-do, who are the only consumers of refined sugar in India. The agriculturists prepare their sugar for their own use, and the poorer classes everywhere prefer to use the cheap raw sugar to which they have been accustomed from time immemorial. The duty is imposed on all sugar from countries giving bounties, whether imported directly from the country of production or through other countries, and even when changed in condition by manufacture in another country. The Austrian Government protested against the Indian countervailing duty as opposed to the provisions of the most-favored-nation treaties, inasmuch as the duty would vary in proportion to the bounty, and thus cause unequal duties to be imposed on imports from different countries. Lord Salisbury, while admitting that the right of imposing countervailing duties was a matter of controversy, pointed out that when the American Government took similar action none of the states affected maintained their opposition, and pleaded that India was specially justified in the circumstances in which the industry of that country was placed. After one season of good crops, a failure of the rainfall in 1899 again caused great scarcity of food in many parts of India, and actual famine in an area containing about half as large a population as was affected by the failure of the monsoon in the autumn of 1866. The famine-stricken districts in 1897 comprised 260,000 square miles, containing a population of 70,000,000, though in about half of this area, with two thirds of the population, the famine was not severe. The deficiency in the food crops was about 18,000,000 tons of grain, the value of which was estimated at Rx 90,000,000. The losses of other crops amounted to about Rx 20,000,000 more. The expenditure of the Government for relief was Rx 19,000,000. The failure of crops in 1899 extended over 100,000 square miles in British territory, with a population of 15,000,000, and 250,000 square miles of native territory, containing 15,000,000 population. This area included five sixths of the Central Provinces and the southeastern part of the Punjab-districts where the agricultural population was still suffering from the depression caused by the previous famine. Bengal, half of the Northwest Provinces and Oudh, and the Burmah, Madras, and Mysore regions, including the most densely inhabited and highly cultivated tracts in India, suffered from no shortage of crops, although the pressure of high prices bore upon the laboring and city populations. The southern Mahratta districts, the south of the Deccan, the greater part of Hyderabad, the main districts in Central India, the western half of the Northwest Provinces, and the northern part of the Punjab suffered a marked deficiency, though nowhere was there a complete failure of crops. The total area affected seriously was half as large in British dominions, and the population only a third as great as in 1897. In the native states, however, the area of grave distress was more than three times as great, with more than twice the population. In Rajputana the people were threatened with a more serious situation than any that had occurred since the famine year 1869. The food stocks in all India were estimated to be sufficient for the requirements of the country until the rains should be due in July, 1900, and considerable quantities of foreign wheat were

delivered at Calcutta as soon as the prices reached the scarcity stage. The Government took more timely precautions than in 1896. The system of relief by means of poorhouses, doles, famine works, etc., was promptly set in operation. The Government promised also advances to agriculturists and remission of rent.

Navigation.--The total number of vessels in the foreign trade entered at British Indian ports during the year ending March 31, 1898, was 4,975, of 3,917,761 tons, of which 1,984, of 3,127,061 tons, were British, 946, of 142,882 tons, British Indian, 1,419, of 75,772 tons, native, and 626, of 572,046 tons, foreign. The total number cleared was 4,784, of 3,866,869 tons, of which 1,964, of 3,087,527 tons, were British, 923, of 138,500 tons, British Indian, 1,332, of 74,919 tons, native, and 565, of 565,923 tons, foreign. The total number of steamers entered was 578, of 1,454,321 tons; cleared, 758, of 1,790,223 tons. The number of vessels entered with cargoes in the interportal trade was 91,522, of 10,479,527 tons; cleared, 86,660, of 10,523,910 tons.

