Cardle, 6 Wall. 318, 18 L. ed. 816, 7 Wall. 506, 19 L. ed. 264; Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85, 19 L. ed. 332, will, when examined, establish this proposition as far as judicial decision can King v. Price, 6 East, 323; King v. Justices of As the power of the court to resentence a prisoner is not affected by the fact that he had entered upon the imprisonment ordered by the court under the first sentence, so it cannot be affected by the fact that he had paid into court the fine imposed upon him. The King v. Loveden, 8 T. R. 615. The case is wholly distinguishable in principle from those cases which relate to the power of a court to resentence a prisoner where the judgment has been reversed upon writ of error. Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court: An application to this court was made at a former day for a writ of habeas corpus, on the allegation that the petitioner was unlawfully imprisoned under an order of the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York. Disclaiming any assertion of a general power of review over the judgments of the inferior courts in criminal cases, by the use of the writ of habeas corpus or otherwise, we proceed to examine the case in the record of the circuit court and the return of the marshal, in whose custody the prisoner is found, to ascertain whether they show that the court below had any power to render the judgment by which the prisoner is held. It appears from these that the petitioner was indicted under an act of Congress, passed the 8th of June, 1872 (17 Stat. at L. 320, . § 290), for stealing, purloining, embezzling, and appropriating to his own use, certain mail bags belonging to the Postoffice Department. Upon the trial, on the 22d day of October, 1873, the jury found him guilty of appropriating to his own use mail bags, the value of which were less than $25; the punishment for which, as provided in said statute, is imprisonment for not more than one year or a fine of not less On consideration of the petition, the court than $10, nor more than $200. On the 3d day was of opinion that the facts therein recited of November, 1873, the judge presiding senvery fairly raised the question whether the cir- tenced the petitioner, under said conviction, to cuit court, in the sentence which it had pro- one year's imprisonment, and to pay $200 fine. nounced, and under which the prisoner was The petitioner was on said day committed to 166*] held, had not exceeded its *powers. It jail in execution of the sentence, and on the foltherefore directed the writ to issue, accom-lowing day the fine was paid to the clerk of the panied also by a writ of certiorari, to bring be: court, who, in turn, and on the 7th day of Nofore this court the proceedings in the circuit court under which the petitioner was restrained vember, 1873, paid the same into the treasury of his liberty. The authority of this court in of the United States. On the 8th day of the same month, the prissuch case, under the Constitution of the United States, and the 14th section of the judiciary actoner was brought before the court on a writ of of 1789 (1 Stat. at L. 73), to issue this writ, and to examine the proceedings in the inferior court, so far as may be necessary to ascertain whether that court has exceeded its authority, is no longer open to question. The cases cited in the note below U. S. v. Hamilton, Dall. 17; Ex parte Burford, 3 Cranch, 448; Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 75; Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 7 Pet. 568; Ex parte Metzger, 5 How. 176; Ex parte Kaine, 14 How. 103; Ex parte Wells, 18 How. 307, 15 L. ed. 421; Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L. ed. 281; Ex parte Mc 539; McRea v. Mayor, 59 Ga. 168, 27 Am. Rep. 390; Wragg v. Penn Township, 94 Ill. 11, 34 Am. Rep. 199. Prisoner is not put in jeopardy by being placed on trial before a judge and jury at a special term of court not called as authorized by law. Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 229, 35 Am. Dec. 54. Verdict of acquittal and judgment thereon determine the prosecution forever. State v. Hand, 6 Ark. 169, 42 Am. Dec. 689; People v. Webb, 8 Cal. 478. Verdict of acquittal or conviction of itself is a bar to a second trial though there be no judgment upon it. Mount v. State, 14 Ohio, 295, 45 Am. Dec. 542; State v. Norvell, 2 Yerg. 24, 24 Am. Dec. 458; State v. Benham, 7 Conn. 414; Logg v. People, 8 Bradw. App. Cas. 102; Brennan v. People, 15 III. 517. Where upon a trial for murder in the first degree the verdict was "not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter in the second degree" and defendant procured a new trial, held that he could not be convicted of murder. Johnson v. State, 29 Ark. 31, 21 Am. Rep. 154: State v. Martin, 30 Wis. 216, 11 Am. Rep. 567; State v. Belden, 33 Wis. 121, and cases cited, 14 Am. Rep. 748; Contra State v. McCord, 8 Kan. 232, 12 Am. Rep. 469; State v. Behimer, 20 Ohio St. 572. habeas corpus, the same judge presiding, and an order was entered, vacating the former judgment, and the prisoner was again sentenced to one year's imprisonment from that date; and the return of the marshal to the writ of habeas corpus shows that it is under this latter judgment that he holds the prisoner. It is conceded that all this was during the same term at which his trial took