upon the question whether Mr. Lord had authority to execute and deliver the release given to Hubbell.

The trial court found that such instrument was executed without any power or authority, and, as to the oil company's claim, was wholly inoperative and void.

It may be conceded that the assignment of October 6, 1874. was intended to relate back to and have effect as of a date prior to the execution of the release.

By the terms of the instrument of August, 1872, the oil company assigned only its claim against Taylor individually, and against his individual estate in the hands of the assignee.

By the instrument of October, 1874, it assigned its claim against the joint property of Taylor and Hubbell. In both, it expressly reserved its claim against Hubbell individually.

This was in entire harmony with the tripartite agreement, which recited the fact that the assignees had never realized anything from Hubbell's individual estate, and which contemplated the discharge of the assignees by the creditors, but that the oil company should retain its claim against Hubbell.

The legal conclusion which the appellant asked the court to draw from the two assignments was, that they were ineffectual to divide the claim, and carried to the assignee the right to collect the whole judgment.

That is, that although the assignor intended to sell and the assignee to buy but a part or share of the claim, and clearly expressed such intent in the deed of assignment, the law gives to the instrument an entirely different effect, and transfers what neither intended should pass by it.

I know of no principle of law that works such a result, and no authority is cited to sustain it.

The authorities that are cited hold simply that a creditor cannot split up a single cause of action without the consent of the debtor.

The reason for this rule is, that to permit a cause of action to be divided would subject the debtor to many embarrassments and responsibilities not contemplated in his original contract. He has a right to stand upon the singleness of his original contract, and to decline any assignment by which it may be broken into fragments: Mandeville v. Welch, 5 Wheat. 277.

But the rule goes only to the right to sue as assignee of a part of a single cause of action.

It does not deny the right to sell and transfer an undivided

part of a demand. And if all the owners unite in a suit upon it, the fact of the assignment of a part constitutes no defense. We need not consider, in this case, what title or authority Mr. Lord acquired under the assignment to him, or what would have been the effect on the claim if Taylor or the assignee had paid it in full to Lord. No such question arises.

The only pertinent inquiry is, Did Lord, under the assignment of the demand against Taylor, acquire power to release Hubbell?

That inquiry was properly answered at the trial, and there was no error in the refusal to find the request I have quoted. If the assignment was ineffectual to divide the claim, the title remained in the oil company.

But as the judgments were several, and not joint, and no question of payment by either debtor arises, it is not perceived why the judgment against Taylor could not be separately assigned. No one was prejudiced by such a transaction, and the rights of the debtors between themselves remain unimpaired and unaffected.

The claim that Mr. Lord incurred some liability to Hubbell in case the release was ineffectual to discharge him is not available on this appeal. No motion was made to amend the complaint, except in respect to the demand for judgment. The claim against Lord could not stand upon the allegation of the complaint, and the court properly denied the motion to amend.

The judgment should be affirmed.

JOINT DEBTORS. AS TO THE EFFECT OF THE RELEASE OF ONE OF Two JOINT DEBTORS, see Eldred v. Peterson, 80 Iowa, 264; 20 Am. St. Rep. 416. The release of one joint debtor releases the co-debtor: Berry v. Gillis, 17 N. H. 9; 43 Am. Dec. 584, and note; unless the remedy against him is expressly reserved: Yates v. Donaldson, 5 Md. 389; 61 Am. Dec. 283, and note; Merriman v. Barker, 121 Ind. 74. A joint debtor who has not paid his share cannot complain against a judgment rendered against his co-obligor for an amount greater than that for which such co-obligor is liable: Scharff v. Noble, 67 Miss. 143. A parol agreement by the payee of a note to release one of three makers as to two thirds of the debt, and permit the other portion to be paid in a certain manner, is a release of the other two makers upon their payment of their proportionate shares: Seligman v. Pinet, 78 Mich. 50. Sev-1 eral debtors being jointly liable for a debt, an agreement by the creditor to release one from further payment and from liability for contribution does not discharge the others: Benton v. Mullen, 61 N. H. 125. Payment by one debtor of a judgment recovered against all of several joint debtors extinguishes the whole recovery: Caldwell v. Martin, 29 S. C. 22.

ASSIGNMENT OF PART OF A DEMAND.—A part of a chose in action may be assigned: Exchange Nat. Bank v. McLoon, 73 Me. 498; 40 Am. Rep. 398. Contra, Thalhimer v. Brinckerhoff, 3 Cow. 623; 15 Am. Dec. 308. The assignment of part of a demand may be upheld in equity, although void at law: Grain v. Aldrich, 38 Cal. 514; 99 Am. Dec. 423, and note; Kingsbury v. Burrill, 151 Mass. 199.

RIGGS V. COMMERCIAL MUTUAL INSURANCE Co.

[125 NEW YORK, 7.]

STIPULATION THAT THE DECISION IN ONE CASE SHALL GOVERN ANOTHER is valid and enforceable.

INSURANCE. POLICIES NEED NOT DISCLOSE THE NATURE OF THE INTEREST

of the assured, unless some condition in them requires such disclosure. INSURANCE INTEREST TO WHICH IT ATTACHES. A policy, if otherwise valid, attaches to whatever insurable interest the assured had, whether as owner or otherwise. INSURABLE INTEREST. — WHENEVER THERE IS A REAL INTEREST to protect, and a person is so situated with respect to the subject of insurance that its destruction would, or might reasonably be expected to, impair the value of that interest, the insurance of such interest is not a wager within the meaning of the statute prohibiting wager policies.

