1872.

VOORHEES V. BONESTEEL.

and all these acts have been strictly construed by the court.

Yale v. Dederer, 18 N. Y. 272, 22 N. Y. 450; Kelso v. Tabor, 52 Barb. 125.

And even in the cases which hold she may make her husband the agent, as Buckley v. Wells, 33 N. Y. 519, and Knapp v. Smith, 27 N. Y. 277, the court carefully adverts to the fact that the cases are untainted with fraud, and makes that fact an element in its decision.

In re Rathbone, 1 Bank. Reg. 145, and 2 Bank. Reg. 89, was a case where a similar attempt was made by a bankrupt to conceal his property in his wife's name.

The property there was procured by the bankrupt's services as an insurance agent, and the court says in the first opinion: "It must be regarded as a gift by him to her in fraud of his creditors, and as property held by her in trust for him." In the second opinion it is said, and "Fraud it is entirely applicable to this case: is scarcely ever made out by direct evidence. The proof of it is generally arrived at by the interweaving of circumstances till the fabric is fully formed." It is not often that full evidence of it is shown, as in this case; and yet, less full evidence is often entirely satisfactory. Messrs. John Winslow and Joshua Van Cott, for appellee:

Under the laws of New York, a married woman may own and possess property as if she were single, and the same shall not be liable for her husband's debts (Laws of 1848 and 9; Laws of 1860, 157, ch. 90, § 1); and may sell her property and carry on any trade or busiand 3. ness, etc. Ibid. §§

The law will protect the wife's separate estate. As to that portion of it in controversy, no creditor has ever suffered on account of it. No creditor's property or money is represented in it, in any way whatever.

The stock or interest was transferred to the respondent by Mr. Taylor, for reasons satisfactory to both, and that related solely to their mutual interest.

The consideration therefor, or inducement to make the transfer, moved from her, the respondent. When the transfer was made, it became her property, and there is no possible reason why it should be confiscated to gratify creditors who are represented nominally by the assignee, Mr. Voorhees.

A married woman is at liberty to avail herself of the agency of her husband, as if they had not been united in marriage.

Buckley v. Wells, 33 N. Y. 518; Owen v. Cawley, 36 N. Y. 600; see, also, Knapp v. Smith, 27 N. Y. 277, a leading case, not only on subjects of agency, but of wife's title to property claimed by husband's creditors.

Draper v. Stouvenel, 35 N. Y. 513; Abbey v. Deyo, 44 Barb. 382; Hinckley v. Phelps, 2 Allen (Mass.) 77; Richardson v. Merrill, 32 Vt. 27; 33 Vt. 457.

There is no difficulty in holding that, at law, a married woman may now own property as against her husband.

While her title is open to inspection, creditors can reach it only upon the ground of fraud. In such inquiry, the question is whether the transaction is sincere and bona fide. Gage v. Dauchy, 34 N. Y. 296, in which Knapp v. Smith, supra, is cited with approbation.

The complainant's bill, which contains no allegation of fraud whatever, was properly dismissal are so well set forth by the court below, missed at circuit. The reasons for such disin the opinion there given, that we respectfully refer this honorable court to the same. It may be found reported in 7 Blatchf. C. C. 495.

Mr. Justice Clifford delivered the opinion of the court:

Assignees of the estate of the debtor, in a proceeding in bankruptcy, may be chosen by the first meeting, the judge, or, in case there is no creditors, or, if they make no choice at their opposing interest, the register, may make the appointment, subject to the approval of the judge. 14 Stat. at L. 522. Section 14 also provides that as soon as an assignee is appointed and qualified, the judge, or, where there is no opposing interest, the register shall, by an instrument under his hand, assign and convey to the [*25 assignee all the estate, real and personal, of the bankrupt, and that the title to all such estate, with the deeds, books and papers of the bankrupt relating thereto, shall, by operation of law, vest in such assignee. Such assignments, it was foreseen, might give rise to controversies, and the 2d section of the act, in view of that contingency, provides that circuit courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts, of the same district, of all suits at law or in equity which may or shall be brought, by the assignee in bankruptcy, against any person claiming an adverse interest, or by such person rights of property of said bankrupt, transferagainst such assignee, touching any property or able to or vested in such assignee.

