faith, the trial court properly held that they were entitled to recover, in addition to the damages for the loss of their bargain, the amount expended in making such improvements. The contract itself provides that the plaintiffs should build a house upon the lot within three months; and his loss in consequence of such expenditure is the natural and legitimate result of the unauthorized acts of the defendaut. Skaaraas v. Finnegan. Opinion by Vanderburgh, J.

[Decided May 17, 1884.]

SALE-WHEN CONDITIONAL AND NOT MORTGAGE— IMPEACHING WITNESS.-Where A. conveys land to B. by absolute deed, and B. at the same time executes to A. a bond or agreement conditioned to reconvey the land to A. upon payment of a certain sum of money at a time specified, the transaction between the parties apon this simple state of facts purports to be, and prima facie is, what is called a conditional sale and not a mortgage. Except in Pennsylvania, where a somewhat peculiar doctrine appears to prevail, an examination of the adjudged cases will generally show that where a deed absolute and a simultaneous bond or agreement for reconveyance have been held to constitute a mortgage, other facts have appeared in addition to the simple facts of a deed and bond or agreement. Henley v. Hotaling, 41 Cal. 22; Haynie v. Robertson, 58 Ala. 37; 1 Jones Mortg., § 260 et seq. A mortgage is a security for something to be paid or performed; hence facts showing that a deed upon its face absolute is really intended as a security, show it to be a mortgage. Instances of this are where it appears that there is a loan of money by the grantee to the grantor, whether evidenced by the grantor's notes or by other express obligation, or even without any personal obligation of payment on the part of the grantor, and the purpose of the transaction embodied in the deed and bond or agreement for reconveyance is the repayment of a sum loaned, with or without interest. Belote v. Morrison, 8 Minu. 87 (Gil. 62); Hill v. Edwards, 11 Minn. 22 (Gil, 5); Holton v. Meighen, 15 Miun. 69 (Gil. 50); Fisk v. Stewart, 24 Minn. 97; Benton v. Nicoll, id. 221. And see Flagg v. Mann, 14 Pick. 467; Alstin v. Cundiff, 52 Tex. 453., So also if the deed was given for purposes of indemnity. Archambau v. Green, 21 Minn. 520. In such cases the bond or agreement for reconveyance is considered a defeasance, so that the transaction is a mortgage, within the definition given by Chief Justice Shaw in Bayley v. Bailey, 5 Gray, 505, as a “conveyance of real estate, or some interest therein, defeasible upon the payment of money or the performance of some other condition." In considering whether a transaction by absolute deed, and simultaneous bond or agreement for reconveyauce, is a mortgage or a conditional sale, the important question is, what was the intention of the parties? Did they intend security or sale? This intention is to be ascertained by looking at the written memorials of the transaction, and its attendant facts and circumstances. Cornell v. Hali, 22 Mich. 377; Alstin v. Cudliff, supra; Smith v. Crosby, 47 Wis. 160; S. C., 2 N. W. Rep. 104; Henley v. Hotaling, 41 Cal. 22; Edrington v. Harper, 3 J. J. Marsh. 353; Hill v. Edwards, supra; Holton v. Meighen, supra. (2) There are authorities holding that impeaching witnesses must speak from their knowledge of the reputation, at the time of the trial, of the witnesses sought to be impeached. Chance v. Indianapolis, etc., Co., 32 Ind. 472; Rawles v. State, 56 id. 433; Mitchell v. Com., 78 Ky. 219. But the better doctrine, and that supported by the weight of authority, and in our opinion by considerations of practical good sense, is that there is no inflexible rule confining the reputation (for truth and veracity) which may properly be given in evidence to impeach a witness, to his reputation at or very near the time of the trial at

which he testifies; but that as respects this matter of time, it is for the court to receive or reject the proposed impeaching testimony, in the exercise of a sound discretion. Teese v. Huntingdon, 23 How. 2; Sleeper v. Van Middlesworth, 4 Denio, 431; Kelly v. State, 61 Ala. 19; Rathbun v. Ross, 46 Barb. 127; Snow v. Grace, 29 Ark. 131. There may be cases where it would be held that the trial court abused its discretion, but we perceive no occasion for so holding in the present instance. Buse v. Page. Opinion by Berry, J. [Decided May 22, 1884.]

