State court and has thereby lost the right to controvert the plaintiff's recovery. "A default has practically the same effect as a verdict." 5 This rule cannot be extended to include a case where motion costs have been taxed against a defendant in the State court and his proceedings in such State court are stayed in default of the payment of such costs, where the defendant still has the right to pay the costs and proceed with his defense in the State court." § 80. To make a suit removable under the general statute, the right involved in such suit must be a pecuniary one.— Whatever power Congress may have in that respect, it has not seen fit to provide by the general statute 1 for the removal of any cause from a State court to a United States Circuit Court where the right in controversy is not "capable of being valued in money."2 Where the cause of action alleged is such that United States Circuit Court will 2 Though used in reference to oust the jurisdiction of such Court. | Fuller v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 37 Fed. 163. * Berrian v. Chetwood, 9 Fed. 678; McCallon v. Waterman, 15 Fed. Cas. 1247, 1 Flip. 651, 4 N. Y. Wkly. Dig. 382, 4 Cent. Law J. 413. appellate jurisdiction dependent upon the value in controversy, the language of the Supreme Court in Huntington v. Saunders, 163 U. S. 319, 16 Sup. Ct. 1120, 41 L. 174, is equally applicable to juris liction by removal: "The matter in controversy must have actual value." 5 McCallon v. Waterman, 15 Fed. Cas. 1247, 1 Flip. 651, 4 N. Y. Wkly. Dig. 382, 4 Cent. Law J. 413.ing a discharge, and the Court held Contra, as to a pro confesso, under the act of 1875, but it is doubtful if these cases are applicable under the present act. Deford v. Mehaffy, 13 Fed. 481; Chester v. Wellford, 5 Fed. Cas. 584, 2 Flip. 347. 6"His failure to comply with the order of the State court may leave him, after removal, under a stay in this Court, as he would be if still in the State court, but it cannot deprive him of the right secured to him by the Federal statute, so long as its provisions are complied with." Hulbert v. Russo, 64 Fed. 8. § 80. 1 Ante § 7. In that case a bankrupt was seek that such discharge had no determinable money value. So there is no standard by which to determine the money value of the removal of a county seat. Smith v. Adams, 130 U. S. 167, 9 Sup. Ct. 566, 32 L. 895. In a habeas corpus case begun in a State court, removed to a United States Circuit Court, and then remanded to the State court, the Supreme Court said: "The conclusion is inevitable that a jurisdiction, conferred by Congress upon any Court of the United States, of suits at law or in equity in which the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of a it has no pecuniary value, a suit cannot be removed upon a statement in a petition for removal that such suit involves a jurisdictional sum.3 The general rule is that to be removable, a cause must embrace a "controversy " between the plaintiff or plaintiffs and the defendant or defendants therein, "in which the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of two thousand dollars." 4 Whether there are any exceptions to this general rule will be considered thereafter.5 § 81. The amount in dispute, in an ordinary case, must exceed the sum or value of two thousand dollars," 1 to make it a removable one.-To give a United States Circuit Court original jurisdiction under the general statute, the matter in dispute must ordinarily exceed $2,000.2 A United certain number of dollars, includes | the matter in suit not being measno case in which the right of neither urable by dollars and cents." Casparty is capable of being valued in well v. Caswell, 120 Ill. 377, 11 N. money; and therefore that writs E. 342. of habeas corpus are not removable from a State court into a Circuit Court of the United States under the act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 2; and this case was rightly re-moval, although the petition for manded to the State court." Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U. S. 487, 6 Sup. Ct. 148, 29 L. 458. There is no pecuniary standard by which to determine the sum or value in dispute in a suit for a di vorce. Bowman v. Bowman, 30 Fed. 849; Simms v. Simms, 175 U. S. 162, 20 Sup. Ct. 58, 44 L. 115. The same is true of a suit to annul for fraud a decree of divorce. Caswell v. Caswell, 120 Ill. 377, 11 N. E. 342. 