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RROR to Common Pleas, No. 1, of Allegheny necessity of making some explanation to rebut its county. The opinion states the case.

prima facie negligence. The case is not like Finucane MERCUR, J. This action was brought against the v. Small, 1 Esp. 315, in which there was no express plaintiff in error to recover for the loss of some govern- agreement as to the care to be exercised. Nor is it ment bonds. Its general business is indicated by like Farnham v. Camden & Amboy R. R. Co., 5 P. F. its name. It took two classes of risks. In one class Smith, 53, where it was held that proof merely of loss it became the absolute guarantor of the safety of the was not sufficient to put the bailee on his defense. deposit. In the other its liability was qualified and The evidence, in the present case, of the defendant in restricted. The present case arose under the latter error did not stop with merely showing the loss. It class. The defendant in error rented a safe in the showed the bonds had been abstracted by some one burglar-proof vault of the company, subject, inter alia, entering the vault and opening the safe by means of a to its following rules and regulations:

key. The presumption of want of ordinary care was “Whenever a party rents a safe, and deposits therein thereby created. All the evidence calculated to rebut at pleasure, contents not being made known to the that presumption was fairly left to the jury by the company, its liability is limited: (1) To the keeping learned judge. of a constant and adequate guard and watch over and The other assignments have no merit, and were not upon the burglar-proof safe. (2) To the prevention of urged in the argument. access by any renter to the safe of any other renter. Judgment affirmed. (3) To the protection of safes and contents from any dishonesty on the part of any of the company's employees."

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS. He renewed the lease annually several times and paid the required rent. The safe is closed by an iron


AND FEBRUARY, 1878. door, to which a lock is attached. The valuables are placed in a tin box made to fit into the safe like a

DOMICILE. drawer. In this box and safe he placed several thousand dollars in government bonds, and had the ex

Change of residence: what does not amount to : intenclusive possession of the keys to the safe. As the

tion.- A, being unmarried, sold his farm in West interest fell due on the bonds, he took them out, cut

Virginia and came to Pennsylvania, bringing his perthe coupons therefrom, and replaced them in the safe

sonal property with him, and made his home with his and locked it again. Finally, on taking out the en

brother-in-law, but paid no taxes in either State after velope containing the bonds, for the same purpose, he

he sold his land, and died in Pennsylvania. It was discovered that four bonds, two of $1,000 each, and two

contended that he had not changed his residence and of $500 each, had disappeared therefrom. The jury

that his estate was not liable for the collateral inherithave found that he put them in the safe and did not

ance tax of this State. 1 Bouv. Law Dic. 489, defines remove them therefrom. There was no evidence that

domicile to be “that place in which a person has fixed the vault or the safe had been broken, nor that the

his habitation without any present intention of remoylock had been tampered with. These facts being un

ing therefrom. Held, that a mere intention to remore questioned, and the bonds having been taken from the

permanently without an actual removal works no safe, it uecessarily follows that it had been opened

change of domicile; nor does a mere removal from the with a key suited to the lock. Iu order to get access

State, without an intention to reside elsewhere. But to the safe a person would be obliged to step into the

when a person sells all his land, gives up all his busivault. If he entered during business hours, one key

ness in the State in which he lived, takes his movable would enable him to procure the boods. If at other

property with him and establishes his home in another hours, it would require two keys to reach them from

State, such acts prima facie, prove a change of domithe office. The fact that the bonds were taken under

cile. Ilindman's Appeal. these circumstances, was certainly some evidence that

FIRE INSURANCE. the company had not kept * a constant and adequate 1. Unsigned conditions printed on back of policy guard and watch over and upon the safe," as by its when part of the contract.--Where a policy of fire insuragreement it was bound to do. It further agreed to ance, among other provisions and express conditions, prevent the access of any other renter to the safe of provided that the loss should be “payable in sixty days the defendant in error, and to protect his safe and its after the notice, proof, and adjustment thereof, in concontents from any dishonesty of the company's em- formity to the conditions annexed to this policy,” and ployees. If any third persons were given access to certain unsigned provisions, entitled “Conditions the vault, under circumstances that would have enabled of Insurance,” were printed on the back of the policy, them to unlock the safe and remove the bonds, and such indorsed and unsigned conditions are part of the they had so done, although a contingency not provided contract between the insurer and insured. Kensington for in the agreement, yet it cannot be pretended that Nat. Bank v. Yerkes. it would not be evidence of a want of ordinary care. 2. Interpretation of clause providing that policy should So, if the bonds were purloined by either renter or become void upon creation of an incumbrance on the employee, it was certainly evidence to go to the jury

