contract; Low v. Blackford, 87 Fed. 406, majority holding that court is not bound to decree a sale in strict accordance with terms of mortgage.

Constitutional law.-Law, providing that in all suits pending on contracts made before June, 1865, plaintiff should not have verdict unless he made it appear that all taxes had been duly paid for each year, and making other retrospective amendments, is unconstitutional, pp. 316-317.

Constitutional law. States may change remedy, provided no substantial right secured by the contract is impaired, p. 318.

Cited and principle applied in South Carolina v. Gaillard, 101 U. S. 438, 25 L. 939, holding that act providing a new remedy formed no part of the contract created by the charter of the bank, and could be repealed; Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 774, 775, 27 L. 471, 2 S. Ct. 95, 96, holding that act furnished a substantially equivalent remedy, and did not impair the contract; McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 693, 34 L. 314, 10 S. Ct. 982, holding statute requiring the production of bond in order to establish the genuineness of the coupons, is unconstitutional; McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U. S. 124, 19 S. Ct. 142, holding that rights acquired by plaintiff under the judgment, were not lost by the repeal, after judgment, of act of 1882; Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 73, 24 L. 612, holding same as cited case; as also in Robards v. Brown, 40 Ark. 427, holding same; United States v. Johnson Co., 5 Dill. 213, n., F. C. 15,489, holding act transferring a plain ministerial duty from County to Circuit Court, impaired relator's remedy on the bonds; Nelson v. McCrary, 60 Ala. 310, 311, holding that statute giving enlarged homestead in lands acquired after its passage, could not apply as against existing debts; Foster v. Byrne, 76 Iowa, 297, 35 N. W. 514, holding homestead law, providing for the exemption of land from attachment for debt contracted prior to its passage, is void; Watkins v. Glenn, 55 Kan. 431, 40 Pac. 319, holding that mortgage sale law did not apply to existing mortgage contracts; Priestly v. Watkins, 62 Miss. 806, holding invalid, statute engrafting conditions upon bonds; Leavitt v. Lovering, 64 N. H. 609, 15 Atl. 415, 1 L. R. A. 59, holding statute, providing that payments made within three months before a general assignment shall be void, does not apply to existing contracts; State v. Bank of Tennessee, 3 Baxt. 400, although the new remedy be less speedy and convenient, it will not be invalid for that reason; Roberts v. Cocke, 28 Gratt. 216, holding act conferring on courts and juries power to remit interest, is void; Commonwealth v. Jones, 82 Va. 797, 1 S. E. 90, holding valid, act making treasurer withhold certificate pre liminary to licens until the papers purporting to be tax-receivable coupons, be verified. Cited in 10 Am. Dec. 135, note on vested rights; dissenting opinion in Fitzpatrick v. Boylan, 57 N. Y. 442,

16 Wall. 310-314, 21 L. 356, SLAWSON v. UNITED STATES.

War.- Vessel used for purpose of war against United States, though afterwards chartered by United States, is excluded from benefit of captured and abandoned property act, p. 314.

No citations.

16 Wall. 314-318, 21 L. 357, WALKER v. WHITEHEAD.

Constitutional law.- Laws which exist at time and place of making of contract, and where it is to be performed, enter into and form part of it; this principle embraces acts affecting its validity, construction, discharge, and enforcement, p. 317.

Cited and principle applied in National Bank v. Sebastian Co., 5 Dill. 418, F. C. 10,040, holding statute providing that counties cannot be sued, is void, as to obligations issued by said counties; Hudson v. Bishop, 32 Fed. 523, holding that statute of limitations formed a part of the surety's contract; Nonce v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 33 Fed. 434, holding that in action for personal injuries, statute of limitations of State where action is brought, governs; United States v. Murphy, 82 Fed. 897, holding that any existing statute was incorporated into the contract of surety; Union Bank v. Board of Commrs., 90 Fed. 9, holding that decision of State courts cannot impair the obligation of contracts; Day v. Madden, 9 Colo. App. 469, 48 Pac. 1055, holding that attachment issued and levied should be sustained, notwithstanding that statute authorizing it was repealed; Allen v. Allen, 95 Cal. 197, 30 Pac. 215, 16 L. R. A. 652, and n., holding that no subsequent law could change time of party's right to redeem; Phinney v. Phinney, 81 Me. 464. 466, 10 Am. St. Rep. 272, 274, 17 Atl. 408, 409, 4 L. R. A. 351, 352, and n., holding statute rendering uncertain the time for foreclosure of mortgagor's equity, is invalid; Simpson v. Serviss, 3 Ohio C. C. 439, holding that lien for penalties prescribed by act against liquor traffic, attaches to real property on which such business is conducted by lessee without knowledge or consent of owner; Shuler v. Bull, 15 S. C. 433, holding that constitutional provision, giving wife her property as her separate estate, did not affect marital rights of husband, previously exercised; State v. Bank of Tennessee, 5 Baxt. 74, holding all contracts in furtherance of acts of Tennessee, after act of secession, may be treated as void; Swinburne v. Mills, 17 Wash. 620, 61 Am. St. Rep. 938, 50 Pac. 491, holding in valid, subsequent law providing for a year's stay of sale under the foreclosure decree; dissenting opinion in Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 750, 27 L. 462, 2 S. Ct. 160. majority holding that execution of contract, to which State is a party, cannot be enforced against her officers; Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 796, 800, 810, 27 L. 478, 480, 483, 2 S. Ct. 113, 117, 126, majority holding that act furnished a substantially equivalent remedy, and did not impair the

