should order the survey and plat to be returned into court for examination and adjudication; that when thus returned notice should be given by public advertisement, or in some other form prescribed by rule, to all parties interested, that objection had been made to the survey and location, and admonishing them to intervene for the protection of their interests; that such parties having intervened, might take testimony and contest the survey and location; and that on hearing the allegations and proofs, the court should render its judgment approving the survey, if found to be accurate, and correcting it or ordering a new survey when found to be erroneous. The act also provided for an ap peal from the decree of the district court to the Supreme Court. By the proceedings thus authorized, the approval of the survey brought before the court had, as against claimants under floating grants, the force and conclusiveness of a judicial determination in a suit in rem, and all such claimants were concluded by it. The survey of the claim under the Flugge grant was, under the act in question, brought 269*] before the district court and there subjected to judicial examination, and finally received the approval of the court. If the defendants or those under whom they hold failed to appear and contest the survey, they cannot now be heard in this action to question its correctness. Rodriguez v. U. S. 1 Wall. 591, 17 L. ed. 692. The objection to the authority of the court to pass upon the survey, because ordered into court before the act of June 14, 1860, is untenable. The act in terms applies to surveys which have been previously returned into court and in relation to which proceedings were then pending, as well as to surveys subsequently made. U. S. v. Halleck, 1 Wall. 453, 17 L. ed. 667. Nor does it matter that a different survey had been previously approved by the surveyor general of California. The whole subject of surveys is under the control of Congress, and until the patent issues thereon, any survey may be set aside and a new one ordered by its authority. The statute also after such conàrmation. *declared that by final confirmation was [*270 meant the patent of the United States, or the final determination of the official survey of the land under the act of Congress of June 14, 1860. The provision of the statute relating to actions where the property is claimed under title derived from Spanish or Mexican authorities, has since then been repealed; but before the repeal, and within the time designated after final confirmation of the grant, the present action was commenced. The repeal could not, however, have any effect upon the rights of the plaintiff. Whilst proceedings were pending before the tribunals of the United States for the confirmation of the claim under the Flugge grant, the statute did not run and could not run against the right of the claimant to the land in controversy. He was obliged, by the legislation of Congress, to present his claim for investigation and determination, under pain of being held to have abandoned it, and was subjected to numerous and expensive proceedings to establish its validity. As a result of the proceedings required, the government, in effect, promised, in case his claim was found to be valid, to give him, in its patent, such evidence of title as would secure to him the possession and enjoy ment of his land. The legislation of Congress imposing this burden upon the claimant and promising this benefit to him, is not the subject of any constitutional objection, and it is not, therefore, within the power of the legislature of a state to defeat its operation. It was adopted by the government in the discharge of its treaty obligations, with respect to which its authority is absolute and supreme. The action of the government thereunder, and the rights which perfected title insures to its possessor, cannot be impaired or defeated in any respect by the statute of limitations of the state. That statute can only begin to run against the title perfected under the legislation of Congress from the date of its consummation. Montgomery v. Bevans, 1 Sawy. 680. The alleged estoppel of the plaintiffs is asserted from the fact that Larkin, who prosecuted the claim under the *Flugge grant [271 But the defendants, to defeat a recovery by for confirmation, had previously located it on the plaintiff, also insist that his right of action land selected farther north than the tract finalis barred by the statute of limitations of Cali- ly surveyed and patented to him, and had anfornia; and also that he is estopped from as-nounced to others that his claim covered the land serting a claim to the demanded premises by the conduct and declarations of his predecessor, the claimant before the land commission, in claiming land under his grant situated in a different locality. The statute of limitations of California, passed in 1863, provided, in substance, that no action for the recovery