Railroads, Posts, and Telegraphs.-The total length of railroads in India on March 31, 1898, was 21,157 miles, of which the Indian Government owned 15,584 miles, native states 2,018 miles, foreign governments 73 miles, guaranteed companies 2,588 miles, and assisted companies 894. The State Railway Agency operated 5,307 miles, of which 5,161 miles belonged to the Government and 146 miles to native states; and the states operated 954 miles of their lines, while companies operated 10,422 miles of the lines belonging to the Indian Government and 919 miles belonging to the native states, besides 3,483 miles of their own, making 14,824 miles in all. The capital expenditure, including unfinished lines, surveys, and coal mines, was Rx 285,211,784, of which total the Indian state railways represent Rx 170,421,746, the state lines leased to companies Rx 38,224,662, guaranteed railways Rx 50,709,764, assisted companies Rx 10,921,414, native state lines Rx 12,385,252, foreign lines Rx 1,750,179, surveys Rx 491,196, and collieries Rx 307,571. The gross receipts of all the railroads for 1897 were Rx 25,595,169, of which Rx 8,858,875 came from 151,263,816 passengers and Rx 15,875,883 from 33,698,617 tons of freight carried. The working expenses were Rx 12,511,163, being 48.88 per cent. of the gross earnings, leaving Rx 13,084,006 for the net earnings, which gave an average return of 5.04 per cent. on the capital expended on lines in operation.

The number of letters, postal cards, and money orders that passed through the post offices of British India during 1897 was 397,897,840; the number of newspapers, 29,778.291; of parcels, 2,708,769; of packets, 19,341,398. The receipts were Rx 1,783,473; expenses, Rx 1,698,156.

The Government telegraph lines on March 31, 1897, had a total length of 48,584 miles, with 148,136 miles of wire. The number of messages sent during the year was 5,077,584. The receipts were Rx 1,071,524; expenses, Rx 946,759.

Adoption of the Gold Standard.-The Indian Currency Committee appointed in 1898 gave in its report to the Secretary of State early in July. Gold was accepted by the Government in payment for public dues, but the rupee was by law the only legal tender. There was no legal relation between rupees and gold, although the Government had declared until further notice a rate at which rupees could be purchased for gold coin or bullion, and this rate of 18. 4d. for the rupee served to determine the maximum limit to which under that arrangement sterling exchange could

rise. The committee concurred in the decision of the Government of India not to revert to the silver standard. The policy of declaring in favor of the reopening of the mints to silver when circumstances indicate it as advisable, continuing meanwhile the existing arrangements, would rest on the hope of a rise in the gold price of silver or a fall in the rate of sterling exchange; but its adoption could only be justified by a belief that it would be advisable to return to silver monometallism. As to the possibility of an international agreement on a ratio, the governments concerned had made no fresh proposals since the negotiations of the United States and France with Great Britain in 1897 proved fruitless. The numerous persons in India who desired a lower rate of exchange than 1s. 4d., and would fix the rupee at 18. 3d. or 18. 2d., base their opinion on a belief that such lower rate would stimulate production and the export trade. Any stimulus derived from a falling rate of exchange would, however, prove but transitory, and could only continue until circumstances brought about the inevitable adjustment. A steady exchange is indeed more favorable to the export trade than a rapidly falling exchange. The committee found no statistical support for the theory that exports are largely and permanently stimulated by a depreciation in the standard of value, resulting in a fall in exchange. Robert Campbell and Sir John Muir dissented from the other members of the committee in so far as they believed that the experience of six years had not sufficiently justified the adoption of the 1s. 4d. rate of exchange, which represents the ratio of 22 to 1. The only practical alternative at the present time to silver monometallism the committee found to be the gold standard-that is, gold as the measure of value in India, either with a gold currency or a gold reserve. Over 80 per cent. of the foreign trade of India is with countries having the gold standard. A further important consideration for a country like India is that a gold standard is the simplest and most efficacious means of attracting foreign capital. India needs capital from abroad for the purpose of developing her productive resources, and she needs also a periodic inflow of money every year for the purpose of moving the crops, the want of which is seen from the fluctuations of discount rates at different seasons, the variations reaching 7 per cent. or more every year. A gold standard is the only means, in the opinion of the committee, by which these benefits can be obtained in present conditions, but its effective establishment would not preclude India hereafter from considering responsible proposals for an international agreement. The undertaking of the Government to give rupees for gold at the rate of 16d. had practically the result of making gold a legal tender, and of fixing a stable rate of exchange and attracting a stock of gold amounting already to over £2, 000,000, which was held as a reserve against the paper currency. A growth of confidence result ing from the definite adoption of the gold standard would tend to produce greater results in the future. Unless the Government was empowered to pay out gold in cashing its notes or meeting other liabilities, it could not go on receiving it into the paper-currency reserve or the treasury. It seemed urgent to the committee that steps should be taken to avoid all possibility of doubt as to the determination not to revert to a silver standard, but to proceed with measures for the effective establishment of a gold standard. The proposals of the Indian Government did not commend themselves to the committee. The danger

