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main of the United States; over and along any of the of a State can enjoin a foreign corporation from military or post-roads of the United States which have pursuing its business. Until the State acts in its sovbeen or may hereafter be declared such by act of Con- ereign capacity individual citizens cannot complain. gress, and over, under, or across the navigable streams The State must determine for itself when the public or waters of the United States." There is nothing to good requires that its implied assent to the admission indicate an intention of limiting the effect of the words shall be withdrawn. Here, so far from withdrawing employed, and they are, therefore, to be given their its assent, the State, by its legislation of 1874, in effect, natural and ordinary signification. Read in this way invited foreign telegraph corporations to come in. the grant evidently extends to the publio domain, the Whether that legislation, in the absence of congressmilitary and post-roads, and the navigable waters of ional action, would have been sufficient to authorize a the United States. These are all within the dominion foreign corporation to construot and operate a line of the National government to the extent of the Na- within the two counties named, we need not decide; tional powers, and are, therefore, subject to legitimate but we are clearly of the opinion that, with such congressional regulation. No question arises as to action and a right of way secured by private arrangethe authority of Congress to provide for the appropria- ment with the owner of the land, this defendant cortion of private property to the uses of the telegraph, poration cannot be excluded by the present oomplainfor no such attempt has been made. The use of pub- ant. lic property alone is granted. If private property is The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed. required it must, so far as the present legislation is concerned, be obtained by private arrangement with its owner. No compulsory proceedings are author
REPORT OF EX PARTE JUDICIAL PROCEED. ized. State sovereignty under the Coustitution is not
INGS NOT A LIBEL. interfered with. Only National privileges are granted. The State. law in question, so far as it confers ex
ENGLISH HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, COMMON PLEAS clusive rights upon the Pensacola Company, is cer
DIVISION, JANUARY 30, 1878. tainly in conflict with this legislation of Congress. To that extent it is, therefore, inoperative as against a
USILL V. HALES. corporation of another State entitled to the privileges of the act of Congress. Such being the case the charter
An ex parte application was made to a police magistrate in
open court by certain persons who had been employed of the Pensacola Company does not exclude the West- by the plaintif upon a railway, for a summons against ern Union Company from the occupancy of the right
the plaintiff under the Masters and Servants Act, 1867
(30 & 31 Vict., c. 141), on the allegation that he had not of-way of the Pensacola and Louisville Railroad Com- paid them their wages, though he had received funds pany under the arrangement made for that purpose.
to enable him to do so. The magistrate refused to
grant their application, on the ground that the facts as We are aware that in Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, stated by them did not bring the case within his juristhis court decided that a State might exclude a cor
diction to do so, and afforded no ground for criminal
proceedings. The defendants, who were newspaper poration of auother State from its jurisdiction, and proprietors, published a fair report of the proceedings that corporations are not within the clause of the Con
before the magistrate, which contained matter defanu
atory to the plaintiff. Held, that the defendants were stitution which declares that “the citizens of each protected by the privilege which attaches to all fair State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities
and impartial reports of judicial proceedings, and that
such privilege was not taken away either by the fact of citizens in the several States." Art. IV, $2. That that the magistrate decided that he had no jurisdicwas not, however, the case of a corporation engaged
