so was vested in them, and the measure of damages is the loss sustained by the innocent third party by reason of his not obtaining the valid contract which such directors assumed to execute. Farmers' Co-operative Trust Co. v. Floyd, 846.

15. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDERS.—When a corporation has become wholly insolvent, and has ceased to do business, and has assigned its property for the benefit of creditors, suit to enforce their statutory liability may be commenced against the stockholders by creditors, without any of them first recovering judgment and having an execution returned unsatisfied, and the statute of limitations begins to run from that time against the right of action. Barrick v. Gifford, 798. 16. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDERS. Where a

corporation has property and continues to do business, a creditor must first obtain judgment against it, and have an execution returned unsatisfied, before he can bring suit against the stockholders upon their individual statutory liability, and the statute of limitations begins to run against them from that time, and not before. Id.

17. METHOD OF ENFORCING STATUTORY LIABILITIES OF STOCKHOLDERS. A suit in the nature of a creditor's bill is the proper method to be adopted by creditors of an insolvent corporation to enforce the statutory liability of its stockholders, and when such suit is brought, no creditor can acquire priority nor maintain a separate suit to enforce such liability in his own behalf. Id.

18. INSOLVENCY - CREDITOR'S BILL-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. — A suit in the nature of a creditor's bill to enforce the statutory liability of the stockholders of an insolvent corporation saves the running of the statute of limitations, not only as against the claim of the one filing it, but also as against the claim of every creditor of the corporation who comes into the action before its final termination. Id. 19. LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDERS.

A change in the stockholders of a corporation has no effect upon its legal status. It remains through all changes in the personnel of its stockholders, the same legal entity, possessed of the same rights, and subject to the same liabilities.

Id.

20. LIABILITY OF NEW STOCKHOLDER. - When one purchases or acquires stock in a corporation, no matter at what time, he acquires a fractional interest in the capital stock, assets, profits, and liabilities of the corporation. Id.

21. LIABILITY OF NEW STOCKHOLDER. — If an existing stockholder of an insolvent corporation is solvent, it is immaterial, so far as his statutory liability to creditors is concerned, when he became the owner of the stock, or from whom he acquired it. Id.

22. CHANGE OF NAME OF CORPORATION WILL NOT RELIEVE ADMITTED STOCK SUBSCRIBER therein from liability to the creditors of the corporation for the amount remaining due on the stock subscribed by him. Howard v. Glenn, 156.

23. FRAUD OF CORPORATION NOT AVAILABLE AS DEFENSE TO STOCKHOLDER. - In an action by creditors of a corporation to collect unpaid subscriptions by a stockholder, the defense of fraud on the part of the corporation in inducing the stockholder to subscribe is unavailable. Id. 24. LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDER FOR UNPAID SUBSCRIPTIONS. — A plea that a decree upon which suit by creditors to collect unpaid stock subscriptions to a corporation is based, provided that if the stockholders should pay a certain per cent upon their subscriptions within a certain time, this

would be sufficient to pay off the indebtedness of the corporation, is not available to such stockholder if it fails to allege that he paid or offered to pay such per cent on his unpaid stock subscriptions. Id. 25. ID. - A stockholder of a corporation is liable to its creditors upon his unpaid stock subscription, and the fact that other stockholders may have been released as to their subscriptions by a decree of court is no defense to him, unless such action increased his liability. Id.

26. STOCKHOLDER, WHEN Bound by Decree. A decree of a court of competent jurisdiction in an action against a corporation by its creditors is binding upon a stockholder of such corporation, although he is a nonresident and not personally served with process, and though he never appeared or had notice of such suit. Id.

27. JURISDICTION OVER NON-RESIDENT STOCKHOLDERS. A trustee appointed by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction to maintain suit for the unpaid stock subscriptions to a corporation may sue nonresident stockholders who were not personally served with process, and who had no notice of the suit in which such decree was rendered. Id. 28. CORPORATION BOOKS AS EVIDENCE OF STOCK SUBSCRIPTION. — In an action by the creditors of a corporation to recover the amount due by a subscriber to its stock, proof that the corporation to the stock of which such stockholder admittedly subscribed is the same as that in the name of which suit is brought makes the books of such corporation admissible as evidence as to the amount and value of his subscription, or of any other transaction between him and such corporation. Id.

29. SHARE-HOLDER IN CORPORATION NOT CHARGEABLE WITH CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF RESOLUTIONS OF ITS DIRECTORS. — A share-holder in a corporation is not chargeable with constructive notice of resolutions adopted by its board of directors, or of provisions in its by-laws regu. lating the mode in which its business shall be transacted with its customers; and when he deals with the corporation as a customer, his rights are in no wise limited by its regulations or by-laws not brought to his knowledge. Pearsall v. Western Union Tel Co., 662.

