of such a suit, when maintainable, is based on citizenship, not subject-matter. It is conferred by the general statute,2 and not by the special statute as to patent-rights.3 The State courts have jurisdiction, concurrent with the Circuit Courts of the United States, of suits to enforce or annul contracts relating to patent-rights, although the validity of the patents come in question incidentally. A suit McMullen v. Bowers, 42 C. C. A. | Co., 17 Fed. Cas. 153, 6 Blatchf. 356, 470, 102 Fed. 494; 3 Fish. Pat. Cas. 483; McCarty & Hall Trading Co. v. Glaenzer, 30 Fed. 387, 24 Blatchf. 269; Wren v. Annin, 34 Fed. 435; Williams v. Star Sand Co., 35 Fed. 369; Nesmith v. Calvert, 18 Fed. Cas. 2, 1 Woodb. & M. 34, 2 Robb. Pat. Cas. 311, 17 Hunt Mer. Mag. 508; Randolph v. Robinson, 20 Fed. Cas. 262, 2 N. J. Law J. 171. A case close to the border line, Densmore v. Three Rivers held by the Circuit Court to arise Manuf'g Co., 38 Fed. 747; Montgomery Palace Stock Car Co. v. Street Stable-Car Line, 43 Fed. 329; Routh v. Boyd, 51 Fed. 821; upon contract, and by the Circuit Court of Appeals to arise under the patent-right laws, is Atherton Mach. Co. v. AtwoodMorrison Co., 99 Fed. 113; s. c., 102 Fed. 949. Pliable Shoe Co. v. Bryant, 81 C. C. A. Fed. 521; Standard Dental Mfg. Co. v. National Tooth Co., 95 Fed. 291; Kurtz v. Strauss, 100 Fed. 800; Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 Fed. Cas. 640, 1 Cliff. 288; Burr v. Gregory, 4 Fed. Cas. 813, 2 Paine 426, 1 Fish. Pat. Rep. 12; Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co. v. Whitney, 6 Fed. Cas. 345, 2 Ban. & A. 30; Goodyear v. Day, 10 Fed. Cas. 678, 1 Blatchf. 565, 1 Fish. Pat. Rep. 385; Goodyear v. Union India Rubber Co., 10 Fed. Cas. 726, 4 Blatchf. 63; Hill v. Whitcomb, 12 Fed. Cas. 182, 1 Ban. & A. 34, Holmes 317, 5 O. G. 430, 1 Am. Law T. Rep. (N. S.) 382; Magic Ruffle Co. v. Elm City Co., 16 Fed. Cas. 399, 13 Blatchf. 151, 2 Ban. & A. 152, 8 O. G. 773; Merserole v. Union Paper Collar 2 Ante § 6. 3 Rev. St. U. S., § 629, cl. 9. 4 Pratt v. Paris Gaslight & Coke Co., 168 U. S. 255, 18 Sup. Ct. 62, 42 L. 458, affirming s. c., 155 Ill. 531, 40 N. E. 1032, which affirmed s. c., 51 Ill. App. 603; Wade v. Lawder, 165 U. S. 624, 17 Sup. Ct. 425, 41 L. 851, dismissing writ of error from Wade v. Ringo, 122 Mo. 322, 25 S. W. 901; Marsh v. Nichols, 140 U. S. 344, 11 Sup. Ct. 798, 35 L. 413, dismissing writ of error from Nichols v. Marsh, 61 Mich. 509, 28 N. W. 699; Walter A. Wood Mowing & Reaping Mach. Co. v. Skinner, 139 U. S. 293, 11 Sup. Ct. 528, 35 L. 193; Dale Tile Manuf'g Co. v. Hyatt, 125 U. S. 46, 8 Sup. Ct. 756, 31 L. 683, affirming Hyatt v. Dale Tile Manuf'g Co., 106 N. Y. 651, 12 N. E. 705; Shoemaker v. South Bend Spark to enjoin the assessment or collection of taxes upon a patent, or to recover damages for the slander of title to a patent, or to enjoin the same, or to enjoin interference with plaintiff's business in the use of a patent, does not arise under the patent laws.5 Arrester Co., 135 Ind. 471, 35 N. E. | not deprive the State courts of the 280, 22 L. R. A. 332; Havana Press Drill Co. v. Ashurst, 148 Ill. 115, 35 N. E. 873; Rowe v. Blanchard, 18 Wis. 441, 86 Am. D. 783; power to determine questions arising under the patent laws, but only of assuming jurisdiction of cases' arising under those laws. There is a clear distinction between a Page v. Dickerson, 28 Wis. 694, case and a question arising under 9 Am. R. 532; Leonard v. Barnum, 34 Wis. 105; Rice v. Garnhart, 34 Wis. 453, 17 Am. R. 448; the patent laws. The former arises when the plaintiff in his opening pleading-be it a bill, complaint, or declaration-sets up a right unFuller & Johnson Manuf'g Co. v. der the patent laws as ground for a Bartlett, 68 Wis. 73, 31 N. W. 747, recovery. Of such the State courts 60 Am. R. 838; have no jurisdiction. The latter Dickinson v. Hall, 14 Pick. 217, may appear in the plea or answer 25 Am. D. 390; or in the testimony. The determiNash v. Lull, 102 Mass. 60, 3 Am. nation of such question is not beR. 435; yond the competency of the State Binney v. Annan, 107 Mass. 94, 9 tribunals." Am. R. 10; Darst v. Brockway, 11 Ohio 462; Middlebrook v. Broadbent, 