have pronounced opinions, which support the | is a doom, and if submitted to with fidelity, sedoctrine we maintain. 25 Conn. 19; 45 Ill. 90; Mayor v. Thorne, 7 Paige, Ch. 261; Taylor v. Blanchard, 13 Allen, 370; 2 Yerg. 554; 3 Greenl. 326; Cooley, Const. Lim. ch. 11, p. 393. The terms, "privileges and immunities" were applied in the Roman law to describe classes of rights. They comprised those special endow ments or benefits to some, which were made by the legislator and which were not shared by all (privilegium affirmativum), or in those exemptions (immunitas, privilegium negativum), from duties or services to which others were subjected. These privileges and immunities were right. Lindley, Jur. §§ 30-32'; App., note to § 31. These are akin to charters, private statutes and patents. McElvey, Roman Law, §§ 188, 189. With this general meaning they are used in modern legislation and jurisprudence. The separate estates of the realm in Great Britain, lords, clergy, and people, have their rights and immunities. Under charters and customs, cities and classes of subjects have the same. In the colonial discussions we find a claim for the rights, privileges and immunities of Englishmen for the colonial population. In the Congress of 1776 we find a resolution inviting desertion from the British army, and promising the deserter protection in his religion, and that he should be invested with the rights, privileges, and immunities of natives as established by law. The terms are found in the 4th of the Articles of Confederation, and the 2d section of the 4th Article of the Constitution of the United States; and evidently apply not to political but civil rights. These rights are protection to life, personal freedom, property, religion, reputation, and in the treaty of Paris of 1803, providing for the cession of Louisiana, the United States promised to grant the natives of that territory the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens. P'ermoli v. New Orleans, 3 How. 589; American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511. cures a blessing to the human family. The obligation to labor being imperious, confers a right to labor, which right is property; and it cannot be withdrawn or destroyed by arbitrary legislation without the violation of natural right. This right is a social right, and constitutions have been made to secure it from invasion. No state of the American Union can deprive a man of his title by arbitrary edict; and arbitrary institutions to limit, depress, impair or to take away this right, cannot be favored nor maintained. No protection can be extended to such institutions, for the reason that they in their constitution and nature take away the equal protection due to those who are not members of them. The act, No. 118, allows the company it establishes to carry on exclusively the business of preparing animal food for market, and of keeping animals for sale within a large district, for three parishes. The company can land them at its docks or wharves, keep them in its yards or stables, and prepare them in its slaughterhouse for market, or exhibit them for sale in its stables. Any other citizen must, under a penalty, use the docks, wharves, yards, and slaughter-house of the company, and none other. The company may purchase for these purposes any land in that district. No other person may have, use or bargain for land for the same purpose. The Delery Plantation is now used for all of these purposes by the company, it being owner; the injunction upon Cavaroc restraining him from selling, and the other defendants from using that plantation for such purposes. No butcher can exercise his art, except at the place designated by the company and at a price not determined by himself. It is not the butcher alone who is affected. The entire community is restrained in the same manner. The labor of some, the property of all, in those parishes is restricted to the company by this enactment. The rights, privileges, and immunities of the citizen have been diminished and impaired, that this corporation shall have a inonopoly. The object of the act is to create a monopoly The states of the Union are political organi- in favor of the Live-Stock Landing and Slaughzations, with powers to accomplish the ends of ter House Co., by placing all persons not belonggovernment. By the 14th Amendment these ing to that company under a disability to do and governments are particularly bound to accom-perform acts in the course of the regular busiplish the same ends as the government of the United States, in reference to all citizens of the United States alike, and in some sort under control and supervision. No citizen of the United States may be abridged in his privileges or immunities; he must be secured from arbitrary legislation over life, liberty and property; he must not be denied equal protection under the law. These fundamental conditions being assured, he may acquire the means of subsistence and have the advantage of the union or division of free application of industry to ennoble his nature, promote progress in his art, trade, or profession, and to improve the moral and material state of himself and of his posterity. Thus union, justice, domestic tranquility and liberty may be attained, for the existing generation and their posterity. 