BANKS AND BANKING.

See INSURANCE, 6; TAXATION.

COSTS.

See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 2.

CO-TENANCY.

1. WASTE AND DAMAGES. - A tenant in common who cuts and removes timber from unoccupied lands is answerable to his co-tenant in an action on the case. Benedict v. Torrent, 589.

2. CONVEYANCE OF A PORTION OF THE COMMON LANDS by metes and bounds, even when they are composed of separate parcels, may be treated as void by the other co-tenants. Barnes v. Lynch, 470.

3. VOID CONVEYANCE BY TENANT IN COMMON.. Where one tenant in common conveys to a stranger any but an undivided interest in the whole of the land, and such interest is prejudicial to the rights of the other co-tenants, such conveyance is void as to them. When partition is had between the co-tenants, such conveyance may be considered in partitioning the land so as to secure the interest of such purchaser. Benedict v. Torrent, 589.

4. SALE OF INTEREST IN TIMBER-RIGHT OF PURCHASER.-One tenant
in common cannot convey his interest in the timber on the common
land, and thereby make his co-tenants tenants in common with his
grantee. The interest thus gained by such purchaser is such interest
as shall be set off to his grantor in partition proceedings. Such partition
must be made of the entirety of the estate according to the shares held
by each co-tenant. The purchaser will then be entitled to all timber
interests secured by his conveyance. Id.

See PARTITION,

COUPONS.

See MORTGAGES, 8.

COVENANT-ACTION OF.

ACTION OF COVENANT LIES AGAINST GRANTEE OF DEED POLL. Midland
etc. R'y Co. v. Fisher, 189.

COVENANTS.

1. RULE FOR INTERPRETATION OF. The primary rule for the interpreta-
tion of a covenant contained in a deed is to gather the intention
of the parties from their words, by reading, not simply a single clause,
but the entire context, and where the meaning is doubtful, by consider-
ing such surrounding circumstances as they are presumed to have con-
sidered when their minds met. Clark v. Devoe, 652.

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2. COVENANT RUNNING WITH LAND, WHAT IS. - An agreement in a deed
conveying a right of way for a railroad, to fence the same, is a covenant
running with the land and essentially inhering in it, and such covenant
binds the grantee of the original covenantor, and inures to the benefit of
the owner of the servient estate in which the easement with its encum-
brance inheres. Midland etc. R'y Co. v. Fisher, 189.

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3. GRANTEE OF ORIGINAL COVENANTOR BOUND TO PERFORM LATTER'S Agree-
MENTS WHEN. When a deed which creates a right discloses a cove-
nant which burdens the right, a subsequent grantee of the original
covenantor, in accepting such deed and asserting a claim to the priv
ileges conferred by it, becomes bound to perform the agreement. And
when, in addition to the covenant in the deed, the facts open to observa-
tion show that the covenant has not been kept, such grantee cannot
justly claim the rights of a purchaser without notice. Id.

See EASEMENTS.

CREDITOR'S BILL.

See CORPORATIONS, 17, 18.

CRIMINAL LAW.

1. PROOF OF INTENT FROM DISTINCT CRIME. -Proof of a different crime
from the one charged, though generally objectionable, is admissible
when both crimes are closely linked or connected, especially in the res
gestæ, and also when such proof is pertinent and necessary to show in-
tent. When the intent is thus shown, further proof of premeditation is
unnecessary. State v. Deschamps, 392.

2. RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO QUESTION ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE. While
the court must be satisfied of the competency and admissibility of evidence

offered, the accused has the right to prevent the admission of incompetent or inadmissible evidence against him; and the fact that the trial judge is satisfied of the competency and admissibility of proffered testimony does not exclude the right of the accused to question it. State v. Miller, 418.

3. RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES. - The admissibility in evidence of a confession by the accused must necessarily be tried and determined by the court before the same is permitted to go to the jury `as evidence; but in such trial the accused has a right to participate, and to cross-examine the witnesses by whom the confession is sought to be proved. Id.

4. PRACTICE- DISCHARGE OF JURY WITHOUT VERDICT. -Where, in the trial of a criminal case, the evidence is excluded from the jury on the ground that the indictment charges no offense, the jury must be discharged without rendering a verdict. State v. Brown, 790.

5. ASSAULT WITH DEADLY WEAPON - PRESUMPTION OF INTENT TO KILL. — An assault made with a weapon likely to produce death, but from which no killing results, does not raise a presumption of an intent to kill. Malice in an assault by stabbing does not necessarily include an intention to kill. Patterson v. State, 152.

