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of alien parents, during their temporary sojourn in was the proprietor of a botel in Bellows Falls; that he that city, returned with them the same year to their kept a bar in his hotel, at which intoxicatiug liquor native country, and always resided there afterward. was sold, and that the defendant Sullivan tended the It was held that she was a citizen of the United bar for him; that Sullivan unlawfully sold said liquor States.
to one Peter Good, who drank such quautities of it After an exhaustive examination of the law, the that he died in consequence thereof. She also offered vice-chancellor said that he entertained no doubt that to prove that said Good was married to one Mary E. every person born within the dominions and allegi- | Marcy in 1854, and that she lived with him as his wife ance of the United States, whatever the situation of till the summer of 1867, when she left him, and at the his parents, was a natural born citizen; and added, time of his death, in 1881, she was living in Worcester, that this was the general understanding of the legal Mass., with another as his wife, between profession, and the universal impression of the public whom the ceremony of marriage was performed in mind. In illustration of this general understanding 1872; that no divorce had been granted to said Good he mentions the fact, that when at an election an in- or his wife; that the said Mary E. was not dependent quiry is made whether the person offering to vote is a on said Good for her support, and that she made citizen or an alien, if he answers that he is a native of no claim on his estate, and none on the defendants; this country the answer is received as conclusive tbat that soon after said Good's wife left him he procured he is a citizen; that no one inquires further; no one this plaintiff, Mary M., then about fourteen years of asks whether his parents were citizens or foreigners; age, to work for him as his housekeeper; that she lived it is enough that he was born here whatever was the with him as his wife till the time of his death; that at status of his parents. He shows also that legislative that time she was the mother of seven children, and expositions on the subject speak but one language, and two days after his death she gave birth to an eighth he cites to that effect not only the laws of the United child, and that said Good was the father of said chilStates, but the statutes of a great number of the States dren; that after the birth of the first child the cereand establishes conclusively that there is on this sub- mony of marriage was performed between the said Good ject a concurrence of legislative declaration with and the said plaintiff, Mary M., aud that she underjudicial opinion, and that both accord with the gen- stood that he had been divorced from his first wife; that eral understanding of the profession and of the pub- said Good acknowledged the seven born previously to lic.
his death to be his children, and furnished a home and Whether it be possible for an alien, who could be support for them; that said Good treated and acnaturalized under our laws, to renounce for his chil- knowledged said plaintiff, Mary M., as his wife in the dren, whilst under the age of majority, the right of community where they lived; that he had supported citizenship, which by those laws he could acquire for her, and would have contined to do so bad he lived; them, it is unnecessary to consider, as no such ques- and that she was dependent on him for support. Mary tion is presented here. Nor is the further question E. Good brought her action by her next friend, Mary before us whether, if he cannot become a citizen, he M. Good. In this suit the plaintiff offered to prove subcan, by his act, release any right conferred upon them stantially the same facts that Mary M. did in her suit; by the Constitution.
and that she was the child, about thirteen years old, of As to the position of the district attorney that the the said Peter and Mary M. Good; that ever after her Restriction Act prevents the re-entry of the petitioner birth said Peter had acknowledged that he was her into the United States, even if he be a citizen, only a father, and treated her as his child, furnished her a word is necessary. The petitioner is the son of a mer- home, supported her, and would have continued to do chant, and not a laborer within the meaning of the so had he lived; and that she was dependent on said act. Being a citizen, the law could not intend that he Peter for ber support. should ever look to the government of a foreign coun
Bridgman & Weston and C. B. Eddy, for plaintiffs. try for permission to return to the United States. And no citizen can be excluded from this country ex
James Barrett and L. M. Reed, for defendants. cept in punishment for crime. Exclusion for any
ROWELL, J. The first point made by the defendother cause is unknown to our laws and beyond the
ant is that the statute* gives a right of action, not to power of Congress. The petitioner must be allowed
one dependent for support on the intoxicated person to land, and it is so ordered.