premises: confession of judgment, effect of, etc.-One of of an omission, on the part of the company, to exer- the conditions printed upon the back of such a policy cise that ordinary care and vigilance which men ordi

provided that "should there at any time, during the life narily exercise, and ought to exercise, under such cir

of the policy, an incumbrance fall or be executed cumstances, in the protection of their own property. upon the property insured sufficient to reduce the real The vault and the safe were in the possession, and interest of the insured on the same to a sum only equal under the protection, of the company. The manner to or below the amount insured

. then the in which the bonds were most probably taken shifted policy shall become void;" the insured confessed a the burden of proof. It threw upon the company the judgment greater in amount than the value of the

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property. Held, that the policy was thereby avoided, ity to contract marriage, their marriage ought to be even though no execution ever issued upon such judg- declared null and void. (Simonin v. Mallac, 2 Sw. & ment. An incumbrance falls” upon a property when Tr. 67; 29 L. J. [P. M. & A.] 971, distinguished.) Sota judgment is entered. Ib. (W. Not. Cas.)

tomayor v. De Barros, L. R., 3 P. D. (C. A.) 1.


STATUTE OF FRAUDS. Parol promise to answer for the debt of another, when False representation : of personal property: contagious not within the statute : promise to pay out of funds disense, animals affected with : sale in market: implied transferred by the debtor for the purpose.-Where one representation thut animals not suffering from disease : makes a parol promise to pay the debt of another, out

conditions of sale: contagious diseases (animals) act, 1869 of funds transferred to the promisor for the purpose,

(32 and 33 Vict., c. 70, s. 57): vendor and purchaser.- The such promise is not within the statute of frauds. The defendant sent for sale to a public market pigs which he creditor to be benefited, though not present at the

knew to be infected with a contagious disease; they time of the promise, becomes the owner of the fund were exposed for sale subject to a condition that no thus impressed with a trust for him, and as such can warranty would be given and no compensation would sue for it. Justice v. Tallman (W. Not. Cas.)

be made in respect of any fault. No verbal representation was made by or on behalf of the defendant as

to the condition of the pigs. The plaintiff having RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

bought the pigs, put them with other pigs, which be

came infected; some of the pigs bought from the deANIMALS.

fendant and also some of those with which they were Property in wild: embezzlement: master and servant.

put died of the contagious disease. The plaintiff har- A gamekeeper, not authorized to take or kill rabbits

ing sued to recover damages for the loss which he had for his own use, took and killed some wild rabbits

sustained. Held (reversing the judgment of the upon his master's land, and converted them dishon

Queen’s Bench Division), that, although the defendant estly to his own use by selling them. The taking,

might have been guilty of an offense against the conkilling, removing, and selling, were parts of one con

tagious diseases (animals) act, 1869, he was not liable to tinuous action. Held, that a conviction of such game

plaintiff, for that his conduct in exposing the pigs for keeper for embezzlement of the rabbits could not be

sale in the market did not amount to a representation sustained. The Queen v. Read, L. R., 3 Q. B. D. 131.

that they were free from disease. Ward v. Hobbs, L.

R., 3 Q. B. D. (C. A.) 150.

Interest of plaintiff at time of loss : vendor in posses-
sion : intended demolition of premises under compulsory

Underlease: waiver of objection to title : constructive power.- The plaintiff insured his premises in the de

notice of provisions in original lease: qualified covenant fendants' office by a policy which provided that their

not to assign or underlet without consent : clause of recapital should be liable to pay to the assured “any

entry not applicable to negative covenants: usual cove

nant: covenant not to mow meadow land more than loss or damage by fire to the buildings " not exceeding 16001. The premises were afterward required by the

once a year: clause of re-entry in case of bankruptcy, Metropolitan Board of Works under their compulsory

composition with creditors, or execution issued against

lessee: merger: reversion.- Where a parol contract is powers, in order that they might be pulled down for

made for the grant of an underlease subject to a the improvement of a street, and the amount of pur

question of title, possession taken with the knowledge chase-money payable to the plaintiff was assessed by

and consent of the grantor is not of itself a waiver of an arbitration, according to the Laud Clauses Act. After

objection to title by the grantee, but it is only evidence the board had accepted the plaintiff's title, but before he had executed a conveyance, the premises were