6. UNDER FALSE PRETENSES, OBTAINING GOODS. - Where an agent obtains personal property belonging to his principal, and to the immediate possession of which the latter is entitled, by means of false statements made to a third party, the agent is not guilty of obtaining goods or property by false pretenses. Nothing is a false pretense, within the mean. ing of the statute, which has no tendency to and does not harm a person. In re Cameron, 262.

7. INCEST, SINGLE ACT CONSTITUTES. — A single act of sexual intercourse between persons related by blood or affinity within the degree prohibited by statute constitutes incest. State v. Brown, 790.

8. SUFFICIENT AVERMENT.

Under a statute prohibiting the commission of the sexual act between persons nearer of kin than cousins," an indictment alleging the commission of the sexual act by uncle and niece is sufficient, without a direct averment that that relationship is nearer than that between cousins, or that they were related by blood or affinity. Id.

9. Sufficient AVERMENT. — An indictment charging incest between an unmarried uncle and his niece is equivalent to an averment that she was not his wife. Id.

10. WHEN NOT MODIFIED BY STATUTE, INCEST IS SEXUAL COMMERCE, either habitual or in a single instance, either under form of marriage or without it, between persons too nearly related in consanguinity or affinity to be entitled to intermarry. Id.

616

11. SUFFICIENT AVERMENT. - Under a statute prohibiting the commission of the sexual act between persons nearer of kin than cousins," an indictment charging incest between uncle and niece need not allege that they were not husband and wife, whether they had gone through the ceremony of marriage or not. Nor is it material in such case that the marriage was celebrated in a country where it was valid. Id.

12. LIBEL OF FAMILY. A false publication that a member of a par ticular family, by name, has been a state-prison convict, and directed against the whole family, is a criminal libel of the whole family of that name. State v. Brady, 296.

13. ANY PUBLICATION WHICH TENDS TO DEGRADE or injure another person, or to bring him in contempt, hatred, or ridicule, or which accuses him of a crime punishable by law, or of any act odious and disgraceful to society, is libelous, unless the same is shown to be true. Id.

14. LOTTERY, WHAT IS. Any scheme for the distribution of prizes by lot or chance, or by which one, on paying money or other valuable thing to another, receives a ticket which entitles him to receive in return a larger value or nothing, as some formula of chance may determine, is a violation of a city ordinance prohibiting lotteries. State v. Boneil, 413. 15. ID. - A scheme by which a person who pays five cents for a package of tes is entitled to select it from a number of envelopes, some of which, in addition to tea, contain a ticket which entitles the purchaser to a prize, while the others contain nothing but the tea, is a lottery; and the sale of such packages of tea is a violation of a city ordinance prohibiting lotteries. Id.

16. HOMICIDE TO AVOID ARREST. Where an officer is killed, with knowledge or reasonable grounds of belief that he intended and was endeavor. ing to make an arrest for a felony with which the accused was charged, it is murder; but if the killing was done suddenly, under the surprise of a night visit by an armed man, without knowledge of his purpose or official character, or reasonable ground of belief as to the same, and without malice, it is manslaughter. Croom v. State, 179.

17. ID. INSTRUCTIONS. Where an armed officer, at night, with a posse, and without a warrant, is killed in attempting to arrest a person charged with felony, and the only expression used by the officer to indicate his official capacity or his purpose to arrest was, that "You are mine,” or that "You are my meat," it is reversible error, upon the trial of the accused, to use the expression "You are mine," and to exclude the other and stronger expression in charging the jury, when the dividing line in the case between murder and manslaughter is upon whether or not the conduct and language of the officer, taken in connection with all the circumstances, indicated to the accused a purpose to arrest him for felony, rather than to molest him by mere violence for some lawless purpose. Id.

18. WHAT WILL REDUCE MURDER TO MANSLAUGHTER — INSTRUCTIONS. — A father has the right to protect his daughter from the personal violence of her husband, and to go to his premises for that purpose; and if he kills him in the heat of sudden passion, in an effort made in good faith to so protect his daughter, it is not necessary that a blow should be given, or a trespass committed on the person of the accused, to reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter. It is reversible error to fail to so instruct the jury, even if a verdict of manslaughter is returned. Campbell v. Commonwealth, 348.

19. ID. INSTRUCTIONS. On the trial of a father for the killing of his daughter's husband, the jury should be instructed, when such instruction is justified by the evidence, that as matter of law a father has the right to protect his daughter from great bodily harm against the violence of her husband; that if prior to the day of the tragedy she had been beaten by her husband so as to endanger her life or inflict upon her great bodily injury, of which the accused had knowledge, and that the violence was renewed on the night of tragedy, the father, on receiving information of the fact, had a right to arm himself and go to the residence of the husband to protect his daughter from his violence; and that if finding his