4 Wash. C. C. 380; 18 How. 591, 15 L. ed. 497; 3 H. & McH. Md. 525; 14 Ala. 627; Cooley, Lim. 16, 392; 3 Story, Const. 625. The authorities we have cited show that labor ness, for the benefit of the company. Austin, in his Jurisprudence, p. 586, defines monopoly "to consist in the duty which is imposed on persons generally to forbear from all such acts as would defeat or thwart its purpose." Again, he says (pp. 48-401), "the right styled a monopoly is a right in rem which has no subject. There is no specific subject over, or to which the right exists, or in which the right inheres. The officium or common duty to which the right corresponds, is a duty lying on the world at large from selling commodities of a given description or class; but it is not a duty lying on the world at large to forbear from acts regarding determinately a specific subject." The statement is true as to inventions and copyrights, the only forms of monopoly existing under the laws of Great Britain. But under the act No. 118, there is a determinate subject. The monopoly is not only that all men shall forbear to make use of their property for the preservation of animals intended for sale and slaughter in three parishes, but that | plication to it. "New things which have fair they shall carry to, and deposit in the buildings | features are most commonly hurtful to the comand inclosures of the corporation, their proper- monwealth, for commonly they tend to the ty upon an involuntary contract of bailment grievous vexation and oppression of the subwith the company; and also that ail persons do- ject, and not to that glorious end that at first ing work in a regular vocation, shall use their was presented." Co. Inst. 540. buildings to carry on their work. No consideration of public health required the universal prohibition of these establishments anywhere in three parishes, when it is manifest that the whole complaint is confined to the damage done the water passing through the water-pipes at very low stages of water. No consideration of public health required that what was denied to all should, under any exception, be allowed as a favor to seventeen But the question comes: has a state power to declare that all the lands within a large territory shall not be used in a particular manner, in order to benefit the owners of a single parcel of land in their neighborhood? In this case, an owner is enjoined from selling, and persons competent to contract are restrained from purchasing land, lest they might interfere with the monopoly of the defendant. They are prohib-persons. These seventeen persons were, under ited from improving it, or any other land in the three parishes with docks, ways, stables, yards, etc. Such thralldom of the soil in feudal times was not uncommon. The 14th Amendment embodies all that the statesmanship of the country has ordained for accommodating the Constitution and the institutions of the country, to the vast additions of territory, increase of the population, multiplication of state and territorial governments, the annual influx of aliens, and the mighty changes produced by the Revolutionary events, and by social, industrial and commercial development. The purpose is manifest, to establish through the whole jurisdiction of the United States one people, and that every member of the Empire shall understand and appreciate the constitutional fact, that his privileges and immunities cannot be abridged by state authority; that state laws must be so framed as to secure life, liberty, property, from arbitrary violation, and protection of law shall be secured to all. Thus, as the great personal rights of each and every person were established and guarded, a reasonable confidence that there would be good government might seem to be justified. The mandate is universal in its application to persons of every class and condition. no condition, guardians of the public health, nor are they now under any other obligation to regard it than that which attaches to every member of the community. Centralization is complained of as destructive of local self-government and as tending to the erection of a despotism. Can there be any centralization more complete, or any despotism less responsible, than that of a state legislature concerning itself with dominating the avocations, pursuits and modes of labor of populations, conferring monopolies on some, voting subsidies to others, restraining the freedom and independence of others and making merchandise of the whole? A proposition to any constitutional convention sitting at any time before this decade, to permit discriminations between members of the same profession or the same trade, as to the conditions on which they might labor, would have met with no sanction or favor. The judicial tribunals were intolerant of laws that had any such object or tendency. The case of Phila, Association v. Wood, 39 Pa. 73, is an instance. The