of the acceptance of the title, which may be rebutted by

other circumstances. Upon an agreement to grant an destroyed by fire. Held, that the defendants were liable to pay the plaintiff 15001., the full value of the

underlease the grantee has constructive notice of the buildings at the time of the fire, and not merely the

provisions of the original lease only when he has a fair damage done to the buildings considered as old mate

opportunity of ascertaining what they were. Where

a lease provides that the lessee shall not assign or rials, for the dealings between the board and the plain

underlet without the consent in writing of the lessor, tiff did not affect the defendants' contract. Colling

which, however, is not to be withheld from any assignridge v. The Royal Exchange Assurunce Corporation,

ment or underlease to a respectable and responsible L. R., 3 Q. B. D. 173.

person, it is unnecessary to the validity of an assign

ment or underlease to a person of that character that Nullity of: consanguinity: marriage illegal by the law the consent of the lessor should be first obtained. of domicile.-- The petitioner and respondent, Portu

Semble, that a power of re-entry, upon the lessee willguese subjects domiciled in Portugal, and first cousins

fully failing or neglecting to perform any covevant, to each other, came to reside in England in 1858, and

does not apply to a breach of a negative covenant. Tu in 1866 they went through a form of marriage before

a lease of a farm a covenant not to mow meadow land the registrar of the district of the city of London. In

more than once a year is not an unusual covenant, so 1873 they returned to Portugal, aud their domicile as to excuse au intended assignee from accepting the throughout continued to be Portuguese. By the law title. But a power of re-entry in a lease, if the lessee of Portugal a marriage between first cousins is illegal,

and his assigns become bankrupt, or make a compoas being incestuous, but may be celebrated under a

sition with creditors, or if execution should issue Papal dispensation. Held (reversing the decision of against either of them, is unusual, and an intended the court below), that the parties being by the law of

assignee is not bound to accept an assignment of a the country of their domicile under a personal disabil

lease containing such a covenant. Where a lessor,


being himself a tenant for years, grants to his sublessee the residue of his interest from the termination of the existing sub-lease, the grant operates as an inter esse termini, and the existing sub-lease does not merge; and a right of re-entry contained in the original lease would still exist and enable the lessor to reenter for breach of covenant. Semble, where two pieces of land are demised by one lease containing a power of re-entry over both, and afterward the reversion in one of them is assigned to the lessee, the right of re-entry remains intact over the piece of land of which the reversion remains vested in the lessor. Hyde v. Warden, L. R., 3 Ex. D. (C. A.) 72.

the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, to secure a present indebtedness and also future advances of goods to be made by the mortgagee, is a valid security for such indebtedness and the amount of advances actually made. A mistake in the description of the premises in such mortgage may be corrected as against the assignee of the mortgagor subsequently appointed. Where the mortgagee has proved his debt as a secured claim in the proceedings, an action to foreclose the mortgage should be brought in the Bankrupt Court by leave of the court first obtained. U. S. Dist. Ct. Wis. Schulz v. Bolting, 17 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 167.

REDEMPTION. By assignee of bankrupt's property.--The assignee may redeem property of the bankrupt, which has been sold on execution to the judgment creditor, without pay. ing the unsatisfied balance of the judgment, or taking the property subject to the lien of such judgment. U. S. Dist. Ct. Cal. Lloyd v. Hoo Lue, 17 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 170.


CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Congress may control telegraphs: State law giving exclusive right to maintain telegraphs invalid.-Under the power given to Congress to regulate commerce among the several States, control may be exercised over telegraphs, and laws of States, in conflict with congressional legislation on the subject, are invalid. Accordingly, a law of Florida, giving an exclusive right to a company to maintain a telegraph line in a portion of that State, held inoperative against a company entitled to the privileges of the act of Congress of July 24, 1866. in relation to telegraphs. Decree of Circuit Court of Florida affirmed. Pensacola Telegraph Co., appellant, v. Western Union Telegraph Co. Opinion by Waite, C. J.



DISCHARGE. Petition for: what it should state.- A petitioner for a discharge in bankruptcy should clearly state from what debts he desires to be discharged. Where, in involuntary proceedings against one who is a member of a partnership, the bankrupt files his petition for a discharge, giving no schedule of firm debts and assets, nor praying for a discharge from firm liabilities, the discharge granted upon such petition will only relieve bim from his individual indebtedness. Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Corey v. Perry, 17 Nat. kr. Reg. 147.