contract; Low v. Blackford, 87 Fed. 406, majority holding that court is not bound to decree a sale in strict accordance with terms of mortgage.

Constitutional law.- Law, providing that in all suits pending on contracts made before June, 1865, plaintiff should not have verdict unless he made it appear that all taxes had been duly paid for each year, and making other retrospective amendments, is unconstitutional, pp. 316–317.

Constitutional law. States may change remedy, provided no substantial right secured by the contract is impaired, p. 318.

Cited and principle applied in South Carolina v. Gaillard, 101 U. S. 438, 25 L. 939, holding that act providing a new remedy formed no part of the contract created by the charter of the bank, and could be repealed; Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 774, 775, 27 L. 471, 2 S. Ct. 95, 96, holding that act furnished a substantially equivalent remedy, and did not impair the contract; McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 693, 34 L. 314, 10 S. Ct. 982, holding statute requiring the production of bond in order to establish the genuineness of the coupons, is unconstitutional; McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U. S. 124, 19 S. Ct. 142, holding that rights acquired by plaintiff under the judgment, were not lost by the repeal, after judg ment, of act of 1882; Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 73, 24 L. 612, holding same as cited case; as also in Robards v. Brown, 40 Ark. 427, holding same; United States v. Johnson Co., 5 Dill. 213, n., F. C. 15,489, holding act transferring a plain ministerial duty from County to Circuit Court, impaired relator's remedy on the bonds; Nelson v. McCrary, 60 Ala. 310, 311, holding that statute giving enlarged homestead in lands acquired after its passage, could not apply as against existing debts; Foster v. Byrne, 76 Iowa, 297, 35 N. W. 514, holding homestead law, providing for the exemption of land from attachment for debt contracted prior to its passage, is void; Watkins v. Glenn, 55 Kan. 431, 40 Pac. 319, holding that mortgage sale law did not apply to existing mortgage contracts; Priestly v. Watkins, 62 Miss. 806, holding invalid, statute engrafting conditions upon bonds; Leavitt v. Lovering, 64 N. H. 609, 15 Atl. 415, 1 L. R. A. 59, holding statute, providing that payments made within three months before a general assignment shall be void, does not apply to existing contracts; State v. Bank of Tennessee, 3 Baxt. 400, although the new remedy be less speedy and convenient, it will not be invalid for that reason; Roberts v. Cocke, 28 Gratt. 216, holding act conferring on courts and juries power to remit interest, is void; Commonwealth v. Jones, 82 Va. 797, 1 S. E. 90, holding valid, act making treasurer withhold certificate pre liminary to licens until the papers purporting to be tax-receivable coupons, be verified. Cited in 10 Am. Dec. 135, note on vested rights; dissenting opinion in Fitzpatrick v. Boylan, 57 N. Y. 442,

Cited and principle applied in Constable v. Nat. S. S. Co., 154 U. S. 62, 38 L. 910, 14 S. Ct. 1067, holding valid, stipulation in bill of lading that respondent should not be liable for fire happening after unloading of cargo; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie, etc., Transp. Co., 10 Biss. 29, F. C. 11,112, holding that common carrier may, by contract with shipper, secure to itself the benefit of any insurance effected by him; St. Louis, etc., Ry. v. Weakly, 50 Ark. 406, 7 Am. St. Rep. 110, 8 S. W. 137, holding carrier relieved from liability, though stipulation was signed under a mistake as to its contents; Clyde S. S. Co. v. Burrows, 36 Fla. 135, 18 So. 351, holding that burden is upon carrier to maintain defense, that he is exempt from common-law liability by contract; Phifer v. Carolina, etc., R. R., 89 N. C. 316, 45 Am. Rep. 692, upholding stipulation in bill of lading that company alone, in whose custody goods were at time of loss, shall be liable. Cited in 32 Am. Dec. 497, note; without particular application, in H. & T. C. R. R. v. Park, 1 Tex. App. Civ. 143.

Carriers cannot, by unsigned notice, printed on back of freight receipts, limit their common-law liability, though shipper does not expressly dissent from them, pp. 329-330.