NEW JERSEY COURT OF CHANCERY ABSTRACT.*

MARRIAGE-SETTLEMENT - POWERS OF TRUSTEEREVOCATION CLAUSE.-Where a marriage sttlement authorizes and empowers the trustee to sell and invest and re-invest the trust property at the direction of the wife, and to pay over the income to her, with a provision that if she survives her husband the trustee is to re-convey the property to her, and it contains no revocation clause, she cannot, during her husband's lifetime, require of the trusstee the payment of the proceeds of the sale of the trust property. Buchanan v. Paterson. Opinion by Runyon, Chancellor.

TRUST-COURT WILL FOLLOW FUNDS.-On October 26, 1881, one Baldwin, who was one of the executors and the general financial manager and custodian of the securities of an estate, and also the cashier of a National bank, purchased four bills of exchange for $6,535 each, dated October 16, 19 21 and 24, 1881, payable in six months, which had been accepted by the drawees, and were made payable to the drawers and indorsed by them. Baldwin, to pay for the bills, drew from the bank on his check as executor $25,000 from the deposit of the credit of the estate, and placed in the box containing the papers of the estate, usually kept in the cashier's desk in the bank, the four drafts, with this memorandum attached: "Est. W. James, loan $25,000, October 26, 1881. C. Nugent & Co." The proceeds of the drafts were applied to the drawer's indebtedness to the bank. The bank failed on October 31, 1881, and the defendant was appointed receiver on November 2, 1881. He gave to the executors the box and all its contents, except the four drafts, which he kept, claiming that they were the assets of the bank. He refused to deliver them on demand, and collected them at maturity, but kept the proceeds separate. Held, that Baldwin, in the purchase of the drafts, acted as the agent of the drawers and as executor and not as cashier, and though the drafts were paid for by law with funds which the estate had on deposit" in the bank, and though Baldwin knew at the time that the bank was insolvent, yet the transaction being a bona fide purchase, and not a plan to secure preference of the estate over other depositors, the transaction was not in violation of section 5242 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which forbids the transfer of any bills of exchange, etc., owing to any National bank * after the commission of any act of insolvency, or in contemplation thereof; and further, that this court has jurisdiction to follow the proceeds of the drafts as trust property so long as they are identifiable, and to decree their payment to the estate. Tuttle v. Frelinghuysen. Opinion by Runyon, Chancel

* *

lor.

*

MORTGAGE-PURCHASE-MONEY-SECOND LIEN. — - A

purchase-money mortgage may be made a second lien by an agreement made after the sale between the vendor and another mortgagee of the premises, where the *Appearing in 58 N. J. Eq. Reports.

agreement has been consummated by recording the other mortgage before the vendor's, and by the vendor's knowingly acquiescing therein for several years. Mutual Loan, Savings and Building Association v. Elwell. Opinion by Runyon, Chancellor.

WILI LEGACIES- ADEMPTION.- A testator by his will made in 1863 gave to his wife for life the use of his homestead farm, together with the furniture, etc., excepting the house then occupied by his son Abraham, with certain appurtenances. He gave to his son David the land whereon David then lived, and for which he had given David a deed in 1858, and also $800 which he had given David in 1863 as David's full share. He gave his daughter Dorothy for life, after his wife's death, if Dorothy should survive his wife, the use of the house, garden, etc., and also $3,000, to be invested by his executors, the interest to be paid to her annually, and if insufficient for her support then a specified part of the principal yearly, and if Dorothy should die "without heirs," her share was to be equally divided between David and Abraham. He then gave Abraham his homestead farm after the death of his (testator's wife, excepting Dorothy's right therein. He also gave to his three grandchildren $1,000 each when they should arrive at the age of twenty-five years. Testator died in 1881, and his wife predeceased him. He had no real estate other than that devised, and his personal estate is not sufficient to pay the debts and legacies. Held, that the legacies are not charged on the land, and must abate proportionally, and that testator did not die intestate as to the amount of the legacy given to one of the grandchildren, which was adeemed during testator's life-time. Brands v. Hartung. Opinion by Runyon, Chancellor.

