with instructions to ascertain if the check was granted by the court is precisely what is claimed good, and to say that it was presented by a by counsel here as to the effect of such verbal stranger. Snarrenberger presented it to Mr. statement, as will be seen at once by its inspecSanford, the proper officer of the bank, who, tion. It is as follows: "A verbal certification after examining the check and the state of Stall of a check is equally valid with a written cer& Meyer's account, said, "It is good,' or "It is tification, and constitutes a contract obligatory all right; send it through the clearing-house." on the party giving the certification, the conThere is a slight disagreement between Snar-sideration of which is the property parted with renberger and Sanford as to the precise words by the party receiving the certification, on the used, but we do not deem the difference of faith of the certification." The plaintiff in erany importance. But there is difference in ror, against whom the jury rendered their ver616*] *another point between these two, which dict, notwithstanding the instruction thus with the jury might have had some weight. given, must be held to have had the benefit of Snarrenberger testifies that he told Sanford the principle thus asserted with the jury, that the check was offered to his house by a whether the court was right in giving it or not. stranger, which Sanford denies; and Sanford says that he told Snarrenberger that if the check was offered by a stranger he would advise them to have nothing to do with him; that he would be careful and not pay so large a check to a stranger, no matter how good looking he was. On the return of Snarrenberger, Espy, Hei delbach, & Co. delivered the bonds and gold to the stranger and received the check in payment, and in the language of the record "the stranger went his way and was heard of no more." Espy Heidelbach, & Co. indorsed the check, and it was paid, as stated already, through the clearing-house. In a suit brought by the bank to recover the money it had a judgment, to reverse which this suit is brought. The defendants excepted to the admission of certain testimony given by the plaintiffs on the trial for the purpose of proving that the words "all right," "it is good," when used in reference to a check presented at the bank on which it is drawn, had, by the custom and usages of the bankers of Cincinnati, acquired a limited and well understood meaning, namely: that it had reference exclusively to the genuineness of the drawer's signature and to the state of his account at the bank. The objections made to this evidence were, that in its nature it was inadmissible; that the person testifying showed his want of knowledge on the subject, and that the expressions "all right" and "it is good" were not the precise expressions used. But we need not inquire whether the court was right in admitting this testimony, because in the subsequent progress of the trial it became immaterial. The court refused to charge the jury as requested by the plaintiff's in their fifth and sixth prayers, that if there was such an understanding among bankers as to the use of the terms mentioned, it limited the responsibility of the bank to these two matters; and in the charge of the court, of its own motion, it placed the case beyond the influence of such testimony, by instructing the jury that as matter of law such was 617*] *the effect of the words supposed, when used under the circumstances suggested by the interrogations of plaintiff's counsel in regard to the understanding of them among bankers. We are relieved, also, by an attentive consideration of the instructions given by the court, from another very grave question much discussed by counsel in this court, that is, whether a verbal statement by the proper officer to certify checks that the one presented is good, is, or is not, the equivalent of a written certification of the check in the usual manner. For the fourth instruction asked by the defendants and The plaintiffs on the trial below prayed ten distinct instructions to the jury, all of which were granted except the fifth and sixth, which we have considered. The defendants prayed eight instructions, all of which were refused or modified except the fourth, to which attention has just been called. Upon all these rulings of the court as well as upon the charge of the court of its own motion, errors are assigned. But we are of opinion that the whole case turns upon the latter charge of the court. This consisted of four distinct propositions: 1. That if defendants below sent the check to the bank for the purpose of having the latter pass upon the genuineness of the signature and the state of the account of the drawer, the statement that it was good, or all right, would *estop them from denying that the sig- [*618 nature was genuine, and there were funds to meet it. 2. If defendants sent the check for the purpose of testing the genuineness of the signature of the drawers, the state of their account, and to test its genuineness in all other respects, and plaintiff, knowing the full extent of the object for which it was sent, replied, "It is good," or "It is all right," plaintiff is estopped to set up that the check was raised. 