lard, 10 id. 152; Hopkinson v. Foster, L. R., 19 Eq. Cas. 74; Lunt v. Bank of North America, 49 Barb. 221; Chapman v. White, 6 N. Y. 412; Ætna Bank v. Fourth National Bank, 46 id. 82; Duncan v. Berlin, 60 id. 151; Attorney-General v. Life Ins. Co., 71 id. 325; Carr v. Bank, 107 Mass. 45; Lloyd v. McCaffrey, 46 Penn. St. 410; Bullard v. Randall, 1 Gray, 605; Dana v. Bank, 13 Allen, 445; Moses v. Bank, 34 Md. 580; Fogarties v. Skillman, 12 Rich. (S. C.) 518; Munn v. Burch, 25 Ill. 35; Bank v. Bank, 80 id. 212; Roberts v. Corbin, 26 Iowa, 315; Buckner v. Sayre, 18 B. Mon. 745; Lester v. Given, 8 Bush, 357. Dickinson v. Coates. Opinion by Norton, J. [See 7 Eug. R. 69; 21 id. 796.] FINANCIAL LAW. -OFFSET. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-PLEADING The maker of a promissory note, transferred after maturity, sued in the name of the holder and owner, cannot plead in offset a claim in his favor against the payee; but under the general issue, he can make any defense, which grew out of the note transaction, or out of any agreement between himself and the payee in relation to the note. Among the cases so holding are Britton v. Bishop, 11 Vt. 70; and Armstrong v. Noble, 55 id. 429. In Adams v. Bliss, 16 id. 39, it was held that offset could not be pleaded although the note had been transferred for the purposes of collection merely. The defendant in this case gave notice, by his pleadings, of payment, but the findings of the court below do not show payment, but an independent claim in offset against the payee. Sup. Ct. Vermont. Haley v. Congdon. Opinion by Taft, J. (56 Vt. 65. NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. HOWELL ON NATURALIZATION. Naturalization and Nationality in Canada, Expatriation and repatriation of British subjects, etc. By Alfred Howell of Osgoode Hall, Barrister. R. Carswell & Co., Toronto and Edinburgh, 1884. Pp. 132. This manual comprises the Canada Act of 1881, with an explanation of the technical terms used therein, former statutes affecting subject-matter collated, acts wholly and partly repealed by Imperial Act of 1870, also the Laws of the United States on Citizenship and Naturalization. The whole supplemented with appropriate forms. The author also considers in twentysix pages "the old rule of perpetual allegiance." Those for whose use it is intended will find needed information in convenient form. The publishers' work is admirably done. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS. HE following decisions were handed down Tuesday, Oct. 7, 1884: Judgment affirmed with costs-Patrick Walsh, appellant, v. Trustees of New York and Brooklyn Bridge Company, respondent; People v. Equitable Trust Company of New London, Conu.; City National Bank of Poughkeepsie, respondent, v. William Phelps, impleaded, appellant; Philip Kruman, respondent, v. Elias W. Beach et al., appellants; Rochester Savings Bank, respondent, v. James G. Averell and others, appellants; Levi Sillerman and another, respondents, v. Edward Clark and others, appellants; John McDermott, respondent, v. Sarah M. Bull, appellant; National Bank of Rondout, respondent, v. Benedict Dreyfus and others, appellants; Todd v. Same; Gertrude E Armitage, respondent, v. Daniel Mace, appellant; People ex rel. Chamberlain, as trustee, respondent, v. John G. Forrest and others, appellants; Village of Port Jervis, respondent, v. First National Bank of Port Jervis, appellant; Henry Beckworth, etc., respondent, v. James Brackett and others, appellants; Benjamin C. Nottingham, respondent, v. Maggie Clark, appellant; Philip A. Fitzpatrick, respondent, v. Lauren C. Woodruff, appellant; John Glushing, respondent, v. Thomas R. Sharp, receiver, etc., appellant; Gertrude B. Murray, appellant, v. New York Life Insurance Company, respondent; Thomas H. Larned, appellant, v. William E. Tillotson, respondent; Henry Helbriegel, respondent, v. John B. Manning, appellant; Allen Wilson, appellant, v. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, respondent; George A. Coe, respondent. v. David Bearup, appellant; Lizzie Hannou, infant, etc., appellant, v. John T. Agnew and others, respondents: A. B. Hepburn, receiver, appellant, v. W. H. Montgomery and others, respondents. Judgment reversed. new trial granted, costs to abide the event-Francis B. Wallace and another, respondents, v. Robert H. Berdell and others, appellants; Ambrose S. Murray v. Same; George W. Wood, appellant, v. Rudolph F. Rabe and another, respondents; A. Barton Hepburn, receiver, etc., appellant, v. William H. Montgomery and others, respondents; Same v. Same; James Wilmore, appellant, v. James A. Flack and