4. LANDLORD AND TENANT-ENFORCEMENT OF LEASE BY MARRIED WOMAN. Where a married woman whose lease is not binding upon her, because not properly acknowledged, has complied with all the conditions thereof, her coverture cannot be set up as a defense in an action on the lease. Id.

LEASE.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT; RAILROAD COMPANIES, 1.

LEGISLATURE.

-

LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF STATE FUNDS. The control, disposition, and appropriation of state funds to the payment of debts against the state are powers exclusively belonging to the legislature, and cannot be delegated to or exercised by the courts, under the Louisiana constitution. Curter ▼. State, 404.

LIBEL AND SLANDER.

1. GRAVAMEN OF LIBEL CONSISTS IN ITS PUBLICATION. Accordingly, the fact that a libelous card or advertisement was written by a person other than the publisher will not exonerate the latter from liability. Riley v. Lee, 358.

2. ADVERTISEMENT CHARGING FALSEHOOD. A written or printed publica tion which tends to degrade or disgrace the person about whom it is written or printed, or which tends to render him odious, ridiculous, or contemptible in the estimation of his friends or acquaintances or the public, is, per se, actionable as libelous. Accordingly, the publication of a card in a newspaper, charging a person with having uttered a falsehood, is libelous per se. 3. DEFAMATORY ADVERTISEMENT.

Id.

-

- An advertisement proclaiming the defamation of a person's character, and averred to have been published without malice, as a matter of news, is not the subject of a lawful advertisement unless it is proved to be true, and in the absence of such proof, the publisher must answer in damages. Id.

4. CHARGING PERSON WITH BEING A RETURNED CONVICT. A false publi cation in a newspaper, concerning a person, that he has been a convict in a state penitentiary, is libelous per se. State v. Brady, 296.

5. CRITICISM IS DISCUSSION; or as applicable in libel cases, a censure of the conduct, character, or utterances of the person criticised. Belknap v. Ball, 622.

6. CRITICISM OF OFFICIAL CANDIDATE. - When one becomes a candidate for public office, he thereby deliberately places his conduct, character, and utterances before the public for their discussion and consideration. They may be criticised according to the taste of the writer or speaker, and the law will protect them in so doing, provided their statements of or reference to the facts upon which their criticisms are based observe an honest regard for the truth. In such discussion the law gives a wide liberty. Within this limit public journals, public speakers, and private individuals may express opinions and indulge in criticisins upon the character or habits or mental an moral qualifications of official candidates. Id. 7. FALSE STATEMENT OF UTTERANCES OF OFFICIAL CANDIDATE. A false and malicious published statement that a candidate for public office gave utterance, either in writing or in speech, to certain language, imply ing his ignorance and unfitness for office, is neither privileged crit cism nor expression of opinion, but is libelous. Such statement is

statement of fact, for the falsity of which the publisher is answerable. ld.

& FALSE STATEMENT OF UTTERANCES OF OFFICIAL CANDIDATE. A false and malicious publication in a newspaper, in a coarse and blotted imitation of the handwriting of a candidate for office, purporting to be a fac-simile of the words, "I don't propose to go into debate on the tariff differences on wool, quinine, and all the things, because I ain't built that way. — Charles E. Belknap," or such publication of a report of a speech made by him in which he is made to give utterance to language to the same effect, is libelous. Id.

9. CHARACTER AND REPUTATION OF CANDIDATES for public office are protected from malicious attack by the same rules as are those of private individuals. Greater latitude is allowed in the case of the former than in the latter; and beyond this the same rule applies to both. Id. 10. PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. — In actions for libel, qualified privilege extends to all communications made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, and embraces cases where the duty is not a legal one, but is of a moral or social character of imperfect obligation. Pollasky v. Minchener, 516.

11. PUBLICATION OF FALSEHOOD IS NEVER PRIVILEGED. No public interest can be subserved by its publication and circulation. If false statements are published in good faith, with an honest belief of their truth, damages may be reduced to a minimum. No other rule will protect the freedom of the press and the rights of individuals. Belknap v. Ball, 622.

12. FREEDOM OF PRESS. The constitutional guaranty of "the freedom of the press" is simply intended to secure to the conductors of the press the same rights and immunities, and such only, as are enjoyed by the public at large, in relation to criticising the acts of public officers and private individuals. Riley v. Lee, 358.