BANK-RECEIVER-SET-OFF BY DEPOSITOR.-The capital stock of the bank is the trust fund for the security and payment of the creditors, and it is the duty and legal obligation of the stockholders to pay it in according to their agreement, in order that it may be applied to the payment of the debts. A stockholder is not relieved from that duty and obligation by the fact that he is a creditor. To permit him to set-off the debt due him would, where the corporation is insolvent, manifestly give him a preference as a creditor. To this he is not entitled. It is the right of the other creditors to have him pay in the money due from him for stock as part of the fund for the payment of the debts. The principle has frequently been enunciated, and is established. Stockton v. Mechanics and Lab. Sav. Bank, 5 Stew. Eq. 163; Vanatta v. N. J. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 4 id. 15; Sawyer v. Hoag, 17 Wall. 610; Lawrence, Receiver, v. Nelson, 21 N. Y. 158; Wood v. Dum mer, 3 Mason, 308; Hillier v. Allegheny Ins. Co., 3 Penn. St. 470; Grissell's case, L. R. (1 Ch. App.) 528; Black & Co.'s case, L. R. (8 Ch. App.) 254. Williams v. Traphagen. Opinion by Runyon, Chaucellor.

WILL-" DIE LEAVING LAWFUL ISSUE"-CONSTRUCTION.-A testator gave his residuary estate to his four children. George, Mary, Henry and Charles, to be equally divided among them, and "in case of the death of any one or more of my children without leaving lawful issue, it is my will, and I direct that the share or shares of the one or more so dying shall go to the survivor or survivors of my children; but if any of my children shall die leaving lawful issue living, such issue to take the share his, her or their parent would have taken, share and share alike." The will was dated May 10, 1869, and testator died February 11, 1870. At his death he had the four children mentioned, and they are still living. George and Henry have children; Mary and Charles are unmarried. Held, that the intention of the testator was to give each of his children an absolute estate in the residue, subject only to be de

feated by the death of the child in testator's life-time. In Clayton v. Lowe, 5 B. & Ald. 636, a testator, after bequeathing a specific legacy, devised all and every other part of his real and personal estate to be equally divided between his three grandchildren, share and share alike, forever, and provided that if either of them should happen to die without child or children lawfully begotten, then such part or share of the one so dying should be equally divided among the survivors; but if any of them should die and leave child or children lawfully begotten, such child or children should have their parent's share equally divided amongst them, share and share alike. It was held that under that devise the grandchildren took an estate in fee simple as tenants in common. In Gee v. Corporation of Manchester, 17 Ad. & E. (N. S.) 737, where a testator devised and bequeathed his real and personal estate to be divided equally amongst his children in follow

manner

ing, viz.: "I will and bequeath to my eldest son A. one-seventh share of my property to A.'s heirs, executors and administrators." And in like terms be gave a like share to each of his six other children, and added: "And in case any of my sons or daughters die without issue that their share returns to my sons and daughters equally amongst them; and in case any of my sons and daughters die and leaving issue, that they take their deceased parent's share, share and share alike." All the children survived the testator. It was held that the word "die" in the provision just quoted must be construed to mean death in the testator's lifetime, and consequently that each of the testator's children took a fee simple in one-seventh of the real estate, and an absolute interest in oue-seventh of the personal. So too in Lifford v. Sparrow, 13 East, 359; Edwards v. Edwards, 15 Beav. 357; Slaney v. Slaney, 33 id. 631; Home v. Pillans, 2 Myl. & K. 15; Da Costa v. Keir, 3 Russ. 360; and Ware v. Watson, 7 De G. M. & G. 248; and in this State in Pennington v. Van Houten, 4 Halst. Ch. 272; S. C., on appeal, id. 745; Williamson v. Chamberlain, 2 Stockt. 373; Wurts v. Page, 4 C. E. Gr. 365; and Baldwin v. Taylor, 10 Stew. Eq. 78. In the last named case the provision was as follows: "In relation to the several gifts and devises to my children in this, my last will and testament, it is my will, and I do direct that if any of them shall die leaving heirs their portion shall go to such heirs; if not it shall be divided equally among my surviving children." It was held that the contingency of death was that of death before vesting. Barrell v. Barrell. Opinion by Runyon, Chancellor.

MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

MASTER AND SERVANT-SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT— PARTNERSHIP-DAMAGES-DOCTOR S BILL.- (1) In an action against a master for an injury done by his servant while driving a wagon, evidence that the master's name was upon the wagon used at the time of the accident is admissible to show the relationship of master and servant. (2) Evidence of the continued and notorious habits of a servant in doing his master's business tends to show the master's knowledge of the acts and permission to do them, and is competent to show that the servant was acting within the scope of his employment. (3) Matters of belief are admissible in evidence to show the existence of a partnership, that question being material. (4) A married woman may recover the amount of a doctor's bill and the expenses of her sickness in an action against a master for an injury done by his servant. Schulte v. Holliday. Opinion by Sherwood, J.

[Decided June 11, 1884.]

NEGLIGENCE-SEARCHER OF TITLE-PLEADING-ALLEGATIONS OF NEGLIGENCE AND FRAUD.-If one enters into a contract with another to examine the records to see if title to certain property is free and unincumbered, the law presumes an undertaking on his part that he possesses the requisite knowledge and skill, and that he will use due and ordinary care in the performance of his duty, and if he fail so to do, and such failure result in damages to the plaintiff, she is entitled to recover. Chase v. Heaney, 70 Ill. 268; Clark v. Marshall, 34 Mo. 429; Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195; Shear. & R. Neg., § 288; Warvelle, Abst. 7. The use in the complaint of words imputing fraud, in connection with others imputing negligence, the latter being the gravamen of the complaint, does not make it essential for the plaintiff to prove fraud in order to recover. In arriving at what the grievance complained of is, and the manner in which the wrong was inflicted, the whole count must be taken and construed together. The facts and circumstances alleged show that there was no intent to do a wrongful act, or to omit the performance of a duty, but the absence of the proper attention, care or skill. It alleges strictly non-feasance and not a misfeasance, which marks the distinction between negligence and fraud. Gardner v. Heartt, 3 Den. 232, 236. Smith v. Holmes. Opinion by Champlin, J.

MASTER AND SERVANT-RISKS-DUTY OF MASTERNEGLIGENCE.-(1) A servant, who voluntarily accepts a dangerous employment, assumes all the patent risks incident thereto, and his master is not liable for damages in case of an accident, occurring from such risk, in the course of such dangerous employment. (2) It is not negligence in a master to fail to provide against a patent risk unless he has been requested to do so by his servant, or has induced his servant to believe that he would do so. (3) Unless there is evidence of a request by a servant to provide against a patent risk, the jury cannot consider the question whether it was the duty of his master to remedy it or not. (4) A master is not liable for injuries to his servants, if they have been guilty of contributory negligence. Marsden v. Haigh. Opinion per Curiam.

[Decided Feb. 25, 1884.]

ADVERSE POSSESSION-PAYMENT OF TAXES-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-PAROL CONTRACT AS TO LAND. - An entry upon land is not adverse which is made under a license to lay water pipes to springs thereon, and to change the effect of this entry and make the holding adverse it is not enough to drive stakes around the springs to keep cattle off, but the tenant must keep up the fences and prevent the land from being turned into common. Stephens v. Leach, 7 Har. 262. Payment of taxes assessed upon real estate without the requisite possession cannot make title under the statute. Sorber v. Willing, 10 Watts, 141. Where title is claimed under a parol contract of sale, the evidence of such contract, and of perform

ance thereunder, must be definite and unequivocal, in order to take the case out of the statute of frauds. Wood v. Farmare, 10 Watts, 195; Christy v. Barnhart, 2 Har. 260; Brawdy v. Brawdy, 7 Barr. 157; see also Moore v. Small, 7 Har. 461; Postlethwait v. Frease, 7. Cas. 472. Lund v. Brown. Opinion by Gordon, J.

