Justice Story that the United States Courts cannot enjoin parties from instituting proceedings in State courts, and that State courts cannot enjoin parties from instituting proceedings in the United States Courts; and this opinion is referred to with apparent approval by the Supreme Court.2 In the ab Evans v. Pack, 8 Fed. Cas. 875, 2 | proceedings in a State court; but Flip. 267, 7 Cent. L. J. 409, 7 Re- Rev. St., § 720, was not considered, porter 70, 2 Tex. Law J. 356, 13 so far as appears from the opinion, Am. Law. Rev. 375. and no satisfactory reason is given for taking jurisdiction, except that the suit was authorized by the statute of Texas then in controversy. Some of the United States Courts have, of late years, very much restricted the scope of Rev. St. U. S., § 720. The words " pending in the State court when suit is begun in the United States Court," have been interpolated into this statute by construction. Proceedings not yet begun in State courts have been enjoined by United States Courts. Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Kuteman, 13 U. S. App. 99, 4 C. C. A. 503, 54 Fed. 547; In Central Trust Co. v. Citizens' St. R. Co., 80 Fed. 218; s. c., 82 Fed. 1, Judge Showalter enjoined the prosecution of pending suits, civil and criminal, in the State courts, as well as the beginning of new ones, for the enforcement of a statute, claimed to be void. But so far as the decree in that case prohibited the prosecution of pending suits, it is void, according to the holding of Judge (now Justice) Brown, in Tuchman v. Welch, 42 Fed. 548 (overruled in Hemsley v. Myers, 45 Fed. 283); Fisk v. Union Pac. R. Co., 9 Fed. Evans v. Pack, supra, and the deciCas. 167, 10 Blatchf. 518; Louisiana State Lottery Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 15 Fed. Cas. 970, 3 Woods 222; Live-Stock D. & B. Ass'n v. Crescent City L.-S. L. & SlaughterHouse Co. ("The Slaughter-House Case"), 15 Fed. Cas. 649, 1 Abb. U. S. 388, 3 Chi. Leg. News 17, 13 Int. Rev. Rec. 20, 5 Am. Law. Rev. 171, 1 Woods 21. In Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 14 Sup. Ct. 1047, 38 L. 1014 (s.c., at Circuit, decided with Mercantile Trust Co. v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 51 Fed. 529), the Supreme Court sustained the right of the United States Circuit Court to award an injunction to prevent the bringing of criminal sion of the Supreme Court in Ex parte Sawyer, supra, which is approved in Harkrader v. Wadley, supra. 2 Moran v. Sturges, 154 U. S. 256, 14 Sup. Ct. 1019, 38 L. 981 (citing Story Eq. § 900, Story Const. § 1757); Central Nat. Bank v. Stevens, 169 U. S. 432, 18 Sup. Ct. 403, 42 L. 807. The recent decisions to the contrary are indefensible in principle, and are to be regretted, as they stir up discontent among the people, it being generally considered as bald usurpation for a United States Court to enjoin a party from bringing a suit in a court of his State to enforce his rights. But there seems little hope that the United States Courts will soon let go of sence of a statute, by the rule of comity, a United States Court should not interfere with proceedings pending in a State court or a State court interfere with proceedings pending in a United States Court, or one State court interfere with the pending proceedings of another State court.3 As a United States Circuit Court has no jurisdiction thereof, a suit for an injunction "to stay proceedings in any court of this power to enjoin the beginning of contemplated suits which they have assumed. 8 Among the numerous cases to this effect, the following are a few: Shields v. Coleman, 157 U. S. 168, Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 18 15 Sup. Ct. 570, 39 L. 660; Sup. Ct. 418, 42 L. 819; Cotting v. Kansas City Yards Co., 79 Fed. 679. In Moran v. Sturges, 154 U. S. 256, Stock-14 Sup. Ct. 1019, 38 L. 981; American Wringer Co. v. Ionia, 76 Fed. 6, Porter v. Sabin, 149 U. S. 473, 13 Sup. Ct. 1008, 37 L. 815; Leadville Coal Co. v. McCreery, 141 U. S. 475, 12 Sup. Ct. 28, 35 L. 824; 985; Davenport v. Lord, 9 Wall. 409, 19 L. 704; it is said that there is " grave and serious doubt" of the right of the Central Trust Co. v. Seasongood, United States Circuit Court to en-130 U. S. 482, 9 Sup. Ct. 575, 32 L. join the proceedings of a city then pending, or about to be brought, to enforce a penal ordinance, involving no property right. The general rule is that criminal or quasi-criminal suits cannot be enjoined by any court of equity, without reference to Rev. St., § 720. Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U. S. 148, 19 Sup. Ct. 119, 43 L. 399; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Cannon, 49 Fed. 517; Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co. v. Milner, 57 Fed. 276. The right of a party affected thereby to enjoin, in a State court, the enforcement of a void city ordinance by penal prosecutions in the State courts, is asserted in Davis v. Fasig, 128 Ind. 271, 27 N. E. 726 (citing Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217, 33 Am. R. 239); Sylvester Coal Co. v. St. Louis, 130 Mo. 323, 32 S. W. 649, 51 Am. St. R. 566. Leathe v. Thomas, 38 C. C. A. 75, 97 Fed. 136; Scott v. Runner, 146 Ind. 12, 44 N. E. 755, 58 Am. St. R. 345. A United States Court will enjoin, by ancillary bill, a civil proceeding brought, or about to be brought, in a State court, in hostility to some suit already pending in the United States Court. Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Peoria Lanning v. Osborne, 79 Fed. 657; Central Trust Co. v. St. Louis, A. & T. Ry. Co., 59 Fed. 385; Sharon v. Terry, 36 Fed. 337, 3656, 13 Sawy. 387, 1 L. R. A. 572; a State," is not removable from a State court to a United States Circuit Court.4 Fisk v. Union Pac. R. Co., 9 Fed. Cas. 167, 10 Blatchf. 518. The power to enjoin has been said to extend to criminal prosecutions "when the parties sought to be enjoined have, as plaintiffs, submitted themselves to the Court by a bill in equity as to the matter or right affected by or involved in the criminal procedure." Diggs v. Wolcott, 4 Cranch 179, 2 L. 587; Kelly Maus & Co. v. Sioux Nat. Bank, 81 Fed. 3; Edwards Manuf'g Co. v. Sprague, 76 Me. 53. This rule was not enforced in Bondurant v. Watson, 103 U. S. 281, 26 L. 447, affirming Watson v. Bondurant, 29 Fed. Cas. 426, 2 Spink v. Francis, 19 Fed. 670; Woods 166, 3 Cent. Law J. 398, and s. c., 20 Fed. 567. disapproving on the question of But this limitation is very strictly removal, Watson v. Bondurant, 30 enforced. La. Ann. 1, Ex parte Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, where plaintiff procured from the 8 Sup. Ct. 482, 31 L. 402; State court, before the removal, a Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U. S. preliminary injunction staying pro148, 19 Sup. Ct. 119, 43 L. 399, re- ceedings in a State court, and deversing a judgment in habeas cor- fendant removed the suit for a pus based on the order of injunc-permanent injunction to the United tion in Wadley v. Blount, 65 Fed. States Circuit Court, under the act 667. of 1875, ante § 7, note 7. In This power to enjoin hostile proceedings by ancillary bill, is based, in some of the cases cited, upon U. S. Rev. St., § 716: "The Supreme Court and the Circuit and District Courts shall have power to issue writs of scire facias. They shall also have power to issue all writs not specifically provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." As to a United States Circuit Court granting an injunction to stay proceedings in the State court from which a cause is removed, after the removal of a suit to the United States Circuit Court, see post § 180. Lawrence v. Morgan's L. & T. R. & S. Co., 121 U. S. 634, 7 Sup. Ct. 1013, 30 L. 1018; Hunt v. Fisher, 29 Fed. 801; Smith v. Schwed, 6 Fed. 455, 2 removals were effected by plaintiffs after preliminary injunctions had been granted in the State courts. The limitation, in section two of the act of 1875 as amended by that of 1887-8, of the right of removal to the United States Circuit Court, to "such suits as might have been brought in that Court by the plaintiff under the first section,” Mexican Nat. R. Co. v. Davidson, 157 U. S. 201, 15 Sup. Ct. 563, 39 L. 672, — has rendered the case of Bondurant v. Watson, supra, and cases following it, inapplicable under the present statute, even if it was correctly decided, which is seriously doubted § 75. Has a United States Circuit Court, under the present judiciary act, jurisdiction, original or removal, of eminent domain proceedings under State laws, or any matters connected therewith?