cannot enlarge his authority by his own repre sentation. Floyd's Acceptances, 7 Wall. 666, 20 L. ed. 169; Mech. Bk. v. N. Y. & N. H. R. Co. 13 N. Y. 632. And so, corporations, both municipal and private, may dispute the authority of those who have attempted to bind them without authority. And this, too, whether the paper has passed into the hands of the innocent holders or not. The authority of the agent is always open to an inquiry. Leavenworth v. Rankin, 2 Kan. 357; Kochler v. Black River Falls Co. 2 Black, 715, 17 L. ed. 339; 5 B. & A. 886; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Ia. 209; Halstead v. Mayor, etc., supra; Gould v. Sterling, supra; Treadwell v. Hancock Co. 11 Ohio St. 183; Goodrich v. Detroit, 12 Mich. 279, Zottman v. San Francisco, 20 Cal. 96; Herzo v. San Francisco, 33 Cal. 145. But a still stronger case is Marsh v. Fulton Co. 10 Wall. 676, 19 L. ed. 1040, upon the point I am now contending for. But it will be contended that this court has laid down a different rule in some of the earlier cases; a rule which does not require a purchaser to take notice of want of power in a corporation to issue bonds. And what are known as The Iowa Cases are referred to as maintaining that proposition. That there is an apparent conflict between the cases from Iowa and the later ones to which I have before referred, may be true; and yet, a careful examination of the decisions will show no real conflict. | People v. Tazewell Co. 22 Ill. 147; Schuyler Co. v. People, etc., 25 Ill. 181; Schuyler Co. v. Farwell, 25 Ill. 181; Marshall Co. v. Cook, 38 Ill. 44. Now, here are seven decisions of the supreme court of Illinois running from 1856 to 1866, construing statutes conferring power on the municipal corporations to aid railroads by their bonds and subscriptions, and not in a sing'e instance have they held that a mere naked sta utory power to issue their bonds has been suflicient to uphold bonds with no better foundation; but, on the contrary, in every case they have held that there must be a substantial compliance with all the requirements of law, before the officer acting under it can bind the municipality. And that court, too, in all these cases, have steadily refused to recognize holders of this class of securities as being without notice, but charged them, at their peril, with notice of the acts of public officers, not that they ever departed, by any vacillation from this wholesome rule. Every person who has ever bought any bond, has been notified in advance, by the repeated decisions of the supreme court, that he took them at his peril. All this time, these decisions have been a part of every statute upon that subject; and such statutes, they are all alike in principle, are to be construed in the light of the decisions of the supreme court. Nor are the decisions above referred to the only decisions of the supreme court of Illinois holding the same doctrine. I cite the following, in addition, holding the same principle. Jacksonville v. McConnell, 12 Ill. 138; Fitch v. Pinckard, 4 Scam. (Ill.) 78; Petersburgh v. Mappin, 14 Ill. 193; Pekin v. Reynolds, 31 Ill. 529; Laswell v. Hickox, 4 Scam. (Ill.) 181. No authority is found, in either of these cases, for the instruction that any language, found in either of them, intimating such doctrine is but dictum, and binds no one; and second, if such authority can be found in either of The pretended election held in this town. these cases, or in any other case, it has been ship, for the purpose of determining whether overruled in the later cases of Floyd's Accept- bonds should be issued, was held about one ances, supra, and Marsh v. Fulton Co. supra. year before either of the acts of the legislature It becomes material to inquire: what has above referred to were passed. The only referbeen the decision of the supreme court of Illi-ence to this election, under the act of Feb. 28, nois, in construing this class of statutes, which authorize municipal corporations to aid in the construction of railroads? By the uniform rule of this court, the settled decisions of the highest courts in the state, construing its own statutes, becomes a part of the law, and will be followed by this court. Prettyman v. Tazewell Co. 19 Ill. 415. In this case, certain bonds had been issued by the county of Tazewell, by virtue of a supposed statutory authority, and delivered to the railroad company to which they had been voted. A bill was filed against the railroad, praying that it might be restrained from selling the bonds; and among other reasons assigned for this belief was that the bonds had been so drawn as to be payable at New York, when the statute only authorized the interest to be made payable at New York, and was silent upon the point as to where the principal should be paid. The supreme court sustained this objection, and says that it is such a departure from the statute as to avoid the bonds; and that a county has no authority, except it be conferred by statute, to make its bonds payable anywhere, except at its own treasury. The injunction was made perpetual. See Fulton Co. v. Railroad Co. 21 Ill. 338; 1867, is a proviso to § 13. Prior to the passage of that act, townships