16 Wall. 36-130, 21 L. 394, SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES.

Constitutional law.-A State may validly limit the places in or near a city, where live stock for slaughtering may be landed, giving to one corporation exclusive right to maintain such stock landing yards, p. 61.

Cited in New Orleans v. Steamship Co., 20 Wall. 399, 22 L. 360, sustaining lease by military authorities of New Orleans water-front property.

Constitutional law. Under its police power a State may validly regulate slaughter-houses and prescribe their location, pp. 61-62.

Later decisions have frequently recognized the controlling authority of the principal case in upholding ordinances excluding slaughter-houses from within a city's limits, Spokane v. Robison, 6 Wash. 550, 33 Pac. 961, Portland v. Meyer, 32 Or. 370, 67 Am. St. Rep. 539, 52 Pac. 22, Beiling v. Evansville, 144 Ind. 650, 42 N. E. 623, 35 L. R. A. 274, Ex parte Hielbron, 65 Cal. 611, 4 Pac. 649; or regulating them within those limits, Boyd v. City Council, 117 Ala. 680, 23 So. 664, and Darcantel v. Slaughter-House Co., 44 La. Ann. 640, 11 So. 241. It has been cited and relied upon also in upholding a statute providing for inspection of animals designed for food, State v. Slaughter-House Co., 46 La. Ann. 1035, 15 So. 409; an ordinance prohibiting hogpens in a town within one hundred yards of a neighbor, State v. Hord, 122 N. C. 1095, 65 Am. St. Rep. 744, 29 S. E. 953; and an ordinance regulating the location of liverystables within a city, St. Louis v. Russell, 116 Mo. 254, 22 S. W. 471, 20 L. R. A. 726, and n., State v. Beattie, 16 Mo. App. 137, 145; dissenting opinion, Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 Mass. 125, 31 Am. St. Rep. 537, note, 28 N. E. 1128, 14 L. R. A. 328, and n., majority holding act void, prohibiting employers withholding weavers' wages for defects in their work; People v. Budd, 117 N. Y. 37, 56, sub nom. People v. Walsh, 22 N. E. 683, 690, majority upholding State regulation of grain warehouses and elevators; People v. Hawkins, 157 N. Y. 29, see 51 N. E. 266, erroneously citing 10 Wall. 273, majority annulling law requiring convict-made goods to be so marked. See also notes 25 Am. St. Rep. 887, 92 Am. Dec. 203.

Distinguished in Huesing v. Rock Island, 128 Ill. 476, 15 Am. St. Rep. 136, 21 N. E. 560, holding municipality without power to establish public slaughter-house.

Constitutional law.- Police power is incapable of exact definition. The security, life, health and comfort of the citizen and the beneficial use of property depend upon it, and it extends to protection of lives, limbs, health, comfort and quiet of all persons within the State, p. 62.

The foregoing general observations as to the extent of the police power have been extensively referred to. Several citing cases per

tain to the liquor traffic, and regulations as to the persons to whom liquor-selling licenses might be granted, have been sustained, Trageser v. Gray, 73 Md. 257, 260, 25 Am. St. Rep. 592, 594, 20 Atl. 907, 908, 9 L. R. A. 785, 786, and n.; so also an act making lessors of property on which liquor sold liable for damages done by one intoxicated, Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 522, 30 Am. Rep. 334; the dispensary system of selling liquor has been sustained, State v. Aiken, 42 S. C. 235, 20 S. E. 226, overruling McCullough v. Brown, 41 S. C. 241, 19 S. E. 470, 23 L. R. A. 419, Plumb v. Christie, 103 Ga. 696, 30 S. E. 763, 42 L. R. A. 186, and Guy v. Commissioners, 122 N. C. 474, 29 S. E. 772; as also a law enacting penalties for selling liquor, State v. Hodgson, 66 Vt. 145, 28 Atl. 1091; or prohibiting its sale, Weil v. Calhoun, 25 Fed. S72. And see Garrett v. Mayor, 47 La. Ann. 630, 17 So. 243. The syllabus principle has also been relied upon in upholding ordinances abating privy vaults within a city. Sprigg v. Garrett Park, 89 Md. 409, 43 Atl. 814, Harrington v. Board of Aldermen, 20 R. I. 338, 38 Atl. 3, 38 L. R. A. 311, and n.; regulating livery-stables in a city, State v. Beattie, 16 Mo. App. 137. St. Louis v. Russell, 116 Mo. 254, 22 S. W. 471, 20 L. R. A. 726, and n.; ordinances prohibiting deposit of garbage, Ex parte Casinello, 62 Cal. 540; prohibiting disinterment of dead, In re Wong Yung Quy, 6 Sawy. 447, 2 Fed. 629; licensing hackmen and regulating their conduct at railway stations, Chillicothe v. Brown, 38 Mo. App. 616; requiring removal of powder magazines from city limits, although previous location thereof was authorized by city, Davenport v. Richmond City, 81 Va. 642, 59 Am. Rep. 697; in upholding statutes prohibiting payment of coal miners in scrip, and regulating weighing of coal, State v. Peel Splint Coal Co., 36 W. Va. 812, 15 S. E. 1003, 17 L. R. A. 388; prohibiting Sunday freight trains, Norfolk, etc., R. R. v. Commonwealth, 93 Va. 756, 57 Am. St. Rep. 832, 24 8. E. 839, 34 L. R. A. 107; respecting Sunday observance generally, Swann v. Swann, 21 Fed. 302; assessing lands for drainage purposes, Zigler v. Menges, 121 Ind. 103, 16 Am. St. Rep. 360, 22 N. E. 784; upholding legislative regulation of piping of natural gas, Jamieson v. Indiana, etc., Oil Co., 128 Ind. 564, 579, 28 N. E. 79, 84, 12 L. R. A. 655, and see p. 660; upholding tax on venders of Police Gazette, and similar papers, Thompson v. State, 17 Tex. App. 258; regulating practice of medicine and surgery, Eastman v. State, 109 Ind. 279, 58 Am. Rep. 401, 10 N. E. 97; excluding cattle from neighboring State, where disease prevalent, St. Louis, etc., Ry. v. Smith, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 459, 49 S. W. 631; prescribing terms on which foreign insurance companies might do business, Swing v. Munson, 191 Pa. St. 589, 71 Am. St. Rep. 589, 43 Atl. 344; prohibiting unusual traffic within two miles of religious meeting, State v. Cate, 58 N. H. 241; requiring tenement-houses in New York to be supplied with water on each floor, Health Department v. Rector, 145 N. Y. 39, 45 Am. St. Rep. 581, 39 N. E. 835, 27 L. R. A. 713; requiring regisVOL. VII-61

