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This restrictive provision was not contained in prior statutes, and under them the Circuit Courts of the United States took jurisdiction of many cases by removal from State courts, on the ground of diverse citizenship, of which they were not given original jurisdiction,3 as to person or subject-matter.

Besides, it simplifies the law and | act of 1789, ante § 7, note 3, that avoids confusion, to limit the right the subject-matter of a cause be of removal to suits of which orig- within the original jurisdiction of inal jurisdiction is given to the the United States Circuit Courts United States Circuit Courts by a to make it removable from a State particular section of the statute. court, though, as shown by the This clause fixes a more definite cases just cited, the citizenship criterion by which to determine need not be. the removability of a cause than had before existed.

8 Delaware County v. Diebold Safe & L. Co., 133 U. S. 473, 10 Sup. Ct. 399, 33 L. 674;

Claflin v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 110 U. S. 81, 3 Sup. Ct. 507, 28 L. 76;

Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10, 23 L. 524, reversing Fuentes v. Gaines, 25 La. Ann. 85;

Lexington v. Butler, 14 Wall.

282, 20 L. 809;

Ex parte Biddle, 3 Fed. Cas. 336, 2 Mason 472;

Smith v. Rines, 22 Fed. Cas. 639, 2 Sumn. 338;

Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10, 23 L. 524, dictum quoted ante § 57, note 5;

Sifford v. Beaty, 12 Ohio St. 189,

196;

Conkling's Treatise (3 Ed.), p.

177.

But it was held under the acts of 1867 and 1875, as appears from

Bushnell v. Kennedy, 9 Wall. the cases cited, that a cause might 387, 19 L. 736; be removed, although either the

Green v. Custard, 23 How. 484, subject-matter or citizenship might 16 L. 471;

Gregory v. Pike, 21 U. S. App. 658, 15 C. C. A. 33, 67 Fed. 837; Glenn v. Walker, 27 Fed. 577; Erwin v. Walsh, 27 Fed. 579, 23 Blatchf. 535;

Bell v. Noonan, 19 Fed. 225; Rosenblatt v. Reliance Lumber Co., 18 Fed. 705;

Hobby v. Allison, 13 Fed. 401; Southworth v. Adams, 4 Fed. 1, 9 Biss. 521;

Warner v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 29 Fed. Cas. 260, 13 Blatchf. 231; Winans v. McKean Railroad & Navigation Co., 30 Fed. Cas. 265, 6 Blatchf. 215.

be such as to preclude the United States Circuit Court from taking original jurisdiction.

There are several Circuit Court cases in which a contrary view of the law is maintained,-which construed the prior statutes to mean what the present plainly says:

Ferry v. Westfield, 19 Fed. 155; Levy v. Laclede Bank, 18 Fed. 193;

Ferry v. Merrimack, 18 Fed. 657; Mosgrove v. Kountze, 14 Fed. 315, 4 McCr. 561;

Hardin v. Olson, 14 Fed. 705, 4 McCr. 643;

Berger v. Douglas County, 5 Fed.

It was held necessary, under the 23, 2 McCr. 483;

§ 65. A suit against a non-resident may be removed from a State court to the United States Circuit Court for the District in which the suit is pending, though the venue of an original action in the United States Circuit Court would not be in such District.-The clause of the removal act now under consideration, refers to jurisdiction as such, and not to the venue of actions.1 A suit may be removed from a State Fowlkes v. Fowlkes, 9 Fed. Cas. | over the parties and not of juris621, 21 Int. Rev. Rec. 358, 8 Chi. diction based upon the subject-matLeg. News 41; ter of the litigation." Cates v.

Lehigh Coal & N. Co. v. Central R. Co., 15 Fed. Cas. 249, 4 Wkly. Notes Cas. 187.

Cases in State courts:

Allen, 149 U. S. 451, 13 Sup. Ct. 883, 37 L. 804.

That case arose under the removal act of 1875; and the act of

Trester v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 1887-8 is radically different. There 23 Neb. 242, 36 N. W. 502;

is no room for doubt under it, that

New Orleans C. & B. Co. v. Re- to be removable, a case must be corder, 27 La. Ann. 291;

Ayres v. Western R. Co., 48 Barb. (N. Y.) 132, 32 How. Pr. 351;

Colcord v. Wall, 2 Miles (Pa.)

459.

The Supreme Court in the latest case upon the subject, Cates v. Allen, quoted below, materially modifies the previous cases, and returns, as to the act of 1875, nearly, if not completely, to the law as stated by Justice Story in Ex Parte Biddle, | supra, and Smith v. Rines, supra, by Justice Bradley in the opinion of the three dissenting justices in Gaines v. Fuentes, supra, and by Judge Conkling in his "Treatise on the United States Courts," as quoted by Justice Bradley, in Gaines v. Fuentes, supra, Conkling's Treatise (3 Ed.), p. 177.

one of which the United States Cir-
cuit Court is given “original juris-
diction," by section one of the act,
"over the parties," as well as "jur-
isdiction based upon the subject-
matter of the litigation."
$ 65.

