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DAMAGES.
1. IT A STATUTE IMPOSES OPON ANY PERSON a specific daty for the pro-

tection or benefit of others, if he neglects or refuses to perform such
duty he is liable for any injury or detriment caused thereby, if the in.
jury so caused is of the kind the statute was intended to prevent. Per-

guson v. Gies, 576.
2. ABSENCE OF Malice on the part of defendant and his agents will not

relieve him from liability for damages occasioned by his or their wrong.

ful acts. McKee v. Delaware Canal Co., 740.
3. MEASURE OF DAMAGES. — In an action against a railroad company to

recover for personal injury, a finding of gross negligence against the
company, without a finding of willful misconduct or an entire vant
of care raising a presumption of conscious indifference to consequences
and the legal rights of others, will not authorize a verdict for exemplary
or punitive damages. Such finding will only justify a verdict for com.

pensatory damages. Chattanooga etc. R. R. Co. v. Liddell, 169.
4. NEGLIGENCE - INSTRUCTION. — In an action against a railroad company to

recover for personal injury, an instruction that a finding of gross negli-
gence against the company would entitle plaintiff to recover punitive
damages as punishment of the railroad company is error, when the
statute provides that such damages may be given "to deter the wrong.
doer from repeating the trespass. The instruction should be given in

the words of the statute. Id.
5. NOMINAL DAMAGES MEAN No DAMAGES AT ALL. - They exist only in

name, and not in amount, and should only be awarded where there has
been a breach of contract, and no actual damages whatever have been

or can be shown. Stanton v. Nero York etc. Ry Co., 110.
6. MENTAL ANGUISH, RECOVERY MAY BE HAD FOR, WHEN. — The jury in

assessing damages for the breach of a contract may take into consideration
the mental anguish of the plaintiffs, if they suffered any mental anguish
on account of the matters set out in the coinplaint. If a person contracts,
upon a sufficient consideration, to do a particular thing, the failure to do
which may result in anguish and distress of mind on the part of the other
contracting party, he is presumed to have contracted with reference to
the payment of damages of that character in the event such damages ac-
crue by reason of a breach of the contract on his part. Renihan v.

Wright, 249.
See AGENCY, 4; ANIMALS; AssignMENT, 2; Civil Rights, 1, 2; CONTRACTS,

3, 4; CORPORATIONS, 14; JUDGMENTS, 10; LIBEL AND SLANDER; SALES,
12; TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.

DECLARATIONS.
See AGENCY, 5; EVIDENCE, 3-6; WILLS, 20.

DEDICATION.
1. STREETS DEDICATED BY MAPS. Laying out a large tract of land, and cut-

ting it up into house lots and ways, does not give every purchaser of a lot
a right of way over every street. He has no right to insist upon the keep-
ing open of a street which does not connect his lands with the pub-
lic highway, and which is desirable because it is nearest the water and
in full view thereof. Pearson v. Allen, 426.

2 DEDICATION BY Maps. – Including a space upon a map with dotted lines is

not a sufficient indication that it is to be kept open for the beneft of the
public or of a purchaser of lands in the tract represonted on the map. Ida

See WATERCOURSES, 3.

DEEDS.
1. DELIVERY. – It is an essential characteristic and an indispensable foa-

ture of every delivery of « deod, whether absolute or conditional, that
there must be a parting with the possession of it, and with all power
and control over it, by the grantor for the benefit of the grantoo at the

time of the delivery. Porter v. Woodhouse, 131.
2 DELIVERY of a deed is as essential to the passing of the title as is the

signing or acknowledgment of it. It is the final act, without which
all other formalities are ineffectual; and to constituto delivery, the
grantor must part with the legal possession of the deed, and with all
right to retain it. The present and future dominion over the deed must

pass from the grantor in his lifetime. Id.
& DELIVERY, What is not. – Whero a grantor formally oxecutes a deed,

except delivery, and then places it in a locked box, putting the lat-
ter in the possession of her servant, with the information that it con-
tains the deed, but without divulging the name of the grantee therein,
and directing that the box be not opened until after the death and fu.
neral of the grantor, which direction is followed, there is no such parting
with the possession, custody, and control of the deed by the grantor as

constitutes a valid delivery. Id.
4. DELIVERY of a deed includes not only an act by which the grantor

parts with the possession of it, but also a concurring intent on the part
of the grantor that it shall vest the title in the grantee; but where the
proof fails to show that the grantor ever did any act by which he parted
with the possession of the deed for the benefit of the grantes, the ques.