others, executors, etc., respondents; Lewis G. Knowles, appellants, v. Clara C. Toone, impleaded, etc., respondents; Alice Huntington, respondent, v. Emeline Asher, app.; Chas. W. Durant, Jr., appellant, v. Wm. P. Alendreth, resp.; John B. Grow, resp,. v. Horace Garlock, app.So much of the judgment of the Supreme Court as adjudges that the provisions of the will of Michael Kuhn, deceased, relating to the house and premises No. 472 Eighth avenue, are contrary to law, and void, and all directions in said judgment respecting that property reversed, and that the rights and interests of the parties in said premises No. 472 Eighth avenue should be declared in accordance with this opinion. The residue of the judgment of the Supreme Court affirmed, and the costs of all parties in this court to be paid out of the funds in the hands of the trustee-William P. Radley et al., respondents, v. Peter Kuhn et al., executor, etc., appellants, v. Margaret Schoenberger et al., respondents. Order of General Term reversed; that of Special Term affirmed-People v. Globe Mut. Life Ins. Co. (claim of Mary M. Brown).—Order of General Term reversed; writ of certiorari quashed-People ex rel. Second Ave. R. Co. v. Board of Commissioners of Public Works; Same v. Same.-Order of General Term reversed, and case remitted to General Term to exercise its discretion in reversing the order of the Special Term; costs of this appeal to abide the event of the action-Frank P. Reed, appellant, v. Mayor, etc., of New York, respondent.- Order affirmed with costs-Thomas Cahill, appellant, v. Henry Hilton and another, respondents; William R. Barr and others, respondents, v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. et al., appellants; Adam Emerich, respondent, v. Peter Hefferau and others, appellants; Jennie E. Erkenbrach, appellant, v. George A. Erkenbrach, respondent.Judgment of the General Term affirming judgment entered upon the verdict at Circuit affirmed with costs -Joseph W. Duryee, respondent, v. Mayor, etc., appellant. Judgment affirmed-People, respondent, v. August Muller, appellant. Order of General Term reversed and judgment entered on the report of the referee affirmed with costs-John Baird, appellant, v. Mayor, etc., of New York, respondent.Decree of surrogate and General Term modified, and case remitted to surrogate for judgment in accordance with the opinion in this case, costs of appellants and respondents in this court to be paid out of the estate-In re accounting of the executors of Bullard, Coe Adams and others, executors, etc., appellants, v. Arthur W. Benson and others, executors, etc., respondent.-Order of General Term reversed, and that of Special Term affirmed with costs-Agricultural Ins. Co., appellaut, v. Henry Barnard, impleaded, etc., respond ent. The Albany Law Journal. WE ALBANY, OCTOBER 18, 1884. CURRENT TOPICS. E once amused ourselves, if not our readers, by publishing some specimens of "fine writing" by the judges. At the risk of extending vacation topics beyond the proper bounds, we venture to add a few examples. Chief Justice Jackson, of Georgia, has such a way of putting things that we suspect he must be descended from "Old Hickory." In Hussey v. State, 69 Ga. 54, an indictment for keeping open a tippling shop on Sunday, he thus discoursed: "The door on the street, through the bar and office room into the restaurant, was kept open to the extent that any visitor had only to push it and go in, and tipple in the restaurant. The counter, where on other days drinking could be done, was covered by canvas from the ceiling to the floor, so as to be invisible itself, and to conceal the bottles on shelves behind, and on it in brazen letters was the announcement bar closed,' and all the drinking was carried on in the rear and restaurant room. This fact, that the ostrich thus hid his head in the sand, and thereby imagined that his body was all covered too, is absolutely assigned as the legal reason why he was not visible to the keen eye of the law, which penetrates and despises all subterfuge and deceit! But one witness, though the canvas tried to hide the bird's head, actually did see poked out through a sort of aperture or window, the bill or beak which let out the liquor from the bar to servants in the restaurant. So that the foolish bird did not even keep all his head hid all the time! It makes no difference in law whether the place be called a bar-room, or a glee club resort, or a parlor, or a restaurant, if it be a place where liquor is retailed and tippled on the Sabbath day, with a door to get into it, so kept that anybody can push it open and go in and drink, the proprietor of it is guilty of keeping