of real property or its possession should be maintained unless the plaintiff, his ancestor, predecessor or grantor was seised or possessed of the premises within five years before the commencement of the action, or the property was claimed under title derived from the Spanish or Mexican governments, which had not been previously confirmed by the United States or their legally constituted authorities; in which latter case the parties were allowed five years after the passage of the act within which to bring their action. If the title had been thus finally confirmed, the parties were limited to five years thus selected. It was undoubtedly his desire to have his claim located where he had placed it. The survey made by the surveyor general, both preliminary and subsequent to the confirmation, placed the land in the same locality. Both claimant and surveyor seem to have acted on the supposition that the erroneously designated parallels of latitude should govern the location, instead of the natural boundaries indicated on the map. There does not appear to have been any intention on the part of Larkin to mislead anyone as to the nature of his rights. He was satisfied to keep the land originally selected by him; and he contended, and those who succeeded to his interests contended, for the correctness of his selection; but the government, through its appropriate officers, interfered and asserted that another and different location was required by the grant. There is, therefore, no case for the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. For its application there must be some intended deception in the conduct or declarations of the party to be estopped, or such gross negligence on his part as to amount to constructive fraud. An estoppel in pais is sometimes said to be a moral question. Certain it is, that to the enforcement of an estoppel of this character, such as will prevent a party from asserting his legal rights to property, there must generally be some degree of turpitude in his conduct which has misled others to their injury. Conduct or declarations, founded upon ignorance of one's rights, have no such ingredient and seldom work any such result. There are cases, it is true, where declarations, may be made under such peculiar circumstances that the party will be estopped from denying any knowledge of his rights; but these are exceptional, and do not affect the correctness of the general rule as stated. Com. v. Moltz, 10 Pa. 531; Copeland v. Copeland, 28 Me. 529; Whittaker v. Williams, 20 Conn. 104; Delaplaine v. Hitchcock, 6 Hill. 16; Brewer v. R. Co. 5 Met. 479; Boggs v. Merced Min. Co. 14 Cal. 368; Davis v. Davis, 26 Cal. 23. 272*] *We see no ground for interfering with the judgment of the Circuit Court, and it is, therefore, affirmed. U. S. 387. See, also, the following case, of Ins. Co. v. Detroit, No. 77, for a full argument on ques tion involved in this case, which argument was also filed in this case by leave of court. Messrs. R. D. Benedict and E. C. Benedict, for appellants. Independent of the general question, whether that clause of the 11th section of the judiciary act would have ousted the district court of jurisdiction over the cause, if the objection had been taken at the outset, the respondents cannot avail themselves of that objection here, for they appeared by proctor in the cause without taking it. And it is well settled that by entering a general appearance in the cause by an attorney, the party waives the benefit of the objection. Gracie v. Palmer, 8 Wheat. 699; Harrison v. Rowen, 1 Pet. C. C. 489; Pollard v. Dwight, 4 Cranch, 421; Knox v. Summers, 3 Cranch, 496; Logan v. Patrick, 5 Cranch, 288; Flanders v. Ins. Co. 3 Mason, 158; Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404, 15 L. ed. 451. But, furthermore, the defendants answered to the merits and tried the cause on the merits. Such a course is settled to be a waiver of an objection to the jurisdiction. Sheppard v. Graves, 14 How. 510; Bailey v. Dozier, 6 How. 30; De Sobry v. Nicholson, 3 Wall. 423, 18 L. ed. 264. But, considering the question of practice on its merits, we are met at once by the fact that the decision of the circuit court in this case overthrows a practice of over seventy years of the eighty years of our judicial system. Long continued opinion should receive grave regard in construction of law. Pease v. Peck, 18 How. 595, 15 L. ed. 518; 9 Bac. Abr. 246; Broome, Max. 503, marg. 656. The question as to the right to attach in the admiralty the property of a defendant who was not found in the district, was first raised in the year 1802, only ten years after the passage of the process act of 1792, when the case of Bouysson v. Miller, Bee, 186, arose in the district court of South Carolina, before Judge Bee, then the judge of that court. He says, p. 188, "I am of opinion, therefore, that the proceeding by attachment is agreeable to the rules and usages of the admiralty court." This right of attachment was not again questioned before 1825, when it was understood to be settled in this court by the case of Manro v. Almeida, 10 Wheat. 