had no authority whatever, by any general statute, to vote their aid to railroads. The proviso provides that, "When elections have already been held, and a majority of the legal voters of any township were in favor of a subscription to said railroad, then, and in that case no other election need be had; and the amount so voted shall be subscribed as in this act provided, and such elections are hereby declared legal and valid, as though this act had been in force at the time thereof, and all the provisions hereof had been complied with." There is no pretense that a majority of the legal voters of the township voted at this election, much less that such majority voted for the bonds. The highest number claimed by any witness who voted at that election, is seventy-eight. Only a bare majority of these voted for the subscription, the others against it. All the witnesses say that there were resident in the township at the time of this elec tion, at least two hundred legal voters. The election, therefore, did not bring the township within the proviso; and, there being no subsequent election, it follows, beyond all hope of escape or denial, that there was no authority of any kind to issue these bonds. If not, then they are simply void. And if it were necessary to assign a reason for a statute, it would be very readily seen why a majority of all the legal voters in the town ship should sanction a measure of this importance before the passage of any law upon the subject, governing such an election, where no provisions had been enacted, requiring petitions or notices, or for prescribing the mode, time or place for conducting such election; and when, in the absence of any statute controlling such election, a mere handful of interested parties might gather, without notice, and go through the forms of what they should be pleased to call an election, and thus very easily secure a majority of all the legal voters voting. The legislature could not safely have done less, in thus ratifying prior elections, than to require such a majority of votes cast for the subscription, than to require that a majority of all the legal voters in the township should favor the enterprise; because the presence of that number of the voters at the election would preclude and prevent a clique of interested parties assembling and binding the township without their consent. There is also a proviso, under section 15, requiring the clerk of the election, under elections held prior to the passage of this law, to file with the county clerk of the proper county, within ten days after the issuing of the bonds, a certificate of the vote under which they were issued, the amount of stock subscribed and bonds issued, and the rate of interest. This never was done. The least reference to the law, and the proper place to find the record of the elections required by the law, to make the bonds valid, would have shown defendant in error that the law had not been complied with in any particular, and that the recital on the face of the bonds was a naked and unmitigated falsehood. The evidence shows that the recital in the case of the bonds, as to when the election was held, is not true; and this fact comes from defendant in error. where elections may have already been held and a majority of the legal voters of any township were in favor of a subscription, then, in that case, no other election need be had; and such elections are hereby declared to be legal and valid.” But it will be contended by defendant in error that the act of Feb. 25, 1869 (3 Priv. L. of II. 1869, p. 274), operates to cure all the ob jections I make to the previous proceedings, prior to the statute of Feb. 28, 1867. But this is not so for two reasons: 1. The act of Feb. 25, 18C9, does not purport in any way to cure any of the objections which I have made, but relates to defects of a wholly different character. 2. The act of Feb. 25, 1869, intended to operate as security upon certain acts of township officers, is unconstitutional and void. And first: does this act, which was no doubt intended by the person who drafted it, operate to cure any of the objections urged against the validity of these bonds and coupons? The most casuai reading of the act will show that no such purpose was ever dreamed of. It was intended to obviate and, if it has any effect, did obviate a wholly different class of objections. The preamble recites, "That, whereas, certain township officers along the line of, and through which the Danville, Urbana, Bloomington, & Pekin Railroad passes, have failed to keep a full and perfect record of elections called and held, and township clerks have failed to file with the county clerks, certificates, as required by section 15 of the amended articles of association of said railroad; therefore, Sec. 1. Be it enacted, etc., that, where such informalities and neglect may have occurred and bonds have been issued, or may hereafter be issued, to aid in the construction of said railroad, no such neglect or omission, on the part of township officers, shall in any way invalidate or impair the colletion of said bonds." The only thing cured or attempted to be cured by this act, is a supposed want of