Voorhees, the complainant, is the assignee in bankruptcy of the first named respondent, and ule of debts, filed by the bankrupt, shows that he alleges in the bill of complaint that the schedhe owed debts to an amount exceeding $30,000; that the schedule exhibits no assets except a cerrespondent is the wife of the bankrupt; that she tain note believed to be worthless; that the other has standing in her name, upon the books of the Nicholson Pavement Company, a corporation organized under the general laws of the state of New York, eleven hundred and forty-five shares of the capital stock of said company, of the par tificates of the said company for the said shares, value of $114,500, and that she holds stock cerwhich are believed to be of a value exceeding plainant also alleges that he, as such assignee, $30,000. Apart from those matters the comhas received the required instrument, duly executed, assigning and conveying to him all the estate, real and personal, of the bankrupt, and truth, the property of the bankrupt, and as such that the said stock, as he believes, is, in fact and that it should have been included in the inventory of his property, and that it should be apitors. All of said shares, it is admit- [*26 plied to the payment of the debts due to his credted, are standing in the name of the wife of the facts and circumstances under which the title bankrupt; but the complainant alleges that the was acquired, as confirmed by the conduct of the respondents since that time, affords satisfactory evidence that the property of the shares is in the bankrupt, and he states what the facts were, as he is informed and believes, with great and circumstances attending the acquisition

*

269

Proofs were taken on both sides, and the court having heard the parties, entered a decree for the respondents, dismissing the bill of complaint, and the complainant appealed to this court.

fullness and particularity. Appended to that the other respondent he also denies that the cir-
statement are eleven interrogatories to the re-cumstances under which she acquired the shares
spondents, designed to elicit evidence to estab- are such as are alleged in the bill, and avers
lish the truth of the alleged circumstances. that the shares mentioned are the individual
Service was made and the respondents ap- and separate property of his wife, as alleged in
peared and filed separate answers. Among other her answer.
things, the last named respondent admits that
she is the wife of the bankrupt; that the shares
mentioned in the bill are standing in her name
upon the books of the pavement company, and
that she holds the stock certificates therefor; but
she alleges that the value of the stock is less Before proceeding to examine the errors as-
than one third of the sum alleged in the bill. signed it *becomes necessary to make some [ *28
On the other hand, she denies that the stock is or further reference to the circumstances of the
ever was the property of the bankrupt, or that transaction, in order that the questions present-
he ever had any interest therein, or that the ed for decision may be fully understood. Both
shares should have been included in his inven- parties agree that the title to the shares in
tory, or be applied to the payment of the debts question came from the owner of the license,
due to his creditors, and she denies that the cir- granted by the patentee of the pavement inven-
cumstances under which she became possessed tion, to lay that pavement in the city of Brook-
of the stock are correctly set forth in the bill, | lyn, and the pleadings and proof show that the
and each and every allegation in that behalf, so bankrupt, acting as the agent of his wife, nego-
far as the same are different from, or inconsist- tiated a sale to the firm, therein mentioned, of
ent with, the statement as set forth in her an- one half the right for the sum of $10,000, and
swer. What she alleges is, that, prior to that that the owner of that license, in consideration
time she was engaged in the dry goods business, of those services and the services in the same be-
her husband acting as her agent and attorney in half rendered by the wife, agreed to assign the
fact in carrying on the business; that the busi- other half of the license to the wife, who is the
ness was conducted in her name and for her ac- present holder of the shares. Pursuant to that
count, upon capital furnished to her by her agreement the owner of the license, on the 7th
father; that he made advances to her exceeding of December, 1866, made an assignment of the
$20,000, which she employed in carrying on that whole license, conveying one half to the last
business or expended in paying the expenses of named respondent, and the other half to the firm
their family; that the assignee of the patent de- by whom it had previously been purchased; and
scribed in the bill desired to secure her services it appears that the sale and transfer were rati-
and influence, and through her the influence of fied by the patentee on the 10th of May follow-
her friends, in the interest of that improvement, ing. By this arrangement the last named re-
27*] and proposed, if she would render such spondent became the owner of one half of the
services and procure the aid and influence of license interest, but she subsequently sold to
her friends for the same purpose he would give William Smith & Co. one half of her interest so
her one half interest and right in his assignment acquired for the sum of $10,000, and received
or license to lay such pavement in that city, and the consideration to her own use, and expended
would also give her husband employment in the money for the support of herself and family.
promoting the enterprise and accomplishing the All the parties interested came together on the
undertaking; that she accepted the proposition 5th of November, subsequent to the execution
and rendered the promised service in all proper of the confirmatory license by the patentee, and
ways in her power, and that the other contract-organized the pavement company; and in con-
ing party, in consideration thereof, conveyed a
one half interest in the enterprise to her as he
had proposed, and that such conveyance was
made and received in good faith and without
any intent of defrauding the creditors of the
bankrupt; that none of the money, assets or
property of the bankrupt was used to procure
such conveyance, nor is the same in any way
represented in the shares of the capital stock of
the pavement company now held and owned by
the respondent. Suffice it to say, without repro-
ducing the further details of her answer, that
she claims and avers that she is legally and
equitably entitled to hold and that she does
hold the shares in question as her separate and
individual estate.