473. The practice was a familiar one to Judge Sprague. Shorey v. Rennell, 1 Spr. 418; Boyd v. Urquhart, 1 Spr. 423. The practice was discussed in several cases of Judge Betts without the suggestion of a doubt as to its regularity. Reed v. Hussey, 1 Blatchf. & H. 525; Smith v. Miln, Abb. Adm. 373, 382. The 11th section of the judiciary act does not extend to "causes civil and maritime" in the court of admiralty. It embraces only "suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity," which are specified in the first clause of the section. 2 Pars. Mar. L. 686, n.; 2 Pars. Ship and Adm. 390; Atkins v. The Fiber Co. 1 Ben. 118; Cushing v. Laird (Judge Blatchf.), 4 Ben. 70. It has not been usual to consider admiralty causes as included in practice legislation, un-taining the facts to give jurisdiction, the less specified. court should not have acted. It is the duty of the court to ascertain the meaning of the legislature, from the words used in the statute and the subject-matter to which it relates, and to restrain the operation of a statute within narrower limits than its words import, if the court is satisfied that the literal meaning of its language would extend to cases which the legislature never designed to include in it. Brewer v. Blougher, 14 Pet. 198; Reiche v. Smythe, 13 Wall. 164, 20 L. ed. 566. Admiralty proceedings are sui generis, and there are other instances in which language has been used in the statutes, which at first reading would seem to include them, but which the courts have held not to include them. See, Gaines v. Travis, Abb. Adm. 422; U. S. v. Wonson, 1 Gall. 10; Hemmenway v. Fisher, 20 How. 258, 15 L. ed. 799; The Ann Caroline, 2 Wall. 550, 17 L. ed. 836. No possible reason can be given why the words "civil suit" in the 11th section should have a broader meaning than the words "civil action" in the 22d section. But the latter words, by universal consent, do not include admiralty causes. The 9th section of the judiciary act gave to the district courts the full jurisdiction of the admiralty. This cause is fully within that jurisdiction. And no limitation of that jurisdiction is to be inferred. The admiralty law and practice is outside of the common law and equity. Its causes are peculiar, and are not usually called suits or actions, words which are usually applied to common law actions, but causes; a "cause civil and maritime," a "cause of collision, civil and maritime," "a cause of contract, civil and maritime," etc. Mr. C. Donohue, for appellee: On the libel the court had no authority to issue process, nor had the marshal the right to take the property of the defendant, and both court and marshal were trespassers. The judiciary act is clear and positive on the subject. See, 1 Stat. at L., pp. 78, 79; judiciary act, § 11. The authorities on the subject are also clear. 5 Mason, 35; Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300; Hollingsworth v. Adams, 2 Dall. 396; Day v. India Rubber Co. 1 Blatchf. 628; Sayles v. Ins. Co. 2 Curt. C. C. 212; 15 Law Rep. 137, July 1852; Blair v. Bemis, decided by Judge Shipman, cited by Judge Woodruff. It nowhere appeared by the libel that the court had jurisdiction. It is nowhere averred that the defendant was within the jurisdiction of the court, but it expressly appeared by the allegation of having property there, what the fact was which was relied upon for jurisdiction. A corporation is an inhabitant of the state in which it is incorporated. This proposition is too clearly laid down to need a citation. Such corporation cannot be sued out of the state where so incorporated. I. On the libel wanting such jurisdictional fact, the court being one of limited special jurisdiction, was without power to act. II. The libel being informal and not con As matter of fact the court had no jurisdiction, and both court and marshal were trespassers. The proof shows that the corporation was a foreign one; the marshal's return shows that the defendant was not in the district nor found there. It is thus apparent that the property of the defendant was held by court and marshal as trespassers, and did not confer jurisdiction. The court did not acquire any jurisdiction to pass on or hold the property, by any act in the cause. I. Where the marshal thus seizes property and holds it as a trespasser, no act of the defendant can make that legal. II. The defendant, June 20, 1866, got an order to show cause why the process should not be set aside, and down to July 2, it was apparent that no absolute appearance had been made. III. But where a court and marshal thus proceed in defiance of statute, they cannot set up any act of the defendant, thus brought in, to be an appearance for more than to protect his right, and in this case by express stipulation no right of the respondent was waived by