who dies or is disabled, but to one thus dependent on the person whom the intoxicated person kills or disa
bles; and such is the construction given to a similar CIVIL DAMAGE ACT – LEGAL DEPENDENCY
statute in New Hampshire. Hollis v. Davis, 56 N. H.74. ESSENTIAL,
But in Richards v. Moore, heard at the January Term,
1882, in Franklin county, this court held that the statSUPREME COURT OF VERMONT.
ute gave a right of action to one dependeut on the in
toxicated person, and we are not disposed to overrule Good y. Towns.*
that decision. A legal dependency is necessary to constitute a right of action
The next question is, what is the character of the under the statute, R. L., 8 3833, giving an action to one de
dependency that gives this right of action? Plaintiffs pendent on a person whose death was caused by intoxi
*"Wien a person, by reason of intoxication, commits or cating liquors illegally furnished; thus, if the action is causes an injury upon the person or property of another, a brought by oneclaiming to be the widow of such person, person who by himself, cierk or servant, unlawfully sold or it is incumbent on her to prove that her marriage was law- furnished any part of the liquor causing such intoxication, ful; or if by a child, that he was legitimate.
shall be liable to the party injured for the damage occasioned The statute gives the right of action to one dependent on such by the injury so done,” etc. “ In case of the death or disaintoxicated person for support.
bility of a person, either from such injury or in consequence CTION given by R. L., $ 3833. Trial by jury, Sep
of intoxication from the use of liquors so unlawfully fur tember Term, 1882, Windham county, Rowell, J.,
nished, a person who is in any manner dependent on such inpresiding. Verdict ordered for the defendants. The
jured person for means of support, or a person on whom such plaintiff offered to prove that the defendant Towns
injured person is dependent, may recover from the person un
lawfully selling or furnishing any such liquor the damage or * To appear in 56 Vermont Reports.
loss sustained in consequence of such injury." R. L., 23833.
what class of persons could maintain the action. But Pollock, C. B., said it was beyond all doubt that in the construction of that act the word "child” meant legitimate child only; and a rule for a new trial was refused. The result is in both cases,
NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.
contend that a dependency in fact is sufficient, though it may not be a legal dependency, and that here was a legal dependency in the case of the child at all events. Defendants, on the other hand, contend that nothing short of a dependency that the party depended upon is legally bound to respond to is sufficient, and that here was no such dependency as to either plaintiff.
As to the plaintiff Mary M. Good, it needs no argument to show that Peter Good was under no legal obligation to her to support her. His marriage to her was void; and as between the parties thereto it imposed none of the legal obligations of lawful matrimony. But as to third persons, a man who marries a woman, and holds her out to the world as his wife, cannot discharge himself from liability for necessaries supplied her by proving a previous lawful marriage to another woman still living. Watson v. Threlkeld, 2 Esp. 637 ; Robinson v. Nuhon, 1 Camp. 245. But he is not liable for necessaries furnished her after separation, and ceasing to hold her out as his wife. Munro v. De Chemant, 4 Camp. 215. So in Norwood v. Stevenson and Wife, cited in a note to Munro v. De Chemant from Andrews, 227, it was held that a plea by the husband tbat “they were never joined in lawful matrimony" was no bar to an action against him and his wife for her debt contracted when sole, for that a marriage de facto made him liable.
As to the plaintiff Mary E. Good, she is an illegitimate child of the deceased; and as to such a child it is clear that the common law imposes no liability on the father as such to support it. But he is liable on his express promise for its support. He is also liable on his implied promise, without an order of affiliation, provided he has adopted the child as his own and acquiesced in any particular disposition of it. But he may renounce the adoption and terminate the implied assumpsit. This is the result of the cases, English and American: Hesketh v. Gowing, 5 Esp. 131; Cameron v. Baker, 1 C. & P. 268; Vichole v. Allen, 3 id. 36; Furillio v. Crowther, 7 D. & R. 612; Moncrief v. Ely, 19 Wend. 405. Otherwise than this the father is not liable except he be made so by an order of affiliation; and then bis liability is not to the child, but is imposed by way of helping the mother or indemnifying the towi).
