was the sole owner of the sugar, and that the said Dunlap was the sole owner of the rum, and that the contract for the sale of the sugar was made with the plaintiff in his own right, and that the contract for the sale of the rum was made with him as agent for Dunlap. But if the plaintiff should produce no such explanatory evidence, he could not maintain the present action. And the court further instructed the jury, that if they should be satisfied, that the contract of sale was made with the plaintiff alone, and that part of the goods was the sole property of the plaintiff, and that the residue was the sole property of Dunlap; and that the plaintiff had authority from Dunlap to sell such residue; then the plaintiff had a right to recover judgment in this action against the defendant, for the whole amount of the goods so sold and delivered; and that the other facts stated are not sufficient to bar the plaintiff. The 2d bill of exceptions in the present cause, stated, that the plaintiff produced a witness, who proved, that the sale of the goods was made in the store of Dunlap, where the goods were deposited; that he never knew Dunlap to claim any title to the sugar, nor the plaintiff to the rum; and that, previous to the sale, Dunlap claimed the rum as his separate property, and the plaintiff claimed the sugar as his separate property; and that Dunlap requested the plaintiff to sell the rum with the plaintiff's sugar. Whereupon, the plaintiff prayed the court to instruct the jury, that the evidence so offered was not competent to contradict or explain the purport of the bill of parcels and receipt, or to show that the plaintiff sold part of the goods as his separate property, and the residue as agent of Dunlap; and that it did not amount to proof of such several property and agency, as could enable the plaintiff to recover, in this action, for the whole of the goods sold Which instruction the court refused to give; but instructed the jury, that the declarations of Dunlap, or of the plaintiff, or the request of either of them, cannot be given in evidence, unless the defendant was present, when such declaration or request was made. HARRIS V. JOHNSTON. HARRIS V. JOHNSTON. A verdict being rendered for the plaintiff, the defendant moved the court for a new trial, which was refused, and the court ordered the clerk to deliver up to the defendant, the note of Clingman & Magaw, indorsed by Towers, which was referred to in the receipt, and which was filed in the suit of Dunlap v. the present defendant.* Upon this case two questions arose. 1st. Whether the bill of parcels was conclusive evidence of a joint contract of sale, and of the joint property of Dunlap and Johnston? 2d. Whether, under the other circumstances of the case, the plaintiff could recover in this action? C. Lee, and Jones, for plaintiff in error. 1. The bill of parcels is written evidence, purporting 1 joint contract, and cannot be contradicted by parol. The action ought to have been joint. The bill of exceptions does not state any evidence from which the jury could infer, that part of the goods was the sole property of one, and the residue the sole property of the other. The circumstances offered to prove that fact were too slight to justify the inference, and the court ought to have instructed the jury to that effect. 2. The contract which arose on the sale of the goods has been changed to a special contract, to pay on a certain condition: viz. if the plaintiff shall use due diligence to get the money on the note, and shall not succeed, If the plaintiff negotiates the note, he re *The record does not state the whole order of the court upon the motion for a new trial. The court, upon further argument and consideration, being doubtful whether the plaintiff could support this action, until he had got back the note from Dunlap, informed the plaintiff's counsel, that they would grant a new trial, unless the plaintiff would get that note, and return it to the defendant, and also obtain a release from Dunlap to Harris, of all right of action for the rum sold, ceives its value; he is paid for the goods sold; he has received satisfaction, and can never resort to the defendant, until the note is returned to the plaintiff, and he has taken it up, and offered to return it to the defendant. Whatever would prevent the plaintiff from recovering against the defendant on the note, would equally prevent him from recovering on the contract for goods sold and delivered. The present suit was commenced while suits were depending on this very note, by Dunlap against the present defendant, and by Dunlap against Towers. The defendant cannot, at the same time, be answerable upon the note, and upon the original contract of sale. The order which the court made, that the plaintiff should deliver up to the defendant, the note which had been filed in the case of Dunlap v. Harris, did not aid the