vouching. IV. The fact, if it be one, that the defendant appeared, could not make legal a seizure under a process which was void. Up to the present time the defendants have not been in the district. The decree of the district court in attempting to hold to bond, is unjustifiable, because the process of attachment to compel the appearance of a foreign corporation being void, if that corporation should voluntarily appear, it cannot be said to sustain the attachment. Mr. Justice Swayne delivered the opinion of the court: This is an appeal in admiralty from the decree of the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of New York. The libel is founded upon a charter-party and seeks to recover freight earned by the ship Elizabeth Hamilton in bringing a cargo of bamboo from Kingston and Port Morant, in the Island of Jamaica, for demurrage while the ship *was obtaining the cargo, and for [*297 damages to the ship by getting on a reef when leaving Port Morant. The libel alleges that the respondents are a corporation, and have property in the district, and prays for process against them, and, if they were not found, that a foreign attachment issue against their property in the district, and for a decree for the amount claimed, with interest and costs. The libel was filed on the 13th of June, 1866. On the day following a citation was issued with a foreign attachment clause. On the 20th of the same month the marshal returned that the respondents were not found in his district, and that he had attached all the property found in their factory at Red Hook Point, in the city of Brooklyn. In a journal entry of the same date it is stated: "Mr. Beebe appears for respondent, and has a week to perfect appearance and to answer." On the 19th of July following the respondents executed a stipulation for costs. It recited that "an appearance has been filed in said cause by said disintegrating company." On the same day the proctors for the libelants consented that the In regard to the merits-after a careful examination of the record-we have found no reason to dissent from the views of the learned district judge by whom the case was heard. Atkins v. Fibre Dis. Co. 2 Ben. 381. However full might be our discussion, we should announce the same conclusions. They are clearly expressed and ably vindicated in his opinion. To go again through the process by which they were reached would be a matter rather of form than substance. property attached should be discharged from trict court to issue it, the seizure of the propcustody upon the respondents giving a stipula- erty was a trespass, and the stipulation a tion for its value in the sum of $25,000, and nullity, irrespective of the reservation which it they agreed that in case the judge should grant contained. These considerations render it necthe motion to discharge the property, the stipessary to examine the case both as to the ulation should be canceled, and that "the stip- merits and the jurisdictional question thus ulation for value is given without prejudice to presented. such motion." The stipulation for value was thereupon filed. That also recited "that an appearance has been filed by said company." On the 3d of May, 1867, the respondents filed their answer. Among other things it averred that they were a foreign corporation, created by the laws of New Jersey, and were not residents of the eastern district of New York; and that it was not alleged in the libel that they were either found in the district or resided in the district, and they craved the same benefit and advantage as if they had formally excepted to the libel. It does not appear that the motion to discharge the attachment was ever decided. But by an entry of the 22d of March, 1867, it appears that a motion had been made to vacate 298*] the attachment *clause in the monition, and all the proceedings under it, upon the ground that under the circumstances the 11th section of the judiciary act of 1789 (1 Stat. at L. 73), denied jurisdiction to the court, and that the motion was overruled. The cause was heard in the district court upon the merits on the 16th of December, 1867. The court made an interlocutory decree, disallowing the claim for damages to the ship, but referred the case to a commissioner to ascertain the amount which the libelants were entitled to recover in respect of their other claims. The commissioner made his report. No exception was taken by either party. The court confirmed the report and decreed accordingly. The libelants appealed from so much of the decree as refused them damages for the injury sustained by the ship in leaving Port Morant. The respondents appealed from the whole decree. The circuit court reversed the entire decree, and the libelants thereupon appealed to this court. The case is thus brought before us. The statement of the case, which we have given, shows that the defendants entered their appearance without reservation. If there could be any doubt upon the