tration of dairymen and inspection of stock, State v. Broadbelt, 89 Md. 586, 43 Atl. 775, 45 L. R. A. 438; requiring State registration of letters-patent by vendors of patent rights, Breckbill v. Randall. 102 Ind. 529, 52 Am. Rep. 696, 1 N. E. 363; upholding law requiring corporations to redeem their scrip and store orders in cash, Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Co., Tenn. -, 53 S. W. 960; statute upholding game law, and prohibiting importation of game out of season, Magner v. People, 97 Ill. 336. Elsewhere the right of a city to grant exclusive right to remove dead animals on its streets, unless removed by owner within twelve hours, has been upheld as police regulation, National Fert. Co. v. Lambert, 48 Fed. 461; as also law punishing bankers taking deposits when insolvent, Baker v. State, 54 Wis. 371, 373, 12 N. W. 14, 15. The dissenting opinion in Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 128, 34 L. 139, 10 S. Ct. 691, relies upon the syllabus holding, but the court declared a State prohibition law void as to sale of liquor in original package by importer. Cited, arguendo, United States v. Boyer, 85 Fed. 435, discussing limitations of police and commerce powers; Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 346, 17 Am. Rep. 750, New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 661, 29 L. 520, 6 S. Ct. 258, Pearsall v. Great Northern Ry., 161 U. S. 666, 40 L. 845, 16 S. Ct. 710, and Capital City Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 72 Fed. 825. See the following notes: 1 Am. St. Rep. 644, 35 Am. Dec. 334, 23 Am. Rep. 213, 42 Am. Rep. 457, and 62 Am. Dec. 639.

Distinguished in Georgia Packing Co. v. Macon, 60 Fed. 777, 22 L. R. A. 777, avoiding ordinance making discriminating regulations against importers of meat. Not followed in State v. Indiana, etc., Min. Co., 120 Ind. 580, 22 N. E. 779, 6 L. R. A. 583, and n., holding State may not prohibit carrying of natural gas to another State; American Fert. Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 43 Fed. 613, holding license exacted of importer of fertilizer, not justifiable as police regulation; In re Tie Loy, 11 Sawy. 477, 26 Fed. 614, annulling ordinance prohibiting laundry within a city.

Constitutional law.- Police power is exclusive in the several States, p. 63.

Cited in Western U. Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 95 Ind. 16, 48 Am. Rep. 696, upholding law penalizing failure to send telegraph message; Phelps v. Racey, 60 N. Y. 15, 19 Am. Rep. 144, upholding State game law.

Constitutional law. Louisiana statute of 1869, granting to a corporation exclusive slaughter-house and stock-landing privileges, in New Orleans and vicinity, for twenty-five years, regulating prices to be charged therein and prohibiting maintenance of similar works by others, is a valid exercise of the police power, the monopoly thereby created is not forbidden by the thirteenth or fourteenth amendments, pp. 61-82.