place before the jury. A second writ of habeas corpus issued by the circuit judge was returned into the circuit court when the two district judges sat with him on the hear Where on an indictment for murder a verdict of guilty was received in the absence of the prisoner and the verdict was on defendant's motion set aside for that irregularity, it was held that he had been once in jeopardy and could not be tried again for the same offense. Nolan v. State, 55 Ga. 521, 21 Am. Rep. 281. Defendant was indicted for theft from H. Franks, and on trial the owner's name was shown to be Frank and nolle pros. was entered against defendant's protest. A plea of once in jeopardy was held bad to a new indictment charging the theft from Frank, the name not being idem sonans. Parchman v. State, 2 Tex. Ct. of App. 228, 28 Am. Rep. 435. Mere jeopardy in another state without conviction and punishment will not avail, nor is autrefois convict in another state conclusive. Marshall v. State, 6 Neb. 120, 29 Am. Rep. 363. Former conviction for assault and battery is not such jeopardy as to bar an indictment for manslaughter. State v. Littlefield, 70 Me. 452, 35 Am. Rep. 335; State v. Hattabough, 66 Ind. 223. As to power of court to revise sentence-see note, 46 C. C. A. 412. 875 term, at the discretion of the judge. A criminal may be sentenced to a disgraceful punishment, as whipping, or, as in the old English law, to have his ears cut off, or to be branded in the hand or forehead. The judgment of the court to this effect being rendered and carried into execution before the expiration of the term, can the judge vacate that sentence and substitute fine or imprisonment, and cause the latter sentence also to be executed? Or if the judgment of the court is that the convict be imprisoned for four months, and he enters immediately upon the has been fully completed, because it is still in session of the same term, vacate that judgment and render another, for three or six months' imprisonment, or for a fine? Not only the gross injustice of such a proceeding, but the inexpediency of placing such a power in the hands of any tribunal, is manifest. We are furnished by counsel with a very full review of the cases in the English and American courts on the question of the power of courts over their judgments once rendered in criminal cases. Many of these decisions in the English courts are on writs of error and have but little bearing on the question before us. Others, which seem to present cases of judg-period of punishment, can the court, after it ments vacated or modified during the term at which they were rendered, are based upon the doctrines of the English courts, that there is no judgment or decree until the decree in chancery is enrolled or the judgment has been 167*] *signed by the judge of the court of law, and become technically a part of the judgment roll. Arch. Cr. Pl. 176. If there is anything settled in the jurispru These decisions, some of which go to the ex-dence of England and America, it is that no tent of denying all right to amend or change man can be twice lawfully punished for the the judgment after it becomes a part of the same offense. And though there have been roll, are inapplicable to our system, where a nice questions in the application of this rule to judgment roll, strictly speaking, is no part, or, cases in which the act charged was such as to at least, not a necessary part of our system of come within the definition of more than one judicial proceedings. In most, if not all, our statutory offense, or to bring the party within courts, a minute book, or a record of the pro- the jurisdiction of more than one court, there eeedings of the court, is kept, and is the appro- has never been any doubt of its entire and compriate repository of all the orders and judg-plete protection of the party when a second ments of the court; and this book with all its punishment is proposed in the same court, on entries is, as a general rule, under the complete the same facts, for the same statutory offense. control of the court during the term to which such entries relate. The general power of the court over its own judgments, orders, and decrees, in both civil and criminal cases, during the existence of the term at which they are first made, is undeniable. And this is the extent of the proposition intended to be decided in the case of Bassett v. U. S. 9 Wall. 38, 19 L. ed. 548. That was a case like this, in which, in a prosecution for misdemeanor, the prisoner had been sentenced to imprisonment. But it was by a judgment rendered on confession. He was afterwards, during the same term, brought into court and the judgment vacated, his plea of guilty withdrawn, and leave given to plead anew; and then he gave bail and his case was continued. It was in an action on the bail-bond which he had forfeited that the sureties raised the question of the right of the court to vacate the former judgment. In general terms, without much consideration, for no counsel appeared for the sureties, this court sustained the right. If it was intended in that case to raise the question of the right of the court to inflict a new and larger punishment on the prisoner, without reference to the time of his imprisonment on the one set aside, that point was not presented so as to receive the attention of the court, and certainly was not considered or decided. It would seem that there must, in the nature 168*] of the power *thus exercised by the court, be, in criminal cases, some limit to it. The judgment of the courts in this class of cases extends to life, liberty, and property. The terms of many of them extend through considerable periods of time, often many months, with adjournments and vacations in the same The principle finds expression in more than one form in the maxims of the common law. In civil cases the doctrine is expressed by the maxim that no man shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause. Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et *eadem causa. It is upon [*169 the foundation of this maxim that the plea of a former judgment for the same matter, whether it be in favor of the defendant or against him, is a good bar to an action. In the criminal law the same principle, more directly applicable to the case before us, is expressed in the Latin, "Nemo bis punitur pro eodem delicto" (2 Hawk. P. C. 377), or, as Coke has it, "Nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto." 4 Co. 43a; 11 Co. 95b. No one can be twice punished for the same crime or misdemeanor, is the translation of the maxim by Sergeant Hawkins. Blackstone in his Commentaries cites the same maxim as the reason why, if a person has been found guilty of manslaughter on an indictment, and has had benefit of clergy, and suffered the judgment of the law, he cannot afterwards be appealed. 4 Black. 315 (Shars). Of course, if there had been no punishment the appeal would lie, and the party would be subject to the danger of another form of trial. But by reason of this universal principle, that no person shall be twice punished for the same offense, that ancient right of appeal was gone when the punishment had once been suffered. The protection against the action of the same court in inflicting punishment twice must surely be as necessary, and as clearly within the maxim, as protection from chances or danger of a second punishment on a second trial. The common law not only prohibited a sec ond punishment for the same offense, but it went further and forbid a second trial for the same offense, whether the accused had suffered punishment or not, and whether in the former trial he had been acquitted or convicted. the design of introducing into our Constitution the clause in question." Hence to every indictment or information charging a party with a known and defined crime or misdemeanor, whether at the common law or by statute, a plea of autrefois acquit or autrefois convict is a good defense. 170*1 *In the case of Crenshaw v. Tenn. 1 Mart. & Yerg. 122, it was held by the supreme court of that state that the common law principle went still further, namely: that an in-nically extend either to life or limb; but the dictment, conviction, and punishment in a case of felony not capital was a bar to a prosecution for all other felonies not capital committed before such conviction, judgment, and execution. If in civil cases (says Drake, J., in State v. Cooper, 1 Green (N. J.) 375), the law abhors a multiplicity of suits, it is yet more watchful in criminal cases that the Crown shall not oppress the subject, or the government the citizen, by unreasonable prosecutions. These salutary principles of the common law have, to some extent, been embodied in the Constitutions of the several states and of the United States. By article VII of the Amendments to the latter instrument it is declared that no fact once tried by a jury shall be other wise re-examined in any court of the United States than according to the rules of the common law; and by article V, that no person shall for the same offense be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. It is not necessary in this case to insist that other cases besides those involving life or limb are positively covered by the language of this amendment; or that when a party has had a fair trial before a competent court and jury, and has been convicted, that any excess of punishment deprives him of liberty or property without due course of law. On the other hand, it would seem to be equally difficult to maintain, after what we have said of the inflexible rules of the common law against a person being twice punished for the same offense, that such second punishment as is pronounced in this case is not a violation of that provision of the Constitution. It is very clearly the spirit of the instrument to prevent a second punishment under judicial proceedings for the same crime, so far as the common law gave that protection. In the case of Cooper v. State, in the supreme court of New Jersey (1 Green N. J. 361), the prisoner had been indicted, tried, and convicted for arson. While still in custody under this proceeding he was arraigned on an indictment for the murder of two persons who were in the house when it was burned. To this he pleaded the former conviction at bar, and the supreme court held it a good plea. It is to be observed that the punishment for arson could not techsupreme court founded its argument on the provision of the Constitution of New Jersey, which embodies the precise language of the Federal Constitution. After referring to the common law maxim the court says: "The Constitution of New Jersey declares this important principle in this form: 'Nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.' Our