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in our former decision in this matter, we have been and now are reluctant to approve this proposed change of location and extension, we are forced to do so, feeling that to compel the petitioners to locate the terminus of their road a mile or more away from the busivess centers of the villages of Dover and Foxcroft, would be unjust and unreasonable. It has been suggested that permission would be given the petitioners' company, by the Bangor & Piscataquis Company, to run their trains from the terminus as now located, over the tracks of the Bangor & Piscataquis Railroad to the depot of said company or to such station as said petitioners might establish. Such an arrangement, we could not approve believing as we do, that the occupation of one track by two companies operating trains for a distance of more than a mile, would be exceedingly dangerous and inconvenient. We believe it would have been better for both companies if permission had been given the petitioners' company, to lay its track or tracks within the location of the Bangor & Piscataquis, as above suggested; but this being a matter over which we have no jurisdiction or control, we hereby approve the change of location as prayed for and find that public convenience requires the same.
By the Board.
E. C. FARRINGTON, Clerk.
Decision of the Board, on petition of the Knox & Lincoln
Railroad Company, to determine whether said corporalion may take and hold certain lands needed for the business of said railroad. Decision August 15 1889.
STATE OF MAINE.
Hearing August 13 1889. Counsel appearing. For the petitioners, Henry Ingalls of Wiscasset; for land owners, George B. Sawyer of Wiscasset.
The petitioners, a railroad corporation as appears by the foregoing application, asks that certain parcels of land in the village of Wiscasset may be condemned and taken for public use as provided by section 16 of chapter 51 of the Revised Statutes. It appeared by evidence adduced at the hearing on said application, that the lands described in said application, consisted of one narrow strip of land about a rod in width, situated next southerly of the freight depot, and adjoining the railroad location, not now used for any purpose except for the deposit of rubbish, etc. ; that the railroad company desired said strip of land for the purpose of making an approach from Main street along a side track there situated, to said freight depot. The other described parcel of land is a strip fifteen feet wide, on the easterly or shore side of said railroad location and depot grounds, consisting of flats and a portion of an old wharf. The reasons assigned by the petitioners for the taking of this last mentioned strip of land were to enable them to place a retaining wall for the support of the railroad embankment, and to give them the right to remove a portion of an old and unoccupied building situated on said wharf, which obstructed a view of a switch near the passenger station to approaching trains. Counsel, claiming to represent all of the parties interested in said lands having waived proof and admitted notice to all, as the law requires, insisted that the reasons given by the petitioners for taking the several parcels of land before mentioned were not sufficient in law to empower the Board to order a condemnation of said land : because it did not appear that the object for such condemnation was embraced in those enumerated in the Statutes, for which land might be taken. While we admit that there is some force in the argument to sustain the position taken by counsel for the respondents, we think the Statute is sufficiently broad to give the Board jurisdiction. The object mentioned by Statutes, for which Railroad Corporations may take and hold land, are “Land for Burrow and gravel pits, necessary tracks, side tracks, stations, woodsheds, repair shops, and car, engine and freight houses.” To limit the extent of the land which might be taken to strictly the land covered by those structures mentioned, would be absurd. Such structures without means or right of approach to them, would be useless. Such lands, in connection and in addition to the lands for objects above mentioned, necessary "for the reasonable accommodation of the traffic and appropriate business of the corporation,” may, we think, under the provisions of Statute be taken. We therefore find that the objects for which the petitioners seek to take and hold the parcels of land mentioned are included in the provisions of Statute above mentioned, and accordingly issue this our certificate. We, the undersigned Board of Railroad Commissioners, hereby certify that on the thirteenth day of August, A. D. 1889, we met at the time and place mentioned in our order of notice, which we hereby refer to and make part of this our certificate, and it then appearing and admitted by counsel, appearing for all of the persons and parties mentioned in said application, that notice had been given as ordered, and was sufficient, and then and there viewed the premises mentioned in said application and gave a hearing to all persons and parties interested, who appeared and desired to be heard relative to the same, and after a full hearing of all tbe allegations, statements and proofs of the petitioners and of the other persons and parties mentioned in said application, or interested, and all others who appeared as such, it appeared to us and we so find, determine and certify that so much of the premises mentioned in said application as is hereinafter definitely described, is necessary for the use of said Knox & Lincoln Railroad Company for necessary tracks, side tracks, stations, and for the reasonable accommodation of the traffic and appropriate business of said corporation, viz: beginning at the northeast corner of the land of Alden Bailey ; thence southerly to an iron post or bolt in the northerly line of the land of the heirs of Burker Neal deceased; thence southerly to another iron post or bolt in the southerly line of land last above named ; thence easterly by said last named line to the westerly line of said railroad company; thence northerly by the last named line to the northerly line projected of said Bailey; thence
westerly by said last named line to the first bound.
