by our military forces, having been used throughout that period as the efficient means of furnishing iron for arms, cannon balls and shells; that the property was subsequently captured from the confederate states by our military forces and was put up and sold at public auction by the assistant commissioner of the bureau of refugees, freedmen, and abandoned lands, who was authorized and lawfully empowered to sell and convey the same in that manner, and that the plaintiff claimants, or one of them, in behalf of himself and the others, became the purchasers for the sum of $45,000, that being the highest and best bid made for the same, and that the said commissioner, being thereto duly authorized by the President and 427*] *Secretary of the Treasury, conveyed the property to the plaintiff claimants. Beyond doubt those allegations were entirely inconsistent with the theory of the original information, as they show that the property, at the time the information was filed, was vested in the grantees of the United States, by virtue of a deed duly executed, and given for a valuable consideration paid by the purchasers, who, it is admitted, have never committed any such acts of forfeiture as those charged in the information. Allegations of the kind, however, are not sufficient without proof to oust the jurisdiction of the court. But the district attorney subsequently filed an amended information, and he also alleges that the property was captured from the confederate states, and that the same was seized by order of the President, and that it was, by his order and that of the Secretary of the Treasury, sold to the highest bidder as captured property belonging to the United States, and that the same was purchased, as aforesaid, by the plaintiff claimants for the sum stated in the claim of the grantees. Such an averment in the information is sufficient proof of the fact, as against the prosecutor, especially as he confirms the allegation by referring to the act of Congress, which provides that any interest which the United States have in the lands described in the deed be, and the same is hereby released and confirmed to the said grantees. 14 Stat. at L. 616. Absolute condemnation of the property to the United States was claimed in the first pleading, but the district attorney substantially admits, in the amended information, that no such decree can be entered, as he avers that the property is liable to condemnation, in confirmation of the title of the grantees under the United States, which would be a proceeding wholly without precedent in the jurisprudence of the United States. that the deed conveying the same to the confed- Such a decree is usually regarded as exhausting the jurisdiction of the court, except in maritime cases, where there is a fund in the regis try of the court to be restored to the rightful owner, but the court in this case proceeded to adjudge and decree that the claim of C. C. Huckabee, one of the defendants, be allowed and sustained to certain rights and privileges therein mentioned, including all the timber on a described portion of the lands, and the right of cutting and transporting the same; and that the title to the said described lands be adjudged to be in the said claimant, and that the marshall restore the possession of the said lands to the said claimant; and that the claim of all the defendants be sustained and allowed to another described portion of the lands in controversy, including also the right to the timber for certain purposes, and to the iron ore in certain described localities; and it was also adjudged and decreed that the *present plaintiffs, ex- [*429 cept the United States, should pay the costs of the suit. Exceptions were taken by the present plaintiff's to the rulings of the court and to the decree, and they sued out. the present writ of error. Evidence of the most satisfactory character, consisting of the deed signed by the corporation and by the several defendants, who owned all of the stock of the company, was introduced by the United States to show that the lands and improvements in question were conveyed by the original owners to the confederate states, and that the purchasers paid to the grantors the agreed consideration of $600,000, and it appeared that they entered into full possession of the premises and used and employed the lands and improvements for the purposes alleged in the amended information. Equally satisfactory evidence was also introduced by the United States to show that the entire property was captured by our military forces during the war of the rebellion, and that the whole premises were filed an amended answer, excepting to the sold under the orders of the President, as al428*] amended information; because it *ap-leged, and that the same were conveyed by the pears that the United States have no longer any interest in the prosecution, as they have released their right in the property to the other claimants, and because the jurisdiction of the court is ousted as relates to the property sought to be condemned. Responsive to that, the present defendants It also appears that C. C. Huckabee, one of the present defendants, filed a separate answer, in which he alleges that he is the sole owner of a certain described portion of the lands