Substantially the same defenses are set up in the answer of the other respondent. He admits that the last named respondent is his wife, that the stock stands in her name, and that she holds the stock certificates; but he denies that the stock is or ever was his property; that he has or ever had any interest in the same, or that it should have been included in his inventory, or that it should be applied to the payment of his debts as alleged in the bill. Concurring with

sideration of the transfer of that license to the company, the several parties received certificates in due form for their respective proportions of the same, the last named respondent receiving eleven hundred and fifty shares of the stock, being one fourth, less four hundred shares reserved for the working capital of the corporation. Forty-four of the reserved shares were subsequently transferred to the same respondent, and the proofs show that she sold the same as her own property and appropriated the avails to pay her family expenses. Five of the [*29 shares first allotted to her she gave to her husband that he might be qualified to act as a trustee in the company, leaving the eleven hundred and forty-five shares standing in her name.

It is claimed by the assignee that the half interest in the license right was transferred to the wife of the bankrupt at a time when he was insolvent, in consideration of the services rendered by the bankrupt, and that the avails belonged to his creditors, and that the ownership vested in the wife is simply a cover and a fraud. Accusations of fraud may well be dismissed, as nothing of the kind is alleged in the bill of complaint, and it is well settled law that affirma

W

tive relief will not be granted in equity upon | was organized, she joined with the others inthe ground of fraud unless it is made a distinct terested in the enterprise, and transferred her allegation in the bill, so that it may be put in remaining interest to the company and became issue by the pleadings. Noonan v. Lee, 2 Black, a stockholder, accepting the eleven hundred 508, 17 L. ed. 281; Moore v. Green, 19 How. 69, and fifty shares as her proportion of the stock 15 L. ed. 533; Beaubien v. Beaubien, 23 How. to be divided at that time among the share190, 16 L. ed. 484; Magniac v. Thompson, 15 holders. All agreed in treating her as [*31 How. 281; 2 Wall. Jr. 209; Eyre v. Potter, 15 the owner of a quarter interest in the license, How 42; Fisher v. Boody, 1 Curt. 206. and they assigned the shares to her as her separate property, and the evidence shows that she has always dealt with the interest in the license and in the stock as her own.

