United States, so that a suit arising thereunder to avoid the payment of taxes is within the jurisdiction of a United States Circuit Court.24 Under the act of 1875, a defence to a suit to collect taxes alleging their assessment in violation of an act of Congress, would make the suit removable,25 but that is not now the law.26 A suit by property owners against the officers of a county and the owner of a judgment against the county rendered by a Circuit Court of the United States to enjoin the enforcement of a mandamus of such Court for the collection of such judgment against the county by the levy of a tax upon the property of the plaintiffs and others similarly situated is held to arise under the laws of the United States and to be removable from a State court to a Circuit Court of the United States.27 A suit on the bond of a cashier of a National bank is held to arise under a law of the United States.28 A suit on a Federal contractor's bond, for the benefit of a private claimant, may be brought in, or removed to, a Circuit Court,29 if the amount in dispute exceeds $2,000, exclusive of interest and costs.30 A suit by a telegraph company that had complied with the act of Congress as to telegraph companies 31 was once held to 1 Rev. St. Minn. 1894, p. xlvi; 1 Rev. St. Wis. 1898, p. 36. 24 Wau-pe-man-qua v. Aldrich, 28❘ Fed. 489 (see further mention of this case, post § 105 and note 9). 25 Southern Pac. R. Co. v. California, 118 U. S. 109, 6 Sup. Ct. 993, 30 L. 103, which involved the right of a State to tax a franchise granted by the United States. 26 Ante § 101, auth. note 7. 27 First Nat. Bank v. Society for Savings, 42 U. S. App. 517, 25 C. C. A. 466, 80 Fed. 581. 28 Rev. St. U. S., § 5136, cl. 5; Walker v. Windsor Nat. Bank, 5 U. S. App. 423, 5 C. C. A. 421, 56 Fed. 76. 29 United States v. American Bonding & T. Co., 61 U. S. App. 584, 32 C. C. A. 420, 89 Fed. 925, ❘ L. 221. But be a removable one, because it arose under such act.32 as the questions of law suggested as authorizing a removal have been settled, such a case is not now removable. A suit by an assignee in bankruptcy, to set aside a fraudulent conveyance made by the bankrupt, under the former bankrupt law, was one arising under a law of the United States, and was removable from a State court.34 So a defence based upon the bankrupt law, to a suit in a State court, made the suit a removable one.35 A suit by a discharged bankrupt, brought in a State court, against a citizen of the same State, to enjoin a sale upon execution against him of his homestead exempted to him in the bankruptcy proceedings, the judgment having been rendered and the lien thereof obtained by the creditor prior to the adjudication in bankruptcy, and at a date when no exemption was allowed by the State law, was held not to be removable as a suit arising under the laws of the United States, but one "to be determined by the laws of the State, and in the State courts." 36 32" Whether the complainant Arbor R. Co., 178 U. S. 239, 20 Sup. 34 The State courts and the United States Circuit Courts had concurrent jurisdiction of nearly all cases under that law. Lathrop v. Drake, 91 U. S. 516, 23 L. 414; Eyster v. Gaff, 91 U. S. 521, 23 L. 403; McKenna v. Simpson, 129 U. S. 506, 9 Sup. Ct. 365, 32 L. 771; Woolridge v. McKenna, 8 Fed. 650, 677. 35 Connor v. Scott, 6 Fed. Cas. 313, 4 Dill. 242, 3 Cent. Law J. 305. 86 King v. Neill, 26 Fed. 721. (If any United States Court could take jurisdiction, it would be the District Court Jeffries v. Bartlett, 20 Fed. 496, Adams v. Crittenden, 17 Fed. 42, 4 Woods 618 and this of itself, under the act of 1887-8 would exclude a removal to Under the present bankrupt act, a Circuit Court has no jurisdiction, either by original process or by removal, of a suit by or against a trustee in bankruptcy concerning the property acquired or claimed by the trustee, by reason of the Federal character of such officer, nor of any other suit brought by a trustee, because of his official character, except by the consent of the defendant.37 In a suit brought to restrain the defendants from unlawful competition in business, the complaint alleging that the defendants are fraudulently selling a liqueur or cordial in imitation of that of the plaintiff, by using labels, bottles, and other accessories in imitation of those previously used by the plaintiff, though the plaintiff has had a patent thereon which has expired, the question is one to be determined by the principles of general jurisprudence, and does not arise under the laws of the United States, so as to make the suit removable.38 37 30 St. L. 544, 2 Supp. 843, § 23, | if not directly, by quoted in part below: Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 "Sec. 23. Jurisdiction of United U. S. 524, sub nom. Bardes v. First States and State courts,Nat. Bank, 20 Sup. Ct. 1000, 44 L. 1175, 51 Cent. Law J. 87; "a The United States Circuit Courts shall have jurisdiction of In re Seivers, 91 Fed. 366, 372-3; all controversies at law and in Heath v. Shaffer, 93 Fed. 647; equity, as distinguished from pro- Goodier v. Barnes, 94 Fed. 798; ceedings in bankruptcy, between In re Newberry, 97 Fed. 24; trustees as such and adverse claimPerkins v. McCauley, 98 Fed. 286. ants concerning the property ac- 88 Société (with an unpronouncequired or claimed by the trustees, able French name) v. Cook, 40 Fed. in the same manner and to the 382. The word "liquor" in this same extent only as though bank-case is evidently a misprint for ruptcy proceedings had not been “liqueur," as in the statutes reinstituted and such controversies viewed in