a sufficient record of elections. No effort is made in this act to supply and cure the fatal defect of the election itself. The fatal variance between the election and the act of Feb. 28, 1867, it seems, was entirely overlooked in the bill. This so-called curative act was, in fact, an act to legalize the defective proceedings of officers, and not, in any sense, an act in any way or manner to add to or take from or change the former act of incorporation. Not even the general and deceitful words, "and for other purposes," which are usually attached to the titles of private acts are found in this title. Can it be true that this township is estopped from showing that every recital in the face of these bonds is absolutely and wholly false? That it never gave the supervisor any authority to issue them? That there never was any compliance with the statute? That, by the plain letter and spirit of this statute, these bonds were unauthorized and prohibited? If, indeed, this be the law, then what protection can any statute give to citizens in their corporate capacity? If a total want of authority in a municipal officer to bind the township, combined with fraud and deceit of the worst charA total absence of any record, ought and will acter, may not be uncovered and shown against charge a prudent man with notice that no such these pretended liabilities, then is the situa- election as the law requires was ever held. The tion of the township pitiable indeed. Then, preamble and the act presupposes that some without authority of law, without the knowl-record of the election has been kept, but deedge or consent of the citizen, the supervisor, a clares that such record has not been "full and mere irresponsible ministerial officer of the perfect." humblest grade, may mortgage the property and earnings of his township without stint and without limit. Did the act of Feb. 28, 1867, validate the election of Aug. 1866, as declared by the first instruction of the court? Before the terms or the spirit of the 13th section of that act can have effect, such election as is therein required must have been held. The proviso is: "That, Second. This last act is unconstitutional and void. Section 23 of Art. III. of the Constitution of Illinois of 1848, among other things declares, "And no private or local law, which may be passed by the general assembly, shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be embraced in the title." This constitutional provision was in force at the time of the passage of this law. The law is both a private and local law, and therefore the title of the act must disclose its subject-matter. This it does not do. The title to this simply declares it to be "An Act to Amend an Act entitled 'An Act to Amend Articles of Association of the Danville, Urbana, Bloomington, & Pekin Railroad Company, and to Extend the Powers and Confer a Charter upon the Same.'" It in no manner amends the former act; nor does it in the body of the act purport to be an amendment. It does not add to nor diminish nor change a single word, line or section of the other act to which this title refers, and which it purports to amend. There is not a shadow of connection between the title and the body of the act. The language of the Constitution is: that "The subject of the act shall be expressed in the title," and from this requirement there is no escape, unless the Constitution itself be disregarded. Judge Cooley, in his Constitutional Limitations, p. 143, says of this constitutional requirement that it was intended: first. To put a stop to and prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling leg islation." Second. To prevent a surprise and fraud upon the legislature, by means of a provision in bills, of which their titles gave no information; and third. To fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation being considered, in order that they may have opportunity to be heard thereon if they desire. In the case of Conner v. N. Y. 2 Sandf. 361, the court, in speaking of a like provision of the state Constitution, says that it was aimed at "log-rolling" legislation, by which bills to promote individual interest, and mere neighborhood projects, often at the expense of the people of a county at large, were secured in their passage. purpose and permissible under the state Constitution. Chicago, Dam. & Vin. R. Co. v. Smith, Sup. Ct. Ill. op. of Justice Northrup, filed Jan. 22, 1872. In Taylor v. Thompson, 42 Ill. 9, this court defined a corporate purpose to mean "a tax to be expended in a manner which shall promote the general prosperity and welfare of the municipality which levies it." We adopt this definition, and are of the opinion that no person can doubt that taxes expended to aid the construction of a railroad must promote the general prosperity. This decision affirms the proposition that St. Joseph township could be authorized to aid in the construction of a railroad running to or through the township, by donation or the loan of its credit, and that its corporate authorities could be empowered to make the donation or to pledge its credit for that purpose. St. Joseph township was authorized to grant such aid. 1. The township