3. That if the defendants had no suspicion that the check was raised, and sent it to plaintiff's for examination without specifying the particulars to which they wished the examination directed, the plaintiffs had a right to presume that it was desired in relation to such points as the law presumed them to have knowledge, namely: the genuineness of the drawer's signature and the state of his account, and if they answered in good faith and had no means other than those of defendants of knowing that the check was raised, they were not estopped from setting up that fact. 4. That if the parties were mutually ignorant and unsuspicious concerning the check being raised the law did not impose upon plaintiffs, more than the defendants, the duty of calling on the drawers for information on that subject. The plaintiffs in error, defendants below, can have no cause to complain of the first and second proposition laid down by the court below. If the bank officers had their attention turned to the matter of the raising of the check, or even had notice that in applying to them for information the parties presenting it did so for the purpose of getting information which would include that subject, they could have limited their general statement that it was good so as to exclude its application to that point, or might have declined answering altogether, If, with this notice, says the court, they gave a general | latter proposition. Boyce v. Edwards, 4 Pet. We think it is equally clear on principle that there was no error in the fourth proposition of the court. Undoubtedly, where there exists a suspicion that the check has been altered in the amount, or in the name of the payee, the proper party to be inquired of is the maker of the check. He and he alone has the means of settling that question conclusively. The bank, as a general rule, can know this no better than the party to whom it is presented for negotiation. It is the latter who first parts with his money or property on the faith of the check, and he is as much bound to diligent inquiry on that question as the bank. The latter is held by the law to know the drawer's signature and the state of his account. He is no more bound to know or to answer beyond these two matters than the party who presents it for information. So if there be no suspicion of the fraud in raising the check, the parties are equally innocent, and no question of the relative degree of diligence in making inquiry on that subject arises between them. This is certainly true unless the bank, if it consents to give any information at all about the validity of the check, is bound to answer as to everything which may affect its validity. As this contention is the turning point of the case and is the one which is responded to in the third of the propositions laid down by the court, we turn now to consider that. This assumes that neither party had any suspicion that the check was raised, and that no special reference was made to that point in the inquiry of the defendants below. It is also to be considered that the bank was not asked to certify it in the usual way by indorsing it as good, and that the party who asked information was the one whose name was in the check as payee. We do not propose to decide here what would have been the legal effect in the present case if the bank officer had, under precisely these cir620*] cumstances, *been requested to indorse the check as good, and had done so, affixing his name or his initials in the ordinary way. The strong argument of the plaintiff in error is that such an indorsement would bind the bank for the entire validity of the check, and that what was said verbally by Sanford was the legal equivalent of such an indorsement. If this latter point were conceded, no case precisely in point has been produced where this would be held to bind the bank under the circumstances of the present case. The authorities relied on are mainly acceptances of drafts or bills of exchange; and it is the came class of cases that are relied on to show that a verbal acceptance, or promise to accept, is equivalent to a written acceptance. The highest courts in this country and England have regretted the decisions which gave original sanction to this Bank checks are not bills of exchange, and though the rules applicable to each are in many respects the same, they differ in important particulars. Merchants' Bk. v. State Bk. 10 Wall. 647, 19 L. ed. 1019. Among these particulars is that a check is drawn against funds on deposit with the banker, and the indorsement that it is good implies that when the indorsement is made there were funds there to pay it. A bill of exchange is not drawn on such deposits necessarily, and its acceptance raises no implication that the drawer has such funds to meet it. It is a new promise by the acceptor to pay, funds or no funds. In both cases the bank is supposed to know the signature of its correspondent, and cannot, after indorsing it as good or accepted, dispute the signature. But as one of the main elements