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would be sufficient to pay off the indebtedness of the corporation, is not available to such stockholder if it fails to allege that he paid or

offered to pay such per cent on his unpaid stock subscriptions. Id. 25. ID. — A stockholder of a corporation is liable to its creditors upon his un.

paid stock subscription, and the fact that other stockholders may have been released as to their subscriptions by a decree of court is no defense to

hiin, unless such action increased his liability. Id. 26. STOCKHOLDER, WHEN BOUND BY DECREE. — A decree of a court of com.

petent jurisdiction in an action against a corporation by its creditors is binding upon a stockholder of such corporation, although he is a non. resident and not personally served with process, and though he never

appeared or had notice of such suit. Id. 27. JURISDICTION OVER NON-RESIDENT STOCKHOLDERS. — A trusteo ap

pointed by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction to maintain suit for the unpaid stock subscriptions to a corporation may sue nonresident stockholders who were not personally served with process, and

who had no notice of the suit in which such decree was rendered. Id. 28. Corporation Books AS EVIDENCE OF Srock SUBSCRIPTION. - In an ac

tion by the creditors of a corporation to recover the amount due by a sub. scriber to its stock, proof that the corporation to the stock of which such stockholder adınittedly subscribed is the same as that in the name of which suit is brought makes the books of such corporation admissible as evidence as to the amount and value of his subscription, or of any other

transaction between him and such corporation. Id. 29. SHARE-HOLDER IN CORPORATION NOT CHARGEABLE WITH CONSTRUCTIVE

Notice or RESOLUTIONS OF ITS DIRECTORS. — A share-holder in a cor: poration is not chargeable with constructive notice of resolutions adopted by its board of directors, or of provisions in its by-laws regu. lating the inode in which its business shall be transacted with its cus. tomers; and when he deals with the corporation as a customer, his rights are in no wise limited by its regulations or by-laws not brought to his knowledge. Pearsall v. Western Union Teh Co., 662.



CO-TENANCY. 1. WASTE AND DAMAGES. - A tenant in common who cuts and removes

timber from unoccupied lands is answerable to his co-tepant in an action

on the case. Benedict v. Torrent, 589. 2. CONVEYANCE OF A PORTION OF THE COMMON LANDS by metes and bounds,

even when they are composed of separate parcels, may be treated as

void by the other co-tenants. Barnes v. Lynch, 470. 3. VOID CONVEYANCE BY TENANT IN COMMON. Where one tenant in

common conveys to a stranger any but an undivided interest in the whole of the land, and such interest is prejudicial to the rights of the other co-tenants, such conveyance is void as to them. When parti. tion is had between the co-tenants, such conveyance may be considered in partitioning the land so as to secure the interest of such purchaser. Benedict v. Torrent, 589.


in common cannot convey his interest in the timber on the common
land, and thereby make his co-tepants tenants in common with his
grantee. The interest thus gained by such purchaser is such interest
as shall be set off to his grantor in partition proceedings. Such partition
must be made of the entirety of the estate according to the shares held
by each co-tenant. The purchaser will then be entitled to all timber
interests secured by his conveyance. Idea




etc. R’y Co. v. Fisher, 189.

1. RULE FOR INTERPRETATION OF. — The primary rule for the interpreta-

tion of a covenant contained in a deed is to gather the intention
of the parties from their words, by reading, not simply a single clause,
but the entire context, and where the meaning is doubtful, by consider.
ing such surrou

rounding circumstances as they are presumed to have con.
sidered when their minds met. Clark v. Devoe, 652.
2. COVENANT RUNNING WITH LAND, WHAT 18. An agreement in a deed

conveying a right of way for a railroad, to fence the same, is a covenant
running with the land and essentially inhering in it, and such covenant
binds the grantee of the original covenantor, and inures to the benefit of
the owner of the servient estate in which the easement with its encum.

brance inheres. Midland etc. R'y Co. v. Fisher, 189.

When a deed which creates a right discloses a cove.
nant which burdens the right, a subsequent grantee of the original
covenantor, in accepting such deed and asserting a claim to the prir.
ileges conferred by it, becomes bound to perform the agreement. And
when, in addition to the covenant in the deed, the facts open to observa.
tion show that the covenaut has not been kept, such grantee cannot
justly claim the rights of a purchaser without notice. Id.





1. PROOF OF INTENT 'FROM DISTINCT CRIME. — Proof of a different crime

from the one charged, though generally objectionable, is admissible
when both crimes are closely linked or connected, especially in the res
gestæ, and also when such proof is pertinent and necessary to show in.