Suppose, however, the rule was otherwise, and that the complainant may prove fraud, and be entitled to relief upon that ground, even if he has not alleged anything of the kind, still the result must be the same, as he has not introduced any sufficient proof to establish the charge or to warrant the court in adopting that theory, even if the charge was made in the bill. Instead of that, the theory of the bill is that the half interest in the pavement license was conveyed to the wife in trust for her husband, and that the shares in question are now held by her to his use, as representing to that extent the one half interest of the pavement license, which, as the complainant alleges, was purchased for the benefit of the bankrupt.

Attempt is made in argument to show that the conveyance of the one half interest in the pavement license was made, in part at least, in consideration of the services of the bankrupt, and it must be conceded that some of the proofs tend strongly to support that theory; but the answer to the suggestion made by the respondents, deduced from the same proofs, is satisfactory and conclusive. Those same proofs also show that in rendering those services the bankrupt was acting as the agent and attorney in fact of his wife; that for some time previously he had been engaged in transacting her busi

father, and that the respondent, in rendering the services which it is urged constituted a part of the consideration for the sale of the half interest in the pavement license, was acting in her behalf and to promote her interest.

Confessedly, the claim in that view is dis-ness, using the money furnished to her by her tinctly alleged, in the bill, but the difficulty which the complainant has to encounter in at tempting to support that theory is that every material allegation of the bill in that behalf is distinctly denied in each of the answers, and 30*] that the proofs, instead of being sufficient to overcome the answers, afford satisfactory grounds for holding that the theory of the respondents is correct.

Courts of equity cannot decree against such denials in the answer of the respondent, on the testimony of a single witness. Where the denial is distinct, the rule is universal that the complainant, under such circumstances, must have two witnesses, or one witness and corroborative circumstances, or he is not entitled to relief, as he cannot prevail if the balance of proof be not in his favor, and he must have circumstances in his favor, in addition to his single witness, in order to turn the balance. Clark v. Van Reimsdyk, 9 Cranch, 160; Hughes v. Blake, 6 Wheat. 468; Delano v. Winsor, 1 Cliff. 505.

Under the laws of New York a married woman may manage her separate property, through the agency of her husband, without subjecting it to the claims of his creditors, and it is held that she is entitled to the profits of a mercantile business, conducted by the husband in her name, if the capital is furnished by her and he has no interest but that of a mere agent. Abbey v. Deyo, 44 Barb. 381. Where the husband has no interest in the business it is also held that the application of a portion of the income to the support of the husband will not impair the title of the wife to the property. Buckley v. Wells, 33 N. Y. 520; Sess. Acts 1848, 307; Sess. Acts 1849, 528; Sess. Acts 1860, 157. Married women, at common law, could take title to real or personal property by conveyance from any person except the husband; but where Evidence is entirely wanting to show that no trust was created her personal property vestthe holder of the shares in dispute, or her ed absolutely in her husband when reduced to grantor, or her husband, ever intended or sup- his possession, and he became possessed of her posed that the conveyance of the one half in- chattels real in her right with *power [*32 terest in the license was made to the wife in to aliene them at his pleasure during her life, trust for her husband. Taken as a whole, the and if he survived her, they became his absoproofs, instead of supporting that theory, show lute property. Statutes, such as those above very satisfactorily that the property was con referred to, are intended to devest the title of veyed to the holder of the shares, in pursuance the husband, as such, during coverture, and of a prior agreement between her and her to enable the wife to take the absolute title as grantor that she should have such an interest though she were unmarried. Draper v. Stouveas her own, and that it was received by her nel, 35 N. Y. 512; Kelso v. Tabor, 52 Barb. 127. without any suggestion from any source that Laws of the kind have the effect to modify so the title was in any manner qualified, or that it far the antecedent disabilities incident to the was not to be her own separate property. Voor- conjugal relation, as to secure the wife in the hees v. Bonesteel, 7 Blatchf. 498. Confirmation beneficial enjoyment of the new interests she of that view is derived from the conduct and dec- is permitted by law to acquire, and it is exlarations of all the parties, during the negotia- pressly held that she is at liberty to avail hertions and at the time of the transfer. Through self of the agency of her husband as if they had out she always treated the property as her own, not been united in marriage. Owen v. Cawley, and the husband constantly acquiesced in that 36 N. Y. 600. Those laws vest in the wife the claim. She sold a part of the interest and re-legal title to the rents, issues and profits of her ceived the purchase money, and disposed of it as her own, and when the pavement company