of utility in a bill of exchange is, that it shall circulate freely, and it may thus pass through many hands on the faith of the acceptor's signature, it may possibly be that he should be responsible for the promise contained in it, as it came from his hands, for it was drawn on no special fund, and the possession of such fund by him does not affect his liability. By such acceptance he becomes primarily liable, as if he were the maker [*621 of a promissory note. How far these reasons should be applied to a certification that a check was good seems extremely doubtful, both on principle and authority. Where the object is to use the indorsement to put the check in circulation, or raise money on it, or use it as money, and this object is known to the certifying bank, it may be argued with some force that the bank should, as in the case of an acceptance of a bill of exchange, be held responsible for the validity of the check as it came from the hands of the certifying bank. Such a rule would seem to be just when checks are certified, as we know they aften are, without reference to the presence of funds by the drawer, and when the well known purpose is to give the drawer a credit by enabling him to use the check as money by putting it in circulation. But such a verbal statement as was made in the present case cannot come within that principle. There was no design or intent on the part of the bank to assume a responsibility beyond the funds of the drawer in their hands, nor to enable the payee of the check to put it into circulation. Nothing was said or done by the bank officer which could be transferred with the check as part of it to an innocent taker of it from the payee. Such subsequent taker would have no right to rely on what was said by the bank officers, any further than the payee would. We are of opinion that the court was entirely right in treating the case as one in which information was sought and obtained by Espy, Heidelbach, & Co. for their own use, and to govern their own action. For such information as the bank was willing to give, and did give, it was no doubt responsible, because it had reason to believe that the other party would act upon it. But only to this extent and only on this principle is it liable. It is not liable as for accepting or indorsing a draft or check with intent that it might go upon the market for general use and ANN negotiation with the credit of its name attached | proceedings in relation to the property in question here between these parties, see McVeigh v. U. S. 78 U. S. 266, 20 L. ed. 81. After vari ous proceedings the case came to trial, and there was a verdict and a judgment for the plaintiff McVeigh. A writ of possession was ordered, but with a stay of sixty days, to enable the defendant to take an appeal. The defendants filed a bond and removed the case to the supreme court of appeals of the state. That court, Apr. 23, 1873, delivered the following judgment: "This day came again the parties, by their counsel, and the court having maturely considered the transcript of record of judg ment aforesaid and the arguments of counsel, is of opinion, for reasons stated in writing and filed with the record, that there is no error in the said judgment; therefore it is considered that the same be affirmed, and that the defendant in error recover against the plaintiffs in error, damages according to law, and his costs by him about his defense in this behalf expended. Which is ordered to be certified to the said corporation court of the said city of Alexandria." to the paper, just as it was placed on the market. Under these circumstances, we are of opinion that the circuit court was right in holding that in the absence of *anything tending to [*622 direct his attention to other matters, the bank officer had a right to suppose that information was desired of him only in regard to the signature of the drawers and the state of their account. These were material facts to be known, which both common sense and commercial law presumed to be within his knowledge. The answer he gave: that the check was good or was all right, must be supposed to be responsive only to these two points. The genuineness of the payee's name and of the sum filled in the body of the check were as well known and as easily ascertainable by the payees themselves as by the bank officer, and unless the inquiry was so framed as to call his attention to these points, he had no reason to suppose, in the nature of the transaction, that he was expected to give information in regard to them. So the response of "good" should not on sound principle be held to extend to them. He was under no moral or legal obligation to give an opinion on these points. He had no reason to suppose that he was asked for such an opinion, and because he did give an opinion that the check was good in the only points of which he knew anything, it would be illogical to hold the bank liable on the ground that the response meant good absolutely and for all purposes. The court told the jury very clearly that if the bank officer had any reason to believe that the defendants were seeking information in regard