open a tippling house on Sunday." But after all, it seems to us that Judge Manning, of Louisiana, "takes the cake," in this respect, to borrow a phrase from the world's people. He makes the 35th Louisiana Annual very lively reading. The following are brilliant examples: In speaking of a man afflicted with a cancer in the throat, in Czarnowski v. Zeyer, page 797, he says: "The stricture became so complete, and the œsophagus so rigid, that nourishment by the mouth had to cease. Enemas would not answer as a substitute. The man was in danger of starvation. Food around and before him in abundance, and no power to appropriate it - a modern Tantalus sitting on his own hearth-stone." Tantalus sitting before the fire, and beyond the reach of enemas is VOL. 30- No. 16. truly a piteous object. The judge is not patient 'Procul, O! Procul este profani, By the way, we take it for granted that the printer is responsible for "sticking in the back," in the opinion on page 795, on a question of construction of contract, as we cannot conceive that such a reprehensible mode of assassination has any thing to do with such a question. Judge Manning applies to a lawyer who sued for malicious prosecution the maxim, de minimis, etc., in Maille v. Lacassagne, page 595, as follows: "The plaintiff is the only witness for himself. He has been practicing law since November, 1880 or 1881. The date is very recent, and yet his knowledge of so interesting an event is so misty that he does not fix the year with precision. He has not lost any business in cousequence of the defendant's charge against him, and his outlay, as stated in a bill of particulars, has been $2.60 for newspapers, $9.75 for car fare and extra clerk hire, and $1.50 for mail matter and telegrams, and even these items are reduced upon his cross-examination to 80 cents for newspapers, 10 cents for car fare, 12 cents for postage, and 30 cents for a telegram. The whole affair is so puerile that it seems unaccountable that the counsel on each side should have wasted over twenty pages of printed brief upon it." But inasmuch as the lawyer got a verdict of $450, which was affirmed, he probably does not much care for the judicial sarcasm. It seems that at Swansea Assizes, recently, Mr. Justice Stephen had occasion to complain of the annoyance caused in court by the continued hammering on board a ship in the neighboring dock basin. Having sent once or twice to request that the noise might be discontinued, he despatched the high sheriff to the scene of the annoyance, and he presently returned with the offending workmen. His lordship, after lecturing the men, told them that they must desist, adding that if it caused them inconvenience to stop hammering they must let him know. London Truth remarks: "It must naturally cause workingmen inconvenience, and probably loss, to knock off work for an indefinite period in the middle of the day, and I fail to see by what right any judge can order them to do so. If the Swansea courts are unsuited for their purpose, by all means let steps be taken to improve them, but not in this way." The Canada Legal News observes: "Mr. Justice Stephen met with a measure of success; a learned correspondent rcminds us that the late Mr. Justice C. Mondelet was not as fortunate, when he sent to the Regimental Band to stop playing upon the Champ de Mars in Montreal. It refused." We do not see why the learned justice should conceive himself entitled to stop the industries of the community. Better move his court. Next we shall hear of his suppressing an auction or a singing school. If it is only a man practicing on a cornet we do not object. We are sorry to observe that Lord Justice Bramwell is in favor of cutting off the right of appeal in small cases. He says: "My objection is not that difficult questions do not arise when the dispute is for a small amount. They do as much as when it is for a large one. Nor do I say that such appeals are vexatious, except in so far as the amount is so small as to make them so. My objection is that such appeals 'do not pay,' that prudent litigants should agree to do without them, and that as litigants will not be wise for themselves, the State should be for them. Suppose one man honestly believes that another owes him £20, and suppose the other as honestly believes he does not. What is to be done? They will not toss up to settle, for each would feel that they would be giving up the advantage of being in the right. They must get it settled for them by a court of law or an arbitrator. Would they not show good sense and good temper by agreeing that the first should be the final decision? This must be