It is true, as contended, that the language of the statute is broad, “in any manner dependent;” but after all, we think it should be construed to mean a legal dependency only, the same as though it read in any manner legally dependent." If it is given greater scope than this there would be great difficulty in ad. ministering it. There would seem to be no stopping place short of including all possible cases of actual dependency, whatever the relation of the parties, and notwithstanding the absence of even a moral obligation to support; and yet no one, we presume, would contend for so latitudinarian a construction of the statute. Shall we then stop at the utmost limit of moral obligations? But the law cannot determine what a moral obligation is, and takes no cognizance of them. Again by what rule shall damages be assessed in cases where, as here, no legal right has been lost?
This is not a question on which much authority can be adduced, but the case of Dickinson v. North-Eastern R. CO., 2 H. & C. 735, is worth referring to.
That was an action under the Civil Damage Act of 9 and 10 Vict., ch. 93, which provides that the action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child of the person killed. Price contended that "child," as used in the statute, included an illegitimate child; that the Legislature intended the right of action to be coextensive with the moral obligation to support; and that the legal right to support could not be the test of
WILL--POWER OF SALE-DISCRETION OF EXECUTORS -WHEN COURT WILL NOT CONTROL.- The will of C. directed and empowered her executors to sell her real estate “for the best price that can be obtained for the same, and at such time or times as shall in their judgment be for the best interest of all concerned," and the proceeds were given them in trust for the benefit of certain beneficiaries. In an action brought about five years after the death of the testatrix, the removal of the only executor who qualified, because of alleged neglect of duty in omitting to comply with his provision, the referee found that there bad been no demand for the property, and its depreciation in value after the death of the testatrix was due to the state of the real estate market in the place where the property was situated; that he had made all reasonable efforts to sell, without success, and that prior to the trial no offer had been made by any person to purchase. Held, that the relief sought was properly denied; that while the direction to sell was imperative, the time of sale was in the discretion of the executor, and bis judgment, exercised in good faith, was conclusive. The learned counsel for the appellants calls our attention to Dimes v. Scott, 4 Russell, 195, as decisive of this question. It lacks however an essential element found in the case before us. In the case cited the executors were directed by the testator to convert the personal estate into money and in vest the proceeds in a way stated. The language of the will was imperative. In this the testatrix, as we have seen, directs her executors to sell the real estate of which she shall die seized, but leaves the time of sale to be determined by their discretion. This clause cannot be disregarded. In both cases the intent to have the land sold is absolute, but in the latter the testatrix relies upon the judgment of her executor as to the time of sale, and whatever the court might think as to the expediency of an immediate sale, or a sale at some fixed time, its opinion cannot control the discretion of the executor in that respect. His judgment upou the question is conclusive if exercised in good faith, 1 Story's Eq. Jur. (10th ed.), $8 169-170 a; Burner v. Storms, 1 Sandf. Ch. 357; Hancox v. Meeker, 95 N. Y. 5:28. In view probably of this rule the complaint charges such acts and omissions on the part of the acting executor, as would, if true, subject him to the interference of a court of equity. But the allegations were put in issue, and the trial court has found not only that they were not proven, but on the contrary that the executor has at all times been ready and willing to sell the property in question at a fair price, and bas taken the usual means, by advertising and otherwise, to make that disposition kuown. Haight v. Brisbin. Opinion by Dauforth, J. [Decided May 9, 1884. ] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT - DIVERSION MARKET
CONVERSION PRACTICE FACTS NOT FOUND.-(1) A promissory note made by D., payable to his order at defendant's bank, was for a valuable consideration indorsed by him and delivered to B., at whose request it was discounted by defendant upon pledge as collateral of a $500 govern. ment bond belonging to plaintiff. At about the maturity of the note defendant, without the consent or knowledge of B. or plaintiff, upon receipt of a new
