Each Such were the sentiments of Sir Robert Peel with regard to open questions in the Melbourne Cabinet: how much more completely those remarks apply to the present Government it is needless to point out. Again are the open questions in the Melbourne Cabinet vigorously attacked; but this time in the House of Lords, and by a more energetic and fiery orator: "My Lords, "Idem sentire de republicá' has been in all times, and amongst the best of statesmen, a bond of union at once intelligible, honourable, conducive to the common weal. But there is another kind of union formed of baser materials-a tie that knits together far different natures, the eadem velle atque nolle,' and of this it has been known and been said, 'ea demum, inter malos, est prime amicitia.' The abandonment of all opinions, the sacrifice of every sentiment, the preference of sordid interest to honest principle, the utter abdication of the power to act as conscience dictates and sense of duty recommends-such is the vile dross of which the links are made which bind profligate men together in a covenant of shame;' a confederacy to seek their own advancement at the expense of every duty ;—and this, my Lords, is the literal meaning of open questions.' It is that each has his known recorded opinions, but that each is willing to sacrifice them rather than break up the government to which he belongs : the velle' is to keep in office, the ' nolle ' to keep out all antagonists; and none dare speak his mind in his official capacity without losing the 'firmitas amicitiæ, by shaking the foundations of the Government." tinued to differ on great constitutional shuffling conduct of unprincipled poliand vital questions-produced such a ticians." degree of discontent and disgust, as to lead to the disgraceful expulsion of that Government? The second instance was that of the Slave-trade; but has not that act of Mr Pitt (the permitting of the Slave-trade to be an open question) been more condemned than any other act of his public life? The next instance cited was that of the Catholic Question. I have had some experience of the evils which arose from making Catholic emancipation an open question. All parties in this House were equally responsible for them. Fox made it an open question; Pitt made it an open question; Lord Liverpool made it an open question; Canning made it an open question. Each had to plead an urgent necessity for tolerating disunion in the Cabinet on this great question; but there cannot be a doubt that the practical result of that disunion was to introduce discord amongst public men, and to paralyse the vigour of the executive government. Every act of administration was tainted by disunion in the Cabinet. Every party was jealous of the predominance of the other. party must be represented in the government of that very country which required, above all things, a united and resolute Government. There must be a lord-lieutenant of one class of opinions, a secretary of the opposite, beginning their administration in harmony, but in spite of themselves becoming each the nucleus of a party, gradually converting reciprocal confidence into jealousy and distrust. It was my conviction of the evils of such a state of things- of the long experience of distracted councils, of the curse of an open question, as it affected the practical government of Ireland-it was this conviction, and not the fear of physical force, that convinced me that the policy must be abandoned. I do not believe that the making the Catholic question an open question facilitated the ultimate settlement of it. If the decided friends of emancipation had refused to unite in government with its opponents, the question would have been settled at an earlier period, and (as it ought to have been) under better auspices. So much for the encouraging examples of the right honourable gentleman. They were fatal exceptions from the general policy of Government. If, as I before observed, such exceptions are to constitute the future rule of Government, there is an end to public confidence in the honour and integrity of great political parties, a severance of all ties which constitute party connections, a premium upon the shabby and Here is a splendid outburst of vehement denunciation. If that could be applied with justice to the Government of Lord Melbourne, if such an invective as that is an index of the state of opinion in the country at that time, with reference to the dissensions in the Whig Cabinet, how much more applicable is it to the Coalition of the present day, with regard to whose members, putting out of sight the question of Free Trade, which is now the law of the land, there is hardly a question of public importance to which we can point as an example that idem sentire de republicâ' is their bond of union. Discontent and anxiety may well prevail when we have, in times so important as these, a Ministry in power so disunited, and composed of such discordant elements, such base materials as the present, and backed by followers who, true to their nature, are constantly quarrelling amongst themselves. Look at the diversity of sentiment displayed in their recorded speeches on that subjuct which, more than any other, is uppermost in the minds of the people. There is Lord John Russell in the House of Commons inveighing against the criminal ambition of the Czar of Russia, declaring that "this enormous power has got to such a pitch, that even in its moderation it resembles the ambition of other states;" arguing that that power must be checked; telling the people of