ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, February 3, 1820. DEAR SIR: I have heard nothing yet of the plea in the case of John Anderson against your Sergeant-at-arms. If it comported entirely with the convenience of the counsel who conducts the defence in the court below, I should be glad to see the precise ground on which the controversy is to rest, before the meeting of the Supreme Court on Monday, because after that time my engagements in court will render it much less convenient to me to make the investigation which I suppose will be necessary in the case. Will you permit me to inquire whether you have yet had time to turn your attention to the act of Congress, so as to ascertain whether it is my official duty to appear in this case? The question is a very short one. The act makes it my duty "to prosecute and conduct all suits in the Supreme Court, in which the United States shall be concerned." Is the Sergeant-at-arms the representative of the United States in this instance? Is the House of Representatives the United States? Suppose a collision of authority between the Senate and House of Representatives, in the persons of their officers; which of them must I regard as the United States, so as to be bound officially to appear for them? Suppose such a collision between any other two departments of the General Government: could either of them be considered as more the United States than the other? I confess that, in a question which is made one of unconstitutional oppression between an individual and the House of Representatives singly, I cannot discern very distinctly how the United States at large can be said to be more concerned on the one side than on the other. However, as I have had the pleasure of stating to you already, I shall be perfectly willing to take up this case officially, if such be your construction of the act of Congress. It would be satisfactory to me, however, to know, at your leisure, in what character I am to appear. To the SPEAKER I am, &c., &c., WM. WIRT. of the House of Representatives of the United States. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, SIR: I have, according to your request of yesterday, reconsidered th case from Savannah, on the additional statement which has come up The facts I understand to be these: The Carmelita was seized by th revenue-cutter attached to the port of St. Mary's, within the waters of the district, for an alleged infraction of the act of 1807, to prohibit the importa tion of slaves; on which seizure she has been prosecuted and condemned The doubt whether the officers and men of the cutter are entitled to moiety of the forfeiture given by that act, arises from the fact that the seizure was not made upon the coast, nor upon the high seas, but withi the waters of the district. I do not understand the language of the act as confining this right o the officers and men of the cutter to seizures made upon, the coast and upon the high seas; and surely the reason of the law, which was to stimu late and reward the vigilance and activity of those officers and men, applies with equal force to every seizure wheresoever made. I therefore still retain the opinion which I had the honor to express to you by my letter of the 16th December last. To the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. WM. WIRT. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, SIR: If the collector at Sag Harbor founds his authority to take possession of the goods, which he represents as having been wrecked on Long Island, and, after keeping them nine months, to advertise and sell them, and pay the proceeds into the Treasury of the United States, on the 56th section of the act of the 2d March, 1799, to regulate the collection of duties on imports and tonnage, (as I understand he does,) I am of the opinion that that section docs not apply to the case; it applies expressly to "goods," wares, and merchandise found on board a vessel after the master's report, other than shall have been reported for some other district. If there be any other clause in this or any other act of Congress touching the subject, it has escaped my attention, and you would oblige me by a reference to it. If there be none, I am very clearly of the opinion that this does not give the power in question. Í observe that in the supplemental act of the 25th April, 1818, section 15 makes a regulation with regard to the mode of collecting the duties on wrecked goods; and here it was natural to expect that the power claimed by the collector over the wrecked goods themselves would have been given or recognised, but there is not a word on this subject. I have the honor to be, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant, To the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. WM. WIRT. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, SIR: In the case from the Patent Office submitted for my opinion, I think that the two patents issued to Thomas Blanchard on two different specifications, relative to the same machine, are right in conforming the dates to the respective times of the two applications; and that it would be illegal and improper to antedate the last patent to the time of the first application, because it might overreach intermediate improvements made by others. I have the honor to be, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant, To the SECRETARY OF STATE. 3 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY General, SIR: In the case of the collector at Annapolis, submitted for my opinion to day, I would recommend an application for an injunction to Judge Duvall forthwith to stay the proceedings of Caton. He will have the advantage of the aid of the judges of the Supreme Court, now in session. If the application should fail, the chancellor of the State of Maryland cannot, I think, refuse an injunction. If he should, the collec tor may, I think, remove the proceedings from the court of law of the State into the Federal court, on the ground that the defence rests on the laws of the United States; in which case, the transfer is authorized by the act of Congress. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, To the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. WM. WIRT. