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returning in different parts of a town, does not show a waiver of its regulations affecting its passengers with notice to alight on the south side, nor permission to them to alight on the north side.

William A. Galbraith and Davenport Galbraith, for the appellant.

J. Ross Thompson, for the appellee.

MCCOLLUM, J. The appellant was a passenger on the defendant company's train on a dark night in December, 1887, and in alighting from it at Union station, stepped into a deep ditch by the side of the road-bed, and was injured. A portion of this ditch was dug by the company that day, for purposes appurtenant to its road, and there were no lights or guards near it. It was on the north side of the track, and the depot was on the south side of it. The appellant was, and for twelve years previous thereto had been, a resident of Union, and his house was near the depot. He was well acquainted with the locality; he knew there was no platform or place provided by the company for its passengers to alight on the north side of the track, and that it had constructed a safe and convenient platform in connection with its depot on the south side of it, for their use in entering and leaving its trains. This knowledge was notice to him of a rule of the company that they should get on and off there. In violation of this rule, which it was his duty to conform to, he refused the safe means of exit, and stepped into the ditch on the other side, and for the consequences of his leap in the dark seeks to hold the company responsible.

A passenger's consent to a reasonable regulation of the company for entering and leaving its trains is implied, and for an injury which results from his voluntary disregard of it the company is not liable: Sullivan v. Philadelphia etc. R. R. Co., 30 Pa. St. 234; 72 Am. Dec. 689. In the present case, it affirmatively and sufficiently appears in the testimony produced by the appellant that the company had provided safe and convenient means of ingress and egress to and from its trains, and in this particular had discharged its whole duty to its passengers. It was under no obligation to them to provide a convenient place to alight on the north side, nor to keep its right of way there free of obstructions for the benefit of pedestrians. It was not bound to anticipate and guard against the consequences of a violation by its passengers of its reasonable and known regulations for their protection. It

is admitted by the appellant that his observance of these regulations would have insured his safe exit from the train, and it is obvious that the injury he received was the direct consequence of his disregard of them. It was his neglect of a duty he owed to the company, and not its neglect of a duty it owed to him, which caused the injury, and is a sufficient answer to his demand that the company shall compensate him for it. This is the rule distinctly laid down in Sullivan v. Philadelphia etc. R. R. Co., 30 Pa. St. 234; 72 Am. Dec. 689; and enforced in Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Zebe, 33 Pa. St. 318; 37 Pa. St. 420.

In this case, there was nothing to justify or excuse the appellant's deliberate disregard of the rules of the company. It was prompted by a desire to shorten the walk from the train to his destination. A moment's time and a few rods in distance were all that he could save by it, and neither was of unusual importance to him. It was claimed and proved that the company had permitted persons residing north of its road to cross its right of way and track on foot, at different points in the vicinity of the depot, in going to and returning from their work or business in other parts of the town. But in this there was no waiver of its regulations affecting its passengers, nor permission to them to alight on the north side. There was a little evidence to the effect that occasionally a passenger got off there, but none that the company consented to or knew of it, and the learned judge correctly ruled that the rights and duties of the appellant were not affected by it. In Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Zebe, 33 Pa. St. 318, 37 Pa. St. 420, it was held that the admission of such evidence was error. This case is clearly within the principle of the authorities cited, and the judgment is affirmed.

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RAILWAY COMPANIES-CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS RULES AND RegulaTIONS. ― Railway companies as carriers of passengers may adopt rules and regulations which will be binding upon passengers, provided such rules and regulations are reasonable: Poole v. Northern P. R. R. Co., 16 Or. 261; 8 Am. St. Rep. 289, and note; Reese v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 131 Pa. St. 422; 17 Am. St. Rep. 818, and note; McGowen v. Morgan's etc. S. S. Co., 41 La. Ann. 732; 17 Am. St. Rep. 415, and note. And the company is not liable for injuries to passengers who disobey such regulations: Dodge v. Boston etc. S. 8. Co., 148 Mass. 207; 12 Am. St. Rep. 541. As to who must decide upon the reasonableness of a rule made by a carrier, see Pittsburgh etc. R'y Co. v. Lyon, 123 Pa. St. 140; 10 Am. St. Rep. 517.

RAILWAY COMPANIES DEFECTIVE PLATFORMS.

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Although a passenger

may have known of the defective condition of a platform, he is not bound to

keep such knowledge actually in mind: Pennsylvania Co. v. Marion, 123 Ind. 415; 18 Am. St. Rep. 330. If there are two ways of egress, one of which is faulty, but which has been assented to by the company as a means of exit from its trains, an unwarned passenger using it, and receiving injuries, is entitled to recover, even though the other way, which might have been used, was safe: Delaware etc. R. R. Co. v. Trautwein, 52 N. J. L. 169; 19 Am. St. Rep. 442.

OGLE V. BAKER.

[137 PENNSYLVANIA STATE, 378.]

JUDGMENTS, WHEN MAY BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED. — A judgment or decree obtained by fraud and collusion of the parties to it, for the purpose of defrauding a third person, may be attacked by him in a collateral proceeding.

JUDGMENTS, WHEN CANNOT BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED. —A party who alleges that a judgment has been obtained against him by fraud may attack it directly, by appeal from or by motion to open it, but cannot attack it collaterally in an action to recover money collected by regular process issued upon it.