3 "It is said the statement of the petition that there was such a sum should govern. Although that be the statement of the petition, it manifestly appears not to be true, from the nature of the proceeding; it being but to set aside a mere decree of divorce, and Where the right in controversy has a pecuniary value, but such value is necessarily below the jurisdictional limit, there can be no re such removal alleges the value in dispute to exceed $2,000. Middleton v. Middleton, S7 Iowa 292, 54 N. W. 143. Compare post §§ 86, 99. Mexican National R. Co. v. Davidson, 157 U. S. 201, 15 Sup. Ct. 563, 39 L. 672. Post § 82. § 81. 1 Ante § 7. 2" By the statute defining the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the United States it is made essential to the jurisdiction of the Court that, except in certain specified cases, the matter in dispute must exceed the sum or value of $2,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 25 U. S. St. 433." Oleson v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 44 Fed. 1. States Circuit Court cannot take original jurisdiction under section one of the act of 1875 as amended by the act of 1887-8, of a suit arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States where the amount in controversy does not exceed $2,000.3 This is the rule also where jurisdiction is invoked on the ground of diverse citizenship.1 As already pointed out, a suit must be one of which a United States Circuit Court could take original jurisdiction under § 1 to make it removable thereto under § 2 of the general statute, when such suit is commenced in a State court.5 To make a case removable under clause one of section two on the ground that a Federal question is involved, the amount in controversy, under the general rule, must exceed $2,000.6 "It is clear that a Circuit Court | is assumed upon the diverse citicannot, under that statute, take zenship of the parties, it must aporiginal cognizance of a case aris-pear that the matter in dispute ing under the Constitution or laws exceeds, exclusive of interest and of the United States, or treaties costs, the sum of $2,000. Act made or which shall be made under March 3, 1887, as amended by act their authority, or of a controversy August 13, 1888 (25 Stat. 433; 1 between citizens of different States, Supp. Rev. St. p. 611)." Pliable or of a controversy between citi- Shoe Co. v. Bryant, 81 Fed. 521, zens of a State and foreign states, 522. citizens, or subjects, unless the sum in dispute, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds $2,000." United States v. Sayward, 160 U. S. 493, 16 Sup. Ct. 371, 40 L. 508. 3 Cases quoted note 2 to this section; Cases cited post § 111, note 5; Smithson v. Hubbell, 81 Fed. 593; son, 48 Fed. 621; United States v. Kentucky River Mills, 45 Fed. 273, 275. Under the act of 1875 the amount was required to exceed $500. Ante § 6, note 5. For exceptions to this general rule, see post § 82. 5 Ante § 63. 66 6 The fact that the suit is one arising under the laws of the United States does not entitle the defendant to remove the same from the State to the National Court unless the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of $2,000. 25 Stat. 434, § 2." Ray v. Peirce, 81 Fed. 881, 882. To the same effect are Re Pennsylvania Co., 137 U. S. 451, 11 Sup. Ct. 141, 34 L. 738; Hallam v. Tillinghast, 75 Fed. 849; Hunt v. Hardin, 14 Tex. Civ. App. * Cases quoted note 2 to this sec- 285, 36 S. W. 1028; tion. Howard v. Stewart, 34 Neb. 765, "If the jurisdiction of the Court 52 N. W. 714. The matter in dispute in a suit brought in a State court against the receiver of a National bank must exceed $2,000 to make it removable from such State court to a United States Court. It was held by Judge Baker in a very able opinion, and by Judge Thompson, and Judge Taft, that a receiver appointed by a United States Court has no right to remove to a United States Circuit Court a suit brought against him in a State court unless the amount involved is over $2,000; but the contrary was held by Judge Hanford, and the ruling has been followed by Judge Philips, and Judge Marshall.10 A consideration of the purpose Congress had in view in permitting a receiver appointed by a United States Circuit Court to be sued in a State court without leave of the United States Court appointing him will demonstrate that Judges Baker, Thompson, and Taft are right and Judges Hanford, Philips, and Marshall wrong.11 7 Hallam v. Tillinghast, 75 Fed. | statute, a receiver appointed by a 849; United States Circuit Court could Follett v. Tillinghast, 82 Fed. not lawfully be sued without leave of such Court. 