arranged before any decision is pronounced. For the one against whom it is pronounced, if he gave up his right to appeal, would do so without any return, besides which costs would have been incurred, increasing the temptation to appeal. It may be said that litigants can so agree now. That is true, but they do not. Litigants are in a state of quarrel, and do not agree. Each is satisfied that what the one proposes is for the disadvantage of the other. The result is that the law should do them this kindness." This is not the spirit that has made Great Britain great, The determination to stand up for one's rights, however small, is what has made the little island great, and that resolution should always be facilitated. Lord Bramwell is the person, we believe, who advanced the doctrine that one travelling by railway ought to take his chances of the railway company's negligence without recourse for damages, in consideration of the great advantage of being transported. Perhaps we are stating it too strongly, but it was much to that effect. If his lordship denies it we will look it up. The fair sex have always been allowed to be sworn without taking their bonnets off, and now the question is discussed whether it is necessary for them to remove the glove. Lord Bram well, it is said, never required it. He was a rather impatient man, we believe, and probably could not endure the waste of the public time necessitated in removing a glove with, say, fourteen buttons. NOTES OF CASES. 'N Mallett v. Lewis, 61 Miss. 105, it was held that IN Mural agreement to buy goods exclusively from a certain person for five years, if he sells as reasonably as others, is within the statute of frauds. The court, Chalmers, J., said: "The first contingency set up by the plaintiff, as liable to occur within the year, to wit: that the plaintiff might fail and refuse to sell the goods on as good terms as could be obtained elsewhere, is no contingency at all in the proper sense of the word. On the contrary, it is an attempt to avoid the force of the statute by saying that the adversary might within the year have refused to comply with his portion of it, and therefore his possible refusal makes the contract good. In other words, it is equivalent to saying that the contract is condemned by law; but inasmuch as it is possible that the adversary party may break it, or be unable to comply with its terms within less than twelve months, it therefore escapes the condemnation of the statute. If the mere possibility that one of the parties to a contract may within the year refuse or be unable to comply with its terms avoids the statute prohibiting verbal contracts which do not contemplate full performance within the year, it is apparent that the statute is at once at an end, since it is hard to imagine a case where such a replication to a plea of the statute of frauds could not be filed. A refusal to comply with the terms of a contract by one party usually releases the other, but the court never anticipates a refusal in advance for the purpose either of upholding, or of annulling the contract as made. It is also true that a contract for an indefinite time, as for instance, for life, or until the happening of some contingent, uncertain and expected event, is held not to be within the statute where the contract is strictly personal, and does not descend against the administrator of the promisor, because in such cases the parties are supposed to have contracted in view of the uncertainty of life, and with full knowledge that death might ensue within the year, and thus end the contract. In such cases, as the contract was purely personal, and must end with life, it is held to be fully performed by death, and the court cannot say, from the terms of the agreement, that such was not the contemplation of the parties; but where the agreement, as in this case, stipulates in terms for a longer period than twelve months, the court is bound to see that the deliberate attempt of the parties was to bind each other verbally in the teeth of the statute for a longer period than one year. Where the time is indefinite, and supervening death may work completion within the year, the court will not infer an intention to violate the statute, but where two, five or ten years is expressly stipulated for, there is no room for inference, and the statute comes like a tyrant, and makes all unenforceable." Disapproving, Doyle v. Dizon, 97 Mass. 208. cise of their functions while engaged in the discharge of their duties, is too well settled by adjudications, and too well founded in considerations of public policy to admit of controversy. It is so expressly