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to three or four citizens of Lansing then sitting near in the car, who would identify him, and offered to pay the expense of a telegram to the agent at Lansing to verify the sale of the ticket to him. The conductor told him he was acting under rules of the company, which required him to refuse tickets which were not stamped and dated by the agent in Chicago, as required by the conditions of the ticket, and that unless he paid his fare he would put him off.
Mr. Edwards denies that he offered to pay his fare if he was given a receipt, but says the conductor offered to give him a receipt if he would pay his fare. After they had got about twenty-five miles out, the conductor asked to see the ticket. Edwards handed it to him, and he put it in his pocket, and told him, “ When you pay your fare, I will give you your ticket and receipt.” At the same time he explained to him that if he would pay his fare, and take a receipt for it, when he got to Lansing, and presented the receipt and ticket to the agent, his money would be refunded, and that if he did not pay his fare he would be put off at Elkhart. He refused to pay, and was put off at Elkhart. His ticket was handed back to him before he was put off. He brings this action, in trespass on the case, to recover his damages for being forcibly ejected from the train. The trial judge held that he could not recover.
It is claimed by counsel for plaintiff that the condition requiring the ticket to be stamped at Chicago was an im. material condition, so long as the plaintiff had, to the certain knowledge of the conductor, taken passage at Chicago; that plaintiff was in a situation to, and offered to, identify himself as the proper person, - as the purchaser of the ticket; that the question of identity was, by the ticket itself, to be finally decided by the conductor; that the peculiar circumstances, including the terms of the ticket contract, distinguished this case froin all those cases in which the reasonableness of conditions in tickets, limiting the use of them, have been passed upon by the courts. These distinctions are pointed out by counsel for plaintiff, as follows: "1. But one question arose, or could possibly have arisen, concerning his right to ride upon the ticket. That question, addressed to the conductor, was: 'Is this man who presents this ticket to me the person who bought it and owns it, and is entitled to ride upon it?' 2. That taking the condition, or all the conditions, of this ticket together, they give to the conductor the right and power
to pass finally upon this question; to answer it for the company; to determine the fact; 3. This power or right, being one provided in the contract itself, and for the benefit of the company, and it imposing a duty and obligation upon the passenger which he must discharge, upon request, to the company, also imposes a duty upon the company, its officers and agents."
Unquestionably, parties capable of contracting may enter into such agreements as they choose; and if they rest upon a Bufficient consideration, and are not void for illegality, nor as being against public policy, they are binding upon them. The contract of carriage in this case, including the conditions, was & valid and binding agreement. The conditions were reasonable, and rested upon a sufficient consideration, namely, the reduced rate of fare. Ordinarily, a person going by rail from Lansing to Chicago would be required to purchase a ticket at the point of starting, and upon returning he would be required to purchase a ticket from the agent in Chicago, from that place to Lansing. Under the conditions of this ticket he is required to do no more than call upon the agent there to Becure his passage from Chicago to Lansing in accordance with the conditions. There is nothing unreasonable or annoying in this requirement. The trouble to the passenger is no more than would ordinarily occur, except the signing of his name, and, if required, to identify hinself, which he has received the consideration for in the reduced rate of fare. His contract with the company was, that it would transport him from Chicago to Lansing upon condition that he would prebent his ticket to the agent at Chicago, sign his name in compliance with the contract upon the back of the ticket, and have it dated and stamped upon the back by the ticket agent. This part of his contract he did not comply with. It was a condition precedent to his right to be carried from Chicago to Lansing upon that ticket. The unstamped ticket gave him no right to a return passage; and he absolutely refusing to pay his fare, there was no contract in force between the plaintiff and defendant company to carry him upon its cars. Under such circumstances, it had a right to eject him from its cars. The company had broken no contract, and was not in fault, but was ready to fulfill its contract according to its terms and conditions. This being so, it is difficult to see how its ejecting him from the cars, where he had no right to be, can be treated as a tort; it having used no more force than was necessary to accomplish the purpose. To hold it liable would be to hold it responsible to plaintiff for the consequences of his own neglect, and failure to comply with the contract upon his part. This would be neither reasonable nor just.
The distinctions which the plaintiff's counsel seek to make, above stated, are not warranted by the contract. The plaintiff's right to ride on that ticket from Chicago to Lansing did not depend upon his being the identical person who purchased the ticket, but upon his compliance with the condition precedent of having it stamped and dated, and signing his name. He is not entitled to ride upon it on his return, unless this condition is complied with; and no power or authority is given to the conductor to finally determine whether he bas a right to a passage upon that ticket, unless it is staroped, etc., in ao cordance with the contract. Neither could the conductor be called upon to enter upon an investigation of the identity of the plaintiff. This position is well answered by Mr. Justice Gray in the similar case of Mosher v. St. Louis etc. R. R. Co., 127 U. 8. 396. He says: “The conductor of the defendant's train, upon the plaintiff's presenting a ticket bearing no stamp of the agent at Hot Springs, had no authority to waive any condition of the contract, - to dispense with the want of such stamp, to inquire into the previous circumstances, or to permit him to travel on the train. It would be inconsistent alike with the express terms of the contract of the parties, and with the proper performance of the duties of the conductor in examining the tickets of other passengers, and in conducting his train with due regard to speed and safety, that he should undertake to determine, from oral statements of the passenger, or other evidence, facts alleged to have taken place before the beginning of the return trip, and as to which the contract on the face of the ticket made the stamp of the agent of the Hot Springs Railroad Company at Hot Springs the only and conclusive proof." See also the late case of Boylan v. Hot Springs R. R. Co., 132 U. S. 146. The authorities are uniform that, under a contract like the one in question here, there is no liability, either in tort or upon contract, where the plaintiff has failed to comply with the condition precedent stated above.