England that they must be prepared to enter the contest with a stout heart and a willing mind, and then solemnly invoking the God of justice to prosper her Majesty's arms, to defend the right! We have the Home Secretary and the Earl of Clarendon completely subscribing to these sentiments; but we have the Prime Minister, who more than any other man ought, now that war is declared, to be imbued with hostile feelings against Russian aggression, and determined to carry on the war with vigour, eternally whining after peace, and throwing cold water on the ardour of the people by constantly enlarging on the horrors of war and the blessings of peace. They say that old age is second childhood. England seems likely soon to become aware of this fact, through dire experience. Her Premier, on the Continent, is described, and rightly so, as "the apologist of Russia;" the Minister who is supposed to be, more than any other, in the confidence of his Sovereign. Talk of explanation! The very fact of his entertaining sentiments with regard to Russia so ambiguous, so equivocal, and so lenient towards the enemy of his country, that actually in giving expression to them he is mistaken for offering an apology for the Czar, and exposed to the scorn of the country and the distrust of Europe, seems to us to be amply sufficient to disqualify him henceforth for ever being" the first Minister of the first Sovereign in the world" during the eventful period of war; and the only charitable construction which we can give to the passage is, that he-our helmsman in the storm-has entered upon his dotage, and returned to the proverbial folly of childhood. If his sentiments are the result of mere folly, then he may properly be charged with_credulity; if his friendship for the Czar regulates his conduct, then it is connivance for which he is answerable. In either sense he is unfit for his office. There may be, for aught we know indeed there probably are others in the Cabinet of the same frame of mind. The man who could denounce Turkey as a country full of anomalies and inconsistencies, and endeavour with all the force of his "sanctimonious rhetoric" to excite an antipathy to that State, and despair at her fate, just at the moment when it was necessary to rouse the people against Russian aggression, was merely supporting the Emperor's theory of the "sick man," and cannot be said to have any definite ideas with reference to the aggressive policy of Russia, to check which we are at war; or any very great sympathy with that country to defend which we are also at war. Here is discordancy in the Cabinet on the most vital question; and there is probably as much on every other question that is brought before the notice of the British Parliament. Here is food for discontent and anxiety to the people of England. Thus may their ardour be damped and their spirits quenched long ere the struggle has concluded. And if we look at the supporters of the Government-the Ministerial party, as they are termed there, too, we behold the same intestine strife. What has been the attitude of the Manchester party with regard to the Government ?-what the attitude of the Whig statesmen who have been "banished to invisible corners of the senate?"-what of the Whig peers-such men, for example, as Lords Grey, Clanricarde, and others? Mr Bright and the Whig peers are openly, though on different grounds, hostile to the Ministerial policy, the others scarcely less so. The Manchester party rank amongst the regular supporters of the Government, yet they appeal to the Opposition to know "whether they don't occupy a very absurd position" in following men who 66 will not lead them, and are derisively answered in the affirmative. If they criticise the course of the Government, their opinion is regarded with the greatest indifference and contempt." Thus do matters stand, and yet Ministers have the audacity to affirm that they possess the confidence of Parliament, and that it is the war which prevents the success of their measures. But is this the front which we are to present to our foes? Are we to exhibit to Russia, as our leaders in the strife, a Government on sufferance notoriously incompetent, whether at home legislation or foreign negotiation? Is not Conservative reascendancy the only salvation of the country? Does not the nation at large pant for something like a Government-one which is followed by a united party-one which is at unison in itself-one of principle and not of expediency? When we see a Government openly hostile amongst themselves, scorned and contemned by the country, beaten on every point by their opponents, obliged to withdraw measure after measure, and retaining one only after it, as has been observed before, has undergone as many metamorphoses as ever Övid described-when we see all this, which we can hardly do without being roused to feelings of indignation, it appears to us necessary to consider how may this be remedied, how may Russia be firmly opposed, how may England be rescued from the pernicious effects of an incapable Government, and how may unanimity be restored to the councils of her Majesty? It is very evident, that only by the reascendancy of the Conservative party can these blessings be secured to the country. The tradition of that party is, as its name implies, the preservation of our institutions in Church and State. This is a definite object. That it is a desirable one, is a conclusion which is arrived at by one course of reasoning, the same premises, the same logical inferences. Hence the Conservative party is a united