mentioned in the information; and he also avers commissioner who conducted the sale for the consideration of $45,000 to the plaintiff claimants, or to one of them, for his benefit and that of his associates. Subsequent to the capture by our military forces, the possession of the lands and improvements was continued in the United States, until the sale and conveyance by the said commissioner to the present grantees, on the 3d of February, 1866, at which time they received possession of the premises from the commissioner, U. S. v. Kechler, 9 Wall. pp. 86, 87, 19 L. ed. 575; Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 19 L. ed. 227; and the doctrines above stated are re-affirmed in the Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 20 L. ed. 287, and are applied to the decrees of confederate courts. harm." It was the evidence in Barth v. Clise, supra, that established that the case was inherently defective, and that the defect was incurable and inevitably fatal. The pleadings were good enough, but all the evidence was set out in the record, and so it appeared conclusively that the plaintiff had no right to recover. All And so it is established, that the "confederthe evidence is set out in this record, and it ap- ate states of America" could neither acquire pears conclusively that the United States has nor transfer real estate by the acts of their Conno cause of action against Huckabee and his as-gress, or by the decrees of their court, nor could sociates, who have the title to this land as existing states, while engaged in the rebellion, against all the other parties to this proceeding. transfer property held by them before the war. We think it cannot admit of serious question that this amended libel, on the facts stated in it, destroys the case made in the original libel for confiscation and condemnation of this property, and that this is an attempt to employ highly penal statutes, which provide summary and extraordinary procedure for the purpose of securing to a purchaser from the government, judicial confirmation of a title of property in favor of a private citizen. No government can acquire title to lands, except in accordance with its own laws, and as the "confederate states" have had no valid laws, they were incapable of acquiring titles to lands. As they had no legal existence as a government, or body politic or corporate, they could not accept a deed. Therefore, the allegations in the libel that these lands belonging to the confederate states, is not sustained by the proof, and cannot be true in law If the act of Dec. 15, 1856, amounts to anything, it must devest the United States, as well If the title to this land passed by the deed of as its vendee, of all right to proceed against this Sept. 17, 1863, from the claimants to the conland, to condemn and confiscate it under the federate states, it does not follow that the title acts of 1861 and 1862. No court can, at this passed to the United States by capture. The time, declare that this property is now, by rea- act. of Mar. 12, 1863, "for the collection of son of its ownership, in such relation to the abandoned property," etc., contains no provis government of the United States that it is lia-ion in reference to captured or abandoned lands. ble to be confiscated and condemned if the title has been transferred to Mr. Lyon. This is not a proceeding purely in rem. It is also a personal proceeding. The offense of the owner is made the ground of confiscation in the original libel. In every aspect of the case, the pardoning power extends to the alleged grounds of forfeiture, and this was exercised in favor of the claimants before the government caused any proceedings to be commenced against this property. The President, through Gen. Swayne, seized that which it had released from all penalties and forfeitures by its previous pardon, granted to the claimants. We think that, for the reasons above stated, it is impossible that any proceeding can now be sustained, at the instance of the United States, to confiscate and condemn this property; and we think it clear, also, that, under the allegations of the original and amended libels, no decree of condemnation or confiscation of these lands could be rendered by any court in conformity to the acts of Aug. 5, 1861, and July 17, 1862, on which alone this libel and amended libel are based. It is alleged in the libel that the confederate states owned the property. The facts which are supposed to establish this ownership are very carefully set forth in the amended libel. If this allegation is not proven, then the cause of forfeiture, as alleged, is not true. Could the confederate states acquire title to lands conveyed to it eo nomine by deed? The power of the confederate states to acquire title to lands must depend on their being the government, or a body politic, or corporate. Without some such attribute, they are not a person or legal entity, within the meaning of the law. No legal authority for their existence can be found. It was the name, merely, of belligerents, engaged in a war of rebellion, and as such opposed by law, as well as with arms, throughout the United States. The disposal of abandoned lands was provided for in the act of July 2, 1864, which amended the former act in this and