The judgment must be affirmed.
CARRIERS OP PASSENGERS — RULES AND REGULATIONS - TICKETS. – Rail. way companies, as commou carriers of passengers, have the right to adopt reasonable rules and regulations as to the tickets and methods of paying faro
by passengers, and to remove from their cars, in a propor manner and at a proper place, persons refusing to comply with such rules and regulations: McGowen v. Morgan's Louisiana etc. S. S. Co., 41 La. Ann. 732; 17 Am. Sto Rep. 415, and note; Reese v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 131 Pa. St. 422; 17 Am. 8t. Rep. 818, and note; compare Carsten v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co., 44 Minn. 454; 20 Am. St. Rep. 589.
ANTCLIFF V. JUNE.
[81 MICHIGAN, 477.) MALICIOUS PROSECUTION — JURISDICTION. - Where wrong and injury is
done by a malicious suit, it is immaterial, upon principle, whether or not the court had jurisdiction to entertain such suit, in order that a re.
covery may be had for the malicious prosecution. ACTIONS — SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT. — For every malicious wrong there
is a remedy, and under the prevailing liberal system of pleading, a plain and clear statement of the facts constituting the wrong is sufficient, and it is but little matter, in actions of trespass on the case, what the
action is named. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. IT IS NOT NECESSARY, IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN
action for the malicious prosecution of a civil suit, that the person should be molested or his property seized, if it appears that the suit was malicious, without probable cause, and that the party has been injured
or damaged thereby. PROCESS. — JUSTICE'S SOMMONS IN ACTIONS COMMENCED under a statuto
authorizing its servico in an adjoining county, when the demand sued on is principally for labor and services, must be directod to an officer of
that county, otherwise the judgment is void. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION – SOFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT. - A declaration
which fully sets out a conspiracy between tho defondants to defraud tho plaintiff, and the fact that he was defrauded out of his money paid upon a void judgmont obtained by them through fraud, olearly sets out an actionable wrong, and one that can be recovered for in an action apon
the case, no matter what it is named or called. ACTION FOR ABUSE OF PROCESS. — Where process is willfully made 180 of
for a purpose not justified by law, this is an abuse for which an action
will lie. PROCESS, ABUSE OF. – - OBTAINING A JUDGMENT BY FRAUD AND PERJURY,
not based upon any valid demand, and suing out execution upon such judgment knowing it to be false and fraudulent, and extorting money under sucb oxecution, is an abuse of process for which an action will lie. Action on the case for malicious prosecution and malicious abuse of process.
Hewett and Freeman, and Austin Blair, for the appellant Barkworth and Cobb, for the appellee Crowell.
MORSE, J. This record presents the story of a most outrageous and wicked fraud, committed upon the plaintiff by an abuse of the processes of the law, and one deserving of severe punishment. The chief defendant, J. Reid Crowell, is said to be an attorney at law, and resides at Brooklyn, Jackson County, in this state.
The story, briefly told, is this: The defendant Randy June pretended to have a claim of fifty dollars against the plaintiff, an old man over sixty years of age, and a farmer, living in the township of Manchester, Washtenaw County, which township adjoins the township of Norvell, in Jackson County, where June, a laborer, resided. In November, 1886, June put his claim in the hands of Crowell for collection. Crowell understood what the claim was for, told June it was collectible, and, as he (Crowell) testifies, was to bave all he collected over forty dollars. Without attempting to collect it without suit, Crowell went, January 3, 1887, to Joseph M. Griswold, a justice of the peace in the village of Brooklyn, Columbia township, Jackson County, and took out a summons in favor of June against Antcliff, who is the plaintiff in this suit. summons was made returnable January 11, 1887, and com. manded the constable to summon Antcliff, “if he shall be found in your county, to answer to June in a plea of trespass on the case upon promises, to his damages three hundred dollars or under."
This summons was directed to any constable of Jackson County, and was handed by Crowell to one Brenner, a deputy sheriff of Washtenaw County, to serve, he claiming that there was a new statute, under which Brenner could make service in Washtenaw County. Brenner returned the summons as pero sonally served upon Antcliff in the township of Manchester, January 4, 1887. The statute referred to is Howell's Statutes, bec. 7216 (act No. 246, Laws 1879, p. 249). Between the day of this service and the return day of the summons, Antcliff received an unsigned letter, stating that he had better not appear. The following is the letter:-
"BROOKLYN, February 3, 1887. “ MR. ANTCLIFF.
" Don't let Mr. Crowell or any one else fool you into coming into Jackson County. All they serve those kind of papers on you for is to get you into this county; then they will serve another kind of summons on you. Look out for them.”
In consequence of this communication, Antcliff did not appear. On the return day, June and Crowell were on hand. No one else was present except the justice. His docket shows