13. MERCANTILE AGENCY PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION. A mercantile agency does not stand in such relation either of interest or duty with its subscribers that communications from it to them generally are privi leged. Exceptions exist in relation to those persons who are interested in obtaining the particular information and to whom it is furnished upon special request. To this extent, and no further, are such communications protected by a qualified privilege. Pollasky v. Minchener, 516. 14. LIBEL BY MERCANTILE AGENCY. - False publications respecting the character and financial standing of a business man, furnished by a mer cantile agency to its subscribers generally, without request, is libelous, and not privileged, though made in good faith. Id. 15. LIBEL BY AGENT OF MERCANTILE AGENCY. A general agent and district business manager for a mercantile agency who furnishes, or causes to be furnished, through his chief clerk, to its subscribers generally, without request, false publications respecting the character and financial standing of a business man, is liable in an action for libel therefor, as such communications are not privileged. Id. 16. MALICE IN LIBEL CONSISTS IN INTENTIONALLY PUBLISHING, without justifiable cause, any written or printed matter which is injurious to the character of another; and everything written and published of another that is injurious to his character must, for the purposes of the action, be

taken to be false, until it is shown by plea and proof to be true; and the presumption of malice remains through the entire case until it is met by plea and proof of a contrary motive, or that the publication was jus tifiable. Riley v. Lee, 358.

17. EXPRESS MALICE IS PRESUMed, and need NOT BE PROVED, when the words published are libelous per se. State v. Brady, 296.

18. REPUBLICATION AS EVIDENCE OF MALICE. The republication of a newspaper article, after the commencement of an action charging it to be libelous, with comments thereon by the defendant, may be evidence of malice. Welch v. Tribune Pub. Co., 629.

19. EVIDENCE- MALICE. In an action of libel against a newspaper publisher for charging that a jury perjured themselves in returning a verdict, evidence on the part of the plaintiff as to whether or not any influence other than that of the evidence and the instructions and arguments of counsel was brought to bear upon him as a juror in the consideration and conclusion of his verdict is immaterial, and inadmissible to show malice. Id.

20. EVIDENCE OF MALICE. In an action of libel against the publisher of a newspaper for charging that a jury perjured themselves in rendering a verdict, evidence that a written request, signed by all the jurors, requesting such publisher to make a retraction, is admissible to show malice, upon proof that such request reached such publisher. Id. 21. EVIDENCE OF JUSTIFICATION. - In an action of libel against the pub. lisher of a newspaper for charging that a jury perjured themselves in rendering a verdict, evidence that other newspapers published in the place where the verdict was rendered severely criticised the action of the jury as extraordinary is admissible in justification. Id.

22. EVIDENCE OF MOTIVE FOR VERDICT. — In an action of libel by a juror against a publisher of a newspaper for charging that a jury perjured themselves in rendering a verdict, the plaintiff, as a witness in his own behalf, cannot be compelled, on cross-examination, to state his motives or reasons for finding the verdict. Id.

23. LIBEL OF JURY. — A newspaper publication charging that a jury have perjured themselves in rendering a verdict is libelous. Id.

24. WORDS NOT DEFAMATORY WILL SUPPORT AN ACTION FOR SLANDER, if they are falsely and deliberately uttered to work injury, and accomplish their intended purpose. Morasse v. Brochu, 474.

25. WORDS ARE ACTIONABLE PER SE which convey an imputation upon one in the way of his profession or occupation, and in such case there need be no averment of special damages. Id.

26. A PRIEST IS LIABLE TO AN ACTION FOR SLANDER, if, referring to a physician who has contracted a second marriage before the death of his divorced wife, he informs his congregation, in effect, that the fact of such marriage is to excommunicate the person referred to, and that if any of them should be sick, and in want of the priest's assistance, they need not send for him if such physician was there, because he, the priest, would not be in the same room with him. These words were a virtual instruction that the person referred to was an unsuitable and improper person to be employed as a physician, and a direction not to employ him, on pain of losing caste in the church and the ministrations of its priest. Id.

27. WORDS ACTIONABLE PER SE. The words, "What are you doing with that nine-dollar black-mailer here?" spoken of an employee to her em

ployer by a stockholder and director in the company for whom she works, are not a privileged communication, but are slanderous, and actionable per se. Hess v. Sparks, 300. 28. MEASURE OF DAMAGES.

Where the words spoken are slanderous per se, and are uttered maliciously, punitive as well as compensatory dam. ages may be recovered. Id.

29. PRIVILEGE OF COMMUNICATION MUST BE PLEADED. — In slander, the issue that the words spoken were a privileged communication is not raised by a general denial. Such privilege must be specially pleaded.