INSOLVENCY. What constitutes : knowledge : notice.-A person, being a merchant or trader, is insolvent when unable to pay his debts as they mature in the ordinary course of business. The word knowledge" in section 34, as amended, of the Bankrupt Act, means actual knowledge, as contra-distinguished from constructive knowledge. A person having notice of such a state of facts in regard to the financial affairs of the bankrupt as in law constitute insolvency, either as that term denotes when applied to a merchant or trader, or when used in its general and popular sense, must be presumed to have actual knowledge, upon receiving any payment, assignment or conveyance from the bankrupt, that the same is a fraud upon the Bankrupt Act. U. S. Dist. Ct. Iowa. In re Hauck, 17 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 158.

JURISDICTION. 1. Rights of creditors of bankrupt determinerl, by bankrupt, not by State law.-Where an adjudication has been had and an assignee under the State law has surrendered the estate in his hands, the rights of creditors are to be determined by the court under the provisions of the Bankrupt Law, and not under those of the State Law. U. S. Dist. Ct., N. D. Ohio. In re Bousfield & Poole Mfg. Co., 17 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 153.

2. Purties: when assignee not necessary party.--Where leave has been granted to a creditor, pursuant to the provisions of section 5106, to proceed in a cause which was then pending, a judgment obtained therein is valid, although the assignee is not made a party. Ib.

3. Interest.-Interest upon the claim accruing, after the commencement of the proceedings, is allowable. Ib.

4. Priority of United States as creditors.- Where the United States has recovered a judgment in such an action, such judgment, including the damages, costs and interest, is entitled to priority, and no proof of the claim need be made. Ib.

MORTGAGE. To secure future advances: when valid: mistake: foreclosure.-A mortgage executed by a bankrupt prior to

When county bonds invalid in hands of hona fide holder.- By a statute of Missouri, it was enacted, that whenever twenty-five persons, tax payers and residents of a municipal township, should set forth their desire to subscribe to the capital stock of a railroad company proposing to build a road into or near said town, it should be the duty of the County Court to order an election to determine if such subscription should be made; and if it should appear that twothirds of the qualified voters voting at such election were in favor of such subscription, it should be the duty of the County Court to make such subscription in behalf of the township, according to the terms and conditions thereof, and to issue bonds in the name of the county.

On the 5th of May, 1870, the County Court of Bates county, having received a proper petition, ordered that an election be held in a township to determine whether the town should subscribe $90,000 for the stock of the C. R. R. Co., to be paid in county bonds, and the agent was directed to make such subscription on the books of the company, and report to the court what he had done. The agent applied to the company, but it had no books, and for other reasons he did not make the subscription, and reported to the court that “the bonds of said township are not subscribed," which report was formally approved. Afterward the County Court made another order, stating that the subscription had been made to the C. rail


road; that a consolidation bad been made between for the market rate. Judgment below affirmed. Hazelthat road and another, resulting in the G. Railroad ton v. Weld. Opinion by Andrews, J. Co.; that $90,000 in bonds of the county be issued in [Decided March 26, 1878.) payment of such subscription; and that B, an agent to receive and dispose of the bonds, be authorized to

CRIMINAL LAW. subscribe for the stock of the G. Co. The stock was 1. Murder in the second degree: what facts will justify subscribed for, in accordance with this order, and the conviction for.- Defendant was on trial for murder by bonds issued Held, that the subscription to the stock shooting deceased with a pistol. It was shown that the of the G. Co. was not valid, and the bonds issued there- pistol was used, and the evidence tended to show that for were invalid, even in the hands of bona fide hold- it was used intentionally, and in such close proximity ers for value. Judgment of Circuit Court, W. D. to a vital part of deceased that it would scarcely fail of a Missouri, reversed. County of Bates, plaintiff in error, fatal result and there was doubt whether defendant was v. Winters. Opinion by Hunt, J. Clifford, Swayne and at the time in any peril, or, if so, whether he attempted Strong, JJ., dissented.

to escape. Held, that the submission to the jury of the PRE-EMPTION.