other particulars; but by this act no provision was made for the sale of abandoned lands, but only for the lease of them for periods not exceeding twelve months. The 2d section of the act of July 2, 1864, very clearly shows that lands were not included in the terms "captured or abandoned property" found in the act of Mar. 3, 1863. Nor were lands included in the proviso to the 1st section of said act. The language of the 2d section of the act of July 2, 1864, is: "In addition to the captured and abandoned property to be received and disposed of as provided in said acts, the said agents shall take charge of and lease for periods not exceeding twelve months, the abandoned lands," etc., etc. The term "captured" is not applied to lands in either of the said acts of Congress. The proviso to the 1st section of the act of Mar. 3, 1863, only excepts movable property from the power of the special agents to receive and collect abandoned or captured property, and so, in the part of the act conferring the right to receive and collect as well as in the exception stated in the proviso, lands are not included. At the time the sale of this land was made by Gen. Swayne to Mr. Lyon, Feb. 3, 1866, there was no statutory provision made by Congress for the disposal of lands captured from the confederate states, unless the statutes above cited applied to them. If those statutes applied, the lands could not have been sold under their provisions, as they only provided for a lease of them. Title by capture can only apply to the public property of the enemy. If that property is immovable, the mere capture does not change the title. In the act Aug. 6, 1861, Congress defined the lawful subjects of prize and capture. These subjects include lands, and subject them to con support such a defense, or to warrant the court | All captures in war vest primarily in the sov. in finding for the defendants upon any such ereign, but in respect to real property, Chancelground, which is all that need be said upon the lor Kent says, the acquisition by the conqueror subject, as it is obvious that that objection can- is not fully consummated until confirmed by a not be sustained. Ryder v. Wombwell, Law treaty of peace, or by the entire submission or Rep. 4 Exch. 39; Giblin v. McMullen, Law Rep. destruction of the state to which it belonged, 2 P. C. App. 335. which latter rule controls the question in the case before the court, as the confederation having been utterly destroyed no treaty of peace was or could be made, as a treaty requires at least two contracting parties. 1 Kent, Com. (11th ed.) 110; Lawr. Wheat. (2d ed.) 55; U. S. v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 86. Power to acquire terriConstitution in the United States. Conquered territory, however, is usually held as a mere military occupation until the fate of the nation from which it is conquered is determined, but if the nation is entirely subdued, or in case it be destroyed and ceases to exist, the right of occu absolutely in the conqueror. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511; Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 9 Cranch, 195; Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 246; U. S. v. Rice, 4 Wheat. 254; The Amy Warwick, 2 Sprague, 143; Johnson v. McIntosh, 8 Wheat. 588. Complete conquest, by whatever mode it may be perfected, carrics with it all the rights of the former government, or in other words, the conqueror, by the completion of his conquest, becomes the absolute owner of the property conrights are no longer limited to mere occupation of what he has taken into his actual possession, but they extend to all the property and rights the conquered state, including even debts as well as personal and real property. Halleck, Int. Law, 839; Elphinstone v. Bedreechund, 1 Knapp, P. C. Cas. 329; Vattel, 365; 3 Phil. Int. Law, 505. 4. Argument to show that the court below had no jurisdiction of the case if the plaintiff claimants had a good title to the premises, is hardly necessary, as both the pleadings and evidence show that they were in the possession of the lands and improvements when the prosecution was commenced. Sufficient has been re-tory either by conquest or treaty is vested by the marked to show that their title is a good one as against the United States, and it is quite clear that the present defendants do not have any such standing in the pleadings in this information as to give them the right to call it in question, as the suit is one in the name and for the benefit of the United States. Confiscation Cases, supra.pation becomes permanent, and the title vests Such being the character of the suit, the mistake of the district attorney in supposing that it might be prosecuted to confirm the title of the plaintiff claimants cannot have the effect to give the court any jurisdiction of the case, much less to give the court jurisdiction to determine that the title to the premises is in the defendants and to eject the plantiffs, holding under the United States, and to decree that the possession of the lands and improvements shall be delivered to the defendants. What the district attorney ex-quered from the enemy, nation or state. His pected to accomplish by continuing to prosecute the information after the seizure