of the withdrawal of gold by the natives for hoarding did not appear to the committee to present such practical difficulties as to justify a permanent refusal to allow India to possess the normal accompaniment of a gold standardnamely, a gold currency. The committee was in favor of making the British sovereign a legal tender and current coin in India and of throwing open at the same time the mints of India to the unrestricted coinage of gold on the same terms and conditions as those governing the Australian branches of the royal mint. The result would be that the sovereign would be coined and would circulate both in Great Britain and India, and there would be an effective gold standard and a free inflow and outflow of gold. The committee did not recommend these measures for immediate adoption, and considered that for some time to come it would not be advisable to limit the legal tender of rupees in discharge of debt. The gold reserve should be freely used for remittances when exchange falls below specie par, as this is its principal use; and the Government of India should make its gold available for this purpose whenever the necessity arises, under such conditions as circumstances may render desirable. If exchange shows a tendency to fall below the specie point, the Government might remit gold to England, the India bills of the Secretary of State being correspondingly reduced; and when it has accumulated a sufficient reserve it might discharge obligations in India in gold. The exclusive right to coin rupees must remain vested in the Government of India, which should continue to give rupees for gold, but should not coin fresh rupees until the proportion of gold in the currency is found to exceed the requirements of the public. The committee recommended also that the profit on the coinage of rupees should not be credited to the revenue or held as an ordinary balance, but should be kept in gold as a special reserve apart from the paper-currency reserve. The committee recommended the retention of the 16d. rate instead of a lower one or a higher one, not because it is indicated on any theoretical grounds, but because the business world has accepted this provisional rate as the permanent rate at which the Indian monetary standard is to be transferred from a silver to a gold basis, and because prices have adjusted themselves to that ratio and it is the one on which debts have been contracted. For the speedy attainment of an effective gold standard it is con

sidered desirable that the Government of India shall husband its resources, exercise strict economy, and restrict the growth of its gold obligations. E. A. Hambro thought that the establishment of a Government bank would facilitate the carrying out of the policy recommended. W. H. Holland advised making no change until the provisional arrangement had been tested further. Robert Campbell and Sir John Muir joined him in appending to the report a warning against borrowing in sterling either for the establishment or the maintenance of a gold standard, and incurring a load of debt and its consequent addition to the home charges, only to find, perhaps, that an impracticable scheme had been pursued which, when left to its own merits, must break down.

The Government adopted most of the recommendations of the committee. The bill introduced in the Legislative Council on Sept. 8 made the sovereign legal tender in India, and provided for the striking of gold coins in the Indian mints, which were proclaimed a branch of the royal mint of Great Britain. The rupee was fixed at

18. 4d. Clinton Dawkins, the financial member of the Viceroy's Council, disclaimed any hostility to silver, and the Viceroy argued that only with a gold standard could India enter upon a discussion of international bimetallism upon equal terms with foreign powers. The Government accepted no obligation to exchange gold for rupees. The rupee currency should expand in response to trade demands, as the exchange of rupees for gold would render the currency more elastic and could have no tendency to produce a monetary stringency, although there might be a stringency of loanable capital. The Secretary of State, in accepting generally the committee's recommendations and communicating the decision of the British Government in favor of acting on the principles recommended, impressed upon the Indian Government the advisability of making the gold reserve freely available for foreign remittances whenever circumstances render it desirable. The people of India of all classes and the English who are engaged in tea planting or other productive industries opposed the closing of the mints in 1893 to silver, the adoption of the rate of 1s. 4d., and the final adoption of the gold standard. The gold-standard party in India consisted of the foreign merchants, who were exasperated by the fluctuations in exchange, and the AngloIndian officials, who receive their salaries or part of them in rupees. When the value of the ru pee began to deviate considerably from the old rate of 28. the Government decreed that the salaries and pensions of the higher officials should continue to be paid at that rate in gold; those of the intermediate officials half in gold, representing their savings and remittances to their families in England, and half in silver, answering for their expenses in India; while the lower grades of officials, Anglo-Indian, Eurasian, and native, whose expenditures were confined to the country, received their salaries in silver rupees, which came to be worth half as much in gold as they had formerly been. The Government itself became most anxious to arrest the fall of the rupee, because its downward movement disturbed all financial calculations by the constantly growing item of loss by exchange on the remittance of £15,000,000 to £18,000,000 sterling to England every year. These home charges represented partly the pensions, civil and military, that had been made payable in pounds sterling instead of in tens of rupees, but to a greater extent the debts contracted in England to cover budget deficits, to build railroads, and for other purposes, all of which are payable in gold. The India of the Indians, on the other hand, prospered on the cheap rupee, and built up a grain-export trade, a cotton industry, and many other thriving branches of commerce and enterprise. The royal commission that was appointed in 1895 to inquire into the expenditure of the Government of India, owing to a hopeless disagreement among its members or to some other cause, adjourned its proceedings in July, 1897, and neither made a report nor gave any other sign of existence.