real estate as against the husband and his creditors, and it is held that the husband cannot, as

formerly, acquire title to such property in virtue of his marital rights. Consequently, it is held that where the legal title to property is in the wife, as against her husband, it cannot be seized to satisfy his debts without proof that in the given case her title is merely colorable and fraudulent as against his creditors, which is decisive of this case, as nothing of the kind was either alleged in the bill or established by any sufficient evidence. Gage v. Dauchy, 34 N. Y. 293; Webster v. Hildreth, 33 Vt. 457.

tract, made and delivered to him, on the 9th day of March, 1860, the bonds in the name of the county for $20,000, the amount for which the courthouse was to be built.

5. That afterwards Robert Clark, the county judge as aforesaid, went to New York with said Bumgardner, and, claiming to act as county judge of said county, made and issued to said Bumgardner new bonds for $20,000, which new bonds differed in the amount of each and in time of payment, and the amount Apply that rule to the case, and it is clear of coupons in other particulars, and had a seal that the decision of the Circuit Court is cor-made at New York, which he called the seal of rect, and the decree is accordingly affirmed.

CHARLES R. LYNDE, Plff. in Err.,

v.

COUNTY OF WINNEBAGO, STATE OF
IOWA.

(See S. C. 16 Wall. 6-16.)

County bonds, recitals in―estoppel by-signed out of state.

the county, and then and there signed said bonds and affixed said seal to them, and delivered them to said Bumgardner, and that they are the same bonds on which this suit is founded.

6. That said Clark proposed to issue said bonds in substitution for those first mentioned which were to be delivered up and canceled, and the evidence shows that they were delivered to the said Clark at New York.

7. That while said Clark was in New York making and delivering the bonds offered in this

bago was acting as count judge in said county, and held a term of county court, and issued county warrants, and did other business in discharge of his duties as acting county judge.

1. Where the county judge is the officer desig-suit, the clerk of the district court of Winnenated by the statute to decide whether the voters have given the required sanction to the issue of county bonds, and he executed and issued the bonds, with the requisite popular sanction set forth upon their face, such recital of his decision, in the absence of fraud or collusion, is final. It is not open to examination, where the bonds are in the hands of a bona fide purchaser.

2. It is not a valid objection that the bonds were made payable and were sold beyond the limits of the county and of the state.

3. It was competent for the county Judge to visit New York and there affix to the bonds a seal there procured for that purpose, although a statute of the state provided that, in case of the absence of that officer, the county clerk shall fill his place. [No. 24.]

IN

Argued Oct. 28, 1872. Decided Jan. 6, 1873.
N ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United
States for the District of Iowa.
Suit was brought in the court below by the
plaintiff in error, to recover upon certain bonds.
This cause being submitted to the court
without a jury, the court found the following
facts:

1. The plaintiff owns the bonds, and received them of his father by will, and the father purchased them for value without notice of any defense to them before their maturity.

Thereupon the court finds the law to be for the defendant; to which ruling the plaintiff then and there excepted, and filed his bill of exceptions.

Judgment having been given for the defendant, the plaintiff sued out this writ of error. The case is further stated by the court.

Shiras VanDuzer & Henderson, and W. Penn
Messrs. H. D. Beam, D. N. Cooley, Eighmy,
Clark, for plaintiff in error:

1. The bonds sued on are negotiable instruments.

2. The plaintiff is an innocent holder for value.

3. The county of Winnebago at the date of these bonds, March 9, 1860, had the power, under the laws of Iowa, to issue bonds to aid in the erection of a courthouse.