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, DEAR SIR: Since the argument of the question propounded by the bench, arising under the Spanish treaty, in the case of the Isabella, my reflections on the bearing of that question on the belligerent rights of this nation, connected with the doubts which the court expressed on the subject, have led me to forget the individual interests involved in the controversy, and to consider the construction of the Spanish treaty as one of the most serious national questions which has been ever raised before the supreme tribunal of the nation. Under this impression, I have thought it my duty to bring the pendency of this question to the knowledge of the Federal Executive, and to receive their instructions as to the course which it was their wish I should pursue. I beg leave to enclose a copy of my communication to the President, together with his answer; and to request, if any doubts still remain on the mind of the court, that the court will be pleased to hear a more full and solemn argument on that single branch of the case of the Isabella which involves the construction of the treaty. I hope that this request is perfectly compatible with the sacred respect which is felt for the independence of the Judiciary;-the Government asking only to be heard, if the doubts of the court still remain, on a question which they consider as replete with the most serious consequen ces to our nation: because the decision of the Supreme Court in this case must, of necessity, give the law to the prize courts of our country in any future war in which we may be involved; and if the decision be favorable to the construction set up on the part of the claimant, it is very easy to foresee the use which may and will be made of it by any enemy with whom it may be our misfortune to be hereafter engaged in a war. Should there be nothing indelicate or improper in this request, (as I trust there is not,) I will take the liberty to move the subject in court to-day, in presence of the opposite counsel. But if, in the estimation of the court, there should be the slightest impropriety in such a motion, (which I confess I am not able to discern,) my respect for the court will certainly restrain me from making it. I have the honor to be, dear sir, very respectfully, your most obedient, &c., WM. WIRT. To the CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, SIR: I have examined the case stated by the collector at Norfolk, together with the opinion of Mr. Bradford, then Attorney General, on an analogous case in 1794. It is very probable (perhaps certain) that Congress, in framing our revenue laws, did not contemplate the case of a public armed ship of a foreign nation entering our ports with merchandise on board, and with the intention to land such merchandise for sale and consumption within our jurisdiction; because that is an employment to which it was not to have been expected, a priori, that public armed ships would be put. It is, however, equally clear that Congress intended to impose a duty on all foreign merchandise imported into our country, howsoever imported. And if a foreign armed ship, departing voluntarily from her appropriate character, chooses to adopt that of a merchant ship, she must, I think, be subject to all the consequences of such adoption, and be treated by our revenue officers as a merchant ship; there being no principle of national comity known to me which requires a nation to permit a foreign armed ship to trade in her ports, in evasion of her revenue laws. I have the honor, &c., &c., To the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. WM. WIRT. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY General, March 13, 1820. SIR: I have not the slightest doubt of the correctness of Mr. Binney's opinion on the effect of the letters of attorney given to "Jonathan Smith, Esq., cashier of the Bank of the United States, or his successors in office." The office which was in the view of the appointer is made clear beyond doubt, by its being the office held by J. S. in the Bank of the United States at the time of his appointment; and this point being fixed, it is just as clear that the intention of the appointer was that Mr. Smith should hold the power only while he held that office; and that the power should pass with the office to the person who should succeed him. I have the honor, &c., &c., WM. WIRT. To the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, SIR: I have examined carefully the petition of Isaac Entwisle, with the documents annexed to it, which you have submitted for my opinion. It is alleged, and appears to be true, that Mr. Entwisle purchased the brig Cumberland in entire ignorance of the fact that a forfeiture had attached to her by a previous act of smuggling. Such forfeiture, however, had attached, and followed her into the hands of Mr. Entwisle; nor do I think that the private purchase, under these circumstances, purged the offence, and removed the forfeiture, any more than the private sale of a stolen horse would divest the title of the original and true proprietor. Such is my opinion on the strict law of the case. It is, however, a very hard case on Mr. Entwisle; and, with great deference, I think a fit one for the act of grace which the petition solicits. I have the honor to be, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant, To the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. WM. WIRT. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, March 23, 1820. SIR: An application has been made by the chairman of a committee of Congress for the use of the enclosed memorial; it is therefore returned, for your own direction in the case. The committee, I understand, is acting on the subject this morning; and the messenger who hands you this will, if you so order it, carry the memorial at once up to the House. I have already had the honor of stating to you, in conversation, that on a quo warranto lately instituted by Anderson vs. Wallace, to try the title of the latter to the office of surveyor of the Virginia military reservation in Ohio, the judgment of the circuit court was in favor of Anderson. The parties, by consent of record, waived all objections to the form of the proceeding, being, on both sides, desirous of obtaining the opinion of the Supreme Court on the merits; and the case was brought up with this view to the late term of the Supreme Court. The argument of the cause was confined to the merits. The court, however, refused to take the jurisdiction thus tendered by consent; and reversed the judgment of the court below, on the ground that they could not recognise any such proceeding in law as a quo warranto in the name of an individual. As, however, I had stated that the issuing of grants in the Virginia military district had been suspended, in the hope of obtaining the opinion of the court on the question who was to be regarded as the surveyor of that district, it was stated to me from the bench, as being the unanimous opinion of the court, that Wallace was, in contemplation of law, a mere intruder into the office, and that Anderson alone was to be regarded as the legally constituted sur veyor. I have the honor to be, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant, WM. WIRT. To the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, SIR: The question whether the sureties of Samuel M. Reed, who was appointed a collector of direct taxes and internal duties under the act of 22d July, 1813, are liable for his delinquencies, under the act of January 9, 1815, is one of those legal questions in relation to which one would not be surprised at a judicial decision the one way or the other. As well from its delicacy and difficulty, as from the circumstance that the decision of your department is final on the parties, I have held the case longer |