and sale of the property by the United States is not perfectly certain, unless he supposed the court might treat the information as one in the nature of a bill in equity to remove a cloud upon the title of the grantees under the United States, arising from the pretense of the present defendants that the deed which they executed to the confederate Tested by these considerations, it must be asstates was void as having been procured by du-sumed for the further purposes of this investiress. Concede that, still it is evident that it was gation that the title acquired by the plaintiff an attempt to accomplish what the court under claimants from the United States was a valid such a pleading had no jurisdiction to grant, as title, and if so, then it is clear that the court bethe parties interested were citizens of the same low had no jurisdiction of the cause of action state, and no such issue was alleged in the in- alleged in the information, as the plaintiffs, if formation, and if there had been, and the par- disturbed in their possession of the premises, ties had been citizens of different states, it would had a plain, adequate and complete remedy at nevertheless be clear that the court could not law. Discussion of that rule of decision at this grant any such relief under any process founded time, however, is unnecessary, as the whole upon the act of Congress, entitled "An Act to subject was considered by this court in a recent Confiscate Property." 12 Stat. at L. 319. case, to which reference is made as one entirely Doubtless a bill in equity would lie, in a proper applicable in principle to the case before the court, to remove a cloud upon their title, but it court. Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 621, 20 L. is obvious that for any encroachment upon their ed. 503; Hipp v. Babin, 19 How. 271, 15 L. ed. possessions they had a plain, adequate and com- 633. plete remedy at law. They claimed title under the United States, and the record shows that the title of the United States was derived by conquest from the government of the late confederate states. Our military forces captured the property while it was in the possession of the confederate states as means for prosecuting the War of the Rebellion, and it appears that the captors took immediate possession of the property and continued to occupy it under the direc- Usually where a court has no jurisdiction of tions of the executive authority until the gov- a case, the correct practice is to dismiss the suit, ernment of the confederate states ceased to ex- but a different rule necessarily prevails in an st and the unlawful confederation became ex-appellate court in cases where the subordinate tinct, when it was sold by the or lers of the ex- court was without jurisdiction and has given ecutive and conveyed to the plaintiff claimants. I judgment or decree for the plaintiff or improp Numerous exceptions were taken by the plaintiffs to the rulings of the court in admitting and rejecting evidence, several of which it is obvious were erroneous, but in the view taken of the case it is not necessary to re-examine any such questions, as the court is of the opinion that the court below had no jurisdiction to render any decree in the case upon the merits of the controversy. stored it to Huckabee and his associates by his pardon, unless some law of the United States placed it beyond his reach. There was no such law. Congress gave the President the power to include in his pardon and amnesty any condition he might deem expedient for the public welfare; and this broad and benign authority, suited to the great work of restoring the government to its proper influence and rightful sway, had a plain and direct reference to the disposal by the President, of property claimed by the rebels, but forfeited to the United States. U. S. v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128, 20 L. ed. 519; Armstrong's Foundry, 6 Wall. 766, 18 L. ed. 882. If Congress, by any legislation subsequent to this grant of pardon, intended to confine its effects to narrower limits than it embraced when it was granted, that legislation has failed of its purpose. But nothing of the kind was intended. A release to Mr. Lyon by the act of December, 1866, was at most a quitclaim, and affirmed nothing in respect to the title so conveyed. The death of Washington M. Smith, one of the claimants, and the results which follow his death, present the point distinctly, that the entire case turns on the facts: 1. Whether the title to these lands passed by capture merely to the United States; and 2. Whether the pardon of the President restored them to their former owners. If these lands are not found to be in the first category, then the death of Smith terminates the right to confiscate them. If in the second, the right of forfeiture is removed, and the right of the United States to condemn or claim them is destroyed. The Hiawatha, 2 Black, 692, 17 L. ed. 485; 2 Bl. Com. 421; Strother v. Lucas, 12 Pet. 410; Fleming v. Page, 9 How. 603. Mr. Justice Clifford delivered the opinion of the court: ing, abetting or promoting such insurrection or resistance to the laws, or any person or persons engaged therein;" and the provision was, that if any person, being the owner of any such property, shall knowingly use or employ or consent to the use or employment of the same as aforesaid, all such property shall be lawful subject of prize and capture wherever found, and it was made the duty of the President to cause the same to be seized, confiscated, and condemned. 