organization law of Illinois, approved Feb. 20, 1861, confers upon each town, as a body corporate, capacity to make such contracts as may be necessary to the exercise of its corporate or administrative powers. Gross' ed. Stats. of Ill. 742. In addition to the other powers, said township organization law confers upon the electors in towns the power to direct such sums to be raised, for certain purposes, or for any other purpose, as they may deem necessary. Gross' ed. § 5, p. 745. Special town meetings are authorized by said law to be held when deemed necessary to the interests of the town, to act upon such subjects as are specified in the notices calling them. Gross' ed. p. 746. The clause "a majority of the legal voters of the township" intended to require only a majority of the legal voters of the township voting at the election to be held to vote upon the question. The 2d section of this act, however, declares it to be a public act; but that does not help the matter. The act itself shows it to be both a Under the most favorable circumstances, the private and local law. Whether it is a private supervisor could know, from personal acquaintor local law, or a public one, is to be deter-ance but approximately, the number of legal mined by the contents of the body of the act. The legislature cannot defeat this provision of the Constitution by any such shallow device as naming a purely private act a public one. Railroad Co. v. Gregory, 15 Ill. 20. This provision of the Constitution is mandatory. People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 186; People, etc. v. Mellen, 32 Ill. 181. For these reasons, then, this curative act is void, and cannot aid defendant in error. Mr. Horatio C. Burchard, for defendant in error: The legislature has the constitutional right to authorize counties and cities to aid in the construction of railroads, by lending their credit or by taking stock. Prettyman v. Tazewell Co. 19 Ill. 406; Robertson v. Rockford, 21 Ill. 457; Johnson v. Stark Co. 24 Ill. 85; Perkins v. Lewis, 24 Ill. 208. Aid, in form of a donation to a railroad company, as well as by subscription to its stock for the purpose of securing the construction of its road to a town, has been held to be a corporate voters in the township. Their qualifications depending upon age, residence, nativity, and naturalization, he would have no power to ascertain by judicial investigation, were that practicable, nor in any authoritative manner, except as they came to vote. If the election itself was the evidence of the number, the question was free from difficulty. If a majority was required of all, voting and not voting, what tests, what evidence, and what means of judicial and authoritative investigation is provided or can he exercise, to determine whether it has become his duty to subscribe for the town? Evidently the phrase "a majority of the legal voters of any township," as used in the 13th section, is no broader than the phrase, "a majority of all the legal voters of such townships voting at such election" used in section 14; but the latter expression states more fully what the former implies. That it was not the intention of the legislature to require a majority of all the legal voters of the township, including those not voting at the election, to have been in favor of subscrip tion to the railroad, is apparent from the pro- | until it should appear that a majority had visions of section 15 of the act, which required voted for subscription, should find and recite in the town clerks to file with the county clerks the bond the fact that must appear to him be"certificates of the votes of their towns." If a fore he could legally act. Such finding and remajority of all the voters residing in the town- cital of his conclusion on the bond would conships were necessary, whether voting or not, clude the township for which he was authorized the certificate of votes cast at the election to act, as well as himself, as to whether the rewould be valueless, without some provision for quired majority had voted. ascertaining the number of actual legal voters in the township. The legislature used the language, it is a legal presumption, in the sense and with a view to the construction given to the words by the courts of the state, which had previously passed upon their meaning. Almost the identical phraseology occurs in § 5, art. VII. of the Constitution of Illinois, which forbids the removal of a county seat "Until the point to which it is proposed to be removed shall be fixed by law, and a majority of the voters of the county shall have voted in favor of its removal to such point." The supreme court of Illinois, in construing this section and the phrase "voters of the county," held: "That the voters of the county referred to were the voters who should vote at the election authorized by it. We hold, therefore, that a majority of the legal votes cast at this election is sufficient to determine the question of a revocation of the county seat." People v. Warfield, 20 Ill. 159. Similar language is used in section 6 of the same article of the Constitution of Illinois, which received a similar construction from the supreme court of the state. People v. Garner, 47 111. 