Hollender v. Magone, 149 had been between the bankrupts U. S. 586, 13 Sup. Ct. 932, 37 L. 860. and such adverse claimants. The Supreme Court in "b Suits by the trustee shall only be brought or prosecuted in the courts where the bankrupt, whose estate is being administered by such trustee, might have brought or prosecuted them if proceedings in bankruptcy had not been instituted, unless by consent of the proposed defendant." The text is indirectly sustained, Singer Manuf'g Co. v. June Manuf'g Co., 163 U. S. 169, 16 Sup. Ct. 1002, 41 L. 118, reversing s. C., 41 Fed. 208, gives an elaborate discussion of the subject of unfair competition in business under color of the defendant's right to manufacture articles, in that case sewing machines, of the kind formerly covered A suit upon an injunction or supersedeas bond given in a United States Court is held to arise under a law of the United States.39 A suit growing out of the Chicago drainage canal and requiring a construction of certain acts of Congress, was held to be a removable one, as arising under the laws of the United States.40 § 105. To give a United States Circuit Court jurisdiction of a suit as one arising under a treaty of the United States, the plaintiff's right of action must be based directly upon such treaty.-The restrictive construction of the language of the present judiciary act, to which reference has been made in the preceding sections,2 has been applied in determining what cases arise under a treaty of the United States. It is not enough that a question may possibly arise in the progress of a case depending upon the construction of a treaty. The plaintiff must base his right to recover directly upon such treaty. Suits involving rights under old Spanish and Mexican grants, that are protected by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,3 do not arise under such treaty, so as to give a United States Circuit Court original jurisdiction thereof, when no question is raised by plaintiffs as to the validity or construction of such treaty. Nor are such suits In the later decision of this case, it is said, pp. 117–118: "Where the parties claim under Spanish or Mexican grants, confirmed and patented by the United States, and the controversy is only as to what were the rights acquired by the parties respectively, or their predecessors in interest, under the Spanish or Mexican governments, it being conceded that the rights so acquired, whatever they may have been, were included in the confirmation and quitclaimed through the patent of the United States, Federal jurisdiction does not exist; and it is immaterial whether such rights were acquired through the original grants or trans removable from State courts, as arising under such treaty, if begun therein.5 Decisions of the Supreme Court as to its appellate jurisdiction under Rev. St. U. S., § 709, support these statements of the law. In a case already cited,' it was actions subsequent thereto. In the case at bar, as appears from the pleadings, defendant concedes the validity of the Mexican and Spanish grants, and patents issued thereon, through which complainants derive title, and that said grants and patents include the lands they purport to grant. The matter in dispute is whether or not the waters percolating under said lands passed with the original grants thereof, and the determination of this question does not require a construction of the Constitution or any treaty or statute of the United States, but depends upon the laws of Mexico and Spain." This decision was affirmed Per Curiam, s. c., 177 U. S. 169, 20 Sup. Ct. 573, 44 L. 720, quoted ante § 101, note 11. ernment under the grants, and before the cession of California to the United States; or upon the facts and [the] laws of Mexico in force in California before its acquisition by the United States." McFadden v. Robinson, 22 Fed. 10, 10 Sawy. 398. 6 California Powder Works v. Davis, 151 U. S. 389, 14 Sup. Ct. 350, 38 L. 206; Phillips v. Mound City L. & W. Ass'n, 124 U. S. 605, 8 Sup. Ct. 657, 31 L. 588; San Francisco v. Scott, 111 U. S. 768, 4 Sup. Ct. 688, 28 L. 593,cases in which jurisdiction was held not to arise under the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo; Kennedy v. Hunt, 7 How. 586, 593, 12 L. 829, 833, a case involving rights under Spanish grants in what was formerly part of Florida -writ of error dismissed; New Orleans v. De Armas, 9 Pet. 224, 9 L. 109, a case arising out of conflicting grants from France and Spain at New Orleaus-writ of error dismissed. In Phillips v. Mound City L. & W. Ass'n, supra, quoted in California Powder Works v. Davis, supra, it is said: 5"The only question in the case seems to be this: Conceding that both parties had grants of tracts of land, that each grant was confirmed, that a patent issued for each rancho as confirmed, and that the tract in controversy in this case is covered by [the] grants and patents, which party acquired the title to the tract in controversy? And that depends upon which in fact "Article VIII of the treaty proacquired the oldest effective grant. tected all existing property rights That question is to be determined within the limits of the ceded terby an examination of the proceed-ritory, but it neither created the ings of the Spanish and Mexican rights nor defined them. Their exgovernments in making the in- istence was not made to depend on choate grants to the respective the Constitution, laws, or treaties parties, and upon the subsequent of the United States. There was acts of the parties and Mexican gov-nothing done but to provide that if 7 Ante § 104, note 24. |