12 Stat. at L. 319. Pursuant to that act the district attorney exhibited an information against a certain tract of land, therein described, containing three thousand six hundred acres, with the improvements thereon, known as the Bibb County Iron Works, which belonged to the late confederate states, and which, as he alleges, had been previously seized by the marshal under an order of seizure duly issued; and he also alleges that the property had for several years been knowingly used and employed by the owners, or with their consent, in aiding, abetting and promoting the late insurrection and rebellion, and in aiding, abetting and promoting persons engaged in the insurrection, rebellion and resistance to the laws and authority of the United States, and that the property, during those years, had been knowingly used and employed by the owners, or with their consent, as a place for the mining and manufacturing of iron ore into all kinds of machinery and implements for military purposes by persons engaged in armed rebellion and resistance to the laws and public uthorities, contrary to the statute in such case made and provided. Service was made and the present defendants appeared and claimed to be the true and lawful owners of the property and they deny in separate and distinct articles in the answer every material allegation of the information. Apart from that they also allege that they have severally *received spe- [*426 cial pardon and full amnesty from the President for all past offenses connected with the late war of the rebellion, and that they respect conditions of the several pardons, and therefore that the property should be restored to them as the rightful owners. Prior to the rebellion the property in question was owned by a corporation known as the Bibb County Iron Company, and it appears that the present plaintiffs, at this stage of the litigation, entered their appearance in the suit, and being admitted to become parties and make Pleadings, in informations for seizures upon land, or for confiscation of property, as well as in causes of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, or in actions at law, or suits in equity, are gov-ively have fully complied with all the terms and erned by certain well-established rules of practice, which require that the allegations shall correspond with the facts as proved, and that the information, as in the case of a libel, declaration, or bill of complaint, if filed in a Federal court, shall show that the court has jurisdiction of the cause of action. McKinlay v. Morrish, 21 How. 346, 16 L. ed. 101. Proper parties in all cases are also required; and in all cases, except where there is a set-off or cross-claim, they allege that the property belongs action, the damages or relief sought, if the cause of action is sustained, should be adjudged and awarded to the party promoting the suit and not to a stranger; and if the cause of action is not sustained the judgment or decree should be for the opposite party, whether respondent or defendant. to them as the joint owners of the same; that the original owners sold the property to the late confederate states for the sum of $600,000, and then and there received payment in full for the same, and executed to the grantees a title deed of the premises with full covenants of warranty, and that the purchasers took full possession of the property with all the appurtenances appertaining to the same; and they also aver that the grantors were fully advised of the objects and purposes for which the property was purchased, which were to furnish the grantees vith iron to be used in manufacturing arms and munitions of war to be used in prosecuting the ebellion, and that the same was held, used, occupied and enjoyed by the grantees as the undisputed owners until the same was captured by our military forces, having been used throughout that period as the efficient means of furnishing iron for arms, cannon balls and shells; that the property was subsequently captured from the confederate states by our military forces and was put up and sold at public auction by the assistant commissioner of the bureau of refugees, freedmen, and abandoned lands, who was authorized and lawfully empowered to sell and convey the same in that manner, and that the plaintiff claimants, or one of them, in behalf of himself and the others, became the purchasers for the sum of $45,000, that being the highest and best bid made for the same, and that the said commissioner, being thereto duly authorized by the President and 427*] *Secretary of the Treasury, conveyed the property to the plaintiff claimants. Beyond doubt those allegations were entirely inconsistent with the theory of the original information, as they show that the property, at the time the information was filed, was vested in the grantees of the United States, by virtue of a deed duly executed, and given for a valuable consideration paid by the purchasers, who, it is admitted, have never committed any such