tion of intent becomes immaterial. Id.
8. Deed POLL, ACCEPTANCE OF, EFFECT OF. — The acceptance of a deed poll

by the grantee makes it the mutual written contract of the parties, and
therefore the statute of limitations respecting verbal contracts does not

apply thereto. Midland etc. Ry Co. v. Fisher, 189.
6. CONVEYANCE OF LAND OF NON-NAVIGABLE LAKE. – Where the owner of

land surrounding a non-navigable inland lake, longer than it is broad,
conveys a portion of the land bordering on the lake by a deed which
describes the lake as one of the boundaries, the title of the purchaser

extends to the center of the lake. Lembeck v. Nye, 828.
7. ID. - Where the owner of land surrounding a non-navigable lake con.

veys a portion thereof by deed describing the margin of the lake as
one of the boundaries, the title of the purchaser extends to low-water

mark only. Id.
& ID. Where the owner of land surrounded by a non-navigable inland

lake conveys a portion of the land by deed describing it by metes and
bounds, without reference to the lake, the title of the purchaser only ex.

tends to the lines mentioned in the deed. Id.
9. CONVEYANCE OF BATTURE OR ALLUVION Rights. — A deed which de-

scribes the property sold as fronting on a certain street, and extend.
ing between certain lines to the river, without guaranty of measure-
ment, conveys the batture or alluvion rights to the river frontage
described in the deed. Meyers v. Mathis, 385.
AX. ST. REP., VOL. XXI. - 61

10. WHEN DEED CONVEYS BATTURE OR ALLUVION Rights. - A deed describ.

ing the property sold as fronting on a river conveys the batture or al.
luvion rights without any provision to that effect contained in the

deed. Id.
8o. CO-TENANCY, 2-4; COVENANTS; EASEMENTS; HOLBARD AND Wor, 2-12;

MORTGAGES, L.

DEFINITIONS
“Cashier." Knickerbocker v. Wilcos, 595.
“Children." Oyster v. Knull, 890.
“ Combination." Emery v. Ohio Candle Co., 81%
“ Correct plat." Timothy v. Chambers, 163.
“Creditors.” Mandeville v. Avery, 678.
“ Freedom of the press.'

Riley v. Lee, 356
"Garbage." People v. Gordon, 524.
“ Homestead." T'imothy v. Chambers, 163.
“I will direct.” Oyster v. Knull, 890.
"I will support.” Oyster v. Knull, 890.
If.” Chattanooga etc. R. R. Co. v. Liddell, 169.
Lapsus lingua. Chattanooga etc. R. R. Co. v. Liddell, 169.
Negligence. Ellis v. Lake Shore etc. R. R. Co., 914,
“Order of myself.” Jenkins v. Bass, 344.
Sale of a chattel. Stephens v. Gifford, 866.
“The directors." McKensey v. Edwards, 339.
“Trust." Emery v. Ohio Candle Co., 819.
“You are my meat." Croom v. State, 179.
“You are mine." Croom v. State, 179.

DENTISTRY.
1. VALIDITY OF STATUTE REGULATING PRACTICE OJ DENTISTBY. - The le.

gislature may by statute regulate the practice of dentistry within the
state, and may provide that only those possessing skill and learned in
that profession shall be permitted to practice. It may prescribe the
nature and extent of the qualifications required and the rules for ascer.
taining and determining whether those proposing to practice come up
to the statutory standard. If the statuto operates equally upon all
who may desire to practice, and is enacted to promote the health and
welfare of the people by excluding those who are ignorant and inca-
pable, then the fact that the conditions may be rigorous, impolitic, and
unjust will not render the statute invalid. Such legislation is not re.
pugnant to section 2 of article 4 of the United States constitution, nor
in conflict with section 1 of the fourteenth amendment thereto. State v,

Creditor, 306.
2. ID. — A statute regulating the practice of dentistry, and prescribing

the nature and extent of the qualifications required, and the rules for
ascertaining and determining whether those proposing to practice come
up to the statutory requirement, cannot be deemed to unduly discrimi.
nate between persons or classes, or to be unconstitutional because it
exempts those engaged in the practice of dentistry within the state at
the time of its enactment from the necessity of obtaining a diploma
from a dental college, and requires such a diploma from all others.
Although this fact may work a hardship upon a practicing dentist who
comes into the state after the enactinent of the statute, it does not ren.
der the law invalid. Id.

DEPUTY.
See SAERIFPS, 1.

DISORDERLY CONDUCT.

See CARRIERS, 3.

DIVORCE.
See MARRIAGE AND DIvoire

DRAFTS.
See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 6, 7.