241. 8 Ray v. Peirce, 81 Fed. 881; Pitkin v. Cowen, 91 Fed. 599 (both disapproving Carpenter v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 75 Fed. 850); Barton v. Barbour, 104 U. S. 126, 26 L. 672; Ray v. Peirce, 81 Fed. 881. followed in Gilmore v. Herrick, 93 sally denied, the action of Judge Fed. 525. Caldwell being a conspicuous exception. Such a suit is not removable as one arising under a law of the United States in any event. Post § 110. It is suggested in Ray v. Peirce, supra, that a United States Circuit Court might possibly order the removal of a suit from a State court upon a proper showing under the last clause of § 3 of the present judiciary act, ante § 17. 9 Carpenter v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 75 Fed. 850. 19 Sullivan v. Barnard, 81 Fed. 886; Dow v. Memphis & L. R. R. Co., 20 Fed. 260. The purpose of the section permitting a receiver to be sued without leave of the Court appointing him was to correct abuses that had grown up under the former practice. Central Trust Co. v. St. Louis, A. & T. R. Co., 40 Fed. 426. It is well said by Judge Baker in Ray v. Peirce, supra, p. 882-3: "To compel the claimant to prosecute a suit against the receiver Shinney v. North American Sav- of a railroad for a small demand in ings, L. & B. Co., 97 Fed. 9. the Court of his appointment, gen "Prior to the enactment of this erally remote from the claimant's That there can be no removal of a suit from a State court to a United States Circuit Court on the ground of a diverse citizenship under the second clause of the second section of residence, involved such incon- the intention of Congress to permit venience and expense as to amount not only the bringing of suits in many cases to a practical denial against a receiver but the prosecuof justice. Even an application to tion of such suits to final judgment the Court who appointed the re- in the court where brought, at least ceiver for leave to sue in another if the amount sued for is not in court nearer the residence of the excess of $2,000, is implied in the claimant and his witnesses was act as clearly as the right to have found to be inconvenient and ex- process, which Judge Caldwell says pensive, and frequently such ap-in a case cited, supra, is as much a plications were met with denial. With the multitude of railroad receiverships, the evil became so intolerable that legislation was found necessary to secure relief." It is the policy of the act to afford relief to persons injured through the wrongs of receivers appointed by Federal Courts, by permitting suits in the courts of the State, and without requiring the parties injured to suffer the hardship of appealing in small cases to the Court appointing the receiver or any other Federal Court. The mere right to sue in a State court is no relief at all, if the action, however small the amount involved, may be removed at will by the receiver to the Court which appointed him. No man can afford to sue a receiver for killing a pig or a calf, if there is a right to remove the suit to the United States Court, instead of disposing of it before a justice of the peace, as would otherwise be done. To say that immediately upon the filing of a suit against a receiver for $2,000 or less as authorized by this statute, the receiver may remove it to the Federal Court, is not only to abridge and evade the act, but to nullify it. That it was part of the act because implied, as Central Trust Co. v. St. Louis, "The right to sue in the State court without procuring the leave of this Court includes the right to prosecute such suit to final judgment when the amount involved is $2,000 or less." Judge Baker further says in that case, page 884: "If, in suits involving $2,000 or less, brought in a State court, the receiver may at once remove them into a Court of the United States, then the right to sue secured to the claimant by the statute is rendered practically valueless. Such a construction would defeat the true meaning and intent of the statute. The statute abrogates the old rule on the subject of suing receivers. It is made lawful now to sue a receiver appointed by a Court of the United States without procuring the leave of that Court. The Court has no discretion to say when or where its receiver may be sued. The right to sue is given without condition or limitation, and, as was said by the Supreme Court, it |