to the general validity of the check, or if they had been asked any question which related to the genuineness of the check as to amount or the names of the payees, his statement that it was all right would bind the bank. This was as far as the court ought to have gone in that direction, for they were not bound to answer such a question, nor, as we have already said, does the law or the nature of the business imply that they had any superior information on these points to that which the defendants had. The case was certainly very fairly put before the jury, so far as the rights of plaintiffs in error are concerned, if the views here advanced are sound, and the judgment must be affirmed. An entry appears in the records of the clerk's office: "The foregoing was received and entered." The present writ of error was directed "To the Honorable the Judge of the corporation court of the city of Alexandria." Messrs. P. Phillips, C. Cushing, and C. W. Wattles, for defendant in error: The first ground for dismissal is, that the writ of error is directed to the corporation court, instead of the court of appeals. The judgment was, in all things, affirmed in the court of appeals. There was nothing to be done in the corporation court, but to record this judgment and issue execution. No new judgment was entered by the corporation court. The certificate of the clerk states that the judgment of the court of appeals was received and recorded May 5, 1873. The only judgment of the corporation court, as shown by the record, is that rendered Oct. 25, 1872. The party is now claiming the benefit of a supersedeas, by reason of his having lodged his writ within ten days from the clerk's record of the judgment of the appellate court, although that judgment was rendered Apr. 23, 1873. The record of the corporation court was removed into the court of appeals, where it still JOHN C. UNDERWOOD and Erasmus D. remains, with the judgment of affirmance. The Foree, Plffs. in Err., V. WILLIAM N. McVEIGH. Writ of error to state court-how directed. Where a judgment of an inferior state court was affirmed in the court of appeals of the state, and upon such affirmance judgment was given in the the plaintiff in error his damages and costs, and such judgment was entered in the former court, the writ of error from this court must be directed to such court of appeals, and not to the inferior state court, and if directed to the inferior state court the writ of error will be dismissed. latter court that the defendant in error recover of [No. 504.] Submitted Mar. 16, 1874. Decided Mar. 23, 1874. andria County, State of Virginia. This was an action of trespass and ejectment, commenced by McVeigh in the corporation court of Alexandria, Va. (As to certain other latter court merely directed that this judgment should "be certified to the said corporation court of Alexandria." The plaintiffs in the present writ ignore wholly the judgment of the higher court, whose jurisdiction they invoke, and address themselves to the judgment of the lower court from which they appealed. The judgment of the court of appeals was a final judgment, for it settled all the matter in controversy between the parties. Richmond R. Co. v. Louisa R. Co. 13 How. 71; Paul y. Va. 8 Wall. 168, 19 L. ed. 357; Bennett v. Hunter, 9 Wall. 327, 19 L. ed. 672; Bigelow v. Forrest, 9 Wall. 339, 19 L. ed. 696; Corbett Y. Nutt, 10 Wall 465, 19 1. ed. 976; Knox v. Bk. 12 Wall. 379, 20 L. ed. 414. Mr. S. Ferguson Beach, for plaintiffs in error: The proceedings in the present case reached no finality, within the meaning of the 25th section of the judiciary act, until the decision of the court of appeals was entered in the corporation court, as the judgment of that court. Until then there had been no judgment on which an execution could issue. Green v. Van Buskirk, 3 Wall. 448, 18 L. ed. 245; McGuire v. Com. 3 Wall. 382, 18 L. ed. 164; Getston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246. Any other practice than this, indeed, would render the 25th section of the judiciary act practically unavailing in Virginia, in all cases where the plaintiff in error should desire to have his writ operate as a supersedeas. In the case at bar, the plaintiff's desired their writ so to operate, and they executed the required bond for the purpose. That it might so operate, it was important to have the writ directed to the proper court, and lodged in the proper clerk's office. Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court: The writ of error taken in this cause is dismissed, because it should have been directed to the court of appeals instead of the judge of the corporation court of Alexandria. Mr. Justice Clifford, dissenting: Jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court, in certain cases, to re-examine and reverse or affirm, upon a writ of error, the final judgment or decree rendered in the highest court of law or equity of a state, in which a decision in the suit could be had, in the courts of the state. a commission by which the judges of one court Cohens v. Va. 6 Wheat. 