note, executed and indorsed by D. for the same do not think the case of Campbell v. Beaumont amount, which contained the statement, “U. S. bond 91 N. Y. 464, properly considered, at all conflicts with $500 collateral security," and upon payment of the in- our view of the question now presented. In that case, terest cancelled the first note and surrendered it to D. as in this, the intention of the testator was sought Before maturity of the second note D. absconded; it after by an examination of the scope and meaning of not having been paid when due, defendant, without all the provisions of the will, and the first derise was notice to B. or plaintiff, sold the bond in open market, there in terms given for the “sole use benefit” of the appropriating sufficient of the proceeds to pay the primary devisee. In view of that fact, aud from the note. In an action for the conversion of the bond, held, indefinite and inconclusive character of the language that defendant was liable; that before retaining the used in framing the provision, which was claimed to bond upon a new contract it should bave required the have created a remainder, it was held that it was not consent of B. (2) Much of the argument of the learned the intention of the testator to limit the absolute charcounsel for appellant is founded upon the evidence in acter of the primary devise. See also McLean . Freerelation to facts not found by the referee,and as to which man, 70 N. Y. 81; Downing v. Marshall, 23 id. 366. The no finding was requested. In such a case they cannot following additional cases may be cited as supporting be considered for the purpose of reversing the judg- the general principle by which we have been con. meut. Thompson v. Bank of British North America, trolled. Norris v. Beyea, 13 N. Y. 273; Smith v. Van 82 N. Y. 1. With the facts before us found upon suffi- Ostrand, 64 id. 278; Smith v. Bell, 6 Pet. 68, distin. cient evidence (Potter v. Carpenter, 71 N. Y. 75; Stilo guished. Wager v. Wager. Opinion by Ruger, C. J. well v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 72 id. 385) there is no error
[Decided Jane 3, 1884.] of law in the judgment appealed from. Burnap v. National Bank of Potsdam. Opinion by Danforth, J.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—“DUE PROCESS OF LAW"[Decided May 9, 1884.]
LEGISLATURE MAY CHANGE REMEDY.-Sections 1421-5
of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing for the subWILL-REPUGNANT CLAUSES-LIMITATION
stitution of the sureties to an undertaking indemnifyDEVISE OF ABSOLUTE ESTATE.-The will of W. gave ing a sheriff against a levy made by him as defendant to his wife the use of $4,000, which was about one-third in an action against him because of such levy, are not of his estate, during life, with privilege in case the in- violative of the constitutional provision, prohibiting come therefrom should not be sufficient to support her the taking away of the private property of a citizen to use sufficient of the principal for that purpose. To without due process of law.” Amendment to U. S. his daughter S. was given the residue of his estate. Const., art. 4; State Const., art. 1, § 6. They simply What remained of the $4,000 at the wife's death, the change the form of the remedy of the owner of the will, in case of the death of the daugther be
property, which is nevertheless left substantial and ef. fore the death of the wife thus provided : “All the fectual. The power belonging to the State Legislature property, both real and personal, that shall be left by
to regulate the civil procedure for the enforcement of my daughter at her death, which shall belong to me at rights authorizes it to say when an officer, acting upmy death, I give, together with what shall remain der the requirements of that procedure may, and when from the above mentioned $4,000, devise and bequeath he may not, be sued, provided only the citizen is not to my beloved wife, to her use, her heirs and assigns deprived of adequate remedy for any trespass or forever.” The testator's daughter S., which was his wrong. The doctrine of the Federal courts has gone only child, died before him. Iu an action brought by so far as to hold that a tax may be assessed witbout 10collateral relatives, the heirs and next of kin of the tice to the property-owner, and collected, although ildeceased for a construction of the will, held, that it legal, and his possible remedy by an action in equity to was the manifest intent of the testator to give to the restrain the collection of the tax was sufficient to save survivor of the two legatees named his entire estate the enactment complained of from the condemnation remaining undisposed of upon the death of the other, of the fundamental law. McMillen v. Anderson, 95 whenever that event should occur; that the gift to U. S. 37. Here a wider and more abundant remedy the wife, in case of her surviving the daughter, was exists, and we do not feel safe or justified in saying not dependent upon the taking effect of the primary that the right to sue a specifio individual is a constitugift to the daughter, and while the language employed tional right which cannot be taken away, although ad. in making the latter gift would generally import an equate and complete protection to the right of propabsolute estate, yet as such a construction would ren