Sec. 129, p. 26, Code of Iowa of 1851.

When these bonds were issued, the county judge had the power to contract for the erection of a courthouse, without submitting the question to a vote of the people, and thereby 2. The county judge of Winnebago sub-create an indebtedness against the county. mitted to the voters of said county at a special Iowa v. Napier Co. Judge, 7 Iowa, 430. election, held on the 6th day of March, 1860, the By 114, p. 23 of Code, it is enacted that: question of levying a tax of seven mills on a dol-"The county judge may submit to the people lar for the purpose of building a courthouse; said tax to be levied annually, not exceeding ten years, until sufficient amount was raised for said purpose, and that the whole number of votes at said election was twenty-nine, of which twenty-four were in favor of the proposition.

3. That no proposition was ever submitted to said voters to borrow money or to issue bonds for that or for any other purpose.

4. That the county judge made a contract with Martin Bumgardner to build a courthouse for said county, and, on account of said con

NOTE-Recitals in negotiable bonds or securi ties evidence of the facts recited; estoppel by recitals in-see note to Mercer Co. v. Hacket, 17 L. ed. U. S. 548.

of his county, at any regular election, or at a special one called for that purpose, the question whether money may be borrowed to aid in the erection of public buildings," etc.

4. The power to borrow money for the erecbeing thus conferred upon the county, all the tion of courthouses and other public buildings usual and necessary incidents to the full execution of the power will be presumed to have been also conferred.

Commonwealth v. Councils of Pittsburg, 41 Pa. 278; Scybert v. Pittsburg, 1 Wall. 272, 17 L. ed. 553; Meyer v. Muscatine, 1 Wall. 391, 17 L. ed. 566; Hull v. Marshall Co. 12 Iowa, 156.

5. When these bonds were issued, i. e., in

1860, the affairs of the several counties of | is now and has ever since been used as a seal of lowa were controlled and managed by the county judges.

By the Stat. of Iowa, see ch. 15, p. 21 of Code of Iowa.

the county.

Mr. Thomas F. Withrow, for defendant in

error:

I. The execution of the bonds in suit, with

The county judge is declared to be "the ac-out authority conferred by a vote of the people, counting officer and general agent of the coun- was not merely an irregular exercise of existing ty," with the power, among other things, "to su- authority, it was an act without power, and perintend the fiscal concerns of the county and the bonds were, therefore, void. secure their management in the best manner." Also "to submit to the people the question, whether money may be borrowed to aid in the erection of public buildings, etc."

He had the power, without a vote of the people, to contract for the erection of courthouses and other public buildings, and thereby fasten a heavy indebtedness upon the people. He had the right and power to submit the question of borrowing money for such purposes to the people; to announce the result of the election and provide the means for carrying into effect such vote, that is, to issue bonds in the name of the county, and negotiate the same for the purpose of raising money; in other words, the county acted through and by him. In these matters he was the county itself. The supreme court of Iowa, in the case of Clapp v. Cedar Co. 5 Ia. 55, declared him to be "the head and hand of the county."

In Ring v. Co. of Johnson, 6 Ia. 272, it is held, that "he is the leading representativethe embodiment of the county. His acts are the acts of the corporation."

1. The fact that bonds have been issued by the county authorizes a purchaser to assume that the vote of the county has been taken as required by law.

Knox Co. v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 545, 16 L. ed. 210.

2. If the bonds recite that the vote has been taken, a purchaser is not bound to look further for evidence of a compliance with the conditions to the grant of the power.

Hull v. Marshall Co. 12 Ia. 142; Casady v. Woodbury Co. 13 Ia. 113; Iowa v. Napier Co. Judge, 7 Ia. 425; Rev. of 1860, § 241; Rev. Stat. 1843, ch. 31, § 4, p. 123, §§ 10, 23, ch. 149, §§ 2, 4.