tion, or that the application was made ex parte. in iuter-state commerce, and enough was said by the court to show that if it had been, very different ques- a newspaper (the Daily News) for the publication tions would have been presented. The language of of certain matter defamatory to the plaintiff. the opinion is (p. 182): “ It is undoubtedly true, as Two other actions brought by the same plaintiff stated by counsel, that the power conferred upon against the proprietors of the Standard and Morning Congress to regulate commerce includes as well com- Advertiser were by agreement argued at the same merce carried on by corporations as commerce car- time. ried on by individuals. * * This State of facts for- The defamatory matter complained of was conbids the supposition that it was intended in the grant tained in a report of an application to a London of power to Congress to exclude from its control the
police magistrate, which had appeared in the three commerce of corporations. The language of the grant publications. The application was for a summons makes no reference to the instrumentalities by which under the Masters and Servants Act, 1867 (30 & 31 commerce may be carried ou; it is geueral, and in- Viot., o. 141), to compel the plaintiff to pay certain cludes alike commerce by individuals, partnerships, wages alleged to be due to the applicants, who had associations, and corporations. * The defect of been employed by him upon an Irish railway. The the argument lies in the character of their (insurance applicants stated that the plaintiff, their employer, had companies) business. Issuing a policy of insurance is himself received payment from the contractor, and not a transaction of commerce. * Such contracts complained of his conduct in withholding from them (policies of insurance) are not inter-state transactions, what they had earned. The magistrate, after hearing though the parties are domiciled in different States." the facts, refused to grant their application, on the
The questions thus suggested need not be considered ground that the facts afforded no ground for criminal now, because no prohibitory legislation is relied upon proceedings. except that which, as has already been seen, is inopera- The action was tried before Lord Coleridge, C. J., tive. Upon principles of comity, the corporations of at Westminster, and the jury found that the report one State are permitted to do business in another was a fair and impartial one of what took place. The unless it conflicts with the law, or unjustly interferes judge ruled that the report, if fair, was privileged, with the rights of the citizens of the State iuto which and the plaintiff obtained a rule nisi for a new trial, they come. Under such circumstances no citizen on the ground of misdirection.
Sir H. Gifford, Solicitor-General (with him Bremner referred to by the plaintiff's counsel, the term ex parte Yelverton and Arthur Child), showed cause.
proceeding has been over and over again used by Sergt. Ballantine and Short, in support of rule.
judges of great eminence: sometimes affirmatively,
in saying that an ex parte proceeding is not privileged; Lord COLERIDGE, C. J. I am of opinion that this
and sometimes negatively, for example, in saying rule should be discharged. This was an action against
“this being a proceeding not ex parte is privileged." a newspaper for a bona fide and fair report of a pro
I do not doubt, for my own part, that if this argument ceeding before a magistrate. Three persons who had
had been addressed to the court some sixty or seventy been employed by a civil engineer upon an Irish rail
years ago, it might have met with a different result way, and who had heard that this civil engineer had
from that which it is about to meet with to-day. That been paid, whilst they themselves, as they said, had
the cases cited in support of it have made a certain not been paid by their superior officer, the plaintiff in
impression upon our minds it is useless to deny. It the action, went before a police magistrate in London;
seems to me in vain to say that, in the judgment of and I must take it for the purpose of my judgment
the great judges referred to, we do not find a rule laid that they applied to him for a summons under the
down that an ex parte or preliminary proceeding is Masters and 'Servants Act. That means that, if there
not privileged; and upon this ground, good or bad, had been materials at the hearing upon which the
that it is very hard on an individual to have a matter magistrate thought that the case had been made out,
which was stated against him behind his back, with no he would have had jurisdiction to issue that summons.