erty is left. Foule v. Mann, 53 Iowa, 42; Craig v.Fowder inoperative the limitation over, and would defeat | ler, 59 id. 200; Sunberg v. Babcock, 16 N. W. Rep. 716, the manifest intent as above stated, it was the duty of distinguished. Hein v. Davidson. Opinion by the court to limit so as to render the whole will oper- | Fiuch, J. ative and to effectuate the intent, and that therefore [Decided June 3, 1884.] the widow was entitled to the whole estate. It was said by Andrews, J., in Taggart v. Murray, 53 N. Y. 236, “If upon a comparison of the different provisions UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ABof a will it is found to contain dispositions which are
STRACT. repugnant to each other, then it is the office of judicial interpretation to preserve, if consistent with the
RAILROAD-RECEIVER-CURRENT EXPENSES-MORTrules of law, the paramount intention of the testator, GAGE CREDITORS.-When a court of chancery, in enas disclosed by the instrument, although in so doing it forcing the rights of mortgage creditors, takes possesmay defeat his purpose in some subordinate and lesssion of a mortgaged railroad, and thus deprives the essential particular.” In accordance with this princi- company of the power to receive future earnings, the ple it was held in Terry v. Wiggins, 47 N. Y. 512, where current earnings being used for the benefit of morta will devised to the testator's wife “all other real and gage creditors before current expenses are paid, the personal estate and effects that I may die possessed of, mortgage security is chargeable in equity with the for her own personal and independent use and main-restoration of the fund thus improperly diverted and tenance, with full power to sell or otherwise dispose of applied to the use of the mortgage creditors. Fosdick the same," with a devise of the residue after his v. Schall, 99 U. S. 252. We do not now hold any more wife's death, to trustees for purposes named, that the than we did in Fosdick v. Schall, or Huidekoper v. wife took a life estate only with power of disposition, Locomotive Works, 99 U. S. 260, that the income of a and that the last clause created a valid remainder. We railroad in the hands of a receiver, for the benefit of
mortgage creditors who have a lien upon it under in fee of the real property owner by the other party at their mortgage, cau be taken away from them and the time of the decree, in addition to a decree for used to pay the general creditors of the road. All we maintenance under section 497, and that it shall be tben decided, and all we now decide is, that if current the duty of the court to enter a decree accordingly, a earniugs are used for the benefit of mortgage creditors wife obtaining a decree of divorce in a court of another before current expenses are paid, the mortgage security State, having jurisdiction of the cause and of the is cbargeable in equity with the restoration of the parties, acquires no title in the husbavd's land in fund which has been thus improperly applied to their Oregon. Bamford v. Bamford, 4 Oreg. 30; Wetmore use. Burnham v. Bowen. Opinion by Waite, C. J. v. Wetmore, 5 id. 469; Hall v. Hall, 9 id. 452: Weiss v. (Decided May 5, 1884.]
Bethel,8 id.522; Oregon Code of Civ.Pro., $$ 376,377,383.
In Barrett v.Barrett, 5 Oreg. 411, the suit was not to asMARRIAGE DIVORCE - DOWER-LEX OREGON CODE, SS 495, 497.--A divorce from the bond
sert a title in real estate, but to enforce,out of the land of matrimony bars the wife's right of dower, unless
fraudulently conveyed by the husband to his daughter,
payment of the alimony awarded to this appellant by preserved by the lex rei sitie. Barber v. Root, 10 Mass.
the California decree of divorce, which was held in ac200; Hood v. Hood, 110 id. 463; Rice v. Lumley, 10
cordance with the decisions of other courts to be so Ohio St. 596; Lainkin v. Knapp, 20 id. 454; Gould v. Crow, 57 Mo. 200; 4 Kent Com. 54; 2 Bish. Mar. &
far in the nature of a debt, that the wife might sue the Div. (6th ed.), ss 706, 712, and cases cited. In each of
husband for it in another State, and might contest the the Massachusetts cases just referred to, the divorce
validity of a conveyance of property made by him was obtained in another State. The ground of the de.