II. The execution of the bonds being without authority, the county is not estopped by the recital therein contained. An agent cannot create a power in himself to execute an instrument for his principal, by reciting its existence. The absence of power is sufficient defense, ever against a holder without actual notice.

Code of 1851, § 114; Rev. 1860, § 250; Code of 1851, § 115; Rev. 1860, 251; Code of 1851, § 116; Rev. 1860, § 252; Code of 1851, § 119; Rev. 1860, § 255; Marsh v. Fulton Co. 10 Wall. 676, 19 L. ed. 1040; Treadwell v. Commissioners, 11 Ohio St. 190; Hopple v. Brown Township, 13 Ohio St. 330; Beckel v. Union Town ship, 15 Ohio St. 438; Aurora v. West, 22 Ind. 88; St. Louis v. Alexander, 23 Mo. 483; Starin v. Genoa, 23 N. Y. 439; Marshall Co. v. Cook, 38 Ill. 44.

III. The bonds in suit were executed by Robert Clark, pretending to act as county judge in the city of New York, while the clerk of the county was legally acting as county judge and holding the county court within the county. He could not act as a county judge, nor as the county court of Winnebago Co., while he was in New York, and therefore the bonds were not executed by the county judge nor the county court.

Code of 1851, § 111; Rev. 1860, § 247; Code of 1851, §§ 103, 107, a portion of which is reprinted in the Rev. of 1860, §§ 240 and 244; Code of 1851, § 94; Rev. of 1860, § 22; Code of 1851, § 125; Rev. of 1860, § 261; Burrell's Dic., word "Court."

IV. The seal of the county was essential to the bonds of the county. The seal affixed was not the seal of the county, and the bonds were for that reason void.

Knox Co. v. Aspinwall, supra, Bissell v. Jefcrsonville, 24 How. 287, 16 L. ed. 664; Moran v. Miami Co. 2 Black, 722, 17 L. ed. 342; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 203, 17 L. ed. 524; Meyer v. Muscatine, 1 Wall. 385, 17 L. ed. 564; Thomson v. Lee Co. 3 Wall. 330, 18 L. ed. 178. The lack of the county seal does not vitiate the county bonds. The statutes of Iowa do not require that the negotiable paper of the county should be issued under the seal of the county. Code of 1851, §§ 93, 94; Rev. 1860, §§ 221, In the case of Ring v. Johnson Co. 6 Ia. 271, 222; Code of 1851, § 108; Rev. 1860, § 244; decided in 1858, the supreme court of Iowa ex-Code of 1851, § 152; Rev. 1860, § 360; Code of pressly holds that the seal of the county is not essential to the validity of promissory notes, coupons and other contracts of like nature.

It does not appear, as a matter of fact, that the bonds are not duly sealed.

Section 94 Code of 1851 of Iowa, authorized the county judge to obtain, as soon as practicable, a new seal for his county, bearing on it the words, Seal of the county of, Iowa.

The evidence does not show that Winnebago county ever had any seal before March, 1860, or that it ever had any other seal than the very one attached to these bonds.

All the evidence shows is, that the county judge, when in New York, procured a seal, had the same properly engraved, used the same in the execution of these bonds, and that the same

1851, § 974; Rev. 1860, § 1823; Bouv. L. Dic. 12th ed., word "Bond;" 7 Bac. Abr., word "Obligation," "B" and "C;" Saylor v. Blacer, 2 S. & R. 503; Ring v. Johnson Co. 6 Ia. 271; Web. Dic., word "Formally;" Bouv. Dic., word "Formality."

Mr. Justice Swayne delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a writ of error to the circuit court of the United States for the district of Iowa.

The case involves the validity of certain bonds issued by the judge of the county of Winnebago. Such cases have been numerous in this court. The one before us, though new in some of its aspects, presents no point which has not been substantially determined in pre