means of answering it, reported in the public papers, Supposing that the complainants had, in his opinion,
while his answer is not similarly reported. There are substantiated their complaint, in that event he would
strong observations in the case of Duncan v. Thwaites, have had jurisdiction to issue an order under the
ubi supra, which no doubt go far toward establishing Masters and Workmen Act, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 141. In
that proposition. There is also a dictum of one of the result, however, he thought that the facts stated
the greatest legal authorities reported. Lord Elby the complainants showed that there was no ground
dou in that case said that every lawyer would be either for summonses against the complainant, or for
startled by the proposition that a report of an ex an answer under the Masters and Workmen Act; and
parte application was privileged; and undoubtedly it lurned out, therefore, in the result that, in a certain
there have been few greater lawyers than Lord El-sense, the application had been made to him with re
don. But we are not now living, so to speak, within gard to matters in which he had no jurisdiction. But
the shadows of these cases; and it is idle to deny that it has long beep held, and most properly held, that it
in cases decided since that time learned judges have is not the result but the nature of the application
come to conclusions wbich it is not for me to say are made to a magistrate which founds his jurisdiction,
inconsistent, but which at least appear to my mind and that, whenever there is an application, made to a
irreconcilable with these earlier decisions. I find magistrate as to a matter over which he has jurisdic
some excellent good sense in the judgment of the tion, he has then jurisdiction for the purpose of ascer- Court of Queen's Bench in the case of Wason v. Waltaining whether the facts make out the case for the
ters, and there is a passage in it which I should desire exercise of that jurisdiction. The distinction between
to adopt. It is said that whatever disadvantage might the cases where there is an inherent want of jurisdic- attach to a system of unwritten law, it has at least tion on account of the nature of the complaint, and
this advantage, that its elasticity enables those who where there is what may be called want of jurisdiction
administer it to adapt it to the various conditions of because the facts do not make out the charge, is very
society and to the habits of the age in which we live, well explained in the case of Reg. v. Bolton, 1 Q. B. 66,
80 as to avoid the inconsistencies which might otherwhich is founded on the decision of Brittain v. Ken
wise arise. In this way only the law of libel has gradnuird, 1 B. & B. 432, and the judgment of Richardson,
ually developed itself into any thing like a settled form, J., in that case. Therefore, in this matter I must take and I entirely concur in the opinion there expressed. it that the magistrate had jurisdiction to enter upon It is well known that, in important cases, ex parte prothe inquiry. What, therefore, was done during this ceedings are published day by day, especially in some inquiry upon which the magistrate had jurisdiction to particular cases of inquiry which would be excluded enter can ouly be described as a judicial proceeding. from privilege according to the rule proposed. It is It was a proceeding before a judge who, so far as the well known that in the course of inquiries before corjurisdiction went, had jurisdiction to conduct it. oners cases are reported from day to day in the newsThat seems clear both upon principle and upon author
papers, and it is unheard of that an action should be ity. If so, this is prima facie a privileged publication, brought by persons affected by such reports, if they because it is fouud to be a fair and bona fide report of are bona fide. That seems to introduce this element a judicial proceeding, and it is too late now to dispute into the determination of these cases, that there is a whether the rule of privilege does or does not extend certain elasticity in the rules which are to be applied to the publication of such proceedings. It has been to the question of privilege-development is perhaps laid down again and again in broad terms that the the more correct word to employ - and courts have publication of proceedings in a court of justice are from time to time applied, as best they might, that privileged if the report of such proceedings be fair and which they think to be the good sense of the rules honest; and the report in this case has been found to which exist to cases which have not been positively be so. An attempt has been made, however, to dis- decided to bave come within them. If there had been tinguish this case, and to take it out of the general a case directly in point with the present - a case in proposition by bringing it within an undoubted quali- which the proceedings had begun and terminated fication that has been grafted upon the general rule. with an ex parte