Id.

30. PLEADING. -THE NAMES OF PERSONS WHO HAVE CEASED TO EMPLOY PLAINTIFF need not, it has been held, be stated in a complaint in an action to recover special damages for slander, whereby plaintiff was injured in his trade or profession. The rule upon this subject in Massachusetts discussed, but not decided. Morasse v. Brochu, 474. 31. EVIDENCE IN AGGRAVATION OF DAMAGES. Where a physician has sued a priest for slander, it is proper to prove, in aggravation of dam ages, that after the action was brought the defendant referred to it in the presence of his congregation, and said, "We shall see if the church shall destroy the verinin or the vermin the church." Id.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 12, 13.

LIFE ESTATES.

See WILLS, 12-14.

LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS.

1. ABSENCE FROM STATE. — If a defendant is absent from the state when a cause of action accrues against him, his occasional or frequent visits to the state, giving the plaintiff an opportunity, by the exercise of ordinary diligence, to commence an action against him, will be of no avail to him under a plea of the statute of limitations, however open and notorious his visits may have been, unless he has been within the state and the jurisdiction of her courts for the full period limited by the statute, either continuously or in the aggregate. Stanley v. Stanley, 806.

2. ABSENCE FROM STATE. The statute of limitations does not run in favor of a defendant while he is absent from the state, no matter if he was so absent when the cause of action accrued; and whenever he departs from the state after having come into it, the running of the statute is suspended from that time and during his absence, whether the cause of action first accrued while he was in, or while he was absent fro.., the state. Id.

3. AMENDMENTS BRINGING IN NEW PARTIES. -Where a plaintiff commences his action against a corporation, and it is served with summons as such, when no such corporation exists, and, after the statute of limitations has fully run, he amends his petition so as to bring in new parties as partners and defendants, the new parties so brought in may successfully rely upon the statute of limitations as a defense. Leatherman v. Times Co., 342.

See CORPORATIONS, 15-18; DEEDS, 5; EXECUTIONS, 3-5; Trust and Trus

TEES, 2.

LOST INSTRUMENTS.

See WILLS, 19, 20.

LOTTERY.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 14. 15.

MALICE.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 5, 23; DAMAGES, 2; LIbel and Slander, 10–21.

1. JURISDICTION.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

Where wrong and injury is done by a malicious suit, it

is immaterial, upon principle, whether or not the court had jurisdiction to entertain such suit, in order that a recovery may be had for the malicious prosecution. Antcliff v. June, 533.

2. IT IS NOT Necessary, in Order to MaintaIN action for the malicious prosecution of a civil suit, that the person should be molested or his property seized, if it appears that the suit was malicious, without probable cause, and that the party has been injured or damaged thereby. Id. 3. ACTION FOR ABUSE OF PROCESS. — Where process is willfully made use of for a purpose not justified by law, this is an abuse for which an action will lie. Id.

4. PROCESS, ABUSE OF.

OBTAINING A JUDGMENT BY FRAud and Perjury, not based upon any valid demand, and suing out execution upon such judgment knowing it to be false and fraudulent, and extorting money under such execution, is an abuse of process for which an action will lie. Id.

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE.

1. DIVORCE-ADMISSIONS AS EVIDENCE. In an action for divorce, admissions of a party against himself are admissible in evidence, if obtained without connivance, fraud, coercion, or other improper means. Burke Burke, 283.

V.

2. ID. — ADULTERY OF BOTH

PARTIES. - Divorce is a remedy provided for the innocent party, and one shown to be guilty of adultery cannot have a divorce for adultery committed by the other, when there has been no condonation. Id.

3. ID. ADULTERY, PROOF OF. In an action for divorce on the ground of adultery, the proof must be clear, positive, and satisfactory, and although presumptive evidence alone is sufficient to establish adulterous intercourse, the circumstances must lead to it, not only by fair inference, but as a necessary conclusion. Appearances equally capable of two interpretations, one an innocent one, will not justify the presumption of guilt. ld.

4. ID. — ADULTery, Proof of. — In an action for divorce on the ground of adultery, proof of frequent opportunity for illicit intercourse, without proof of a will to improve it, will not justify an inference of guilt; it must be further shown that the parties were together under suspicious circumstances not to be easily accounted for unless they had the corrupt design. Id.

5. EXTREME CRUELTY. Where a husband conveys to his wife his homestead and household furniture, constituting the bulk of his property, after which his wife refuses to cohabit with him, and although allowing him to keep a room in the house, finally drives him from it by