courts of justice would have recognized and acted upon it as one of the most valuable principles of the common law without any constitutional provision. But the framers of our Constitution have thought it worthy of especial notice. And all who are conversant with courts of justice must be satisfied that this great *principle [*172 forms one of the strong bulwarks of liberty. Upon this principle are founded the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict." And Hawkins, in his Pleas of the Crown (pp. 515, 526), says that both the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict are grounded on the maxim that a man shall not be brought into danger of his life for one and the same offense more than once. In Moore v. People, 14 How. 13, the defendant was fined $400 under the Criminal Code of that state for harboring and secreting a negro slave. The case came to this court under the 25th section of the judiciary act, on the ground that the right to legislate on that subject was exclusively in Congress. The court did not concur in that view of the question. But it was also urged that the party might be subjected twice to punishment for the same offense if liable to be prosecuted under statutes of both state and national legislatures. In regard to this Judge McLean said, in a dissenting opinion, that "the exercise of such a power by the states would, in effect, be a violation of the Constitution of the United States and of the In the case of Com. v. Olds, 5 Litt. 137, one respective states. They all provide against a 171*] of the *best common-law judges that ever second punishment for the same act." "It is sat on the bench of the court of appeals of Ken- contrary," said he, "to the nature and genius tucky remarked, "That every person acquainted of our government to permit an individual to with the history of governments must know be twice punished for the same act.” that state trials have been employed as a for- Mr. Bishop, in the latest edition of his work midable engine in the hands of a dominant ad-on criminal law (§§ 990, 991, 5th ed.), speakTo prevent this mischief ing of this constitutional provision, says the the ancient common law, as well as Magna the rule extends to treason and all felonies, not construction of these words is that properly Charta itself, provided that one acquittal or to misdemeanors. conviction should satisfy the law; or, in other the courts have applied it to misdemeanors, Yet practically and wisely words, that the accused should always have the and that in view of the liberal construction of right secured to him of availing himself of the statutes and constitutions in favor of persons pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict. charged with crime he cannot well see how To perpetuate this wise rule, so favorable and courts can refuse to apply this constitutional necessary to the liberty of the citizen in a gov- guaranty in cases of misdemeanor. ernment like ours, so frequently subject to changes in popular feeling and sentiment, was ministration. Chitty (1 Cr. Law, 452-462) also drops the words "life and limb" in speaking of the pleas *of autrefois acquit and autrefois con- [*173 | held the prisoner under it would be liable, or vict, and declares that they both depend on the the prisoner at perfect liberty to assert his principle that no man shall more than once be freedom by force, whether the payment of placed in peril of legal penalties upon the same money or imprisonment under such an order accusation. would be a bar to another judgment on the same conviction. On this we have nothing to say, for we have no such case before us. The judgment first rendered, though erroneous, was not absolutely void. It was rendered by a court which had jurisdiction of the party and of the offense, on a valid verdict. The error of the court in imposing the two punishments mentioned in the statute, when it had only the alternative of one of them, did not make the judgment wholly void. Miller v. Finkle, 1 Parker, 374, is directly in point. But we think that no one will contend that the first sentence was so absolutely void that an action could be maintained against the marshal for [*175 trespass in holding the prisoner under it. If we reflect that, at the time this maxim came into existence, almost every offense was punished with death or other punishment touching the person, and that these pleas are now held valid in felonies, minor crimes, and misdemeanors alike, and on the difficulty of deciding when a statute under modern systems does or does not describe a felony when it defines and punishes an offense, we shall see ample reason for holding that the principle intended to be asserted by the constitutional provision must be applied to all cases where a second punishment is attempted to be inflicted for the same offense by a judicial sentence. For of what avail is the constitutional protection against more than one trial if there can be any number of sentences pronounced on the same verdict? Why is it that, having once been tried and found guilty, he can never be tried again for that offense? Manifestly it is not the danger or jeopardy of being a second time found guilty. It is the punishment that would legally follow the second conviction which is the real danger guarded against by the Constitution. But if, after judgment