WILL-CAPACITY-UNDUE INFLUENCE — CONFIDENTIAL ADVISER - TESTATRIX'S DECLARATIONS. - The fact that a testatrix, a married woman, at and immediately before the signing of her will (which had been previously written), was in a state of intense nervous excitement and apprehension of death, caused by her being about to submit to a dangerous surgical operation, and aggravated by a quarrel with a member of her family, is not sufficient to warrant the court in awarding an issue devisavit vel non, on the allegations of testamentary incapacity, and that the testatrix was unduly influenced by prejudice and passion; especially where, as in this case, the testatrix recovered from the surgical operation and afterward made no change in her will. The fact that by said will the testatrix's confidential legal adviser, who wrote it, was made one of the executors thereof (but not a devisee or legatee thereunder), is not sufficient, under the above stated circumstances, and upon his propounding the will for probate after retaining it for four years after the testatrix's death, to cast upon him the burden of proving testamentary capacity and the absence of undue influence. Boyd v. Boyd, 16 P. F. Smith, 283; Cuthbertson's Appeal, 1 Out. 163; Wilson's Appeal, 3 id. 545, distinguished. The seventh section of the act of April 11, 1848, requiring that a will by a married woman shall "be executed in the presence of two witnesses, neither of whom shall be her husband," must be read in connection with the general act of 1833. The word "executed," in the act of 1848, refers to the formality of making a will required by the act of 1833, with the additional requisite that it shall be done in the presence of the two witnesses. Hence all that is necessary to the execution of a valid married woman's will is that two witnesses, neither of whom shall be her husband, shall be present when the testamentary paper is signed by her, and either see her sigu it, or receive the acknowledgment of the genuineness of her signature thereto. It is not necessary that the subscribing witnesses should be able to testify affirmatively that the testatrix knew that the instrument which she signed was her will, or that she formally published or declared it to be her will in any other way than by signing it, and requesting them to attest her signature. Lenton's Appeal. Opinion by Sterrett, J.

[Decided Jan. 7, 1884.]

PARTNERSHIP-WHEN PROPERTY OF IS PERSONAL ESTATE-STIPULATIONS AS TO DISSOLUTION.- The current profits of a partnership business are personal property and descend as such, whether the property of the firm be real or personal. During the continuance of a partnership agreement all the property of the firm, including real estate acquired with partnership funds and used for partnership purposes, must be regarded as personal estate. Stipulations in articles of copartnership for the continuance of the partnership after the death of a member are valid and binding, and prevent a dissolution. Under such stipulations, the interest of a deceased partner, and the profits arising therefrom, are personal property, and descend as such under the intestate laws. The decision in Foster's Appeal, 24 P. F. Smith, 391, much relied upon for the appellants, is predicated of a dissolved firm with all its debts paid and a residuum of unconverted land remaining in specie for mere purposes of distribution. But there are no such facts here. It cannot now be

known that the real estate will not be required for the payment of debts. The firm still continues its business under a lawful agreement to that effect. Whenever a dissolution shall be established and a final settlement of accounts shall take place, the positions con'tended for, and the reasoning by which they are enforced, will become entirely applicable, and will exercise a very potent and possibly a controlling influence upon the questions which will then arise between the present litigants or those who may succeed them. But upon the present state of the record, we think the appellee is clearly entitled to the dividend in question, as the successor to his deceased wife's title. Leaf's Appeal. Opinion by Green, J. [Decided April 28, 1884.]

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS. CORPORATION-SECRETARY --FORGED CERTIFICATE OF STOCK-ESTOPPEL-LIABLE TO TRANSFEREE.-The plaintiff, having purchased for value shares in the defendant's company, discovered, upon application for registration, that his vendor's name was not registered for the shares, and his transfer and certificate had both been forged by the company's secretary. It was part of the secretary's duty to receive and examine transfers and certificates, to have transfers registered, to procure the preparation, execution and signature of certificates with all requisite and prescribed formalities, and thereupon to issue them to the persons entitled to receive them. One of the prescribed formalities was the signature of a director as well as that of the secretary. Held, that the company had authorized their secretary to warrant the genuineness of certificates, and were estopped from disputing their liability upon a certificate issued by him, notwithstanding his forgery of the document. Q. B. Div. May 19, 1884. Shaw v. Port Philip Co., Limited. Opinions by Stephen and Matthews, JJ. (50 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 685.)