The effect of this decision was subsequently much modified. In 1879, Louisiana declared by its Constitution then adopted, that the

monopoly features of the Slaughter-House Company's charter were a nullity, and that police juries of the several parishes should have power to regulate the slaughtering business. Thereupon other slaughter-houses were authorized within the limits of the Crescent Company's monopoly, and the Supreme Court by a unanimous judg ment sustained the validity of this annihilation of the Crescent Company's exclusive rights, Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U. S. 747, 748, 28 L. 586, 587, 4 S. Ct. 652, 654, reversing S. C., 4 Woods, 97, 9 Fed. 745 (and see Crescent, etc., Co. v. Butchers' Union, 120 U. S. 142), 30 L. 615, 7 S. Ct. 473, Darcantel v. Slaughter-House Co., 44 La. Ann. 640, 11 So. 241, Putnam v. Ruch, 56 Fed. 417, Crescent City, etc., Co. v. New Orleans, 33 La. Ann. 939. The concurrence of the judges dissenting in the Slaughter-House Cases, went upon the ground that the monopoly feature of the original charter had been void ab initio, the remaining judges, adhering to the theory that it was valid when granted, declared that the State, nevertheless, had power to abrogate the stipulation at any time. This was upon the theory that one legislature had not the power thus to bind its successors, or even itself, when the administration of the State's power of police was concerned. The view which seeks thus to reconcile the two decisions, absolves the State from the embarrassment of an irrepealable contract, creating a monopoly, but still affirms the power of the State to grant an exclusive right to carry on an otherwise lawful business. It substitutes an exclusive license, terminable at will, for an irrevocable monopoly, yet it still involves the proposition that the legislature may validly prohibit the slaughtering business to all, save its licensees, create a monopoly by licensing only designated persons, or terminate it by according the license freely to all proper applicants. There is a wide difference between a license available to all and a license available to one only. The former is a common incident to the exercise of the powers of taxation and police. The latter creates a monopoly, which the prevailing opinion in the principal case justified as also a proper incident of the police power, and the dissenting opinion condemned in vigorous terms.

Several citing cases have relied upon the doctrine under discussion in upholding municipal contracts, granting exclusive rights, such as gas or electric-light privileges within a city, Crescent City Co. v. New Orleans Co., 27 La. Ann. 147, St. Louis v. Gas-Light Co., 5 Mo. App. 504, and New Orleans Gas Co. v. La. Light Co., 115 U. S. 668, 669, 29 L. 523, 6 S. Ct. 262, Contra, Citizens' Gas Co. v. Louisville Gas Co., 81 Ky. 273, Grand Rapids Co. v. Grand Rapids, etc., G. Co., 33 Fed. 669, St. Louis Gas Co. v. St. Louis Co., 16 Mo. App. 70, 73; and exclusive garbage contracts, Sanitary, etc., Works v. California Reduction Co., 94 Fed. 700, State v. Orr, 68 Conn. 110, 35 Atl. 771, 34 L. R. A. 282, and Coombs v. MacDonald, 43 Neb. 634,

581, 12 U. S. App. 446, though State confer many rights of citizenship, alien is still such until naturalization. Cited in Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U. S. 160, 36 L. 109, 12 S. Ct. 381, arguendo. See note on who are aliens, 84 Am. Dec. 212.

Citizens. First section of fourteenth amendment, declaring all persons born or naturalized in United States "subject to the jurisdiction thereof," citizens, was intended to exclude children of ministers, consuls, and subjects of foreign States, born within United States, p. 73.

Criticised and distinguished in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 678, 679, 42 L. 901, 18 S. Ct. 468, see dissenting opinion contra, p. 724, 42 L. 917, 18 S. Ct. 485, holding children of Chinese subjects, born here, United States citizens.

Constitutional law. Fourteenth amendment, guaranteeing privileges and immunities "of citizens of the United States," means only privileges and immunities incident to citizenship of the United States as distinguished from citizenship of the several States. Hence, though Louisiana statute gave slaughter-house business of New Orleans to a monopoly, no privileges or immunities of national citizenship are thereby abridged, and this portion of the amendment is not infringed, pp. 74-80.

In the Civil Rights Cases, the operation of the amendment was further restricted by the declaration that the laws which Congress might pass in carrying it into effect, must be confined to corrective, rather than direct legislation. Accordingly the provisions of the civil rights act of 1875, prohibiting discriminations against the negro in inns, places of public amusement, etc., were annulled, notwithstanding vigorous dissent, Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 47, 54, 27 L. 851, 854, 3 S. Ct. 47, 54, United States v. Washington, 4 Woods, 352, 20 Fed. 632, charge to grand jury, 30 Fed. Cas. 1006, and see Civil Rights Bill, 1 Hughes, 549, F. C. 2,774; and revised statutes, section 5519, punishing a conspiracy to deprive any persons of the equal protection of the laws was declared invalid, United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 638, 27 L. 293, 1 S. Ct. 608.

The syllabus doctrine has been approved and followed by later cases. In reliance upon it, separate schools for black and white have been declared within the legislative power of the States, unembarrassed by the fourteenth amendment, Board of Education v. Tinnon, 26 Kan. 17, Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 350, 360, 17 Am. Rep. 753, 763, People v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 447, 449, 45 Am. Rep. 237, 238, Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 550, 23 Am. St. Rep. 897, 15 S. W. 766, 11 L. R. A. 829, and Martin v. Board of Education, 42 W. Va. 516, 26 S. E. 349. So a private school, though recipient of municipal aid, may lawfully exclude colored pupils, Clark v. Maryland Inst., 87 Md. 663, 41 Atl. 130; and the State may provide separate coaches for black and white, Cully v. Baltimore, etc., R. R., 1