The statute has not changed the rule that the proper venue of an action may be waived.

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"It is true that by the first section, where the jurisdiction is founded on diversity of citizenship, suit is to be brought only in the District of the residence of the plaintiff or the defendant;' and this restriction is a personal privilege of the defendant, and may be waived by him. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. McBride, 141 U. S. 127, 11 Sup. Ct. 982, 35 L. 659. Section two, however, refers to the first part of section one by which jurisdiction is conferred, and not "While there are cases where the to the clause relating to the DisCourts of the United States may trict in which suit may be brought. acquire jurisdiction by removal | McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. from State courts when jurisdiction | v. Walthers, 134 U. S. 41, 10 Sup. Ct. would not have attached if the suits 485, 33 L. 833." Mexican Nat. R. had been originally brought there- Co. v. Davidson, 157 U. S. 201, 15 in, those are cases of jurisdiction Sup. Ct. 563, 39 L. 672.

The Supreme Court in this late case says:

court to the United States Circuit Court for the District in which the cause is pending in the State court, without regard to the question whether the venue of an original suit would properly be in the United States Circuit Court for that District.2

§ 66. A suit may be removable from a State court although the jurisdiction of such State court has been acquired in a manner that is not authorized in a United States Circuit Court.-Not only is the limitation of removability under consideration inapplicable to the question of venue, but it also does not apply to the means by which jurisdiction is acquired by the State court. It does not affect the removability of a suit that jurisdiction has been acquired

"The provision that no civil suit shall be brought in a Circuit or District Court of the United States, against any person, by any original process or proceeding in any other District than that whereof he is an inhabitant, confers an exemption, in the nature of a personal privilege, that may be waived, and has no application where the defendant to a suit in the State court, who is a non-resident of the State, removes the cause into the Federal Court of that State." Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Meyers, 18 U. S. App. 569, 10 C. C. A. 485, 62 Fed. 367.

A like doctrine is stated in Edwards v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 20 Fed. 452.

2 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Meyers, 18 U. S. App. 569, 10 C. C. A. 485, 62 Fed. 367;

Amsinck v. Balderston, 41 Fed.

641;

First Nat. Bank v. Merchants' Bank, 37 Fed. 657, 2 L. R. A. 469;

Cooley v. McArthur, 35 Fed. 372;
Short v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R.
Co., 33 Fed. 114, 34 Fed. 225;
Tiffany v. Wilce, 34 Fed. 230;
Wilson v. Western U. Tel. Co., 34
Fed. 561;

Gavin v. Vance, 33 Fed. 84;
Loomis v.
New York & C. G. C.

Co., 33 Fed. 353;
Pitkin County Min. Co. v. Mar-
kell, 33 Fed. 386;

Fales v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R.
Co., 32 Fed. 673;

Bliven v. New England Screw Co., 3 Fed. Cas. 715, 3 Blatchf. 111;

American Finance Co. v. Bostwick, 151 Mass. 19, 23 N. E. 656; Craven v. Turner, 82 Me. 383, 19

Cowell v. City Water-Supply Co., | Atl. 864. 96 Fed. 769;

A few cases to the contrary have

Creagh v. Eq. Life Assur. Soc., 83 long since been overruled. Fed. 849.

Stalker v. Pullman's Palace-Car Min. Co., 32 Fed. 183; Co., 81 Fed. 989;

Yuba County v. Pioneer Gold

Harold v. Iron Silver Min. Co., 33

Duncan v. Associated Press, 81 Fed. 529; Fed. 417;

McNeal Pipe & F. Co. v. How

Long v. Long, 73 Fed. 369;

land, 99 N. C. 202, 5 S. E. 745, 6 Am. St. Rep. 513.

by the State court in a different manner, or by a different process or proceeding, from that by which original jurisdiction could be acquired by the Federal Court. It is a material question whether the State court has jurisdiction, and its extent; but the question how such jurisdiction was acquired is not material, except as the method of its acquisition may affect the extent of the jurisdiction.

For example, the United States Circuit Courts cannot acquire jurisdiction in common-law suits by the process of foreign attachment, without the personal service of process upon the defendant within the District. The courts of most of the States may lawfully acquire jurisdiction of suits by the process of foreign attachment, without the personal service of process; and suits in which jurisdiction has been so acquired (if otherwise removable) may be removed from the State courts to the United States Circuit Courts.2

§ 66.

1 Ex parte Des Moines & Minn. R. Co., 103 U. S. 794, 26 L. 461; Chaffee v. Hayward, 20 How. 208, 15 L. 851;

Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300, L. 1093, overruling s. c., 23 Fed. Cas. 1353, 14 Am. Jur. 302;

23;

Picquet v. Swan, 19 Fed. Cas. 609, 5 Mason 35;

Richmond v. Dreyfous, 20 Fed. Cas. 737, 1 Sumn. 131;

Saddler v. Hudson, 21 Fed. Cas. 135, 2 Curt. 6.