application, and where the jury had It is conteuded that this is what may be called a re- found that the report of the proceedings was bona fide port of an ex parte or preliminary proceeding. Now, honest and fair-if there had been a case similar to there is no doubt that, in the cases which have been this in which the report had beeu held not to be privileged, I do not hesitate to say, for my own part, that the application to the magistrate was ex parte, and as I would gladly have acted upon such a case; for I such could not be privileged. Had the matter before do not disguise that my own judgment is not at all the magistrate been in the nature of a preliminary satisfied with the alleged enormous advantage to the inquiry, and if the ultimate judicial determination public from these small cases being published from day was to remain in abeyance until a further investigato day, although they inflict pain upon individuals, tion, I should have thought there was authority at any nor do I see the extreme good resulting which is sup- rate for the defendants' contention, though how far posed to justify them. But it is, of course, the duty
these authorities might be followed in the present day of the judge, nevertheless, to declare the law, not in I think doubtful; but the matter of the application accordance with what he thinks it ought to be, but as was finally disposed of by the magistrate, and I can it is; and if he finds a rule established and laid down, find no case where a fair report of a judicial proceedit is far better that he should accept and apply it judi- | ing finally dealing with the matter in open court has cially and honestly, even if he is not satisfied in his own been held libelous. There are authorities which, until mind with the application of that rule. Therefore I they are carefully examined, would seem to support come to the consideration of this case, feeling that the the contention that an ex parte proceeding in court is general tendenoy of the law has been of late years to not privileged; but, so far as I cau ascertain, these are hold such publications as this as privileged. I do the cases where the proceeding was preliminary, and find one case which to the best of my judgment ap- where there was no final determination at the time of pears to cover the present one; and that is the case to the alleged libelous report. On the other hand Carwhich much reference has been made-the case of rie v. Walters and Lewis v. Levy, ubi supra, are strong Lewis v. Levy, ubi supra. I do not propose to take up
authorities in favor of the report in this case being time by reading the whole of this judgment, or any protected. I am of opinion, therefore, that these rules thing like it; but I find that what was held to be en- must be discharged.
Rules discharged. titled to privilege there was this—the publication of a fair and correct report of proceedings taking place in a public court of justice; and it was accepted as a part
RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS. of the rule that the privilege extended to proceedings taking place publicly before a magistrate, on the pre- SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS, liminary investigation of a criminal charge, terminat
MARCH TERM, 1878. iug in the discharge of the person charged. I am per
ASSAULT AND BATTERY. fectly aware that there may be a distinction
Justification : excluding manager of alms-house from subtle distinction, a distinction which I will not say
witnessing performance of priestly functions. — In an is a mere shadowy distinction, but a subtle distinc
action for assault and battery, it appeared that plaintion - between the case before us and the case of
tiff's husband was the keeper of an alms-house, of Lewis v. Levy. But I cannot disguise from myself
which she was at that time in charge; that the defend. that the argument by which the Court of Queen's ant, McKenna, a Catholic priest, was endeavoring to Bench was led in that case, the ratio decidendi upon administer the sacrament of penance to a sick inmate which the court acted, covered the present case. This
of the house, who was a Catholic, and had requested is a case, as I have already explained, in which there
him to administer it; that such administering rewas a judicial proceeding terminating, not in the dis-quired entire secrecy between the defendant and the charge of the party charged, but in the refusal of the
sick person; that the plaintiff had refused to leave the magistrate to grant a summons against the person room after being requested to retire; and that a charged, on the ground that such a proceeding was not sufficient and proper amount of force was used to warranted by the facts disclosed. I think, therefore, compel her to leave. Held, that the plaintiff being resting my judgment upon this case, and upon Currie rightfully in the room, and the defendant a mere v. Walter, ubi supra, the principles of wbich it adopts, visitor, there was nothing in the priestly character of that these rules must be discharged.