has been rendered on the conviction, and the sentence of that judgment executed on the criminal, he can be again sentenced on that conviction to another and different punishment, or to endure the same punishment a second time, is the constitutional restriction of any value? Is not its intent and its spirit in such a case as much violated as if a new trial had been had and, on a second conviction, a second punishment inflicted? The argument seems to us irresistible, and we do not doubt that the Constitution was designed as much to prevent the criminal from being twice punished for the same offense as from being twice tried for it. But there is a class of cases in which a second trial is had without violating this prin174*] ciple. As when the jury fail to *agree and no verdict has been rendered (U. S. v. Perez, 6 Wheat. 579), or the verdict set aside on motion of the accused, or on writ of error prosecuted by him (People v. Casborus, 13 Johns. 351), or the indictment was found to describe no offense known to the law. . And so it is said that the judgment first rendered in the present case being erroneous must be treated as no judgment and, therefore, presenting no bar to the rendition of a valid judgment. The argument is plausible but unsound. The power of the court over that judgment was just the same, whether it was void or valid. If the court, for instance, had rendered a judg ment for two years' imprisonment, it could, no doubt, on its own motion, have vacated that judgment during the term and rendered a judgment for one year's imprisonment; or, if no part of the sentence had been executed, it could have rendered a judgment for $200 fine after vacating the first. Nor are we prepared to say, that if a case could be found where the first sentence was wholly and absolutely void, as where a judgment was rendered when no court was in session, and at a time when no term was held, so void that the officer who The petitioner, then having paid into court the fine imposed upon him of $200, and that money having passed into the treasury of the United States, and beyond the legal control of the court, or of anyone else but the Congress of the United States, and having also undergone five days of the one year's imprisonment, all under a valid judgment, can the court vacate that judgment entirely, and without reference to what has been done under it, impose another punishment on the prisoner on that same verdict? To do so is to punish him twice for the same offense. He is not only put in jeopardy twice, but put to actual punishment twice for the same thing. The force of this proposition cannot be better illustrated than by what occurs in the present case if the second judgment is carried into effect. The law authorizes imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding $200. The court, through inadvertence, imposed both punishments, when it could rightfully impose but one. After the fine was paid and passed into the treasury, and the petitioner had suffered five days of his one year's imprisonment, the court changed its judgment by sentencing him to one year's imprisonment from that time. If this latter sentence is enforced it follows that the prisoner in the end pays his $200 fine and is imprisoned one year and five days, being all that the first judgment imposed on him, and five days' imprisonment in addition. And this is done because the first judgment was confessedly in excess of the authority of the court. But it has been said that, conceding all this, the judgment under which the prisoner is now held is erroneous, but not void; and as this court cannot review that judgment for error, it can discharge the prisoner only when it is void. But we do not concede the major premise in this argument. A judgment may be erroneous and not void, and it may be erroneous because it is void. The distinctions between void and merely voidable judgments are very nice, *and they may fall under the one class [*176 or the other as they are regarded for different purposes. We are of opinion that when the prisoner, as in this case, by reason of a valid judgment, had fully suffered one of the alternative punishments to which alone the law subjected him, the power of the court to punish further was gone; that the principle we have discussed then | interposed its shield, and forbade that he should be punished again for that offense. The record of the court's proceedings, at the moment the second sentence was rendered, showed that in that very case and for that very offense the prisoner had fully performed, completed and endured one of the alternative punishments which the law prescribed for that offense, and had suffered five days' imprisonment on account of the other. It thus showed the court that its power to punish for that offense was at an end. Unless the whole doctrine of our system of jurisprudence, both of the Constitution and the common law, for the protection of personal rights in that regard, are a nullity, the authority of the court to punish the prisoner was gone. The power was exhausted; its further exercise was prohibited. It was error, but it was error because the power to render any further judgment did not exist. It is no answer to this to say that the court had jurisdiction of the person of the prisoner, and of the offense under the statute. It by no means follows that these two facts