declared in 1 Dill. Mun. Corp., § 98, and the references fully support the general proposition asserted in the text. The consequence might be most serious if such officers were to be left to struggle alone and unaided against every action that persons arrested may choose to bring upon an allegation of abused authority, though honestly exercised, in the maintenance of the public peace and the preservation of good order, and the results of which, though successfully defended, might prove disastrous to the officer. Within the range of this conceded power must be embraced the employment of counsel, and the payment of a reasonable compensation for their services, and the more necessary is it to a municipal body, such as this is, who have no regular and salaried legal adviser to resort to in case the occasion shall require. Such a right, limited by a just responsibility for its exercise, must abide in the corporation as essential to its self-pro In Acker v. County of Anderson, 20 S. C. 495, it was held that a county is not responsible for injur-tection, and the attainment of the ends for which ies to a mule and buggy caused by the mule taking fright at a placard placed on a public bridge without the knowledge of the county commissioners, and removed by them as soon as it was brought to their attention. The court said: "This action was brought under this authority, and the only question was whether the plaintiff's injury was received through a defect in the repair' of Rocky river bridge. It appeared that the county commissioners had nothing to do with putting the placard on the bridge, which was placed there as a public place by some enterprising business man, intent on advertising the merits of the 'force-pump,' and that as soon as it was brought to their attention they had it taken down. If therefore any responsibility as to consequences arose out of the placard being on the bridge, it would seem not to attach to the county. Even if the commissioners had allowed it to be placed there, it is more than doubtful whether the county could have been made liable. The only matter for which the act gives an action against the county is a defect in the repair of a highway, causeway or bridge.' If there was no defect in this bridge there was no right of action against the county, and whether there was such a defect was a question of fact, which was submitted to the jury, upon what we must assume to have been a fair charge, as no complaint is made here on that point." We should suppose that a court might hold, as matter of law, that a placard on a bridge is not a "defect in a bridge." it is formed. Adjudicated cases are not wanting * * AN ARTICLED CLERK'S DAY IN LONDON. In Roper v. Town of Laurinburg, 90 N. C. 427, it was held that a town may appropriate a reasonable amount of its funds to employ counsel to defend its police officers in actions for false imprisonment. The court said: "The right of a municipal corpo-TURNING out of Fleet street, just on the city ration to provide an indemnity for its officers who of Temple Bar (for be it premised we are may incur a liability to others in the bona fide exer- speaking of days when the old Bar still retained its glance on Chitty's pile of briefs. That learned gentleman's minutes must indeed be golden this morning; and who would recognize in the dry, old barrister of to-day the genial umpire of the 'Varsity' boat race to-morrow? Now for Mr. W.'s chamber. We cross the lane, enter the really noble gateway of Lincoln's Inn, and make for our learned adviser's abode in the New Square. He is, we find, in the Lord Justices' Court, and thither we follow him. Half a dozen barristers, a couple of solicitors, one old woman, probably insane, and a score or so of that insignificant but necessary class known as suitors, constitute the audience before whom the burly, vigorous Lord Justice James is carrying on an animated discussion with a learned but sorely aggrieved Queen's counsel, whilst his colleague, Mellish, sits by in dignified silence, perhaps cogitating Bacon's dictum that "it is no grace in a judge first to find out that which he might have heard in due time from the bar, or to show quickness of conceit in cutting off counsel too short." Certainly, Bacon is no authority in James' estimation. The gentleman we are in search of speedily joins us, and receiving a blank sheet, with the indispensable fee marked thereon, patiently listens to our verbal instructions, and promises an opinion in time for to-night's post. local habitation), we find ourselves in a long, narrow, dirty street, from which the sunlight is excluded by grimy buildings crowded together on