WILL-UNEXPRESSED TRUST-LETTER FOUND AFTER TESTATOR'S DEATH.-If a trust of property given by a will is not declared when the will is made, in order to make it binding it is necessary that it should be communicated to the devisee or legatee in the testator's life-time, and that he should accept that particular trust, or possibly it might be sufficient that the trust should be put in writing, and placed in his hands in a sealed packet, and that he should undertake to hold the property upon the trusts so declared, though he did not know what they were. A testator cannot, by imposing an indefinite trust upon a devisee or legatee, the objects of which he does not communicate to him, make a valid declaration of trust of the property given by a letter, not executed as a testamentary instrument, found amongst his papers after his death, and not placed by him in the hands of the devisee or legatee. In such a case the devisee or legatee, admitting himself to be a trustee, will be held to be a trustee for the testator's next of kin. Kay, J., said: "If it had been expressed on the face of the will that the defendant was a trustee, but the trusts were not thereby declared, it is quite clear that no trusts afterward declared by a paper, not executed as a will, could be binding. Johnson v. Ball; Briggs v. Penny, 3 Mac. & G. 546; Singleton v. Tomlinson, 38 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 653; 3 App. Cas. 404. In such a case the legatee would be trustee for the next of kin. There is another wellknown class of cases where no trust appears on the face of the will, but the testator has been induced to make the will, or having made it, has been induced not to revoke it by a promise on the part of the devisee or legatee to deal with the property, or some part of it, in a special manner. In these cases the court has

compelled discovery and performance of the promise, treating it as a trust binding the conscience of the donee, on the ground that otherwise a fraud would be committed; because it is to be presumed that if it had not been for such promise the testator would not have made or would have revoked the gift. The principle of these decisions is precisely the same as in the case of an heir who has induced a testator not to make a will devising the estate away from him by a promise that if the estate were allowed to descend he would make a certain provision out of it for a named person. Stickland v. Aldridge, 9 Ves. 516; Wallgrave 5. Tebbs; and McCormick v. Grogan. But no case has ever yet decided that a testator can, by imposing a trust upon his devisee or legatee, the objects of which he does not communicate to him, enable himself to evade the statute of wills by declaring those objects in an unattested paper found after his death. The essence of all those decisions is that the devisee or legatee accepts a particular trust, which thereupon becomes binding upon him, and which it would be a fraud in him not to carry into effect. If the trust was not declared when the will was made, in order to make it binding, it is essential that it should be communicated to the devisee or legatee in the testator's lifetime, and that he should accept that particular trust. It may possibly be that he would be bound if the trust had been put in writing, and placed in his hands in a sealed envelope, and he had engaged that he would hold the property given to him by the will upon the trusts so declared, although he did not know the actual terms of the trust. McCormick v. Grogan. But the reason is that it must be assumed that if he had not so accepted the will would be revoked-suppose the case of an engagement to hold the property, not upon the terms of any paper communicated to the legatee, or put into his hands, but of any paper that might be found after the testator's death. The evidence in this case does not amount to that, but if it did, the rule of law would intervene, which prevents a testator from decluring trusts in such a manner by a paper which was not executed as a will or codicil. The legatee might be a trustee, but the trust declared by such an unattested paper would not be good. For this purpose there is no difference whether the devisee or legatee is declared to be a trustee on the face of the will, or by an engagement with the testator not appearing on the will; the devisee or legatee cannot, by accepting an indefinite trust, enable the testator to make an unattested codicil. I cannot help regretting that the testator's intention of bounty should fail by reason of an informality of this kind; but in my opinion it would be a serious innovation upon the law relating to testamentary instruments if this were to be established as a trust in the favor of Mrs. Brown. The defendant however having admitted that he is only a trustee, I must hold, on the authority of Mucklestone v. Brown, 6 Ves. 52; Briggs v. Penny, and Johnson v. Ball, that he is a trustee of this property for the next of kin of the testator. Chy. Div. March 29, 1884. Matter of Boyes. (50 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 582.)

CORRESPONDENCE.

MR. BACON SAYS HE IS Not Cato. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

Do not imagine that I undervalue the honor of being mentioned in your pages. Even to be evil spoken of by you is not without advantage, for you will surely speak of me again when you are called upon to set me right.

Permit me then to say that I have not, as you imply, arrogated to myself the functions of a permanent censor of my fellow lawyers' morals. Under invitation

from the American Social Science Association, I read to that body, more than two years ago, a short paper upon the ethics of our profession. It was printed in the transactions of the association, and you commented upon it no doubt more favorably than it deserved. 27 Alb. L. J. 361. But it seems to have impressed your soul no more profoundly than is usual with sermons; for when the Century, to no one's astonishment more than mine, exhumed it from the sepulchre of oblivion, you forgot that you had ever heard of it before, and deduced from the Centurian's abstract certain inferences as to my opinions which I think the paper hardly warrants. Accept the new copy I send herewith; and when, after another two years, you are ready to review it again, please read it first. You will then discover that I have not said what you sadly judged I must have said.