New Frontier Policy.-The Mad Fakir, whose followers caused serious disturbances in the upper Swat valley, occupied in December, 1898, the crest of the watershed overlooking the valley of the Panjkora. He came in contact there with the forces of the Nawab of Dir, which were barring his advance into the valley. The Azi Khel jirgah, an influential clan inhabiting the extreme eastern portion of the upper Swat valley, gave pledges to support the Government and to exert influence on the other clans in the upper valley to help in expelling the Fakir from the country.

It

Fighting occurred in the Sebujni valley, where the Fakir was besieged by the men of the Dir tribe, who attacked his fort, which he abandoned, crossing into the upper Swat valley again and returning to his former stronghold at Pitai, where he had between 300 and 400 men who remained true to him. Gen. A. Reid's movable column was then encamped at Chakdora. moved 7 miles up the valley, and made a camp near Landikai. To reassure the inhabitants, a regiment of Bengal lancers patrolled the upper Swat valley. The Fakir also made visits to the different tribes of the valley, and endeavored to get them to join his standard so as to preserve their country from British occupation. The Azi Khels, however, were kept loyal by the exertions of the British officers, and they not only refused to allow him to enter their country, but marched out against him and pursued his force into the Jinki Khel territory, where his fortress of Pitai was situated. They even induced a section of the Jinki Khels to withdraw their support from the cause of the Mad Fakir. This reduced his influence to insignificance. The Khani Khels of the Chamkanni tribe made a raid in the Kurram valley in February, 1899. A detachment of troops under the political officer inflicted reprisals by destroying villages and seizing cattle. The fortification of the Khaibar pass was not proceeded with on the original extensive plan, because Lord Curzon's Government decided to withdraw the garrison of British troops and leave the Khaibar rifles to defend the pass, keeping troops in readiness at Peshawur to march up if these should be faithless or prove insufficient to hold it against outside foes. The usual reliefs were not sent to the forts at Chitral in the spring. The Government decided to reduce the garrison and the defensive works to be held. The incursions of the Waziris and of Afghans into the Kuram valley led to a punitive column being sent in May. The new frontier scheme adopted by Lord Curzon relative to the Khaibar involved · the abandonment of the projected railroad through the pass. On the Samana and in the Kuram the new frontier policy was adopted also. English garrisons were withdrawn, and the defense of the frontier was left to native militia under British officers. The Indian press praised the new policy not only as immediately reducing frontier expenses, but as calculated to conciliate the tribes and avert the dangers that had resulted before from irritating the independent hill peoples. When Lord Curzon arrived in India the Government was committed to a policy involving the construction of large fortifications and the maintenance of the existing garrison in Chitral; to making a new fort at Landi Kotral and fortifying other positions in the Khaibar, and building a railroad into Afghanistan through this pass; to considerable expenditure on forts and garrisons on the Samana range; to maintaining a large garrison of regular troops in the Tochi valley; to establishing a central station at Miranshah and placing garrisons in fortified posts at various points in this section of the border; and to maintaining a regular garrison at Wana for the purpose of guarding the Gomal route and Waziristan. The measures adopted after Lord Curzon had examined the situation involved a wide departure from the plans of his predecessor. It was decided to maintain only the escort of the political officer in the fort at Chitral, and, instead of extending the fortifications there, to remove the garrison to Drosh, building a fort there to dominate the Dir country. By securing the cooperation of the Mehtar of Chitral, his levies