JUDGMENT ON WARRANT OF ATTORNEY, WHEN CANNOT BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED. A judgment entered on a warrant of attorney is as impervious to collateral attack in an action to recover money collected by regular process issued upon it as is a judgment obtained in open court. R. P. Kennedy and Edward Campbell, for the appellant. A. D. Boyd, R. E. Umbel, G. D. Howell, and E. H. Reppert, for the appellee.

MCCOLLUM, J. On December 22, 1886, a judgment was entered in the court of common pleas of Fayette County, in favor of the appellant and against the appellee, for five hundred dollars, with interest thereon from the 16th of March preceding. This judgment was entered upon and by virtue of a warrant of attorney contained in a note purporting to be executed by the appellee. An attachment execution was issued upon it, which was duly served upon the defendant therein, and the National Bank of Fayette County was summoned as garnishee. In due course of law, judgment was obtained against the garnishee for $377, and an execution was issued for its collection. The bank paid the amount thereof to the sheriff, who paid it to the appellant. In April, 1887, this suit was brought by the appellee to recover the amount so paid, and the substance of her claim is, that the note on which the original judgment was entered was a forgery, and that she did not appear in answer to the attachment because the appellant told her that she need not, and that he

would attend to it for her. The judgment, and the attachment proceedings founded upon it, remain of record, unimpeached, and the question is, whether, while they so remain, an action for the recovery of the money collected and paid by virtue of them can be maintained.

The general rule is, that money collected or paid upon execution cannot be recovered back unless the judgment on which the writ issued is first vacated or reversed: Federal Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 82 Pa. St. 357; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Heath, 95 Pa. St. 333. The reason of the rule is well stated by Mr. Justice Sharswood in Federal Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 82 Pa. St. 357, as follows: "An execution is the end of the law. To permit money so collected or paid to be reclaimed in a new suit would lead to indefinite and endless litigation. If such suit could be maintained, then another might be brought to recover the money paid on the judgment and execution in it, and so on ad infinitum."

In Tarbox v. Hays, 6 Watts, 398, 31 Am. Dec. 478, the plaintiffs brought an action of replevin to recover certain property which the defendant had purchased at a constable's sale on an execution issued on a judgment which he held against them. It was alleged by the plaintiffs that the judgment was procured by fraud and without notice to them, but it was ruled by this court that the defendants therein could not question it collaterally. A judgment or decree procured through the fraud and collusion of the parties to it, for the purpose of defrauding a third person, may be attacked by such person in a collateral proceeding, because he has no standing to appeal from it, or to require that it be vacated or reversed. A party, however, who alleges that a judgment has been obtained against him by fraud may assail it directly by appeal from or motion to open it, but he cannot impeach it in an* action to recover the money collected by regular process issued upon it. If it be conceded that the averments of the appellee are true, her appropriate remedy was an application to open the judgment. The record of the attachment proceeding shows that she had notice of the judgment before anything was recovered upon it, and the accuracy of this record is not disputed by her. A judgment entered on a warrant of attorney is as impervious to collateral assault as a judgment obtained in open court.

As to the truth or falsity of the appellee's claim, or of the evidence submitted to support or to controvert it, we express

no opinion. We merely decide that while the judgments in question remain of record unreversed, an action to recover the money collected upon them cannot be maintained.

The judgment is reversed.

JUDGMENTS - COLLATERAL ATTACK. — A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be collaterally impeached, unless the record shows affirmatively a want of jurisdiction; and evidence even of fraud not found in the judgment roll will not be received to avoid a judgment, although such fraud was in obtaining jurisdiction: Williams v. Haynes, 77 Tex. 283; 19 Am. St. Rep. 752, and note collecting cases upon the subject of collateral attacks upon judgment. Compare Wilkerson v. Schoonmaker, 77 Tex. 615; 19 Am. St. Rep. 803; Lang Syne Gold-mining Co. v. Ross, 20 Nev. 127; 19 Am. St. Rep. 337.

PAXSON V. NIELDS.

[137 PENNSYLVANIA STATE, 385.]

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-PROMISE TO PAY PRE-EXISTING DEBT OF ANOTHER, WITHOUT NEW CONSIDERATION, VOID.A note given by a widow for the payment of a debt due by her husband, who was insolvent at the time of his death, without any new consideration to support it, is void, and the renewal of the note from time to time will not raise such consideration.

Lewis Dewart and J. Nevin Hill, for the appellants.

W. H. M. Oram, for the appellee.

MCCOLLUM, J. We are unable to discover from the evidence any consideration for the note in suit. The maker of it is the widow and executrix of Theodore F. Nields, who, at his death, was indebted to the appellants on two notes and a bookaccount, in the sum of $307.52. The estate was insolvent, and, after discharging the judgment liens, was able to pay its general creditors but five per cent on their claims. On April 21, 1885, the appellants presented their claim to the auditor appointed to distribute the fund in the hands of the executrix, and seven days thereafter induced her to give her personal note for it, which, when paid, was to be in full of their demand against the estate. The dividend their claim was entitled to was $16.47, and it was awarded to them. They received it, and applied it on her note. This note was renewed from time to time, and the amount thereof was reduced by payments from her own earnings to $267.94 at the date of the last renewal. The fund shown by the account of the executrix to be in her hands for distribution was all there

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