subject it is removed by their repeated subsequent recognitions of the fact. This made their position just what it would have been if they had been brought in regularly by the service of process. In this aspect of the case all defects were cured and the jurisdiction of the court over their persons became complete. Pollard v. Dwight, 4 Cranch, 421; Knox v. Summers, 3 Cranch, 496. This warranted the decree in personam for the amount adjudged to the libelants. But the stipulation for value was entered into subject to the motion to discharge the property attached; the stipulation to be canceled if the motion prevailed. Though this motion was not decided, the subsequent motion, founded upon the 11th section of the judiciary act, took its place and had the same effect. The latter motion was overruled, and the decree required the 299*] stipulators to perform their undertaking. The circuit court reversed the decree by reason of the facts relied upon in support of the motion to vacate. If the attachment clause was void for want of jurisdiction in the dis The question of jurisdiction is of a different character, and requires more consideration. The Constitution, art. 3, § 2, declares that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to "all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." The act of Congress of the 24th of September, 1789 (1 Stat. at L. 76), known as the judiciary act, provides that the district courts "shall have also original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including all seizures under all laws of impost, navigation or trade of the United States, where the seizures are made on waters which are navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burden within their respective districts as well as upon the high seas.' The short practice act of September 29, 1789 (1 Stat. at L. 93), required that "the forms and modes of proceedings in causes of [*300 equity and of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction shall be according to the course of the civil law." By the 2d section of the practice act of 1792 (1 Stat. at L. 276), it was declared "that the forms of writs, executions and other process shall be, in suits in equity and in those of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, according to the principles, rules and usages which belong to courts of equity and to courts of admiralty respectively, as contradistinguished from courts of common law, except so far as may have been provided for by the act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, subject, however, to such alterations and additions as the said courts respectively shall, in their discretion, deem expedient, or to such regulations as the Supreme Court of the United States shall think proper, from time to time, by rule to prescribe to any circuit or district court concerning the same." The act of the 23d of August, 1842 (5 Stat. at L. 517), authorized the Supreme Court "generally to regulate the whole practice" of the circuit and district courts in all their proceedings. This controversy turns upon the 11th section of the judiciary act of 1789. The importance of the section in this case induces us to set it out in full: "The circuit court shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several states, of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, when the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or val ue of $500, and the United States are plaintiffs, | Then follows the provision that no one shall be or petitioners, or an alien is a party, or the suit arrested in one district for trial in another "in is between a citizen of the state where the suit a civil action" before a circuit or district court; is brought and a citizen of another state, and and next the prohibition here in question. shall have exclusive cognizance of all crimes Construing this section, down to the second and offenses cognizable under the authority of prohibition, inclusive, by its own light alone, the United States, except where this act other-we cannot doubt that by the phrase "civil suit," wise provides, or the laws of the United States mentioned in this prohibition, is meant a suit shall otherwise direct, and concurrent jurisdic- within the category of "all suits of a civil nattion with the district courts of the crimes and ure at common law or in equity," with which offenses cognizable therein; but no person shall the section deals at the outset. This view debe arrested in one district for trial in another, rives further support from the 9th, 21st and in any civil action, before a circuit or district 22d sections of the act. The 9th section gives court. And no civil suit shall be brought be to the district court its admiralty jurisdiction, 301*] fore *either of said courts, against an its common law jurisdiction, and its criminal inhabitant of the United States, by any origi: jurisdiction. With reference to that first named, nal process