There are some contrary decisions by the United States Circuit

Lackett v. Rumbaugh, 45 Fed. Court of Pennsylvania; but these

Treadwell v. Seymour, 41 Fed. 579, 581;

Harland v. United Lines Tel. Co., 40 Fed. 308, 6 L. R. A. 252;

Noyes v. Canada, 30 Fed. 665; Boston Electric Co. v. Electric Gas Lighting Co., 23 Fed. 838;

Anderson v. Shaffer, 10 Fed. 266; Dormitzer v. Illinois & St. L. Bridge Co., 6 Fed. 217;

Chittenden v. Darden, 5 Fed. Cas. 642, 2 Woods 437;

Hollingsworth v. Adams, 12 Fed. Cas. 348, 2 Dall. 396, 1 L. 431; Maudlin v. Carll, 16 Fed. Cas. 1164, 3 Hughes 249;

Nazro v. Cragin, 17 Fed. Cas. 1259, 3 Dill. 474;

have been overruled:

Fisher v. Consequa, 9 Fed. Cas. 120, 2 Wash. C. C. 382;

Graighle v. Notnagle, 10 Fed. Cas. 948, Pet. C. C. 245;

Guillou v. Fontain, 11 Fed. Cas. 108, 32 Leg. Int. 362, 21 Int. Rev. Rec. 348, 2 Am. Law T. Rep. (N. S.) 502, 1 N. Y. Wkly. Dig. 269, 8 Chi. Leg. News 25, 23 Pittsburg Leg. J. 33, 7 Leg. Gaz. 321;

Taylor v. Gardner, 23 Fed. Cas. 766, 2 Wash. C. C. 488;

Toland v. Sprague, 23 Fed. Cas. 1353, 14 Am. Jur. 302.

2 Pollard v. Dwight, 4 Cranch 421, 2 L. 666;

North Alabama Dev. Co. v. Orman, 13 U. S. App. 215, 5 C. C. A.

A suit by a county to enforce the collection of delinquent taxes by a sale of the real estate on which the taxes were assessed, commenced by the county treasurer filing a list of delinquent lands in the district court of the county, and the publication of notice, pursuant to the laws of Minnesota or South Dakota, is removable, although it is not commenced in the manner in which a suit would have to be commenced in a Circuit Court.8

22, 55 Fed. 18, affirming Orman v. North Alabama Dev. Co., 53 Fed. 469;

Smith v. Life Ass'n, 76 Va. 380. For the method of proceeding in such cases after removal, see post

Skinner v. Garnett Gold-Min. Co., ch. XV. 96 Fed. 735;

Spreen v. Delsignore, 94 Fed. 71; Purdy v. Wallace Müller & Co., 81 Fed. 513;

8"It has been held in several decisions that a case cannot be removed into the Federal Courts unless it could originally have been begun there. Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U. S. 454, 462, 14 Sup. Ct. 654, 38 L. 511; Mexican National Railroad Co. v. Davidson, 157 U. S. 201, 208, 15 Sup. Ct.

Du Pont v. Abel, 81 Fed. 534; Long v. Long, 73 Fed. 369; Vermilya v. Brown, 65 Fed. 149; Richmond v. Brookings, 48 Fed. 241; Crocker Nat. Bk. v. Pagenstecher, 563, 39 L. 672; In re Cilley, 58 Fed. 44 Fed. 705; 977. An examination of these deSeeley v. Missouri, K. & T. R. | cisions, however, will show that the Co., 39 Fed. 252; limitation mentioned is based, not Shampeau v. Conn. River Lum-upon matters of procedure, but upber Co., 37 Fed. 771; Barney v. Globe Bank, 2 Fed. Cas.sential to jurisdiction in the first 894, 5 Blatchf. 107, 2 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 221;

Clarke v. Chase, 5 Fed. Cas. 942, Brun. Col. Cas. 638, 21 Law. Rep.

34;

on those elements specified as es

section of the act of 1887-88. To confer original jurisdiction, the following facts, and no others, are necessary: (1) A suit of a civil nature at common law or in equity. (2) It

Garden City Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 9 must involve at least $2,000, excluFed. Cas. 1153, 1 Dill. 305; Sayles v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 21 Fed. Cas. 608, 2 Curt. 212;

Second Nat. Bank v. New York Silk Manuf'g Co., 21 Fed. Cas. 960, 13 Reporter 355, sub nom. New York Silk Manuf'g Co. v. Second Nat. Bank, 10 Fed. 204;

sive of interest and costs. (3) It must arise wholly between citizens of different States, or present one of the other conditions mentioned in the last part of the first section. A proceeding which presents these elements is within the original jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, not

United States v. Ottman, 27 Fed. withstanding it may involve matCas. 387, 1 Hughes 313;

American Finance Co. v. Bostwick, 151 Mass. 19, 23 N. E. 656;

ters of procedure which would prevent its commencement in those Courts. The section defining the

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