with the fraudulent intent of preventing her from recision of the Court of Appeals of New York in Wait
covering the alimony. Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582;
Livermore v. Boutelle, 11 Gray, 217; Bouslough v. v. Wait, 4 N. Y. 95, by which a wife was held not to be deprived of her right of dower in her husband's real
Bouslough, 68 Penn. St. 495. In De Godey v. De estate by a divorce from the bond of matrimony for Godey, 39 Cal. 157, and in Whetstone v. Coffey, 48 Tex. pis fault was, that the Legislature of New York, by
269, the point decided was that land acquired by the expressly enacting that “in case of divorce dissolving
husband or the wife during the marriage, the title in
which by the local law vested in neither separately, the marriage contract for the misconduct of the wife, she shall not be endowed," had manifested an inten
but in both in common, continued to belong to both tion that she should retain her right of dower in case
after the divorce, and that a division thereof between of a divorce for the misconduct of the husband. See
them, if not made by the decree of divorce, might be also Reynolds v. Reynolds, 24 Wend. 193. The decis
obtained by a subsequent suit for partition in the State
in wbich the divorce was granted and the land was ions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Colvin v. Reed, 55 Penn. St. 375, and in Reel v. Elder, 62 id.
situated. Barrett v. Failing. Opinion by Gray, J. 308, holding that a wife was not barred of her dower
[Decided May 5, 1884.] in land in Pennsylvania by a divorce obtained by her FRAUD
JUDICIAL SALE OBTAINED BY, VOID husband in another State, proceeded upon the ground CREDITORS. — When a scheme is entered into to circuthat in the view of that court, the court which granted late a fact that a large indebtedness of the succession the divorce had no jurisdiction over the wife. And see to an estate exists in favor of the heirs, being suffiCheely v. Clayton, 110 U. S. 701. Whether a statute of cient to absorb the estate, and being secured by a one State, securing or denying the right of dower in mortgage; to depreciate the value of the estate so that case of divorce, extends to a divorce in a court of the supposed indebtedness would cover it; to put forth another State, having jurisdiction of the cause and of claims to the estate which would complicate the title the parties, depends very much upon the terms of the and affect the salable value of the land ; and to procuro statute, and upon its interpretation by the courts of judicial sale by which the title might be cleared of inthe State by the Legislature of which it is passed, and cumbrauces, and the land divided among the heirs in which the land is situated. In Mansfield v. Mc- free from liability for the debts of the estate, and the Intyre, 10 Ohio, 27, it was held that a statute of Ohio, sale is so accomplished, the property being appraised which provided that in case of divorce for the fault of by incompetent persons at a grossly inadequate value, the wife she should be barred of her dower, was inap- the sale is in fraud of creditors, and null and void. plicable to a divorce obtained by the husband in The most solemn transactions and judgments may, at another State; and the wife was allowed to recover the instance of the parties, be set aside or rendered dower, upon grounds hardly to be reconciled with the inoperative for fraud. The fact of being a party does later cases in Ohio and elsewhere, as shown by the au- not estop a person from obtaining in a court of equity thorities before referred to. In Harding v. Alden, 9 relief against fraud. It is generally parties that are the Greenl. 140, a wife who had obtained a divorce in victims of fraud. The court of chancery is always another State recovered dower in Maine under a stat- open to hear complaints against it, whether commitute, which upon divorce for adultery of the husbard, ted in pais or in or by means of judicial proceedings. directed “her dower to be assigned to her in the lands In such cases the court does not act as a court of reof her husband in the same manner as if such husband view, nor does it inquire into any irregularities or was actually dead ; " but the point was not argued, errors of proceeding in arother court; but it will scruand in the case stated by the parties it was conceded tinize the conduct of the parties, and if it finds that that the demandant was entitled to judgment if she they have been guilty of fraud in obtaining a judg. had been legally divorced. The statute of Missouri, ment or decree, it will deprive them of the benefit of which was said in Gould y, Crow, 57 Mo. 205, to ex- it, and of any inequitable advantage which they have tend to divorces obtained in another State, was ex- derived under it. Story's Eq. Jur., $$ 