make valid, however erroneous, it may be, any judgment the court may render in such case. If a justice of the peace, having jurisdiction to fine for a misdemeanor, and with the party charged properly before him, should render a judgment that he be hung, it would simply be void. Why void? Because he had no power to render such a judgment. So, if a court of general jurisdiction, should, on an indictment for libel, render a judgment of death, or confiscation of property, it would, for the same reason, be void. Or if, on an indictment for treason, the court should render a judgment of attaint, whereby the heirs of the criminal could not inherit his property, which should, by the judgment of 177*] the court, be confiscated to the state, it would be void as to the attainder, because in excess of the authority of the court, and forbidden by the Constitution. A case directly in point is that of Bigelow v. Forrest, 9 Wall. 339, 19 L. ed. 696. In that case, under the confiscation acts of Congress, certain lands of French Forrest had been condemned and sold, and Bigelow became the holder of the title conveyed by those proceedings. After Forrest's death his son and heir brought suit to recover the lands, and contended that under the joint resolution of Congress, which declared that condemnation under that act should not be held to work a forfeiture of the real estate of the offender beyond his natural life, the title of Bigelow terminated with the death of the elder Forrest. In opposition to this, it was argued that the decree of the court confiscating the property in terms ordered all the estate of the said Forrest to be sold, and that though this part of the decree might be erroneous, it was not void. Here was a case of a proceeding in rem where the property was within the power of the court, and its authority to confiscate and sell under the statute beyond question; but the extent of that power was limited by the statute. The analogy to the case before us seems almost perfect. In that case the court said: "It is argued, however, on behalf of the plaintiff in error that the decree of confiscation of the district court of the United States is conclusive, that the en tire right, title and interest of French Forrest was condemned and ordered to be sold; and that as his interest was a fee simple that entire fee was confiscated and sold. Doubtless, a decree of a court having jurisdiction to make the decree cannot be impeached collaterally, but under the act of Congress the district court had no power to order a sale which should confer upon the purchaser rights outlasting the life of French Forrest. Had it done so it would have transcended its jurisdiction." The doctrine of that case is re-affirmed in the case of Day v. Micou, ante, 860, at the present term, where it is said that in Bigelow v. Forrest, "we also determined that nothing more was within the jurisdiction or judicial power of the [*178 district court (than the life estate), and that, consequently, a decree condemning the fee could have no greater effect than to subject the life estate to sale." But why could it not? Not because it wanted jurisdiction of the property or of the offense, or to render a judgment of confiscation, but because in the very act of rendering a judgment of confiscation it condemned more than it had authority to condemn. In other words, in a case where it had full jurisdiction to render one kind of judgment, operative upon the same property, it rendered one which included that which it had a right to render and something more, and this excess was held simply void. The case before us is stronger than that, for unless our reasoning has been entirely at fault, the court in the. present case could render no second judgment against the prisoner. Its authority was ended. All further exercise of it in that direction was forbidden by the common law, by the constitution and by the dearest principles of personal rights, which both of them are supposed to maintain. There is no more sacred duty of a court than, in a case properly before it, to maintain unimpaired those securities for the personal rights of the individual which have received for ages the sanction of the jurist and the statesman; and in such cases no narrow or illiberal construction should be given to the words of the fundamental law in which they are embodied. Without straining either the Constitution of the United States, or the well settled principles of the common law, we have come to the conclusion that the sentence of the circuit court under which the petitioner is held a prisoner was pronounced without authority, and he should, therefore, be discharged. And it is so ordered. Dissenting, Mr. Justice Clifford and Mr. Justice Strong. Mr. Justice Clifford, dissenting: Provision is made by the act of the 8th of June, 1872, that any person who shall steal, purloin or embezzle any mail bag or other property in the use of or belonging to the Postoffice *Department, or who shall, for any lucre, [*179 gain or convenience, appropriate any such property to his own use, or to any other than its proper use, or who shall, for any lucre or gain, convey away any such property to the hindrance or detriment of the public service, his aiders, abettors and counselors, shall, if the value of the property be $25 or more, be deemed guilty of felony, and on conviction thereof the |