legislature imposed taxes upon foreign insurance companies which were appropriated to a fireman's association. The 14th Amendment is not confined to any The decision of the supreme court of Pennclass or race. It comprehends all within the sylvania was adverse to the act, and the opinscope of its provisions. The vast number of la-ion of the court contains a clear and creditable borers in mines, manufactories, and commerce, exposition of the injustice of such an act. In as well as the laborers on the plantation, are de- the case of Ward v. Maryland, 20 L. ed. 449, this fended against the unequal legislation of the court expressed decided disapprobation of an act state. Nor is the Amendment confined in its which was designed to depress the business of application to laboring men. one class for the advantage of one more favored. It was argued in that case, that the purchase of a license was voluntary. That the tax could Under the decisions of this court, the bulbe evaded by abandoning the business that rewarks that have been erected around the invest-quired a license; that no coercion was employed, ments of capital are impregnable against state legislation. The obligation of contracts has been asserted with vigor, and the scope of the provision under the administration of the court Louisiana has created monopolies in the is nearly as comprehensive as the dealings of slaughter-house business; the sale of gas; the men. Labor, under the 14th Amendment, is making of levees in the state; the erection of placed under the same protection. The signs privies in New Orleans, and the selling of lotof the times very plainly show that the pro-tery tickets; the endowments of various state tection has not been extended too soon. companies with state bonds, and the indorse ment of their securities; the funding of all sorts of securities as debts; prodigal expenditures and jobs innumerable form only a portion of the mischiefs of a government destitute of any sense of moral responsibility. No consideration for the public health will explain such a novelty as that the daily meat of the entire population of three parishes, one of which is the largest city for the reception of domestic products for sale in the United States, is forbidden, except at the establishment mentioned by seventeen persons, without any knowledge of the business or connections of the people; and this to be for twenty-five years. The words of Lord Coke are potent in their ap and that the dealer could comply with the act and so maintain his business. The court did not adopt such conclusions. If an ordinance be unreasonable; if it be unequal; if it be unjust, because of its inequality; does it not fall within the exact letter of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution? "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction, equal protection of the law." See, Morano v. Mayor, 2 La. 217; Pontchartrain R. v. Orleans Nav. Co. 15 La. 404. And in a later case the doctrine was broadly laid down that the power of the legislative department is supreme, except where restricted by the Constitution. merous courts and text writers. This authority, when not restricted by constitutional provisions, is sometimes said to be equal to the power of Farliament. Cooley, Const. Lim. 2d ed. 85, 88, 89. Thorpe v. Rutland, etc. R. R. 27 Vt. 142; City of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 138; Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 410; Story, J., in 11 Pet. 605; Curtis, J., in 13 How. 90; License Cases, 5 How. 588; Ohio Life Ins. Co. v. Debolt, 16 How. 428; License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 470, 18 L. ed. 500; Moor v. Veazie, 31 Me. 360; S. C., 32 Me. 343, S. C., on error, 14 How. 568; Cushing's Law of Legislative Assemblies, § 717; Dwarr. Stat. Potter's ed. 450; Cooley, Const. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 7 Pick. 448, by Morton, J.; Varick v. Smith, 5 Paige, 160. Life, liberty, and property, if not affected by N. O. Draining Co. etc. 11 La. Ann. 338. laws in opposition to the section of the Con- The latter doctrine of the authority of the stitution mentioned, were entirely under the legislature of a sovereign state has been reitcognizance and control of the state govern-erated and affirmed, in various phrases, by numents. The state governments might devest vested rights if they did not impair the obligation of contracts, or violate the prohibitions of the Constitution. The state governments might fix the status of every person on its soil. It did so in the laws tolerating slavery. The admit ted slaves, they created slaves by the laws, and they emancipated slaves. They could have made any sort of grades of population they thought fit, without violating the Constitution, or being subject to the control of this court. How is the case now? Every act of the legislature that affects any individual member of the population, by abridging the privileges or immunities which he claims to have as a citizen, which affects his life, liberty or prop-Lim. 573; Gov. & Const. Law, by Tiffany, 109; erty arbitrarily, or which