each side, and we notice at once a change in the character of the busy folk who hustle us on the narrow pavement. There is an indescribable shabbiness of apparel, a prevalence of garments which have long since seen their best days, and now produce a tout-ensemble of threadworn rustiness, matching well with the colorless, hard-ground faces of their wearers. We do not need the sight of yonder barrister scuttling along under full sail, with gown distended balloon-wise, and an ancient umbrella protecting a still more ancient wig, or of this pert clerk with an armful of papers, and an expression of latent excitement on his worried face, to tell us that we are now amongst the lawyers, and that this is Chancery Lane. On our left rises the forbidding portico of the Incorporated Law Society building, which we pass not without a twinge of doubtful anticipation of the fast approaching day when we must mount the dreaded stairs and undergo the agonies of our "final," and diving under the archway on our right we scurry past the historic Rolls Chapel, stumble up the steps skirting the desolate "garden" (oh, much enduring word), and enter that Pandemonium of noise and confusion known as 66 Judges' Chambers." All round the room, behind the desks, are ancient and not too civil clerks, pursuing their several routine duties, with accustomed disregard of the shouting throng who occupy the large, central space, and straight-Legacy and Succession Duty Division, where we way we add our tribute to the din, and begin howling in our loudest tones "Field and Roscoe!" Gregory!" "De Gex!" And so on through the list of opposing firms with whom we have business this morning. Do not suppose from the sudden rush to yonder corner, and the general scrimmage ensuing, that a football has been surreptitiously introduced into these strictly business precincts. Oh, no! The judge of the day has just come, and the fight is to get before him. A powerful porter guards the door leading to the luminary's presence, and cautiously opens that portal from time to time to let in those who have fought their way to the front. Our athletic training stands us in good stead here, and after a short, but lively struggle, we rush triumphant over a fat solicitor, and heedless of his objurgations soon find ourselves inside. The judge, whom, not being in the glory of his judicial attire, we regard as a dull and rather testy old gentleman, soon knocks off our little matters, and whilst we are still busy explaining, scribbles a few words on our summonses, hands them back to us, and we emerge as unceremoniously as we entered. The formal orders are soon made out, and stamped with the undecipherable blot which is supposed to represent the judge's signature, and now we are free of chambers for the day. Heated and excited we turn into the Rolls to look at the cause list, and take a hurried glance at Jessel disposing of motions at express pace, not without casting an envious | Our next destination is Somerset House, that huge pile of desolate quadrangles and interminable corridors, wherein the Inland Revenue Department houses its enormous staff. Our business is with the have to pass an account, a task of all others most distasteful to our souls. Every estate in the kingdom comes under the scrutiny of this inexorable bureau, and so complete and far reaching is its network that sooner or later the smallest and most obscure succession gets captured therein. And not only must the accounts of all, from the Duke of Westminster down to Jones, the little country shopkeeper in Northumberland, pass and pay toll, but these accounts must all be conformed to certain procrustean forms, and vouched throughout. It is a matter of perfect indifference to yonder bland and smiling clerk whether item 6 of schedule X is a matter of £5 or £5,000. All he knows is that it is not "in form." His politeness is only exceeded by his firmness, and he is bound to win in the long run, so we can only make a careful note of his requirements, and send them down to our country client for him to comply with as best he can. We have one more call to make before we leave the building, and we make our way across to the probate office in the southeastern corner. Here we have to search a will, nor are we the only persons on a like errand bent. Observe these two women poring with blank countenance over the closely written pages of yonder ponderous folio. They will probably pass the whole day here, and make life miserable for the unhappy attendants, who conscious of impending fate, are all furtively watching the pair, and casting about for some means of escape. Vain hope! The stern glances |