NOTICE.

See CHATTEL MORTGAGES, 5; CORPORATIONS, 29.

NOTARIES PUBLIC.

1. LIABILITY OF SURETY ON OFFICIAL BOND. - The law which specifies the conditions and obligations of an official bond furnished by a notary public in compliance therewith forms part of the bond, and must be strictly construed against the surety therein. Schmitt v. Drouet, 408.

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2. ID. The surety on the official bond of a notary public is liable only to such persons as have employed him, and who have suffered injury on account of his failure to perform a duty incumbent on him or required and authorized by law. Id.

3. ID.

Where a notary public does a thing which the law does not authorize him to do, although he does so eo nomine, in his capacity of a notary, the surety on his bond is not liable. Id.

4. ID. A notary public is not authorized by law, nor is it a duty incum. bent upon him, to write officially on any note, or utter any certificate, that a prolongation of payment of a debt has been allowed by an act before him; hence the surety on his official bond is not liable for such act, even if such certificate is shown to be false. Id.

NUISANCES.

1. HIGH FENCE ERECTED FOR SPITE, and with malice, and with no other purpose than to shut out the light and air from a neighbor's window, is a nuisance. Flaherty v. Moran, 510.

2. CONTINUING LIABILITY FOR. -The building and maintaining of a railway in such a manner as to bring together natural streams of water so as to discharge them through a culvert, at a place different from that of the natural discharge of any of them, whereby their waters are com. bined and thrown upon the lands of a private proprietor, creates a continuing nuisance, and if the owner of the lands at the time the railway was built subsequently conveys them, his grantee is entitled to maintain an action for damages suffered after his conveyance was executed, by the overflow of water and the depositing of sand on such land. Wells v. New Haven etc. Co., 423.

3. PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT TO MAINTAIN. If an act is wrong at the outset, its continuance cannot become rightful, and if its continuance will occasion damages varying in quantity with the seasons, it is a continuing nuisance and an invasion of plaintiff's right from day to day, and he may select his own time for bringing an action therefor, and is not barred by the lapse of six years from the erection of the structure constituting the nuisance, though it is of a permanent character. Id.

4. PARTIES MAINTAINING NUISANCE JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE FOR DAMAGES RESULTING THEREFROM WHEN. Persons who by their sev eral acts or omissions maintain a public or common nuisance are jointly and severally liable for such damages as are the direct, immediate, and probable consequence of it. Where, therefore, three several owners of adjoining lots on a city street permit a brick wall extending along the fronts of their several lots to remain in a leaning, unsafe, and dangerous condition, after the buildings of which they were a part had been burned down, and such wall falls upon and kills a person who was lawfully standing on the sidewalk adjacent thereto, all of said owners are jointly

and severally liable, although no part of the wall of one of them touched him. Simmons v. Everson, 676.

See EASEMENTS, 1; MUNICIPAL Corporations, 8, 9.

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NUNC PRO TUNC ENTRY.

See PROCESS, 5.

OFFICE AND OFFICER.

1. TRIAL OF TITLE TO OFFICE. - Title to office cannot be tried in an action of replevin for property belonging to the office. Hallgren v. Campbell, 557. 2. REMOVAL. Where an officer is appointed for a fixed term, and the power of removal is not expressly declared by law to be discretionary, he cannot be removed except for cause; and when cause must be assigned for his removal, he is entitled to notice and a chance to defend. Id.

3. REMOVAL - PRESUMPTION.

- A statutory provision that elective officers shall not be removed except for cause does not raise a presumption of intention that appointed officers may be removed without cause. Id. 4 REMOVAL PRESUMPTION. The legislature may, by express words, confer upon the common council of a city the power to remove an officer without cause; but in the absence of such power given in express words, the presumption is, that the legislature intended that every officer appointed for a fixed term should be entitled to hold his office until the expiration of such term, unless removed therefrom for cause after a fair trial. Id.

5. REMOVAL OFFICER DE FACTO. One who has lawfully been in office. and has been recognized as the officer de facto, and not lawfully removed, indicates his claim to hold the office by his refusal to deliver up the property, books, and papers belonging thereto; and if he has never yielded, but has continued to act, then a subsequent appointee to the office, who has never had possession, cannot be regarded as an officer de facto. Id.