Cited and principle applied in Railroad Co. v. Pratt, 22 Wall. 134, 22 L. 831, if common carrier furnishes unsuitable cars, which owner of cattle sees, he is not relieved from liability, though it is agreed that he shall not be responsible; The Majestic, 166 U. S. 384, 41 L. 1043, 17 S. Ct. 601, The Majestic, 56 Fed. 247, and The Majestic, 60 Fed. 629, 20 U. S. App. 503, 23 L. R. A. 751, and n., all holding passenger not bound by the alleged conditions on back of ticket, as they were not included in the contract proper, in terms or by reference; Ormsby v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 2 McCrary, 54, 4 Fed. 711, holding that common carrier cannot relieve itself from responsibility by mere notice appended to the contract; Ayres v. Western R. Corp., 14 Blatchf. 11, 13, F. C. 6S9, holding company liable, notwithstanding conditions on back of receipt; Rackett v. Stickney, 23 Blatchf. 568, 27 Fed. 879, in the absence of knowledge of master, of the term of the condition, waiving liability for de murrage, he could recover it; The Brantford City, 29 Fed. 394, holding that our law, that stipulations exempting carrier from negligence, without real assent of shipper, is controlling in suits brought here, though by law of the ship's flag they would be valid; The Boskenna Bay, 40 Fed. 94, 6 L. R. A. 175, and n., construing stipulation strictly against the company: The Guildhall, 58 Fed. 799, holding that insertion of stipulation exempting negligence in bill of 'ading, does not make a contract: Sayles v. New York, etc., R. Co., 31 Fed. 328, where stipulations limiting carrier's liability are not very plain, it is for the jury to determine whether shipper understood there was to be such a limitation; New York, etc., R. Co. v. Sayles, 87 Fed. 445, holding clause limiting carrier's liability, impressed in red ink upon one corner of freight receipt, is no part

shipping instructions; Taylor v. Little Rock, etc., R. R. Co., 32 Ark. 899, 29 Am. Rep. 3, holding that railroad may stipulate against liability for loss to goods while in custody of a connecting carrier; Trumbull v. Coulson, 12 Colo. App. 105, 54 Pac. 916, holding connecting carrier not liable for damages caused by negligence of initial carrier; Palmer v. Chicago, etc., R. R., 56 Conn. 143, 13 Atl. 821, where car was unloaded and goods placed by connecting road in its warehouse, and were destroyed while delayed, because initial company neglected to send memorandum of the guaranty of the freight, the latter was held responsible; Savannah, etc., Ry. v. Harris, 26 Fla. 152, 23 Am. St. Rep. 554, 7 So. 545, holding company failing to show delivery of goods to next company, was liable; Bennitt v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 46 Mo. App. 671, so long as carrier holds goods in his vehicle of transportation, his liability as carrier continues; Piedmont Mfg. Co. v. Columbia, etc., R. R., 19 S. C. 364, holding that contract determines the obligation of company beyond its own lines; Hadd v. Express Co., 52 Vt. 341, 36 Am. Rep. 759, holding that there was not a special contract, and company was not liable beyond its lines; Norfolk, etc., R. R. v. Sutherland, 89 Va. 706, 17 S. E. 128, holding company liable for loss caused by its own negligent act in sending car to wrong point; dissenting opinion in Talcott v. Wabash R. R., 159 N. Y. 487, 54 N. E. 10, majority holding that facts raised a question as to whether company agreed to transport the baggage for an independent consideration, over connecting lines, and the granting of a non-suit was reversible er ror. See the following notes: 8 Am. Dec. 215, 216, 24 Am. Dec. 148. 72 Am. Dec. 236, 237, 238, 36 Am. Rep. 761, 42 Am. Rep. 665, and 9 Biss. 54, F. C. 10,001.

Distinguished in Deming v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., 21 Fed. 30, 31, 32, where the question was whether carrier was guilty of willful fault, and consequently forfeited the exemptions in the bill of lading; Rice v. Hart, 118 Mass. 208, 19 Am. Rep. 440, holding that railroad ceases to be a common carrier and becomes a warehouseman, when it has completed the duty of transportation; Philadel phia, etc., R. R. v. Lehman, 56 Md. 232, without any special application. Not followed in Michigan, etc., R. R. v. Lantz, 32 Mich. 509, holding railroad, under its charter, liable as warehouseman only where goods are awaiting delivery.

Carriers. Section in charter of Michigan Central Railroad Company, providing that company shall not be responsible for goods on deposit in their depots, "awaiting delivery," as warehousemen, refers to property which has reached its final destination, and not property to be delivered to connecting carrier, pp. 326-327.

Carrier may restrict or diminish his general liability by special contract. which does not cover losses by negligence or miscon. duct, p. 328.