246. The same construction has been given by the court in People v. Wiant, 48 Ill. 263. "A majority of the voters of the county means a majority of those who actually vote." Louisville & N. R. v. Co. Ct. Davidson Co. Sneed (Tenn.) 637. This was the mode provided by law for ascertaining the sense of the qualified voters of the city upon that question. There would appear to be no other practicable way in which the matter could be determined. State v. Mayor, etc. 37 Mo. 270. These decisions "and none contrary can be found," overthrow the main defense interposed to the collection of the bonds. The fact as to whether an election had been held, and a majority of the voters were in favor of the subscription, was to be passed upon and decided by the supervisor. Section 14 provides: "If it shall appear that a majority of all the legal voters of such towns or townships voting at such election have voted for subscription, it shall be the duty of the supervisor in townships to subscribe to the capital stock of said railroad company, in the name of such town or township, the amount so voted to be subscribed, and to receive from said company the proper certificates therefor. He shall also execute to said company, in the name of such town or township, bonds shall be signed by such supervisor, and be attested by the clerk of the town or township," etc. It was proper that the supervisor, not being authorized or required to execute the bonds "A statute, in providing that county bonds should not be delivered by the commissioners until a sufficient sum had been provided, by stock subscriptions or otherwise, to complete a specified railroad, and imposing upon them a duty of delivering the bonds, when said provision has been made, without indicating any person or tribunal to determine that fact, neces sarily delegates that power to the commissioners and if delivered improvidently, the bonds will not be invalidated.' Knox Co. v. Nichols, 14 Ohio St. 260. In Flagg v. Palmyra, 33 Mo. 440, the act of the legislature, as in this case, provided “that before any such subscription shall be made, the city council shall call an election of the qualified voters of the city, . . . and if a majority of the qualified voters voting at said election shall be in favor of such subscription, the same shall be made by the city council." The city subscribed and issued bonds under the act, but in return to a mandamus to compel the levy of a tax to pay the interest, set up that no call or notice of an election was giv en, and no votes cast, received, counted or returned relating to the subscription, as required by the act. The court held the return insufficient, as against the bona fide holder of the coupons, and that the issue of the bonds authorized the latter to suppose that all those things had been done in the time, form and substance required by the law. The act of Feb. 28, 1866, validated the elec1|tion and cured any irregularities in holding it. "The legislature may, by subsequent acts, validate and confirm previous acts of a corporation otherwise invalid." Winn v. Macon, 21 Ga. 275: McMillen v. Boyles, 6. Ia. 304; Bissell v. Jeffersonville, 24 How. 287, 16 L. ed. 664; Atchison v. Butcher, 3 Kan. 104. It is a well recognized principle of law that, where a power must be conferred to render the performance of a particular act valid and binding, such act done without authority, may be so ratified and confirmed that it will have all the force and effect a prior conferred power would have given to it. Defective subscriptions may be ratified in all cases where the legislature could originally have conferred the power. V. Keithsburg v. Frick, 34 Ill. 405; Copes v. Charleston, 10 Rich. L. 491; McMillen Boyles, 6 Iowa, 304; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 220, 17 L. ed. 530; People v. Mitchell, 327, 18 L. ed. 177; Bass v. Columbus, 30 Ga. 35 N. Y. 551; Thompson v. Lee Co. 3 Wall. 845; City v. Lamson, 9 Wall. 477, 19 L. ed. 725. In regard to ratification by legislative act, this court said, in Beloit v. Morgan, 7 Wall. 624, 19 L. ed. 207: "This is not an open question in this court. Whenever it has been presented, the ruling has been that, in cases of bonds issued by municipal corporations, under a statute upon the subject, ratification by the legislature is, in all respects, equivalent to original authority, and cures all defects of power, if such defects existed, and all irregularities in its execution." The court of Illinois held the same. government under which the local affairs had been managed, and taxes assessed and collected for many years in New York, Michigan, and other states. It provided for a supervisor and other local officers, assigning to each separate and distinct duties in relation to the town affairs, and for a board of supervisors to manthe affairs of the county. 