1570-1573; Kerr pressed in very general terms: “If any woman be di- on Fraud and Mistake, 352-353. This subject was disForced from her husband for the fault or misconduct cussed in Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10; and Barrow of such husband, she shall not thereby lose ber dower; v. Hunton, 99 id. 80. In the latter case, speaking of but if the husband be divorced from the wife, for her the proceeding in the Louisiana practice to procure fault or misconduct, she shall not be endowed.” Under nullity of a judgment, we said, “if the proceeding is section 495 of the Oregon Code of Civil Procedure, as merely tantamount to the common-law practice of amended by the statute of December 20, 1865, provid- moving to set aside a judgment for irregularity, or to ing, that whenever a marriage shall be declared void or a writ of error, or to a bill of review on appeal, it would dissolved, the party at whose prayer the decree shall belong to the latter category"(that is, a supplemenbo made shall be entitled to an undivided third part tary proceeding, connected with the original suit),
"and the United States court could not properly en- MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-ORDINANCES- DELEGAtertain jurisdiction of the case. * Ou the other
TION OF POWER-LEGISLATIVE ACT-CERTIORARI.-The hand, if the proceedings are tantamount to a bill in
city council of Minneapolis has power to make reasonequity to set aside a decree for fraud in the obtaining able regulations as to where, or within what parts of thereof, then they constitute an original and inde- the city, the business of vending, dealing in, or dispos. pendent proceeding; * a new case arisinging of spirituous, vinous, fermented, or malt liquors upon new facts, although having relation to the valid.
may be carried on. This is a legislative power, which ity of an actual judgment or decree, etc.” In Jack- they must exercise themselves by ordinance passed in son v. Ludeling, 21 Wall. 616, it is said: "A sale may the manner prescribed by the city charter. They canhave been conducted legally in all its process and not delegate this power to the mayor. A mere legisforms, and yet the purchaser may have been guilty of lative act of municipal corporations cannot be reviewed fraud, or may hold the property as a trustee. In this
on certiorari. Cases from New Jersey bare been cited case the complaivauts rely upon no irregularity of
as going that far. The courts of that State have probproceeding, upon no absence of form. The forins of
ably extended the application of this writ further than law were scrupulously observed. But they rely upon those of any other State; but our attention has not faithlessness to trusts and common obligations, upou been called to any case, even from that State, which combinations against the policy of the law and fraudu
goes as far as counsel claim. The cases of Camden T. lent, and upon confederate and successful efforts to
Mulford and Carron v. Martin, 26 N. J. Law, 49, 594. deprive them wrongfully of property in which they
cited by petitioner, do not go to any such length. All had a large interest, for the benefit of persons in whom
that was decided in the first case was that an ordinance they had & right to place confidence. Johnson v.
authorizing a new improvement to be made, such as Waters. Opinion by Bradley, J.
opening and paving new streets, and constructing [Decided May 5, 1884.]
sewers, by which the property of specific individuals may be directly taxed to defray the expense, was a
judicial act. In the second case it was merely held MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT
that the Supreme Court had a right to review on certiorari the proceedings of corporations that do acts af
fecting the rights and property of individuals, which NEGLIGENCE-CAUSING DEATH- PERSONAL REPRE
are judicial or quasi judicial in their nature. Dill. SENTATIVE MUST SUE.-The action is brought by a
Mun. Corp., $ 926, is also cited as authority that courts father to recover for the killing, through the alleged
will on certiorari examine the proceedings of munici. negligence of defendant, of his son, a child 17 months
pal corporations, whether legislative or judicial. But old, whereby the plaintiff, as he alleges, has been and
that learned author does not say so. He is simply will be deprived of the services of said son. The stat
stating the rule that certiorari will lie to review the ute provides: “A cause of action arising out of an in
proceedings of such corporations. But that he did jury to the person dies with the person of either
not intend to convey the idea that mere legislative or party.” Gen. St. 1878, ch. 77, $1. This is only decla
ministerial acts could be thus reviewed is evident, for ratory of the rule at common law. Insurance Co. v.