acts of forfeiture as those charged in the information. Allegations of the kind, however, are not sufficient without proof to oust the jurisdiction of the court. But the district attorney subsequently filed an amended information, and he also alleges that the property was captured from the confederate states, and that the same was seized by order of the President, and that it was, by his order and that of the Secretary of the Treasury, sold to the highest bidder as captured property belonging to the United States, and that the same was purchased, as aforesaid, by the plaintiff claimants for the sum stated in the claim of the grantees. Such an averment in the information is sufficient proof of the fact, as against the prosecutor, especially as he confirms the allegation by referring to the act of Congress, which provides that any interest which the United States have in the lands described in the deed be, and the same is hereby released and confirmed to the said grantees. 14 Stat. at L. 616. Absolute condemnation of the property to the United States was claimed in the first pleading, but the district attorney substantially admits, in the amended information, that no such decree can be entered, as he avers that the property is liable to condemnation, in confirmation of the title of the grantees under the United States, which would be a proceeding wholly without precedent in the jurisprudence of the United States. that the deed conveying the same to the confederate states, which he and his associates gave, was executed under duress, and in obedience to the commands of an unlawful power, which neither he nor they could resist, and that the deed is void on that account; and he denies that the lands were ever captured by our military forces, or that the lands were ever seized under any warrant of seizure, as alleged in the information. Hearing was had upon the merits before the court, the parties having waived a jury and filed a stipulation to that effect. Witnesses were examined and other proofs were introduced, and the court entered a decree dismissing both the original and the amended informa tions. Such a decree is usually regarded as exhausting the jurisdiction of the court, except in maritime cases, where there is a fund in the regis try of the court to be restored to the rightful owner, but the court in this case proceeded to adjudge and decree that the claim of C. C. Huckabee, one of the defendants, be allowed and sustained to certain rights and privileges therein mentioned, including all the timber on a described portion of the lands, and the right of cutting and transporting the same; and that the title to the said described lands be adjudged to be in the said claimant, and that the marshall restore the possession of the said lands to the said claimant; and that the claim of all the defendants be sustained and allowed to another described portion of the lands in controversy, including also the right to the timber for certain purposes, and to the iron ore in certain described localities; and it was also adjudged and decreed that the *present plaintiffs, ex- [*429 cept the United States, should pay the costs of the suit. Exceptions were taken by the present plaintiff's to the rulings of the court and to the decree, and they sued out. the present writ of error. Evidence of the most satisfactory character, consisting of the deed signed by the corporation and by the several defendants, who owned all of the stock of the company, was introduced by the United States to show that the lands and improvements in question were conveyed by the original owners to the confederate states, and that the purchasers paid to the grantors the agreed consideration of $600,000, and it appeared that they entered into full possession of the premises and used and employed the lands and improvements for the purposes alleged in the amended information. Equally satisfactory evidence was also introduced by the United States to show that the entire property was captured by our military forces during the war of Responsive to that, the present defendants the rebellion, and that the whole premises were filed an amended answer, excepting to the sold under the orders of the President, as al428*] amended information; because it *ap-leged, and that the same were conveyed by the pears that the United States have no longer any interest in the prosecution, as they have released their right in the property to the other claimants, and because the jurisdiction of the court is ousted as relates to the property sought to be condemned. commissioner who conducted the sale for the consideration of $45,000 to the plaintiff claimants, or to one of them, for his benefit and that of his associates. Subsequent to the capture by our military forces, the possession of the lands and improveIt also appears that C. C. Huckabee, one of ments was continued in the United States, until the present defendants, filed a separate answer, the sale and conveyance by the said commisin which he alleges that he is the sole owner of sioner to the present grantees, on the 3d of Feba certain described portion of the lands men-ruary, 1866, at which time they received postioned in the information; and he also avers session of the premises from the commissioner, |