the defendant, or in the offices of religion which he LOPES, J. In this case three men, who believed was about to perform, that gave him the control of themselves aggrieved by the conduct of the plaintiff in
the room, or any legal authority to exclude or remove respect of the payment of their wages, applied to a from it by force any person lawfully there, and the magistrate in open court for a summons under the facts relied upon in justification did not, as matter Masters and Servants Act, and the magistrate refused
of law, furnish any defense. Cooper v. McKenna. the application, considering it a matter for civil and
(Mass. L. Rep.) not a criminal court. The defendants afterward published a report which the jury bave found was a fair report of what occurred. On principles of public con- Acceptance of order payable on happening of future venience the ordinary rule is that no action can be event: construction of. The following order was premaintained in respect of a fair and impartial report of sented to defeudant for acceptance: $445. “Lowell, a judicial proceeding, though the report contain mat- Feb. 3d, 1875. Mr. Blodgett please pay to C. H. Robter of a defamatory kind and injurious to individuals. bins the sum of four hundred and forty-five dollars, It was argued that the matter in respect of which the and oblige, to be paid when the house is finished. J. application was made was not within the jurisdiction
T. Willis.” Across the face of the order was written, of the magistrate. But the cases are clear to show “I accept the order. Chas. A. Blodgett." The order that want of jurisdiction will not take away the priv- was given by Willis, a contractor, to the plaintiff for ilege if it is maintainable on other grounds. Nor do
work done by him on the house in question, belouging I think the privilege is confined to the Superior to the defendant, for Willis, while the latter was still Courts. It is not the tribunal, but the nature of the at work under his contract. The house was fiuished alleged judicial proceedings, which must be looked at. but not by Willis; and the house was sold in an unfiuThe point mainly relied on by the defendants was, that ished state by the defendant to one Litchfield, who
finished it. In an action in the order against defend- company.- A person who is injured by the negligence ant, held, that the order being general in its terms and of another's servant cannot be a fellow-servant with payable absolutely when the house is finished, it was the servant whose negligence causes the injury, so as immaterial who completed it. If the defendant to exempt the master from liability, unless he is under wished to limit his liability, he should have done so the control and orders of the master. Defendants when he accepted the order. Cook v. Wolfendale, 105 and the G. N. Company owned adjoining stations, Mass. 401; Russell v. Barry, 115 id. 300; Somers which were worked by a "joint station staff," the cost y. Thayer, id. 163. The time when the defendant's of whose salaries was borne equally by the two comliability accrued being dependent on the happen- panies. S., one of such staff, was hired by the G. N. ing of an event, the contract between Willis and the Company, and received his salary from them. While defendant was competent, as bearing on the question engaged in his duty as signalman, S. was killed by the whether the time had arrived when the defendant negligence of defendants' engine driver. Held (revers. became liable (Robbins v. Blodgett, 121 Mass. 581); but ing the judgment of the Exchequer Division), that s. it is not competent to limit the extent, or change the was not defendants' servant, so as to be a fellow-sercharacter of the liability, created in express terms by 'vant with the engine driver; and therefore his widow the order and acceptance. Robbins v. Blodgett. (Mass. could recover damages from defendants for his death. L. Rep.)
Ct. App., February 23, 1878. Swanson v. North E. Ry.
Co., 38 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 201.
Indictment: omission to set out the words of the libel: tled to insurance money on mortgaged premises.-Under
arrest of judgment. – An indictment for publishing an a provision in a mortgage the mortgagor was to keep
obscene book, which does not set out the passage or the house on the mortgaged premises insured against
passages of such book alleged to constitute the offense, fire for not less than $3,200 for the benefit of the mort
but only refers to the book by its title, is bad, and the gagee. The mortgagor procured from defendant a
defect is not cured by verdict. Ct. App., February 12, policy insuring, in his name, the house for $1,500 and
1878. Regina v. Bradlaugh and Besant, 38 L. T. Rep. the furniture for $500. The defendant did not know
(N. S.) 118. of the provision in the mortgage. The house being burned, the mortgagee notified defendant of his claim and defendant paid the amount of the insurance to the mortgagor. Held, that the mortgagee had no right of RECENT BANKRUPTCY DECISIONS. action against defendant for the amount of insurance
COMPOSITION. on the house. Stearns v. Quincy Mutual Fire Ins. Co.