When the intent is thus shown, further proof of premeditation is
unnecessary. State v. Deschamps, 392.

tire court must be satistierl of the competency and admissibility of evidence


offered, the accused has the right to prevent the admission of incompetent or inadmissible evidence against him; and the fact that the trial judge is satisfied of the competency and admissibility of proffered testimony does not exclude the right of the accused to question its

State v. Miller, 418. 3. Right OF ACCUSED TO CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES. — The admissibility

in evidence of a confession by the accused must necessarily be tried and deterinined by the court before the same is permitted to go to the jury as evidence; but in such trial the accused has a right to participate, and to cross-examine the witnesses by whom the confession is sought to be

proved. Id. 4. PRACTICE – DISCHARGE OF JURY WITHOUT VERDICT. - Where, in the trial

of a criminal case, the evidence is excluded from the jury on the ground that the indictment charges no offense, the jury must be discharged

without rendering a verdict. Stale v. Brown, 790. 5. ASSAULT WITH DEADLY WEAPON -- PRESUMPTION OF INTENT TO KILL.

An assault inade with a weapon likely to produce death, but from which no killing results, does not raise a presumption of an intent to kill. Mal. ice in an assault by stabbing does not necessarily include an intention to

kill. Patterson v. State, 152. 6. UNDER FALSE PRETENSES, OBTAINING GOODS. – Where an agent obtains

personal property belonging to his principal, and to the immediate pos. session of which the latter is entitled, by means of false statements made to a third party, the agent is not guilty of obtaining goods or property by false pretenses. Nothing is a false pretense, within the mean. ing of the statute, which has no tendency to and does not harm a person,

In re Cameron, 262. 7. INCEST, SINGLE ACT CONSTITUTES. A single act of sexual intercourse

between persons related by blood or affinity within the degree prohibited

by statute constitutes incest. State v. Brown, 790. 8. SUFFICIENT AVERMENT. - Under a statute prohibiting the commis.

sion of the sexual act between persons “nearer of kin than cousins," an indictment alleging the commission of the sexual act by uncle and niece is sufficient, without a direct averment that that relationship is nearer than that between cousins, or that they were related by blood or

affinity. Id. 9. SUFFICIENT AVERMENT. – An indictment charging incest between an un

married uncle and his niece is equivalent to an averment that she was


either habitual or in a single instance, either under form of marriage or without it, between persons too nearly related in consanguinity or

affinity to be entitled to intermarry. Id. 11. SUFFICIENT AVERMENT. - Under a statute prohibiting the commission

of the sexual act between persons nearer of kin than cousins," an indictment charging incest between uncle and niece need not allege that they were not husband and wife, whether they had gone through the ceremony of marriage or not. Nor is it material in such case that the

marriage was celebrated in a country where it was valid. Id. 12. LIBEL OF FAMILY. — A false publication that a member of a par.

ticular family, by name, has been a state-prison convict, and directed against the whole family, is a criminal libel of the whole family of that

State v, Brady, 296.



son, or to bring him in contempt, hatred, or ridicule, or which accuses him of a crime punishable by law, or of any act odious and disgracefal

to society, is libelous, unless the same is shown to be true. Id. 14. LOTTERY, WHAT IS. - Any scheme for the distribution of prizes by lot or

chance, or by which one, on paying money or other valuable thing to another, receives a ticket which entitles him to receive in return a larger value or nothing, as some formula of chance may determine, is a viola

tion of a city ordinance prohibiting lotteries. Stute v. Boneil, 413. 15. ID. — A scheme by which a person who pays five cents for a package of toa

is entitled to select it from a number of envelopes, some of which, in ad. dition to tea, contain a ticket which entitles the purchaser to a prize, while the others contain nothing but the tea, is a lottery; and the sale of such packages of tea is a violation of a city ordinance prohibiting lot.

teries. Id. 16. HOMICIDE TO AVOID ARREST. — Where an officer is killed, with knowl.