judgment. The court had no authority to make such an order; the note was the property of Dunlap, and not of the plaintiff. But the note was of no use to the defendant. It was barred by the act of limitations, and that by the conduct of the plaintiff. In the case of Kearslake v. Morgan, 5 T. R. 513, it is admitted by the counsel on both sides, that if a negotiable note, given for a prior simple contract debt, be indorsed over by the plaintiff, and is outstanding, the plaintiff cannot recover upon the original contract. In the present case, it must be presumed that the plaintiff received value for the note when he passed it to Dunlap, and it does not appear that he has ever been obliged to refund. It does not Swann, E. J. Lee, and Simms, contra. appear that the note was not returned. in the case of Clarke & Young, ante, vol. 1. p. 181, had decided, that it is not necessary, in such a case, to return it. So in the case of Puckford v. Maxwell, 6 T. R. 53, the court said, that " in cases of this kind, if the bill, which is given in payment, do not turn out to be productive, it is not that which it purports to be, and which the party receiving it expects it to be, and, therefore, he may consider it as a nullity, and act as if no such bill had been given at all." The same point is HARRIS .V. JOHNSTON. HARRIS V. JOHNSTON. also decided in 1. Esp. Rep. 5, and 7 T. R. 64, Owenson v. Morse. The question of negligence does not arise in this case. The reason of the admission in the case of Kearslake v. Morgan, that if the note was outstanding, the plaintiff could not recover upon the original cause of action, is, that the defendant would be liable to be sued upon it. The words are, "if he may be sued upon it by a third person." But here the record itself shows that Harris could not be sued upon it by a third person, being only liable to the present plaintiff, who was his immediate indorsee, that point having been decided in the court of appeals in Virginia, upon this very note. As, therefore, Harris is liable upon the note to the present plaintiff only, and, as he will not be liable to him on the note, in case he recovers in the present action, it is the same thing as if the note had been taken up by the plaintiff, and ready to be delivered to the defendant. Jones, in reply, admitted, that modern decisions have laid down the law broadly, that if the note or bill is not honoured, it is of no avail; but it is otherwise, if the note or bill be negotiated; it is then a payment until returned. In the case of Young & Clarke, the plaintiff had not negotiated the bill, and the parties answerable to Clarke were insolvent. The liability of the defendant to a şuit by a third person, on the note, is not the only ground of the opinion in Kearslake v. Morgan. Another ground is, that the defendant may have the benefit of the note against the parties answerable to him. But, if the present defendant is not liable to be sued on the note in the name of a third person, yet Dunlap may sue him upon it, in the name of Johnston.* Marshall, Ch. J. Not if Johnston recovers in the present suit. Jones. But if Dunlap has a right to the note, he may sue in equi. ty, and payment by Harris to Johnston would not be a bar. Marshall, Ch. J. True. We shall consider that point. I have February 19. MARSHALL, Ch. J. delivered the opinion of the court, This case comes up on two exceptions taken to opinions given in the circuit court. The plaintiff in the court below had sold to the defendant in that court, certain goods, wares and merchandize, of which he had given him a bill, headed with the words, "Mr. Theophilus Harris, bought of Dunlap & Johnston," &c. At the foot of this bill of parcels, was the following receipt: "Received, Messrs. Clingman and Magaw's note for the above sum, payable to the order of John Towers or order, indorsed by John Towers and Theophilus Harris, payable 2d April, 1798, when paid, received in full." This note was indorsed in blank by the defendant in crror, and a suit was instituted upon it by Dunlap against Harris, in which suit he ultimately failed, it being the law of Virginia, that on a note, an action by the indorsee can only be maintained against the drawer, or his immediate indorsor. The defendant below objected, 1st. That the bill of parcels was conclusive evidence of joint property in the goods sold and delivered, and, therefore, that the action was not maintainable in the name of Johnston alone. 2d. That no action was maintainable on the original contract, the plaintiff below having indorsed the note mentioned in the receipt, and not having re-acquired any property in it, so as to be able to restore it to Harris. No laches are imputed, or are imputable to the holder of the note. always been of opinion, that in such cases a suit in chancery can be supported; though I do not recollect any case, in which the point bas been decided HARRIS V. JOHNSTON. |