See QUO WARRANTO,

OFFICIAL BONDS.

See NOTARIES PUBLIC, 1-4.

ORDINANCES.

See CRIMINAL Law, 14, 15; MuNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 6–11.

PARENT AND CHILD.
See EVIDENCE, 13.

PAROL EVIDENCE.

See EVIDENCE, 9-15; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 9; JUDGMENTS, 17; PARTNER

SHIP, 2.

PARTIES.

See EJECTMENT, 1.

PARTITION.

1. PARTITION MAY BE MADE SO AS TO PROTECT those who may be benefited incidentally, as, for instance, grantees in severalty of some of the co

tenants, where they can be protected without prejudicing the rights of other tenants in common. Barnes v. Lynch, 470.

2. SEPARATE SUITS OF PARTITION OF FOUR SEPARATE PARCELS OF LAND SIT

UATE IN THE SAME COUNTY will not be allowed, though one of the cotenants, claiming to own the land in severalty, has conveyed three different parcels of it to as many different persons. Id.

3. PARTITION of a Part of the Common LANDS, ALL OF WHICH ARE SITU. ATE IN THE SAME COUNTY, cannot be enforced except by the consent of all the co-tenants; and though one parcel of such land may have been conveyed by one of the co-tenants purporting to convey it in severalty, his grantee is entitled to insist that no partition be made except of all the lands of the co-tenancy. Such partition is of advantage to him, because it may result in the setting off to his grantor of the part so conveyed in severalty, and the operation of the conveyance, by way of estoppel, so as to give a perfect title to the grantee. Id.

4. REVERSAL OF A JUDGMENT IN PARTITION, so far as it affects plaintiff's right to have partition of certain designated tracts of land, though it is affirmed in all other respects, vacates the whole judgment as to those tracts, and as to them releases all the parties to the action from the operation thereof. Reinhart v. Lugo, 52.

PARTNERSHIP.

1. EVIDENCE, WHEN INADMISSIBLE TO SHOW PROPERTY TO BE FIRM ASSETS. As against purchasers and lien creditors dealing with the owners of land on the faith of a recorded title, and without notice that it is dif ferent from what it appears of record, parol evidence is inadmissible to show that although the land was conveyed to the grantees as individuals, yet it was held by them as partnership property. Collner v. Greig, 899. 2. LAND, WHEN REGARDED AS FIRM ASSETS. As between partners, land treated by them as partnership property, especially if purchased and paid for with partnership money, is regarded as firm assets, notwithstanding it was conveyed to the grantees as tenants in common. Whether it is partnership realty is a question of intention, which may be manifested by acts and declarations, and established by parol evidence. Id.

3. PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY - INTEREST ACQUIRED BY FIRST PURCHASER. A conveyance by one partner, with the consent of the others, of all his interest in the firm and its assets, to a third party, vests in the purchaser all the retiring partner's interest in the firm assets, including its real estate; and if such retiring partner afterwards conveys his interest in the firm real estate to another, without consideration, the second purchaser acquires no higher right than his grantor had, and no interest which he can enforce in ejectment against the first purchaser. Id. 4. DEATH OF PARTNER PUTS AN END TO THE COPARTNERSHIP, and the surviving partner has no authority to carry on for the future a partnership trade or business, or to engage in new transactions, contracts, or liabilities on account thereof. Durant v. Pierson, 686.

5. SURVIVING PARTNER IS ENTITLED to the possession and control of the joint property for the purpose of closing its business, and to that end may administer the affairs of the firm, and by sale, mortgage, or other reasonable disposition of the property make provision for meeting its obligations. He may, for that purpose, borrow money, and give a valid pledge of copartnership property for its repayment. Id.

6. SURVIVING PARTNER'S POWER TO BORROW MONEY TO PAY DEBTS of CoPARTNERSHIP. —A surviving partner may in good faith borrow money for the express purpose of paying the debts of his firm, and where a person in good faith loans money to a surviving partner, and the money is faithfully applied by such partner in satisfaction of the liabilities of the firm, the claim becomes one which in equity should be paid out of the assets of the firm, and equity will recognize the right of the surviving partner to have the money so borrowed and applied by him repaid out of the assets of the firm, and an assignment by him for the benefit of creditors which so directs is not fraudulent. Id.