band. A Conservative Minister cannot be a Minister on sufferance; a Whig Minister must. The Whigs are ever desirous of change, and the so-called amelioration of our institutions; but few of them agree together in the paramount importance which attaches The Re to the reform of any particular abuse, or in the amount of innovation which it is desirable to introduce. Hence they are always at variance with each other when the time for action arrives; and this incapacitates them for carrying on the Queen's government. If popular enthusiasm comes to their aid, and force them on in spite of themselves, then the case is different. form Bill of 1832 was carried triumphantly, but by the people. Popular enthusiasm supplied vigour to the executive. Contrast this with another Reform Bill, of no very distant date, as regards its introduction at least, though few of the present generation are likely to see that bill become the law of the land. The time was unfortunate for Whig administrators, though backed by those who claim to themselves the name of Conservatives. A Russian war carried that enthusiasm, so necessary to the Whigs, through another channel, and exposed in a ludicrous manner the true value of a Liberal Administration, and their dependence upon the popular will. True, there was a large party in the Senate clamorous for reform-perhaps a majority. There was no hesitation amongst members to conclude that reform was necessary, for these are liberal times. How, then, do we account for their ill- success? By adopting a happy description of their worth as statesmen, given long ago: "Their head is at fever heat, but their hand is paralysed." They are not slow to adopt as their own any principle, though calculated to throw the country in a flame, so long as it is traditionally the property of their party. But when the time for action arrives, when that principle is to be embodied in a bill, and that theory is to be reduced to a practical test, then comes division and discontent. One portion objects to this part as too sweeping, while another declares it to be too confined. This wants one remedy, the other declares the wishedfor remedy will only prove an aggravation of the malady. There is no hesitation in adopting any principle, however dangerous. Give them the opportunity-the advantageous opportunity, in the eyes of politicians— of putting their plans into execution, and immediately we behold irresolu tion, consequent upon dissension, and inactivity, the offspring of indecision. Only divert the populace from them, who, when roused, carry all before them, as it were, and force their leaders to bury their dissensions-only deprive them of that support, and then you see the intrinsic worth of your Whig statesman. He may carry, perhaps, one bold measure; but his title to succeeding years of administration rests upon the gratitude of his supporters. He is unable to carry those minor measures-those measures of equal public importance, though of a less conspicuous character-more solid though less showy-which contribute so much to the moral happiness and physical enjoyment of a great nation, and which are the pillars of a statesman's fame. There is no firmness in a Whig ruler-there cannot be, if he would reconcile and command the confidence of all the various sects of his followers. Who was it that held with a firm and steady hand the helm of England, when all other Continental nations were submerged in ruin? A Conservative statesman. No Whig Minister could have succeeded then. The utmost firmness and steadiness in conducting the public business of this country were then required. No Whig Cabinet could have guided the fortunes of England then. Obliged to truckle Obliged to truckle first to this man's fancies, then to another's follies, they are but a faithful index of the dissension amongst their followers, and uncertainty and irresolution are sure to follow. Yet to such as these are our fortunes, in times so perilous as our own, committed; and already are the baneful effects visible. If the Conservative party were to pursue the course which the Opposition of former days is known to have taken, what would be the position of the Government? If their opponents were not to support them in the war, the conduct of it would be in the same position as all the other measures which they have brought forward this session, and for the success of which they are dependent upon their followers. Such a state of affairs may continue for a time, but it must eventually call down the indignation of the country. No wonder that the conduct of our Government constantly gives rise to the suspicion that they are too desirous for the cessation of hostilities. It is manifestly their interest so to appear, if it be not also so to act. A peace, even though it were merely an armed truce, would satisfy the crav ings of many of their followers; and probably the belief that such may be obtained, renders them less disagreeable to the Government than they would otherwise have proved themselves. Never, perhaps, was the inability of the Whig party to govern exhibited in such a marked manner as at the period immediately succeeding the passing of the Reform Bill. With a majority of three hundred, they yet disagreed amongst themselves concerning the desirability of introducing innovations into the Irish Church, and they fell. Some have declared that an excess of power-a majority too large to manage-was fatal to the endurance of their power. We rather think that it was but a conclusive proof that a Whig Minister must be a Minister on