in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he the language is "of all civil causes of admiralty shall be found at the time of serving the writ. and maritime jurisdiction." As to the second, "Nor shall any district or circuit court have it is "of all suits at common law," etc. The cognizance of any suit to recover the contents 21st section allows appeals from the district to of any promissory note or other chose in action the circuit court "in causes of admiralty and in favor of an assignee, unless a suit might maritime jurisdiction where the matter in dishave been prosecuted in such court to recover pute exceeds the sum of $300." The 22d secthe said contents, if no assignment had been tion provides "that final decrees and judgments made, except in cases of foreign bills of ex- in civil actions," where the matter in dispute change. And the circuit courts shall also exceeds $50, may be reviewed in the circuit have appellate jurisdiction from the district court upon error. The distinction is thus made courts, under the regulations and restrictions and the terms "causes of admiralty and marhereinafter provided." time jurisdiction" are applied to the former, and the phrases "civil actions" and "suits at common law" to the latter. The prohibition to bring a "civil suit" against an inhabitant of the United States in a district other than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found, is the hinge of the contoversy between these parties. The appellees maintain that a cause of admiralty jurisdiction is a "civil suit" within the meaning of this prohibition. The appellants maintain the contrary. Our views coincide with those of the appellants, and we will proceed to state succinctly the considerations which have brought us to this conclusion. It may be admitted that an admiralty case is a civil suit in the general sense of that phrase. But that is not the question before us. It is whether that is the meaning of the phrase as used in this section. The intention of the lawmaker constitutes the law. U. S. v. Freeman, 3 How. 563. A thing may be within the letter of a statute and not within its meaning, or within its meaning though not within its letter. Slater v. Cave, 3 Ohio St. 85; 7 Bac. Abr. tit. Stat. 1, 2, 3, 5. In cases admitting of doubt the intention of the law-maker is to be sought in the entire context of the section, statutes or series of statutes in pari materia. Patterson v. Winn, 11 Wheat. 389; Dubois v. McLean, 4 McLean, 489; 1 Cooley, Black, 59; Doe v. Brandling, 7 Barn. & C. 643; Stowel v. Zouch, 1 Plowd. 365. 302*] *The general language found in one place, may be restricted in its effect to the particular expressions employed in another, if such, upon a careful examination of the subject, appears to have been the intent of the enactment. Brewer v. Blougher, 14 Pet. 198, 199; Miller v. Salomons, 7 Exch. 546, (in error), 8 Exch. 778; Waugh v. Middleton, 8 Exch. 356, 357. The first paragraph of the 11th section defines the jurisdiction of the circuit court as extending to "all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, where," etc. The criminal jurisdiction of the circuit court is next defined. *We think the conclusion is inevitable [*303 that the terms "civil suit," in the 11th, and "civil actions," in the 22d section, were intended to mean the same thing. The meaning of the phrase employed in the latter admits of no doubt. The language there is "civil actions," and it is used to distinguish them from "causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," provided for in the preceding section. The 21st and 22d sections are in pari materia with the 11th, and throw back a strong light upon the question arising under the latter. We think it dispels all darkness and doubt if any could otherwise exist upon the subject. Our attention has been called to other instances in the laws of Congress where the same phrases are used for the same purposes of distinction between admiralty and other causes. It is unnecessary to refer to them in detail. The argument could not be strengthened by further support drawn from that quarter. The use of the process of attachment in civil causes of maritime jurisdiction by courts of admiralty, as in the case before us, has prevailed during a period extending as far back as the authentic history of those tribunals can be traced. "Its origin is to be found in the remotest history of the civil as well as of the common law." Manro v. Almeida, 10 Wheat. 473. The rules by which it was regulated in the English admiralty are found in Clerke's Praxis, a work still of authority, published in the time of Elizabeth. Browne, in his Civil and Admiralty Law (vol. 2, p. 434), says: "Let us, lastly, suppose that a person against whom a warrant has issued cannot be found, or that he lives in a foreign country; here the ancient proceedings of the admiralty court provided an easy and salutary remedy, though according to Huberus, not author |