INSURABLE INTEREST. - STOCKHOLDER OF A CORPORATION has an insurable interest in the corporate property.

David Willcox, for the appellant.

George Zabriskie, for the respondent.

ANDREWS, J. The defendant is, we think, precluded by the stipulation of January 10, 1889, from raising any question on this appeal except as to whether Tobias, the assignor of the plaintiff, by reason of his being a stockholder in the Merchants' Steamship Company, had an insurable interest in the Falcon when the policy was issued, and perhaps the further question whether that interest, if it existed, was covered by the policy. The situation when the stipulation was made was this: The judgment which the plaintiff recovered at the trial terin had been reversed at the general term, and a new trial had been ordered, and the plaintiff was about to appeal from the order of reversal to this court. The Merchants' Steamship Company had recovered judgment against the defendant in the same court on its policy on the same vessel, similar to the policy issued to the plaintiff, and this judgment had been affirmed by the general term, and the defendant had brought an appeal to this court, which was then pending. There was one question common to both cases, viz., whether there had been an absolute total loss of the vessel insured, without which

it was conceded there could be no recovery. In the case of the Merchants' Steamship Company this was the sole question. In this case there was the additional point whether the plaintiff had an insurable interest. The parties to the stipulation assumed that the question of total loss would be conclusively determined as to both cases by the result of the appeal in the case of the Merchants' Steamship Company, but if the judgment in that case was affirmed, it would still leave open in this case the question of insurable interest. Under these circumstances the parties entered into the stipulation, by which the plaintiff waived his right to appeal to this court from the order of reversal upon the defendant's consenting that if the judgment in the steamship company's case should be affirmed there should then be a reargument in this case before the general term of the question of the plaintiff's insurable interest, which consent was given; and the stipulation further provided "that the decision of the general term on such reargument should be final so far as the plaintiff was concerned, but without prejudice to any right in defendant to appeal therefrom." This court affirmed the judgment in the steamship company's case, and the reargument on the question of the plaintiff's insurable interest was then had before the general term, whereupon the general term reversed its former decision upon the point, and affirmed the judgment of the trial term. The present appeal is from the judgment of affirmance. It was the plain purpose of the stipulation that the defense common to both actions should abide the decision in the steamship company's case, leaving open in this action the distinct and separate question of insurable interest only. The stipulation was valid, and governs this appeal: Townsend v. Masterson etc. Co., 15 N. Y. 587.

The question whether a stockholder in a corporation, as such, has an insurable interest in the corporate property, which he may protect by an insurance of specific tangible property of the corporation, is the question now presented. The policy does not disclose the nature of the interest of Tobias in the vessel insured. But this was not necessary, unless required by some condition of the policy: Lawrence v. Van Horne, 1 Caines, 276; Tyler v. Etna Fire Ins. Co., 12 Wend. 507. The policy, if otherwise valid, attached to whatever insurable interest he had, whether as owner or otherwise. What constitutes an insurable interest has been the subject of much discussion in the cases, and is often a question of great diffi

culty. It is quite apparent that the tendency of decisions in recent times is in the direction of a more liberal doctrine upon this subject than formerly prevailed: May on Insurance, sec. 76. Contracts of insurance, where the insured had no interest, were permitted at common law: Craufurd v. Hunter, 8 Term Rep. 13; but the manifest evils attending such contracts, and the temptation which they afforded to fraud and crime, led to the enactment in England of the statute 19 Geo. II., c. 37, prohibiting wager policies, and this was followed by the enactment in this state of a similar statute (1 R. S. 632) prohibiting wagers; but to prevent the application of the statute to cases of insurance, by way of security and indemnity it was provided that it should "not be extended so as to prohibit nor in any way affect any insurances made in good faith for the security or indemnity of the party assured, and which are not otherwise prohibited by law": Sec. 10. It would seem, therefore, that whenever there is a real interest to protect, and a person is so situated with respect to the subject of insurance that its destruction would or might reasonably be expected to impair the value of that interest, an insurance on such interest would not be a wager within the statute, whether the interest was an ownership in or a right to the possession of the property, or simply an advantage of a pecuniary character, having a legal basis, but dependent upon the continued existence of the subject. It is well settled that a mere hope or expectation, which may be frustrated by the happening of some event, is not an insurable interest. The stockholder in a corporation has no legal title to the corporate assets or property, nor any equitable title which he can convert into a legal title. The corporation itself is the legal owner, and can deal with corporate property as owner, subject only to the restrictions of the charter: Plimpton v. Bigelow, 93 N. Y. 593; Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573. But stockholders in a corporation have equitable rights of a pecuniary nature growing out of their situation as stockholders, which may be prejudiced by the destruction of the corporate property. The object of business corporations is to make profits through the exercise of the corporate franchises and gains so made are distributable among the stockholders according to their respective interests, although the time of the division is ordinarily in the discretion of the managing body. It is this right to share in the profits which constitutes the inducement to become stockholders. So, also, on the