Yours with sincere respect,
THEODORE BACON.

ROCHESTER, N. Y., November 1, 1884.

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.

HAMILTON ON FRACTURES.

A Practical Treatise on Fractures and Dislocations. By Frank Hastings Hamilton. Seventh American edition, revised and improved. Illustrated with 379 wood cuts. Philadelphia, Henry C. Lea's Son & Co., 1884.

This work, for so many years recognized as the standard, and carefully revised and enlarged by its author, who stands in the foremost rank of his profession, will recommend itself to all medical men, and to all lawyers needing information on this subject. The publisher's part has been well done.

DESTY ON TAXATION.

The American Law of Taxation, as determined in the courts of last resort in the United States. By Robert L. Desty. St. Paul, West Publishing Co., 1884. 2 vols. lvii, 610, lxxvi, 611-1477.

This is an exhaustive and well arranged work by an editor of practical views and experience. Mr. Desty will hardly expect his work to supplant or even rival Judge Cooley's as an authority, but it will prove of practical use, and has some advantages over its celebrated predecessor. The arrangement is in one respect novel and commendable. Each section has its authorities appended to it in the body of the page, so that they do not in any instance form a feuilleton running along the bottom of several pages. The indexes, which are copious, are separately paged in each volume, but we do not perceive any advantage in that. The text is classified in the form of italicised propositions, concise and clear, and the commentary is in larger type under each proposition. We regard this as the model way of writing a law book, and on the whole we think Mr. Desty has produced an admirable work. It is well❘ printed.

RORER ON RAILWAYS.

A Treatise on the Law of Railways. By David Rorer. Callaghan & Co., Chicago, 1884. 2 vols. cxix, 739-1618. The death of the author of this work is to be regretted, especially because we believe he could and would have improved it if he had lived. As it stands it is not well classified or arranged, and its style is very bad. "Onto" is more than we can bear. And yet, as the school boy wrote about the horse, the work is "very full of use," and as the student said of Chitty on Pleading, "there is a great deal of close law in it." The treatment of the topics is tolerably good. It is vexatious however to see that an author of industry enough to collect all the law on a topic, has not enough

TAYLOR ON CORPORATIONS.

A Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations having capital stock By Henry O. Taylor. Philadelphia, Kay & Bro., 1884. Pp. vii, 714.

We have delayed speaking of this book in order to have an opportunity of giving it the careful examination which the importance of the subject warrants, and now we shall be forced to content ourselves with a mere notice when a review would be well deserved, especially in consideration of the fact that the subject has recently been treated by Mr. Morawetz in an excellent manner. The present treatise is remarkably compact and logically constructed, although in these points we do not think it superior to Mr. Morawetz.' Its superiority, if any, is in the fact of its more numerous citations, including some of importance which Mr.Morawetz missed. It can be recommended as a useful manual. The publisher's work has been handsomely done.

HOWELL'S MICHIGAN NISI PRIUS CASES. Michigan Nisi Prius Cases, decided by the State and Federal courts in Michigan. To which are added brief biographical sketches of the judges of Michigan, past and present, law anecdotes and reminiscences. Also law miscellanies. Edited and compiled by Charles B. Howell. Detroit, Richmond, Backus & Co., 1884. Pp. xxv, 384. The author says in his preface, "For lack of space I have left out of the book at least double the amount of matter found in the book." His main error was in not leaving out half as much more. The book is utterly worthless, made up of memorandums of useless cases, reports of "highfalutin" arguments, meager biographies, and stupid anecdotes, couched in a ridiculous style. We are glad we do not live among lawyers such as one described, who was apt, "like an angry lion, to lacerate himself and his auditors by his own violence of language." It is no pleasure to us to be called on to notice such books as this, and we sometimes say nothing rather than condemn, but if we do speak we will tell the truth, although Mr. Bishop thinks that is what no editor can do. We had omitted to say that the book is coarsely printed and abominably padded.

PREBLE'S PATENT CASE INDEX. Patent Case Index, containing lists of all the cases involving Patents for Inventions as reported in the United States Supreme and Circuit Court Reports, Robb & Fisher's Patent Cases, the Federal Reporter, and the Patent Office Ga