410; Suydam v. Such jurisdiction arises only in the cases spec- Courts of various grades existed in the several states at the time the judiciary act was passed, and their power and jurisdiction at that time, as well as at the present time, were and are regulated by statute and, of course, were, as they now are, subject to constant change. Many changes, doubtless, have since been made, but all experience has proved that it would have been unwise to have prescribed to what tribunal the writ of error in such a case should be directed, as that is a matter which can best be determined by the court empowered to issue the writ, the object being that it should be directed to such a tribunal as can execute its commands. Cases of the kind consist of several classes, all of which are plainly described in the 25th section of the judiciary act, which also points out, in terms equally plain, the respective conditions annexed to the exercise of right; as, for example, the decision of the state court, in one class of the cases, must be against the validity Appellate power, in some form, is exercised of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exer- by courts in all the states, but the forms and cised under, the United States; and in another modes of proceeding vary from time to time, class the decision of the state court must be in and it is not probable that they are at the presfavor of the validity of a statute of, or an au-ent time precisely alike in any two states. thority exercised under, a state in the respect therein specified; and in a third class the decision of the state court must be against the title, right, privilege or exemption specially set up or claimed, as therein described, by the parties suing out the writ of error. Congress undoubtedly intended by that provision to give the party aggrieved in such a case a right to remove the cause into this court for re-examination, but whatever the grievance may be, the remedy, if any, gives no other; nor does the power to re-examine and reverse or affirm extend to any proceeding, except a final judgment or decree of the highest court of law or equity of a state in which a decision of the suit could be had. 1 Stat. at L. 85. No other process can be employed except that given by the act of Congress; but the act of Congress does not describe the tribunal to which the writ of error shall be directed, from which the clear inference is that Congress intended that it should be directed to the tribunal, or, if more than one, to some one of the tribunals, which can execute the commands of the writ, as it would be an idle ceremony to direct it to a tribunal which could not execute its commands. Common law writers define a writ of error as Where the appellate court requires the whole record to be sent up and executes its own judgments, it may well be held that the writ of error should be directed to that tribunal, as no other can obey the commands of the writ, and send the record, which is the subject of complaint, into the appellate court for re-examination. But where only a part of the record is sent to the appellate court, or where, whatever is sent up, whether the whole or a part, the transcript is immediately returned to the subordinate court, together with the judgment of the appellate court, for record, it is equally plain that the writ of error from this court should be directed to the subordinate court, as the only tribunal which can execute the commands of the writ. Cases arise also where the law of the state requires a full transcript to be sent up to the appellate court, and makes it the duty of all that court, not only to record its own judgment, but also that it shall send down the same to the subordinate court to be there recorded, in which case there is a complete record in both courts, and in such cases the practice is well settled that the writ of error may be directed to either court, as it is clear NNY Since the law requires a thing to be done, says Story, J., and gives the writ of error as the means by which it is to be done, without prescribing, in that particular, the manner in which the writ is to be used, it appears to the court to be perfectly clear that the writ must be so used as to effect the object. It may then be directed, as the learned judge said, to either court in which the record and judgment on which it is to act may be found. that either court is competent to execute the | such highest court may have exercised a revicommands of the writ of error. sory jurisdiction over points in the case, and may have certified its decision to the court below. McGuire v. Com. 3 Wall. 382, 18 L. ed. 164. Direct adjudication to the same effect was also made by this court in the case of Green v. Van Buskirk, 3 Wall. 450, 18 L. ed. 245, in which also, as well as the preceding case, the opinion was given by the late Chief Justice, with the concurrence of all the Associate Justices of the court. By that case it is expressly determined that, when the highest court of a state renders a final judgment in such a case, and sends the judgment with the record to the court below for execution, the writ of error may be directed to the subordinate court; and the Chief Justice went farther in that case, and decided that a judgment cannot be regarded as final, in the sense of the act of Congress, until it is entered in a court from which execution can issue. Unquestionably the judgment to be examined must be that of the highest court of the state having cognizance of the case; but the record of that judgment may be brought from any court in which it may be legally deposited, and in which it may be found by the writ. Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 304. In that case it was directed to the court of errors, which, having parted with the record by remitting it, could not execute it. Without the direction having been changed, it was then presented to the supreme court of the state, but, being directed to the court of errors, it could not be regularly executed by the supreme court. Since those decisions were made and have become known to the legal profession, the examples where the writ of error has been directed to the subordinate court have very much increased in number, as will appear from the following citations, to which many more might be added. Beyond doubt a new writ of error would have been required, had not the parties consented to Butler v. Horwitz, 7 Wall. 258, 19 L. ed. 149; waive all objection and to consider the record | Aldrich v. Etna Ins. Co. 8 Wall. 493, 19 L. ed. as properly here, if in the opinion of this court, 473; Downham v. Alexandria, 9 Wall. 660, 19 the record could be properly brought up by L. ed. 808; Downham v. Alexandria Council, 10 writ of error directed to the supreme court of Wall. 173, 19 L. ed. 829; Ins. Co. v. Treasurer, the state, which, in that case, was a court sub-11 Wall. 206, 20 L. ed. 112; R. Co. v. People, 12 ordinate to the court of errors; and this court having decided that question in the affirmative, the case was heard here under that arrangement. Exactly the same rule was promulgated by this court in the case of Webster v. Reid, 11 How. 457, the unanimous opinion of this court being given by Mr. Justice McLean, in which he says, the writ of error in such a case may be directed to any court in which the record and judgment on which it is to act may be found, and if the record has been remitted by the highest court to another court of the state, it may be brought up by the writ of error from the subordinate court. Examples where the writ of error has been directed to the subordinate court to which the record has been remitted are very numerous, and are sufficient to show that the rule laid down by Mr. Justice Story in the leading case of Gelston v. Hoyt, has always been regarded as the true rule of practice in such cases. State v. Dibble, 21 How. 366, 16 L. ed. 149; Almy v. Cal. 24 How. 169, 16 L. ed. 644; Far ney v. Towle, 1 Black, 350, 17 L. ed. 216; Hoyt v. Sheldon, 1 Black, 518, 17 L. ed. 65; Sherman v. Smith, 1 Black, 587, 17 L. ed. 163; Cohens v. Va. 6 Wheat. 265; Buell v. Van Ness, 8 Wheat. 321; Hunt v. Palao, 4 How. 589; U. S. v. Booth, 18 How. 476, 15 L. ed. 464. Nor is it necessary to rely merely upon examples, as the point has been directly adjudicated by this court in a more recent case, where it was decided that a writ of error from this court is properly directed to the court in which the final judgment is rendered, and by whose process it must be executed, and in which the record remains, although such court may not be the highest court of the state, and although Wall. 384, 20 L. ed. 412; Miller v. State, ante, 98; Bank v. Rochester, ante, 117; Crapo v. Kelly, ante, 430; Miltenberger v. Cooke, ante, 864, and Ins. Co. v. Dunn, 86 U. S. 22 L. ed., both decided at the present term. Three grades of courts are established by the laws of Virginia, of which the court of appeals is the highest, and from which writs of error may issue to the next highest grade, which are denominated circuit and corporation courts, and from which writs of error may issue to the lower grade, called county courts. Writs of error may issue from the court of appeals to the corporation courts, upon the application of an aggrieved party. Regularly, such a party should apply to the court which rendered the judgment, that the execution of the same may be suspended, as in that event it is the duty of the court to grant such a suspension for a reasonable time, in order that the applicant may apply to the court of appeals for a writ of error. He then presents to the latter court a transcript of the record, or of such portion of it as may be necessary to present fully to the appellate court the point or points involved in his complaint, accompanied by a petition for the writ, and an assignment of ment is suspended until the questions involved errors. If the writ of error is allowed, the judgare decided in the court of appeals. Due hearing is had and the court of appeals, if the proceedings are regular, decides the question involved, and affirms or reverses the judgment below, and certifies their decision to the subordinate court, and by the law of the state, the decision of the court of appeals is then required to be entered by the subordinate court as its own, and the provision is that "execution may |