denies him equal protection of its laws, all those become subject to the control or the revisory power of this court. The Constitution, by declaring that every member in the empire is its citizen, every person born within its jurisdiction derives his state and condition from its authority and at the same time stating to those states, that this citizen of ours must not be disturbed in his privileges or immunities or in his life, liberty, or property, brings the government into immediate contact with every person, and gives to every citizen a claim upon its protecting power. Now, therefore, when a state makes a law which oppresses any portion of its own citizens, it is just as much the subject of examination here as it was in the olden times, when they made a law affecting the privileges and immunities of citizens of other states of the Union. Citizens of the different states are all, without discrimination, or without being affected by any fact of residence, subject to the same degree of protection. Messrs. T. J. Durant, Charles Allen, J. 8. Black and M. H. Carpenter, for defendants in error: 1. The only ground on which the jurisdiction of this court can rest is, that the charter is in violation of the Constitution of the United States. 2. There is no provision of the Constitution prior to the 14th Amendment, which this charter can be supposed to violate. There is no provision in the Constitution of Louisiana which prohibits the granting of such charter. On the other hand, the Constitution contains a recognition of the power to impose excises or duties on particular occupations, in the provision that "all places of business or of public resort for which a license is required by either state, parish, or municipal authority, shall be deemed places of a public character," etc. So, under the former Constitution, statutes involving a similar exercise of legislative power were passed and upheld. The foregoing authorities amply show that the power of a state is complete, unqualified and exclusive in relation to all those powers which relate to mere municipal legislation or internal police. The legislature is the sole and exclusive judge of whether a statute is reasonable and for the benefit of the people. Judge Story said: "Whether the grant of a franchise is or is not on the whole promotive of the public interest, is a question of fact and judgment, upon which different minds may entertain difsumed to be injurious, and then the grant to be ferent opinions. It is not to be judicially asreasoned down. It is a matter exclusively confided to the sober consideration of the legislature, which is invested with full discretion, etc. "I know of no power or authority confided to the judicial department to rejudge the decisions of the legislature upon such a subject." Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 605. So, also, this court, in a later case said: "With the exception of the powers surrendered by the Constitution of the United States, the people of the several states are unconditionally and absolutely sovereign within their respective territories. It follows that they may impose what taxes they think proper upon persons or Contracts are things within their dominion. sometimes incautiously made by states, as well as individuals, and franchises, immunities, and exemptions from public burdens improvidently granted; but whether such contracts shall be made or not is exclusively for the consideration of the state." Yessfully contro See, Grant, Corp. 155, 182, for much infor| mation as to markets; Markets and Fairs, Clauses' act of 1847; St. 10 and 11 Vict. ch. 14; 1 Steph. Com. (6th ed.) 683; Dane, Abr. 11 Pet. 621, by Story, J. Ferries, bridges, railroads, and turnpikes, with exclusive privileges, are common. See, Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 7 Pick. 448; Boston & Lowell Railroad v. Salem Railroad, 2 Gray, 31; Newburgh Turnpike Co. v. Miller, 5 Johns. Ch. 111, and many other cases. Exclusive rights of fishing. Chalker v. Dickinson, 1 Conn. 384; Gould v. James, 6 Cow. 376; Collins v. Benbury, 5 Ired. 118; Delaware, etc. R. R. v. Stump, 8 Gill & J. 510; Washb. Eas. 412; 2 Bl. Com. 40; 3 Kent, Com. 6th ed. 418. Exclusive rights of navigation. Ogden v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. Ch. 150; S. C., on error, and 9 Wheat. 1; Moor v. Veazie, 31 and 33 Me. and S. C., on error, 14 How. 568. Gas companies with exclusive rights. Shepard v. Milwaukee Gas Co. 6 Wis. 547; People v. Bowen, 30 Barb. 24. Telegraph companies with exclusive rights. Cal. State Tel. Co. v. Alta Tel. Co. 22 Cal. 398. Legislation imposing restrictions and dens. among which may be ranked the right of ac- No man, nor corporation, or association of Yet it was long since held that the first of these provisions did not prevent the legislature from imposing a license fee on particular occupations. In Portland Bank v. Apthorp, 12 Mass. 255, the court says a reasonable revenue may be exacted by the legislature on certain "means of acquiring property"-"the privilege of using particular branches of business or employment, as the business