-A United States Circuit Court had, upon sound principle, under the judiciary act of 1875, 1 no original jurisdiction of a proceeding to exercise the power of eminent domain of a State, no original right to determine whether property should be appropriated by a State or by any person or corporation under its authority.2 The authority, in that respect, of the United States Circuit Courts, has not been increased by the present judiciary act. The right of eminent domain of the several States cannot be exercised by the United States Circuit Courts, by original proceedings and upon removal, without the States surrendering by Judge Hammond in Hunt v. | law, in the ordinary sense of those Fisher, supra. The plaintiff in Lawrence v. Morgan's L. & T. R. & S. Co., supra, attempted to evade the rule stated in the text, by procuring from the clerk of the State court, without authority of law, a preliminary injunction, which the court only could grant, and then himself removing the cause. But this attempted evasion was unsuccessful. Notwithstanding the clear language of the statute and decisions, jurisdiction upon removal from a State court of a suit to enjoin the prosecution of a suit in a State court was assumed in Eureka & K. R. R. Co. v. California & N. Ry. Co., 103 Fed. 897, upon the authority of the cases under the act of 1875. § 75. 1 Ante § 6, note 5. terms.' Mississippi & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403, 25 L. 206, approved in Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U. S. 1, 5 Sup. Ct. 1113, 29 L. 319. "The general rule with regard to cases of this sort is, that the initial proceeding of appraisement by commissioners is an administrative proceeding, and not a suit." Upshur County v. Rich, 135 U. S. 467, 10 Sup. Ct. 651, 34 L. 196. 3 Ante § 6. "Do the appropriation and condemnation of lands whereon to construct the drain and the assessment of benefits upon the land benefited by its construction constitute a controversy of a civil nature at law or in equity, cognizable by the Federal Courts? It is clear that the proceedings had by and before the drainage commissioners do not constitute a controversy of a civil nature at law or in equity." In re The Jarnecke Ditch, 69 Fed. 161, 2 "The proceeding in the present case before the commissioners appointed to appraise the land was in the nature of an inquest to as- 164. certain its value, and not a suit at to the United States Courts the ultimate control of all internal improvements.1 The appropriation of private property for public use under a State law is an act of sovereignty on the part of the & Lake Superior Copper Co., 25 Fed. 515. It would seem from parts of the opinion in Searl v. School District No. 2, 124 U. S. 197, 8 Sup. Ct. 460, 31 L. 415, "was passed upon and satisfactorily dealt with," in Colorado Midland R. Co. v. Jones, 29 Fed. 193, 4 "With the question of the appropriation of the land sought to be taken, the government of the United States, a separate sovereignty, unless it is the party seeking the condemnation, has nothing to do; and no foreign corporation can, in the Courts of the United that the question is there decided. States, condemn the land of a citi-But the statement that the precise zen of a State for the use of such question involved there corporation; and, if the Federal Courts have not original jurisdiction for such purposes, a proceeding of that kind instituted in the State court cannot be removed to the Federal Courts, because the Federal Courts can under no circumstances have jurisdiction in such cases. The contrary doctrine would destroy every vestige of control which a State has over its internal affairs." Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Pittsburg, W. & K. R. Co., 17 W. Va. 812, quoted and approved by Judge (now Justice) Brewer, in Colorado Midland R. Co. v. Jones, 29 Fed. 193; which latter case is cited with approval in Searl v. School District No. 2, 124 U. S. 197, 8 Sup. Ct. 460, 31 L. 415. There is an intimation in the Kansas City case, The Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U. S. 1, 5 Sup. Ct. 1113, 29 L. 319, which was a proceeding to open or widen a street, that the right of the city to open the street might be contested in the United States Circuit Court on removal. The point is expressly so decided in Mineral Range R. Co. v. Detroit in which only the amount of damages was in controversy, indicates that this is not correct. In Leavenworth, N. & S. R. Co. v. Union Pac. R. Co., 29 Fed. 728, Judge (now Justice) Brewer assumed full control of a condemnation suit upon removal, as if a United States Circuit Court has jurisdiction to determine when the power of eminent domain of a State shall be exercised, and itself administer the exercise of such power. It is said of the West Virginia case above quoted, in a dictum in Gerling (Martin's Adm'r) v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 151 U. S. 673, 14 Sup. Ct. 533, 38 L. 311: "That decision is inconsistent with the decisions of this Court," citing Mississippi & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, supra (which the West Virginia case approves); the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, supra; and Searl v. School District No. 2, supra. But there is no necessary conflict |