sufferance-in other words, is unable to govern. Unhappily for themselves, at the period to which we are alluding, a rather more important question than usual occasioned the schism. Those who disagreed did not merely, as generally happens in these cases, hold aloof for a time, embarrass the Government, and then return to their allegiance, but they went at once into open hostility. They retired to swell the Conservative ranks. This is a specimen, on an exaggerated scale perhaps, of what is constantly occurring when a Whig Ministry is in power. For what do we see now? We behold the Conservative party united in their opinions with regard to Russian aggression upon Turkey. In the Ministerial host there is nothing, as usual, but dissension and endless disagreement. The Manchester party condemns the war and everything belonging to it. The Peelites evidently look with a cold eye upon it; they believe not in the vitality of Turkey, or in the danger of Russian aggrandisement. So far there is agreement between these sects. They cannot, however, form one party, for there is disagreement between them on vital points connected with Home administration. Then, again, there are the philosophical Radicals demanding the Ballot, while the aristocratic Whigs most properly declare that secret voting shall never become one of the institutions of the country. In short, the Ministerial camp is split up into various and opposing sects, which are continually warring with each other, while the Cabinet itself is but another scene of this general medley and confusion, this discontent and convulsion; and its executive power is paralysed by internal discord. The introduction of the Peelites amongst the Whigs has but increased the differences in the camp. Never was there a time when the internal dissensions of a Ministerial host were so marked, so widespreading, or so notorious. And this, too, at this critical time, when England ought especially to be calm and tranquil within, in order to be able to consider well what are her interests without. Is this to continue? Are the interests of England and Europe to be jeopardied by the continuance in power of a Ministry so divided and so weak? It is, we think, a truly logical inference that the fall of the Coalition, and the reascendancy of the Conservative party, is the only method by which an end can be put to that constant strife, and unanimity restored to the councils of our Sovereign. In a time of war, it is of the last importance that a Ministry should be united and firm, and possessed of the confidence of the country. Every one will probably admit this; but, then, does the Coalition answer to this description? It is idle to pursue this subject further. No one who really wishes well to his country in this emergency, can say that it is to the present Government that we ought to confide the direction of our affairs, unless he be dazzled by the undoubted splendour of their names. There are, doubtless, great talents amongst them; but there is such a thing as the utmost danger in a superfluity of talent, particularly when applied to pursuits to which they are not especially adapted. Too much collective talent begets an overweening self-confidence, and lessens the sense of responsibility; moreover, if this too great self-confidence be brought to bear its influence in the direction of affairs of which one is ignorant, no beneficial result is to be expected. Again, if all these misdirected and misapplied talents be controlled by an incapable chief, can it be said that their administrative abilities are placed at service of the country? No! personal pique and private considerations prevent it. We need not dwell upon the incapability of the First Lord of the Treasury, which is now generally admitted. We now look to the other prominent members of the Government. The office assigned to Lord Palmerston is the most notoriously incongruous. With a world-wide reputation for his administration of our foreign affairs, gained in an experience of them for sixteen years, his lordship is placed in an office where he may exercise his negotiative powers with county magistrates, town constables, and the like. There he is the most popular Foreign Secretary of the day, the man in whom the country has perhaps as great a confidence as in any one, engaged in squabbles over town police, graveyards, sewers, and the rest. Lord Palmerston cannot be said to be at home in his office. The country is disposed to look with favour upon him on account of his great name and services; but does he really make a better Home Secretary than Mr Walpole? Why was he not transferred to the War Office on its creation, with his extensive knowledge of European affairs? If the interests of the country had been consulted, undoubtedly he would; but again private considerations were opposed to the national will and the public weal; and the Duke of Newcastle, who has as yet no claims to public confidence, is placed in an office to which, on the formation of the Government, it cannot be said that he was assigned. Again, there is Sir George Grey, who is adapted more especially to the Home Office, if to any; but, "being more remarkable for his private virtues than his administrative abilities," is certainly not the man to be unceremoniously pitchforked into an office with which he has no acquaintance, other than the little he is supposed to have learnt during the "disastrous administration of Lord Glenelg." If there are talents here-if there is experience here-as in Lord Palmerston's case, so in this; the experience |