of an auctioneer, of an attorney, of a tavern keeper, of a retailer of spirituous liquors," etc. "Every man has a natural right to exercise either of these employments, free of tribute, as much as a husbandman or mechanic has to use his particular callbur-ing." (p. 256). "According to the Constitution, there can be no doubt that the legislature might as well exact a fee or tribute from brokers, factors or commission merchants for the privilege of transacting their business, as from auctioneers, or inn-holders, or retailers, or attorneys." (p. 257). "Every man has the implied permission of the government to carry on any lawful business; and there is no difference in the right between those which require a license and those which do not, except in the prohibition, either express or implied, where a license is required." (p. 258). It is laid down generally that all inspection Jaws, quarantine laws and health laws of every description, belong to the state government. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 203; New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 141. Offensive trades of all descriptions, boneboiling establishments, petroleum factories, livery stables, ten-pin alleys, and the like, are subjects of almost universal legislation. Restrictions upon slaughter-houses and the keeping of animals are also common. See, Pierce v. Bartrum, Cowp. 269; Player v. Jenkins, 1 Sid. 284; Bosworth v. Herne, Cas. t. Hardw. 405; Butcher's Co. v. Morey, 1 H. Bl. | 370; Commonwealth v. Patch, 97 Mass. 221; Brooklyn v. Cleves, H. & D. 231; Cooper v. Schultz, 32 How. Pr. 132; Milwaukee v. Gross, 21 Wis. 240; Ex parte Shrader, 33 Cal. 280. Statutes for the observance of the Lord's day, prohibiting labor or business, exist in many states, and with universal recognition by the courts. Statutes limiting the hours of labor, prohibiting the employment of children, except under certain conditions, in mechanical and manufacturing establishments, also exist in certain states. That decision was affirmed on great consideration, in Com. v. People's Savings Bank, 5 Allen, 431; Attorney-General v. Bay State Mining Co. 99 Mass. 152, where the language above quoted is referred to and approved; Com. v. Provident Inst. for Savings and Com. v. Hamilton Mfg. Co. 12 Allen, 312, 298; the decisions in the two latter cases having been affirmed on error by this court. See Providence Inst. v. Mass. 6 Wall. 611, 18 L. ed. 907. The decision in the same state, that the statute requiring peddlers to obtain a license and pay a fee was constitutional, has been cited be fore. Comth. v. Ober, 12 Cush. 493. Likewise, in the same state a statute confer In many states, taxes are imposed, or ex- ring an exclusive privilege upon a railroad comcises or duties, upon various lawful employ-pany has been held to be not within the constiments; for instance, upon attorneys, auction- tutional prohibition. eers, brokers, dealers in junk and second-hand articles, factors, inn-holders, keepers of intelligence offices, pawnbrokers, peddlers, pilots, the aters and retailers of liquors. The general authority of the legislature to lay such burdens upon particular occupations has been vindicted whenever assailed. Forbidden, exce State, 12 Mo. 268; Commontioned by seven? Cush. 493. knowledge of the tn of Massachusetts, adopted King v. Tirrell, 2 Gray, 331. The provisions of the Constitution have not been deemed to extend to such cases. This state has been selected as an illustration because the Constitution was adopted long ago, the construction above referred to was contemporaneous with its adoption, or nearly so, and has been long acquiesced in. Other illustrations to the same effect might be given, if necessary. But the validity of such legislation, under similar constitutional provi sions, is recognized in the general treatises, and is hardly open to question. See, Cooley, Const. Lim. 390. Nor is it open to question, at the present time, that until the adoption of the 14th Amendment, it was fully within the power of any state legislature to pass a law declaring occupations unlawful which were before lawful, and imposing burdens and restrictions upon occupations then lawful. Legislation concerning the employment of selling liquor and carrying on lotteries, in certain states, has changed occupations which were lawful into unlawful occupations, and has interfered with the acquisition of property, by those who were engaged in those occupations; and has abridged their natural rights, and prevented them from laboring in their chosen employment; but the validity of that legislation has been established by this court. The charter, in the present case, falls within these principles. It conferred certain exclusive privileges, but it was upon the consideration of moneys to be expended and duties to be performed by the corporation for the public benefit. The company was bound to expend very large sums of money in the first instance, in preparing for the accommodation of the public, and continuously to perform duties for the benefit of the public. It was bound alike to the provisions of the charter and by the Constitution of Louisiana, to maintain a public slaughterhouse, where all persons might resort for the purpose of slaughtering their animals, upon the same terms. The company owed duties to the public, which it was bound to perform, under penalty of the forfeiture of its charter and a fine, and it might, moreover, be indicted for the non-performance of them. It is not necessary, therefore, in the present case, to fall back upon the doctrine that the legislative power of a state extends to the granting of strict monopolies; because this charter is not a monopoly. But Chief Justice Gibson did not shrink from the assertion that monopolies were not inconsistent with the laws of Pennsylvania. Commonwealth V. Canal Comrs. 