47 N. Y. 443, 7 Am. R. 457; Burrall v. Jewett, 2 Paige 134. In these cases will be found many others cited. The law is thus happily stated by Justice Brown in the opinion of the Supreme Court in Pratt v. Paris Gaslight & Coke Co., supra: "The State court had jurisdiction both of the parties and the subject-matter as set forth in the declaration, and it could not be ousted of such jurisdiction by the fact that, incidentally to one of these defenses, the defendant claimed the invalidity of a certain patent. To hold that it has no right to introduce evidence upon this subject is to do it a wrong and deny it a remedy. Section 711 does The question received careful consideration, with the same result, in Slemmer's Appeal, 58 Pa. St. 155, 98 Am. D. 248. Other cases in which the invalidity of the patent was made a ground of defence to notes given for patent-rights in suits in State courts, and in which the State courts were held to have jurisdiction, are Cross v. Huntley, 13 Wend. 385; Elmer v. Pennel, 40 Me. 430. 5 Holt v. Indiana Manuf'g Co., 176 U. S. 68, 20 Sup. Ct. 272, 44 L. 374; s. c., 46 U. S. App. 717, 25 C. C. A. 301, 80 Fed. 1; Emack v. Kane, 34 Fed. 46; The same principles apply to a controversy respecting a copyright, when the suit brought arises out of contract, or general principles of law, and is not based directly upon the copyright statute. The statute giving the Federal Courts exclusive jurisdiction of copyright cases does not apply to a suit to enforce the common-law rights of an author. Cases of the character described stand on the same footing as to removability as other cases of which the State courts and the Circuit Courts of the United States have concurrent jurisdiction under the general statute.8 The State courts have jurisdiction, concurrent with the Circuit Courts of the United States, of cases growing out of interstate commerce, that are not based upon the statute of the United States to regulate such commerce, but upon general principles of the common law. So the general statute 10 conferring jurisdiction upon the Circuit Courts of the United States, concurrent with the State courts, of suits arising under the laws of the United States, confers jurisdiction of a suit for a mandatory injunction by one carrier to compel another carrier and its servants engaged in interstate commerce to comply with the provision of the inter Snow v. Judson, 38 Barb. 210, the suit was held to be within the jurisdiction of the State court, where plaintiff sued defendant for damages for falsely publishing that articles manufactured by plaintiff were an infringement of a patent held by the defendant. 6 Little v. Hall, 18 How. 165, 15 L. 328; Hoyt v. Bates, 81 Fed. 641; In re Rider, 16 R. I. 271, 15 Atl. 72; Holt v. Silver, 169 Mass. 435, 48 N. E. 837. 7 Boucicault v. Hart, 3 Fed. Cas. 983, 13 Blatchf. 47, 4 Am. Law Rec. 726, 8 Chi. Leg. News 257, 22 Int. Rev. Rec. 150, 23 Pittsb. Leg. J. 161. 8 Ante §§ 6, 7. 9 Case removed from State court: Murray v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 62 Fed. 24, 42-3, affirmed s. o., 35 C. C. A. 62, 92 Fed. 868. Contra, as to right to recover, but not denying the jurisdiction of the State courts: Gatton v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 95 Iowa 112, 63 N. W. 589, 28 L. R. A. 556. 10 Ante § 6. state commerce act that the defendant carrier should "afford all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between their respective lines." 11 § 72. The subject of trade-marks is within the concurrent jurisdiction of the State courts and the Circuit Courts of the United States.-The general concurrent jurisdiction of the State courts and the Circuit Courts of the United States embraces the subject-matter of trade-mark cases. To justify the Circuit Court in taking jurisdiction of a trade-mark case, however, upon removal from a State court, the case must fall within some particular jurisdictional clause of the statute, as that the parties are citizens of different States,2 or that the suit arises directly under the trade-mark act of Congress ;3 1124 St. L. 379, 1 Supp. 529, § 3, enforced in Toledo, A. A. & N. M. Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. 730, 732, 19 L. R. A. 387. Compare subsequent proceedings in same case: Toledo, A. A. & N. M. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. 746, 19 L. R. A. 395; Ex parte Lennon, 22 U. S. App. 561, 12 C. C. A. 134, 64 Fed. 320; Ex parte Lennon, 166 U. S. 548, 17 Sup. Ct. 658, 41 L. 1110. § 72. 1 Re Keasbey & Mattison Co., 160 U. S. 221, 16 Sup. Ct. 273, 40 L. 402. 2 Cases of original jurisdiction, in which the same principle is involved: Elgin National Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch-Case Co., 179 U. S. 665, 21 Sup. Ct. 270, 45 L. —, affirming Illinois Watch-Case Co. v. Elgin Nat. Watch Co., 35 C. C. A. 237, 94 Fed. 667, which reversed Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch-Case Co., 89 Fed. 487; Burt v. Smith, 35 U. S. App. 837, 17 C. C. A. 573, 71 Fed. 161; Allen B. Wrisley Co. v. George E. Rouse Soap Co., 62 U. S. App. 240, 32 C. C. A. 496, 90 Fed. 5; La Croix v. May, 15 Fed. 236; Luyties v. Hollender, 21 Fed. 281, 22 Blatchf. 413; Schumacher v. Schwencke, 26 Fed. 818; Graveley v. Graveley, 42 Fed. 265; Battle v. Finlay, 50 Fed. 106; Prince's Metallic Paint Co. v. Prince Manuf'g Co., 53 Fed. 493. 3 "An act to authorize the registration of trade-marks and protect the same," approved March 3, 1881, 21 St. L. 502, 1 Supp. 322, construed in cases cited in preceding note, and in Glotin v. Oswald, 65 Fed. 151. Compare cases under the prior statute: Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 25 L. 550; Duwell v. Bohmer, 8 Fed. Cas. 181, 2 Flip. 168, 14 O. G. 270, 10 Chi. Leg. News 356, 3 Cin. Law Bul. 533, Cox Manual Trade-Mark Cas. 351, 6 Reporter 262, 24 Int. Rev. Rec. 254, overruled in effect by TradeMark Cases, supra; Leidersdorf v. Flint, 15 Fed. Cas. 260, 8 Biss. 327, 18 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 37, 7 Cent. Law J. 405, 7 N. Y. Wkly. Dig. 360, 6 Reporter 739, 18 Alb. Law J. 382, 429, 13 Am. and the sum or value in controversy must exeed $2,000, exclusive of interest and costs, as in other cases, although a Circuit Court may take original jurisdiction of a case under the act of Congress where there is a smaller sum or value in controversy.5 § 73. A habeas corpus proceeding is not removable from a State court to a United States Circuit Court.-A habeas corpus proceeding is a suit, but not a removable one. There are at least two sufficient reasons for denying the removability of habeas corpus proceedings: First: The original jurisdiction of the United States Courts in habeas corpus cases is not derived from section one of the present judiciary act.2 Second: The controversy in a habeas corpus case does not Law Rev. 390, Cox Manual Trade- 5 Glotin v. Oswald, 65 Fed. 151. But there is a query as to this in Re Keasbey & Mattison Co., 160 U. S. 221, 16 Sup. Ct. 273, 40 L. 402. § 73. 1 Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U. S. 487, 6 Sup. Ct. 148, 29 L. 458. 2 U. S. Rev. St., § 751, et seq., give to such Courts their power to issue writs of habeas corpus. King v. McLean Asylum, 21 U. S. App. 481, 12 C. C. A. 145, 64 Fed. 331, 26 L. R. A. 784. For interesting discussions of the disputed questions in reference to granting the writ of habeas corpus by United States Courts, see, on one side: Ex parte Everts, 8 Fed. Cas. 909, 1 Bond 197, 7 Am. Law Reg. 79. Contra: Bennett v. Bennett, 3 Fed. Cas. 212, 1 Deady 299; Ex parte Des Rochers, 7 Fed. Cas. 537, 1 McAll. 68; Ex parte Randolph, 20 Fed. Cas. 242, 2 Brock. 447; United States v. Green, 26 Fed. Cas. 30, 3 Mason 482; United States v. Williamson, 28 Fed. Cas. 686, 4 Am. Law Reg. 5, 5 Pa. Law J. Rep. 377. The whole subject is learnedly discussed in King v. McLean Asylum, 21 U. S. App. 407, 12 C. C. A. 139, 64 Fed. 325; King v. McLean Asylum, 21 U. S. App. 481, 12 C. C. A. 145, 64 Fed. 331, 26 L. R. A. 784, where the conclusion is reached that a United States Circuit Court Ex parte Burrus, 136 U. S. 586, has jurisdiction of a suit for a 10 Sup. Ct. 850, 34 L. 500; Ex parte Young, 50 Fed. 526; writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum upon the ground of diverse citizenship, although it can exercise no power as parens patriæ. |