question whether defendant was guilty of murder in Right to, cannot be obtained by intruder upon lands the second degree was not error. Judgment below of another.-No right of pre-emption can be established affirmed. Blake, plaintiff in error, v. People. Opinion by a settlement and improvement on public lands by Folger, J. where the claimant has obtained possession by break- 2. Evidence: responsive answer.—A witness for the ing into the inclosure of one who has already settled

people was asked, on cross-examination, if he would upon, improved, and inclosed the same land. Such

swear that the deceased was not at the time choking an intrusion, though made under pretense of pre- prisoner? He answered, “I would not swear it, but empting the land, is but a naked, unlawful trespass, don't think he was." Held, that it was not error to reand cannot initiate a right of pre-emption. Judgment fuse to strike out the words, “but don't think he was," of Supreme Court of California reversed. Atherton

on motion of defendant. Ib. v. Fowler. Opinion by Miller, J. Waite, C. J., and

3. Evidence : testifying not positively, but to best of Clifford, J., dissented upon a question of fart in the

belief.–Testimony of witnesses who would not state positively, but said what they stated was to the best of my knowledge;" "I believe it was, eto." Held, not

objectionable on that ground. Ib. COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.

4. Evidence: questioning accused as to motive of acts. AGENCY.

- The district attorney put questions to the prisoner Agent of trustee cannot bind trust estate. – Plaintiff,

on cross-examination calling for the motives which who did certain work for a trust estate, testified that

influenced him in certain actions. Held, not objeche made the contract to do the work with one 0. who

tionable. Ib. was acting in the matter as the agent of the trustee.

[Decided March 19, 1878.] The trustee claimed that he did not employ plaintiff, but that he employed 0. to do the work. Held, that

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. while the trustee might, if he had no funds in his

Powers conferred on common council cannot be delehands to pay for work done on the estate, and the

gated by it to agent.-By the charter of the city of work was necessary for its preservation, make such

Binghamton it is provided that improvements to sidework a charge on the estate, yet his agent would have

walks shall be made at the expense of the premises in no authority to do so and could only charge him person

front of which they are required, and that the comally on his contract, and that plaintiff could not hold

mon council shall order the work to be done within a the trust estate for work done by him under a contract

specified time, of which notice shall be given to the with the agent, but only the trustee personally. Judg

owner of the premises interested, and that “if any ment below affirmed. New v. Nicoll. Opinion by

work shall not be done within the time limited thereEarl, J.

for the common council shall, by contract or other[Decided March 19, 1878.]

wise, cause it to be done and assess the expense thereof CONTRACT.

upon said premises or upon the owner thereof." The Contract for storage at fixed rate : termination of common councit passed a general resolution directing contract: notice to remove or pay higher rate : im- the superintendent of streets, when the owner wegplied contract. - Defendants had stored in plaintiff's

lected to do the work by the time limited, “to cause warehouse a quautity of Brazil wood at an agreed the same to be done.Held, that the power conferred price for storage of 12 cents a ton per month, the upon the common council involved an exercise of discontract being terminable at the end of any month cretion and could not be delegated by it to the street by either party. Plaintiff gave defendants notice to superintendent, and that the ordinance in question remove the Brazil wood by the end of a certain month, was invalid. Judgment below reversed. Birdsall v. stating that if not removed by that time the price for Clark. Opinion by Church, C. J. storage thereafter would be $2 per ton per month. De- [Decided March 19, 1878.] fendants declined to remove the Brazil wood, claiming that the contract for storage was to last until it should

PRACTICE. be sold, and it remained in plaintiff's warehouse for Assignment of claim which has been sued on: assignee some months after the time its removal was demanded. takes cum onere: costs.-Where a party brought action The market rate of storage at the time for the article and a demurrer was interposed to the complaint and was 12% cents a ton a month. Held, that a contract sustained, and instead of amending his complaint he to pay $2 per ton for storage could not be implied transferred the cause of action to plaintiff who brought from the acts of defendants, and they were liable only suit thereon in her own name: Held, that an order of the Supreme Court requiring plaintiff to pay the costs hanced, not only by present circumstances, but by a accrued in the former action was proper and could be hint of much significance which he throws out, almost enforced. When plaintiff took the claim against de- incidentally, as it would seem, towards the conclusion fendants she took it cum onere and was liable to the of the third article. • I know not,” he says, “when same extent as the former owner. Order below af- another earnest effort to solve this problem may be exfirmed. Barton v. Speis. Opinion per Curiam. pected in the actual life of the world. But I am con[Decided March 19, 1878.]

fident that, at no distant date, one if not more (lin oder

linige) great European statesmen will undertake it. PROMISSORY NOTES.

The work is a far lighter one than the founding of the Defense to: consideration: condition precedent.