2. Legislation. "The court held that, under the law existing at the time the vote was had, the tax was ille-age gally levied and invalid; but that the act, legalizing the vote and curing the defects therein, was effectual for that purpose, and that the legislature, without any doubt, had authority to enact that law." Cowgill v. Long, 15 Ill. 203. "Where a subscription is unlawfully made, the legislature may, by a subsequent act, legalize the action." Keithsburg v. Frick, 34 Ill. 405. The legislature of Illinois has passed acts at every session since the adoption of the Constitution of 1848, validating county, town and school district taxes and elections and votes in regard to such taxes. See Sess. L. Ill., 1849, p. 42; 1851, pp. 100, 126; 1853, p. 95; 1845, p. 189, and Priv. L., p. 683; 1859, pp. 175, 177, 207. The issue of township bonds could be authorized by the legislature without the vote of the electors of the township. The power of a state legislature to authorize the officers of the political divisions or municipal corporations of the state to make contracts in regard to local matters, and execute securities and obligations on behalf of and binding upon the people of the corporation or division, as well as to levy taxes for their payment, has been recognized by this court and the state courts. Curtis v. Butler Co. 24 How. 435, 16 L. ed. 745. It is needful only to inquire whether limitations upon this legislative power are imposed by the Constitution of the state of Illinois. 1. Constitutional Provisions. The Constitution adopted by Illinois, and in force Apr. 1, 1848, provided, by art. IX., § 5, that: The corporate authorities of counties, townships, school districts, cities, towns, and villages, may be vested with power to assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes. It was provided by art. V., § 19: "The county judge, with such justices of the peace in each county as may be designated by law. shall hold terms for the transaction of county business, and shall perform such other duties as the general assembly shall prescribe." And by art. VII. § 6: The general assembly shall provide, by a general law, for a township organization, under which any county may organize whenever a majority of the voters of such county, at any general election shall so determine; and whenever any county shall adopt a township organization, so much of this constitution as provides for the management of the fiscal concerns of the said county by the county court may be dispensed with, and the affairs of said county may be transacted in such a manner as the general assembly may provide. A township organization system then existed in several of the states of the Union. It was not the New England town-meeting, but a modification combining a joint county and town At the first regular session after the adoption of the Constitution of 1848, the legislature provided for a township organization by a general law, which was substantially a copy of the New York law in its main features, authorizing the board of supervisors to levy taxes upon the towns of a county for local purposes for the amount laid before them by the supervisors of the town, the amount being the aggregate of town charges and claims allowed by the supervisor, town clerk and justices of the peace, acting as a board of town auditors. Gross, Stat. of Ill. 753, § 7. Among the town charges are enumerated: a. The moneys authorized to be raised by the vote of a town-meeting for any town purposes. b. Every sum directed by law to be raised for any town purpose. Gross, Stat. 753, § 6. The law directed that the moneys necessary to defray the town charges of each town shall be levied on the taxable property of such town, in the manner prescribed in the act for raising revenue and other moneys for state and county purposes and expenses. Gross, Stat. 753, sec. 9. The administrative duties were required to be performed by different officers, some of them having power, sometimes alone and sometimes conjointly with others, to contract or perform duties which would bind and render the town liable for their action. The commissioners of highways had power, without any vote or order of the electors, to lay out roads and bind the town by agreement with the owner, or by assessment of the damages to him. Gross, Stat. 772, § 62; 775, § 88. They, also, without being authorized by a vote of the electors, had power "to assess a road tax on all real estate liable to taxation of the town, to any amount they may deem necessary, not exceeding forty cents on each $100 worth, as valued on the assessment roll of the previous year." Gross, Stat. 765, § 8. By amendinents to the township organization law, approved Feb. 27, 1884, their statement, without any vote of the town thereon, laid before the town auditors, as to the amount necessary for the construction of a bridge in the town, certified by the auditors to the board of supervisors, imposed the duty upon the latter of levying a tax upon the town for the collection of the amount. Gross, Ill. Stat. 766, § 14. Overseers of roads, by the same amendment, in the care of roads and bridges, can bind the town for material used in their repair, the value of which, when ascertained, is made a town charge, and collected by taxation upon the town, without any vote of the electors in regard thereto. Gross, Stat. 770, § 52. In counties where the support of the poor was made a town charge, supervisors, as ex officio overseers of the poor of the town, were author |