edge or reasonable grounds of belief that he intended and was endeavor. ing to make an arrest for a felony with which the accused was charged, it is murder; but if the killing was done suddenly, under the surprise of a night visit by an armed man, without knowledge of his purpose or official character, or reasonable ground of belief as to the same, and

without malice, it is manslaughter. Croom v. State, 179. 17. ID. — INSTRUCTIONS. - Where an armed officer, at night, with a posse,

and without a warrant, is killed in attempting to arrest a person charged with felony, and the only expression used by the officer to indicate his official capacity or his purpose to arrest was, that “You are mine," or that “You are my ineat," it is reversible error, upon the trial of the accused, to use the expression “You are mine," and to exclude the other and stronger expression in charging the jury, when the dividing line in the case between murder and manslaughter is upon whether or not the conduct and language of the officer, taken in connection with all the circumstances, indicated to the accused a purpose to arrest him for fel. ony, rather than to molest him by mere violence for some lawless pur.

pose. Id.


father has the right to protect his daughter from the personal violence of her husband, and to go to his premises for that purpose; and if he kills him in the heat of sudden passion, in an effort made in good faith to so protect his daughter, it is not necessary that a blow should be given, or a trespass committed on the person of the accused, to reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter. It is reversible error to fail to so instruct the jury, even if a verdict of manslaughter is returned.

Campbell v. Commonwealth, 348. 19. ID. — INSTRUCTIONS. – On the trial of a father for the killing of his daugh.

ter's husband, the jury should be instructed, when such instruction is justified by the evidence, that as matter of law a father has the right to protect his daughter from great bodily harm against the violence of her husband; that if prior to the day of the tragedy she had been beaten by her husband so as to endanger her life or inflict upon her great bodily injury, of which the accused had knowledge, and that the violence was renewed on the night of tragedy, the father, on receiving information of the fact, had a right to arm himself and go to the residence of the hus. band to protect his daughter from his violence; and that if finding his daughter and her children expelled from their home into the street hy the husband, and suddenly meeting him in the heat of sudden passion caused by the violence to the wife, the father shot him, not in necessary

self-defense, and without malice, he is guilty of manslaughter. Id. 20. MURDER — INTENT PRESUMED FROM PERPETRATION OF ANOTHER FEL.

ONY. – A homicide comunitted by an accused while engaged in the per. petration of a felony, as rape or sodomy, is murder, and the absence of proof of premeditation or preconceived design to kill is insufficient to

reduce the crime to manslaughter. Stute v. Deschamps, 392. 21. MURDER — Proor NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH. - Simple proof of a homi.

cide is insufficient to establish the crime of murder. The prosecution must first affirmatively prove the existence of malice in the perpetrator,

in order to put him upon his defense. Id. 22. ID. - PRESUMPTION FROM ACT OF KILLING. - When an act is committed

deliberately with a deadly weapon, and is likely to be attended with dangerous consequences, the malice requisite to murder will be presumed; but the presumption which arises from a killing, unattended with such circumstances of violence, is that of murder in the second

degree, or of manslaughter. Id. 23. ID. – PROOF OF MALICE. Malice

may be inferred from many circumstances, other than the use of a deadly weapon, and since proof of it usually lies in circumstantial evidence, evidence of any facts which go

to afford an n'erence of its existence is admissible. ld. 24. ID. - EVIDENCE OF INTENT. Where the scienter or quo animo forms an

essential or indispensable part of the inquiry, testimony is admissible of such acts, conduct, or declarations of the accused as tend to establish Buch knowledge or intent, notwithstanding they may constitute a differ

tne crime in law. Id. 25. MURDER — EVIDENCE. - On a trial for murder, where it appears that

a father, receiving information that his daughter was being abused by her husband, seized his pistol and went to the residence of the husband, and found the daughter and her children, at night, in the street, driven from her home, and on meeting her husband, shot and killed him, after some words had passed between them, evidence of the son-in-law's previcus threats against the accused, and of previous violence against the wife, is competent to show the lawful purpose of the accused in going to the place of the tragedy; but the exclusion of such evidence is not rever. sible error, when other evidence admitted shows the good iaith of the father in his effort to protect the daughter, and that she was in constant danger of boilily harm from her husband. Campbell v. Commonwealth,

348. 26. ID. - Evidence of SELF-DEFENSE. Where a father has knowledge of

cruel treatment inflicted upon his daughter by her husband, endangering her life, it is his natural and legal right to go to the rescue of his daughter, to prevent the infliction upon her person of cruel and in. human blows; and if in his effort to do so he kills the husband, evidence of the threats of the latter to take the life of the accused, accompanied by an effort to do so, such as an attempt to draw a pistol at the time,

is competent on the issue of self-defense. Id. 27. RAPE -- Age of Consent. – A female under the age of twelve years is incapable of yielding consent to sexual intercourse. State v. Miller, 418.


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