German Empire.Those who know the relation in Where promissory notes were given in pursuance of a which Dr. Bluntschli stands to the German Empire and stipulation to discontinue a suit, and an agreement to to the great Chancellor will have no difficulty in asdeliver releases, and such agreement and stipulation cribing their due value to these words, and they will formed in part the consideration for the notes, but the

probably be of opinion that a problem which is thus suits were not to be discontinued until the notes should

spoken of is not very far beyond the boundaries of have been paid, and the releases if delivered before

the narrow region over which even diplomatic vision were not to become operative and binding until that

extends. time: Held, that the discontinuance of the suits and

In the general views for which I contended, I am the delivery of the leases were not conditions prece

gratified to find that Dr. Bluntschli is altogether with dent to but were independent of the notes, and the

me. He admits: 1st. The impossibility of conferring failure to do these acts would not furnish a defense to

on international law the character of a positive systhe notes. Judgment below affirmed. Bruce v. Car

tem, otherwise than by the action of factors analoter. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

gous to what, in municipal law, we call legislation, (Decided February 22, 1878.]

jurisdiction and execution. 2nd. That the realization TRUSTS.

of these factors, within the sphere of the relations of Work done for trust estate on credit of trustee.-Where

separate States, is not permanently shut out by any a party has done work for the benefit of a trust estate,

facts or laws inherent in their character. 3rd. That upon the personal responsibility of the trustee, he can

the failure of all previous schemes of international get no lien upon the estate by the mere promise of the

organization can be satisfactorily explained by their trustee to pay him out of the estate. Motion for re

aiming at two impossible objects: (a) the establishargument denied. New v. Nicoll. Opinion per Cre

ment of an international organism which should be riam.

immutable; and (b) the political equalization of recog[Decided April 2, 1878.)

nized states. As the basis of his scheme Dr. Bluntschli frankly accepts the de facto principle which lies at the root of the doctrine of recognition; and in thus

breaking with the revolutionary schemes of his preINTERNATIONAL LAW.

decessors, I am sure he is eminently right. 4th. Dr.

Bluntschli farther admits the necessity of conforming LETTER FROM PROF. LORIMER.

to modern conceptions of liberty by recognizing the THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH, public opinion of the several states directly by means

March 27th, 1878. To the Editor of the Albany Law Journal :

of representatives chosen by or from the various muSIR– May I venture, through your widely circulated

nicipal legislatures. So far, I believe, then, I have the columns, to call the attention of American Jurists to

concurrence of my eminent colleague, and it goes three very remarkable articles on the organization of

pretty nearly all the length that I care for. The scheme the union of European States (Die Organisation des

which I suggested in the Révue, I intended as an illuseuropaishen Staatenvereins) which Dr. Bluntschli, the

tration of these principles, rather than as a suggestion celebrated Professor of International Law, at Heidel

for their realization. I am, consequently, not much berg, has recently contributed to the Gegenwart."'*

moved by the allegation that I have dreamt the English

constitution, or rather, as he says, the constitution of In the first of these essays Dr. Bluntschli has ex- the United States, whereas he prefers to dream the plained the scheme which Sully ascribed to Henry German Bund. It is very possible that neither of IV and to Queen Elizabeth, with great clearness, them may offer a model which admits of imitation in and with a more enlightened and cordial appre- international relations, and the former has surely as ciation than has commonly been bestowed upon good a municipal history as the latter to recommend it, and concludes with a few somewhat disparag- it. But on the practical branch of the subject I am far ing remarks on the proposals of the Abbé de St. Pierre from wishing to dogmatize. That I shall gladly leave and Rousseau. In the second he has done me the in the hands of “one or more great European stateshonor to criticise a paper on the same subject, which I men," and shall only be too well pleased if, to any expublished in the Revue de Droit International + under tent, however sinsignificant, I may have contributed to the title of Le Probléme final du DroiInternational. bring it under their notice. This object will be far The third he has devoted to his own views, and to the better effected should Dr. Bluntschli's views elicit the plan for their realization, which has occurred to him- criticism of such men as Wm. Beach Lawrence, and self. The interest which at any time would attach President Woolsey, and it is as an appeal to them and to to the discussion of such a theme by the distinguished the other eminent international Jurists, of whom it is President of the Institute of International Law is en- your good fortune to have so many, rather than to the

public or even to the profession, in the first instance, * Nos. 6, 8 and 9: 9th February, 230 February, and 2nd that I now write. Your obedient servant, March, 1878. + 1877.


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