at least two reasons: First, not a single authority Brame, 95 U. 8. 754, and cases cited; Carey v. Berk
cited in support of the text sustains such a proposishire R. Co., 1 Cush. 475. The statute (Gen. St. 1878, §
tion. Second, the author immediately adds, by way 2, ch. 77) creates a cause of action when death is caused
of illustration: “Thus if no appeal or other mode of by the wrongful act or omission of any party, and
review be given, and if there be no statute to the convests it in the personal representative, to wit, the exec
trary, the legality of convictions in municipal courts utor or administrator. No one else can sue upon it.
will be reviewed on certiorari. So under the same cir Nash v. Tousley, 28 Minn. 5. Scheffer v. Minneapolis,
cumstances, and in the same way, the proceedings of etc., R. Co. Opinion by Gilfillan, C. J.
muuicipal corporations in opening streets, in making [Decided May 31, 1884.]
local assessments, in levying taxes, in contested elecGARNISHMENT-ASSIGNEE IS NOT SUBJECT TO-CUS- tion cases, and the like will be examined and reTODIA LEGIS.-Under our statute, the assignee is not,
viewed to ascertain whether they are regular and leby virtue of an assignment, garnishable in a suitgal,” all of which it will be found from an examination against the assignor, unless at the date of service of of the cases cited, have been held to be judicial acts. the garnishee summons he has iu his hands or under Matter of Wilson. Opinion by Mitcbell, J. his control property, money, or effects belonging to [Decided June 3, 1884 ) the assignor, or owes the assignor some indebtedness
DAMAGES-CONTRACT-ASSUMING TO ACT AS AGENT absolutely, and without depending on any contin
--IMPROVEMENTS MADE IN GOOD FAITH.-Defendant, gency. Gen. St. 1878, ch. 66., SS 167, 170-172. After the
wrongfully assuming to be the authorized agent of the property, money, or effects are assigned they no longer
real owner, induced the plaintiff to enter into the conbeloug to the assiguor, for the assignment passes the
tract of purchase in question. In such cases the inentire legal and equitable interest therein to the as
jured party has a remedy in the nature of an action signee. Donohue v. Stearns, 17 N. W. Rep. 381. That
on the case against the agent. 2 Kent Comm. *632; the assignment creates no such indebtedness as the
Story Ag., $ 264. The pleadings are, we think, suffistatute cited speaks of, on the part of the assiguee to
cient to support the action on this ground. The conthe assiguor, is apparent. To these statutory grounds
tract which is annexed to the complaint shows that defor holding that the assignee is not garnishable is to be
fendant assumed to act as the duly authorized agent added the further insuperable objection, that under
of the owner in making the sale, which is also alleged the assigument the property is in custodia legis, and
in the complaint and admitted in the answer; and the therefore no to be reached by levy or garnishment.
complaint also sufficiently shows that plaintiffs were Upon the wbole subject of the non-garnishability of
thereby misled to their damage. It is not material the assignee, we refer to In re Mann, 19 N.W. Rep. 347;
that the contract fails to disclose the name of the Legrise v. Pierse (Texas Sup. Ct.), 17 Reporter, 477;
owner. It is clear enough that defendant assumed to Colby v. Coates, 6 Cush. 558; Dewing v. Wentworth,
sell as agent, and not as owner. The plaintiffs took 11 id. 499; Drake Attach., $ 50; Donohue v. Stearns,
nothing by such unauthorized contract; and haring supra. Lord v. Meacham. Opinion by Berry, J.
been ejected from the premises at the suit of the [Decided May 1, 1884.]
owner, with the loss of improvements made in good