Practice in proceedings for: dismissal.- A resolution of composition was adopted in this case, by which the
creditors agreed to accept uotes of a new firm to be RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.
composed of two members of the old firm and such
other person or persons, if any, as they might associate BILL OF EXCHANGE.
with them, with a fresh capital of at least twenty Acceptance by signature: words of acceptance.- A
thousand dollars, which, if borrowed, should not be bill of exchange is not sufficiently accepted by the withdrawn until the composition was paid. The uew acceptor's name being written across the face of it.
firm was formed of all the members but one of the old There must be an acceptance in writing on the bill,
firm, with the capital required, and a deed of release and the signature of the acceptor. Iu an action by
was signed by the creditors. The capital had been the drawer against the acceptor of a bill, it was proved borrowed and was repaid soon after. The new firm that the bill was directed to the defendant, that the
paid the first and second installmeuts of the composidefendant was seen to write his name across it, and tion, but stopped payment on the third. A day or two that it was given for value. Neither the word "ac
before this the case had been dismissed. Held, that cepted," nor any thing beyond the bare signature of the dismissal should not be vacated and the case sent the defendant, was written upon the bill. Held, that
back into bankruptoy, because (1) creditors of the new the action was not maintainable. Com. P. Div., March
firm could not prove their debts or be paid in this pro2, 1878. Hindpaugh v. Blakey, 38 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) ceeding, and (2) because the remaining partner, him221.
self innocent, lost his opportunity, by the discharge, CARRIER OF PASSENGERS.
of seeing that the composition was faithfully and fully Railway company: liability as carriers of passengers'
carried out. U. S. Dist. Ct., Mass. In re Ewing, 17 luggage : duty at end of journey: delivery to owner.- It Nat. Bankr. Reg. 109. is the duty of a railway company, in regard to the
DISCHARGE. baggage of a passenger which has reached its destination, to have the baggage ready for delivery upon the 1. Will not release lien of judgment.— A discharge in platform at the usual place of delivery until the owner bankruptcy will not release the lieu of a judgment in the exercise of due diligence can call and receive it; which was not proved. Sup. Ct., Ga. Darsey v. avd it is the owner's duty to call for and remove it | Mumpford, 17 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 181. within a reasonable time. Ex. Ch. Div., January 21, 2. Ilomestead exemption. The lands, etc., claimed 1878. Patscheeder v. Great West. Railway, 38 L. T. to be exempt under the Homestead Exemption Law of Rep. (N. S.) 149.
Georgia, must be laid off and designated as such home
stead before the debtor is entitled to such exemption; MASTER AND SERVANT.
and this, although such lands had been previously set Fellow-servant: "joint station staff :" injury to serv- apart to him in proceedings in bankruptcy as exempt ant of one company by negligence of servant of another under such law. Ib.
COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT. 1. Executor, when not discharged.—Where an execu
APPEALABLE ORDER. tor has so administered as to render himself personally liable to the creditors of the testator, his debt to them
Construction of New Code, s 1241: exercise of discreis a fiduciary debt, and unaffected by a discharge
tion of court below as to arrest not reviewable in Court granted to him in bankruptoy. Sup. Ct., Ga. March 19,
of Appeals.-The provision of the New Code, $ 1241, 1878. Lawrence v. McKenzie.
providing that a judgment may be enforced in certain 2. Enforcement of judgment not discharged in bank- cases by punishing the judgment debtor for a conruptcy.--Such a debt having been found against the
tempt of the court does not compel the court below to executor by an award of arbitrators on the reference
act and punish where the facts bring the case within of a cause pending in court, and the award having
the purview of the section. The court below has a been excepted to before the adjudication of bank
discretion in the matter, and when it exercises that ruptcy, and the exceptions having been withdrawn
discretion by refusing to grant an order of arrest an and the award made a judgment of the court while the
appeal does not lie to this court. Appeal dismissed. proceedings in bankruptcy were pending, the judg
Cochrane v. Ingersoll. Opinion per Curiam. ment may, after discharge granted or before, be en
[Decided April 16, 1878. Reported below, 11 Hun, forced by execution, both against property acquired
3-2.] subsequently to adjudication, and against property
CARRIER OF PASSENGERS. set apart by the assignee as exempt. Ib.