5 Watts & S. 388. And the power of Parliament to grant monopolies has not been denied. Grant, Corp. 34. Two cases have been chiefly relied on in opposition to these views: Norwich Gas Light Co. v. Norwich City Gas Co. 25 Conn. 19, and Chicago v. Rumpff, 45 Ill. 90. The Connecticut case differs from the present in this: that the company there was under no obligation to make gas at all; or, if gas should be made, the company might refuse to supply it to any particular citizen. The company owed no duties, and incurred no obligations. There was, therefore, no consideration for that charter, and it might with reason be called a monopoly. Assuming it to be a monopoly, the court thought it unconstitutional; a conclusion not assented to by Chief Justice Gibson in Commonwealth v. Canal Comrs. 5 Watts & S. 388. Whether the decision of the Connecticut case was right or wrong, that case differs from the present in the very particular upon which the decision chiefly rests. In the Illinois case the power of the legislature to authorize such a city ordinance as there deemed invalid was not questioned by the court. The ordinance was invalid because not authorized by the legislature. It is apparent that these sums to be thus expended and these duties to be performed, fur- The provision in this charter for the inspecnished a substantial consideration for the tion of animals designed to be eaten, is so manigranting of the charter. The legislature deemed festly an appropriate matter of legislation as to it an adequate consideration. The supreme require no extended comment. It is similar in court of the state has found no reason for set-principle to the common inspection laws, which ting aside the judgment of the legislature. Shall this court revise the judgment of the legislature upon a question like this? This charter does not come within the legal meaning of the word "monopoly." A monopoly is an exclusive privilege granted without consideration. in different states reach a very great variety of articles. Assuming, therefore, that the present charter would not be in violation of any provisions of the Constitution of the United States prior to the adoption of the 14th Amendment, the question remains, whether the adoption of that Amendment involves the surrender on the part of all the states, to the general government, of all right of legislation of this character. Any man with capital or credit enough to procure the necessary animals may now be a butcher. This charter, therefore, is not a monopoly, in the sense that it prevents anybody So far as can be judged by public debates from being a butcher; instead of that, it makes upon the subject, it was certainly never init easier to be a butcher than it was before. It tended or contemplated that this Amendment is not a monopoly in the sense that it confers should receive such construction. Have Conexclusive privileges without consideration. gress and the whole nation been deceived, mis. And this is the legal test of a monopoly. led, mistaken? Have they done that which they did not intend to do? The language of the Amendment is as follows: See, Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 567, per McLean, J. "A monopoly is that which has been granted without consideration. The accommodation afforded to the public by "No state shall make or enforce any law the Charles River Bridge and the annuity paid which shall abridge the privileges or immunito the College constitute a valuable consideration for the privilege granted by the charter." ties of citizens of the United States, nor shall And in the same case, Mr. Justice Story said: any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or "As long ago as the case in the Year Book, 22, property without due process of law, or deny Hen. VI., 14, the difference was pointed out in to any person within its jurisdiction the equal the argument between such grants as involve protection of its laws." -house p... Taken in the broadest sens, public duties and public matters, for the comstify the charges mon benefit of the people, and such as are for would prohibit any state fro, and invasion of mere private benefit, involving no such consid-existing privileges of any citize eration." p. 639; see, also, 7 Pick. 448; 3 States, or from enforcing any essfully controKent, Com. 6th ed. 358, and note. acted which abridges any privi 403 |