EASEMENTS.
1. PUBLIC EASEMENTS, ACTION BY PRIVATE PERSON FOR OBSTRUCTION 07. –

Though lands are dedicated to public use as streets and ways, their ob-
struction as such will not give a cause of action to a private person, unless

he suffers private damages. Pearson V. Allen, 426.
2. Right TO HAVE LAND Built UPON FOR THE BENEFIT OF LIGHT AND

Air to neighboring land may by deed be made an easement, and may
be created by words of covenaat as well as by words of granto

Ladud i.
City of Boston, 481.
3. IN ORDER TO ATTACH AN EASEMENT TO A DOMINANT ESTATE, it is not

necessary that it shall be created at the moment when either the dom.
inant or the servient estate is created, if the purport of the deed is

to create an easement for the benefit of the dominant estate. Id.
4. EASEMENTS RESTRICTING THE USE OF LANDS. – If the owners of lots front.

ing upon a square of land in a city mutually agree that certain places,
avenues, and passage-ways, as laid out upon a plat, shall remain open as
an appartenant to several lots, and that no building shall be erected upon
certain lots within ten feet of the front line thereof, unless a majority
of the owners shall so elect, nor shall any building extend above a speci.
fied height, such agreement entitles each of the owners to an easement,
and if a city, in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, takes a lot
which is subject to such easement in favor of an owner of another lot, it

must compensate him for the loss of his easement. ld.
6. EASEMENT ATTACHED TO LAND BY PLAIN AND DIRECT LANGUAGE ONLY.

It is only by the use of p'ain and direct language of a grautor that it can
be held that he has created a right in the nature of an easement in land
and attached it to one parcel as the dominant estate, and made the other
servient thereto for all time to come. The creation of such a right will
not be inferred by a forced construction of a covenant, nor by any am.
plification of its language beyond its natural ineauing. Where, there.
fore, the owner of two adjoining city lots conveys one of them by a deed
in which he covenants, for himself, his heirs, executors, administrators,
and assigns, to and with the grantee, his heirs, executors, administra.
tors, and assigns, that he will not erect or cause to be erected on said
lot any building which shall be regarded as a nuisance, or which shall be
occupied for any purpose which may render it a nuisance, this covenant
must be regarded as personal to the grantor, and solely against his own
acts, and will not make bim liable for the acts of his grantees or of sube
sequent owners, provided he neither does such acts himself nor causes
them to be done.

Devoe, 652.
See COVENANTS, 2, 3.

Clark v.

EJECTMENT.
1. PARTIES. — An employee of defendant in ejectment, who is permitted to

reside upon the disputed premises when the suit is brought, and who
claims no interest in the land, is not a necessary party defendant. Sharo

v. Hill, 607.
2. WHAT NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN. – Plaintiff, who has no title to the

land, but entered into possession in good faith, under a claim of right
which proved valueless, may maintain ejectmant against one who ob-
tained possession through plaintiff's tenant, and who shows no title,
right, or interest in the land, except a claim, merely asserted, and not

proved, of being the original owner. Id.
3. EQUITABLE TITLE CANNOT BE Ser up to overthrow a legal title in an

action of ejectment. Id.
4. EQUITABLE TITLE - DEFENSE. The right of possession under color

or claim of title by plaintiff in ejectment may be prima facie title as
against a mere intruder; but when an equitable interest is shown by
defendant which is unconnected with and independent of plaintiff's claim
of title, such defendant may show in defense that plaintiff has no title to
the premises. Id.
See ExecutORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 1; RAILROAD COMPANIES, 2, 3

ELECTION OF WIDOW.
Soe EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 6-10.

EMINENT DOMAIN.
See RAILROAD COMPANIES, 2, 3.

EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEK

See MASTER AND SERVANT.

EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENT.

See AssIGNMENT, 3-5.

EQUITY.
COURT OF EQUITY HAS POWER TO RELIEVE PARTY AGAINST FORFEITURE

and from penalty incurred, without willful neglect on his part, by the
breach of a condition subsequent, upon the principle of equity juris-
prudence that a party having a legal right shall not be permitted to
avail himself of it for the purposes of injustice or oppression. A mort.
gagee, for a good consideration, agreed not to foreclose his mortgage,
which was then due, until one year after the mortgagor's death, pro-
vided that during said period prior mortgages on the same property,
which, with his mortgage, exceeded its value, remained unforeclosed,
and po interest thereon remained unpaid for more than thirty days after
due, "and so long as no taxes or assessments on the said premises re-
main unpaid and in arrears for more than thirty days." Through the
failure, but not willful neglect, of the mortgagor's agent, with whom,
she being absent, she had left money sufficient to make payment, a
sewer assessment remained unpaid for more than thirty days. Bat apon
learning this fact the mortgagor promptly paid the assessment the day
before the summons was served upon her in an action to foreclose the

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