PATENTS (FOR INVENTIONS).

PATENT MEDICINES. THERE CAN BE NO EXCLUSIVE RIGHT to the use of formulas for the manufacture of medicines, though there may be a right to prevent any one from obtaining or using them through breach of trust or of contract. Any one who honestly gets a knowledge of such formu. las has the right to make and sell medicines therefrom, and to publish to the public that they are made according to such formulas. Chadwick v. Covell, 442.

See TRADE-MARKS.

PAYMENT.

See BANKS AND BANKING, 1-7.

PERSONAL PROPERTY.

BODIES OF THE DEAD BELONG TO THE SURVIVING RELATIVES, in the order of inheritance, like other property, and such relatives, and not the executor or administrator, have the right to the custody and burial thereof. Renihan v. Wright, 249.

PERPETUITIES.

See WILLS, 15-17.

PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS.

See DENTISTRY.

PLEA IN ABATEMENT.

See ABATEMENT, 2.

PLEADING.

1. PLEA OF SATISFACTION INSUFFICIENT WHEN.- Where the complaint in an action alleges that the plaintiffs employed the defendants to take care of and safely keep in a secure vault the body of their deceased daughter until they should be prepared to inter the same; that the defendants did not safely keep said remains, but carelessly and negligently took or allowed the same to be taken and buried, or otherwise disposed: of, and wrongfully refused to inform the plaintiffs where said remains had been removed to, - an answer alleging that the defendants, by mistake, had shipped the body to some point of interment not remembered by them at the time the plaintiffs demanded the body; that they so notified the plaintiffs, and promised them to immediately find and return the

body; that the plaintiffs expressed themselves as satisfied with this ar rangement; that shortly afterwards the defendants returned the body, which was taken and interred by the plaintiffs; and that the return of the corpse was taken and received by the plaintiffs in full and perfect satisfaction of all wrongs and injuries incident to the mistake made by the defendants-is bad, because it makes no averment that the plaintiffs agreed with the defendants that they would accept such return in satisfaction of the cause of action alleged in the complaint. The averment at the close of the answer, that the return was so received and accepted, is a statement of a mere conclusion, not warranted by any premises preceding it. Renihan v. Wright, 249.

2. ADMISSION BY PLEA AS EVIDENCE.

A plea bearing on the main issue in the case, and containing an admission by defendant calculated to damage his case, has the effect of making such admission evidence against him upou the trial of any other plea in the same case. Howard v. Glenn, 156.

3. ADMISSION BY PLEA, WHEN ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE. In an action by the creditors of a corporation to recover from a stockholder therein the amount of his unpaid stock subscription, the main issue being whether or not he was a subscriber, and one of his pleas admitting that he did subscribe to the stock of a corporation proved to be the same as that in the name of which suit is brought, such admission can be used as evidence against him in the trial of the other pleas. Id.

See ACTIONS, 1, 3; FRAUD; LIBEL AND SLANDER, 30; LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS, 3; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 1; STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

POWER OF ATTORNEY.

See ASSIGNMENT, 5; JUDGMENTS, 14.

PRESCRIPTION.

See NUISANCES, 3.

PRESUMPTIONS.

See ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT, 3; BANKS AND BANKING, 1; CARRIERS, 2; CRIMINAL LAW, 5, 22; HOMESTEAD, 3; JUDGMENTS, 20; NEGLIGENCE, 5; OFFICE AND OFFICERS, 3, 4; SALE, 6, 15; TELEGRAPH COMPANIES, 2; WILLS, 3-5.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
See AGENCY.

PRIORITIES.

See MORTGAGES, 2, 3.

PROCESS.

1. RETURN OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS signed by a person without adding any official title or designation, and not sworn to, is a nullity, and cannot be validated by proving that he was in fact a deputy sheriff. Reinhart v. Lugo, 52.

2. JUSTICE'S SUMMONS IN ACTIONS COMMENCED under a statute authorizing its service in an adjoining county, when the demand sued on is principally for labor and services, must be directed to an officer of that county, otherwise the judgment is void. Antcliff v. June, 533.