man the right to say that he is educated, that he has conquered his original nature, and risen to his ideal nature. A divine world will now have been created in the individual soul, and therein life will be truly aimful and blessed, because it is the life of God.

CHAPTER II.

GREEK LIFE AND ITS IDEALS.

THE outline of a program of education given in the last chapter was meant to furnish us with a standard whereby to estimate the educational system of the Greeks. Therein we sought to show that the aim of education is to lift the human being out of his " original nature" into his "ideal nature," which consists of intelligence, affection, and will, harmoniously working together for their own perfection; and we concluded that the best education is that which best accomplishes this object.

Before proceeding further, we may do well to dwell for a moment longer on this fundamental point. Man, as a rational being, is his own end. The aim of his life is the realization or manifestation of himself, and to this aim all things, all art, all science, nay, the world itself, are subservient. This self-manifestation forms a triunity of intelligence, affection, will; and it is on the scale of this triunity that all human worth, whether in individuals, nations, or epochs, is measured. If we wish to know where an individual stands in the scale of worth (aperý), we have only to find out how much intelligence, how much love, sympathy, or affection, how much will he possesses, and how harmoniously these

are blended. And the same thing is true of nations and epochs. God himself can mean to us nothing more, and nothing less, than the complete and harmonious realization of intelligence, love, and will; for these are the constituent elements of true being, of which He is the plenitude.

These considerations suggest a curious and somewhat paradoxical result, viz., that a man's sole and only possible duty in this world is to realize himself; in other words, to manifest in himself the divine image, the plenitude of being. At the first glance, this seems to mean that a man's sole concern is with himself and his own "culture," and that he can well afford to neglect the rest of the world, or to use it merely as means. But a moment's reflection will show that the truth is far otherwise. For how can a man manifest intelligence except by knowing the world, man, and God; or love, except by loving these; or will, except by serving these? It follows that the individual can realize himself only by knowing, loving, and serving the world, man, and God. Moreover, since the end of life is the realization of the divine plenitude, it is this that sets the standard of duty, this that furnishes its sanction. In a word, all duty is primarily and directly duty to God. Man's duty to man is but secondary and indirect. It is this fact that imparts to duty its dignity, lifting it out of the spasmodic currents of sentiment and the beggarly arithmetic of prudence, and making it the expression of the divine will which neither hastes nor rests.

The fact that man can attain his end only through knowing, loving, and serving God and his fellows forms the reason why he creates institutions-why he

Institu

is, as Aristotle said, "a political animal." tions are means whereby men are enabled to know, love, and serve God and their fellows better, and are valuable just in proportion as they accomplish this. Here, then, we have a standard for measuring the worth of institutions.

With these standards for moral worth, for duty, and for institutions in our minds, we may perhaps approach Greek education with some hope of forming a true estimate of it. But, before we can do this, we must be able to form a clear conception of what that education was, in what condition it found its subjects, and what it undertook to do for them. This will compel us to consider Greek Life and its Ideals, which, accordingly, will form the subject of this chapter.

During the period in which the Greeks had anything that could fairly be called an educational system, as distinguished from the training afforded by experience, their life centered in, and revolved round, a single institution, which, for want of a better term, we may call the city-state (móλus). This, the highest political achievement of Greek genius, was the crown of a long process, the various epochs in which were marked by institutions of lower grade. These the city-state absorbed, modified, and subordinated, so that they became its organs. In order, then, to understand Greek life and its ideals, we must consider this institution and these organs.

Aristotle, in the opening chapter of his Politics, tells us that the steps in political evolution are marked by (1) the household (oikos, oikía, yévos), (2) the village community or township (kúμŋ, dîμos), and (3) the citystate (róλis); and he goes on to say that the first aims

at securing the natural and daily necessities of life; the second, at providing for the more permanent material goods; the third, at making possible independence or freedom and a virtuous life, wherein true manhood consists. In making this classification, Aristotle is taking into account the constitution of society as he finds it about him, rather than the growth of institutions as historic inquiry reveals it. Indeed, a knowledge of the latter was beyond his reach. He accordingly fails to distinguish between the institutions whose succession paves the way for the city-state and the later modifications of these that arise through the reaction of the same.

Historical research shows us that the earliest of human associations is, indeed, the household-not, however, the household as we understand it, but the patriarchal family, consisting of persons related, or supposed to be related, to each other by blood, and governed by its oldest member. On the other hand, it shows us that this is not something prior to and different from the village community, but something identical with it, at least among peoples who have passed from the nomadic, to the settled, mode of life. Now, one most important fact about the patriarchal family is, that it is, above all, a religious community, held together by religious ties. In saying that it is held together by blood-ties, and again by religious ties, we are not making inconsistent or contradictory statements: the blood-ties are religious ties, and all religious ties are originally blood-ties. This is a fact fraught with such momentous and all-pervasive results that we must dwell upon it at some length.

The patriarchal family consists of two main divi