1. Not liable for loss by robbery of valuable securities 3. Proof of fiduciary debt.-The proof in bankruptcy carried on person of passenger.–Plaintiff was a passenof a fiduciary debt, and the receipt of a dividend ger ou defendant's railway holding the ordinary pasthereon out of the bankrupt's estate, constitute no sage ticket for which he had paid the usual price. He obstacle to the collection of the balance, though the carried in his clothing upon his person without the dividend was, by consent of all the creditors, larger knowledge of defendant or notice to it, solely in than the debt was entitled to in the regular course of his own care and custody, a package of negotiable bankruptcy administration. Ib.
securities of $16,000 in value. These securities were
taken from him in the car of defendant, by violence, LIEN.
by three men who had no connection with defendant 1. Secured creditor : practice. – Where a secured and whose presence in the car was not known to decreditor has proved his claim without stating the fact fendant though it might have been. The jury found that such claim was secured, and has received a divi- that the plaintiff was not guilty of negligence and that dend thereon, if those interested in the distribution the defendant was guilty of negligence in not caring of the estate do not take advantage of the forfeiture for the protection of the plaintiff, and that in conseof the security caused thereby, third parties, not being quence of that negligence the robbery took place. so interested, have no standing to do so. Sup. Ct., Held, that defendant was not liable for the value of the Penn. Bassett v. Baird, 17 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 177. securities carried by plaintiff, and in an action for the
2. Release of lien.—The bankrupt, previous to the loss accruing to plaintiff from the robbery, they could commencement of the proceedings, sold certain premi- not enter into an estimate of the damages. Order ses. Parties who had, prior to the conveyance,
below affirmed. Weeks v. N. Y., N. H. & Hartf. R. performed work upon the premises subsequently filed R. Co. Opinion by Folger, J. a lien therefor, and proved their claim in the bauk
2. How far carrier liable for neglect to protect pasruptcy proceedings, but neglected to state that it senger from robbery.—Though a carrier of passengers is was secured by the llen, and received a dividend. In bound to guard one going in his vehicle, from violence, an action to foreclose the lien, held, that the grantee the damages he must pay if he neglects his duty are of the premises could not claim that the lien was such as would ordinarily result therefrom, as would thereby released. Ib.
naturally be contemplated by the parties. The carrier
would be liable only for the safety of the passenger, MECHANICS' LIEN.
his ordinary baggage, and such articles as are usually Discharge in bankruptcy no defense to.- Where the required by a passenger and reasonable for his personal creditor of a bankrupt, having part of his debt secured
use while on his way or at his place of destination. Ib. by a mechanic's lieu, proved his debt and elected to
[Decided January 15, 1878. Reported below, 9 Hun, retain his lien at an appraised value, the discharge of
669.] the bankrupt is no defense in a suit on the lien. Sup.
CRIMINAL LAW. Ct., Penn., Feb. 25, 1878. Streeper v. McKee.
False pretenses: post-dated check.-On the 28th of
August the prisoner, having bargained for some goods PARTNERSHIP.
of complainant, sent out from complainant's residence Proof: individual property of partners pledged : evi- where he was, a friend who was with him to get, as he dence.- Where the individual property of one of the said, the money to pay for the goods. The friend soon members of a firm is pledged for a debt of the firm, after returned with a check on a bank, purporting to the creditor may, and indeed is bound to prove at the be drawn by one Steinbach, and dated August 29. request of the separate creditors, his whole debt with: This, prisoner represented to be a valid security, and out deduction against the joint assets; but can only attention being called to the fact that it was dated the prove the deficiency, after disposing of the security, 29th, stated that this was done because it was so late against the separate assets of such partner. Evidence in the day and the bank was closed. No account was is always admissible between principal and surety to kept at the bank by any Steinbach, and the check was show what their equitable rights toward each other worthless. The check was taken and prisoner and his
U. S. Dist. Ct., Mass. In re May. E.c parte Mass. friend took away the goods. Held, to constitute a Hosp. Life Ins. Co., 17 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 192.
false pretense, and the fact that the check was post