One other piece or lot of land bounded as follows, viz: beginning at the outside of the wall on the easterly side of the track of said railroad, in the northerly line projected of said Bailey, at the southerly side or end of an old whart; thence easterly by the line last named fifteen feet; thence southerly, keeping the distance of fifteen feet from the outside of said wall, to the southerly line of the heirs of said Neal deceased; thence westerly by said last named line, fifteen feet to the outside of said wall; thence northerly by the easterly side of said wall to the first bound. Also another lot or piece of land bounded as follows, viz: beginning at the northwesterly corner of the lot last above described, at the easterly side of said wall, in the northerly line projected of said Bailey; thence easterly by said last named line, fifteen feet; thence northerly, keeping the distance of fifteen feet from the easterly line of said railroad, to land or flats formerly of Wales Hubbard deceased, being the northerly line of James M. Blinn; thence westerly by said last named line and land or flats, fifteen feet to the easterly line of said railroad; thence southerly by said last named line to first bound. And we further find and determine that all the above described premises, not now owned by said Kuox & Lincoln Railroad Company, is and was at the time of said hearing and on the day of the date of the application and order of notice, owned by the persons and parties named in said application, and that they are the persons and parties interested therein. And at said hearing it further appeared, and we so find and determine that said Knox and Lincoln Railroad Company and the persons mentioned in said application or either of them did not agree, and had not at any time agreed, as to the necessity therefor, or the area necessary to be taken, and that said persons named or either of them, did not consent and had not at any time consented thereto, before the making of said application, though as appears, they each and all had been requested so to do by said company, before the making of said application. We therefore adjudge and determine that the premises above described, are necessary for the reasonable accommodation of the traffic and appropriate business of said railroad corporation, and that said premises may be taken and held for the above mentioned purposes, aud hereby make this our determination, adjudication and certificate of adjudication.
By the Board.
E. C. FARRINGTON, Clerk.
Decision of the Board, on petition of the International Rail
way Company of Maine, to determine the manner and condition of crossing certain highways. Decision September 9 1889.
STATE OF MAINE. To the Supreme Judicial Court next to be held in Dover, in the county of Piscataquis, on the fourth Tuesday of September, A. D. 1889.
We, the undersigned Board of Railroad Commissioners, hereby certify, that in accordance with the foregoing application and order of notice, we met at our office in Augusta, on the seventh day of September, A. D. 1889, that being the time and place designated in said order, and it then and there appearing that notice of said hearing had been given as ordered, we gave a hearing to all persons and parties who appeared and desired to be heard relative to the same. And it then and there appearing by the evidence submitted on the part of the petitioners and others, that the highways or roads mentioned in said application, where crossed by said railroad, were a long distance from the thickly settled portions of the towns mentioned, and that each of said ways were infrequently traveled, we, therefore, determine that said ways muy properly be crossed by said railroad at grade therewith, and that the manner and condition of crossings shall be as follows:
1. The crossing in Brownville, on the way leading from the village of Brownville to Katahdin Iron Works, shall be