Limitations. Statute of or accrue to the same, and in default thereof, such persons so not entering shall be utterly excluded and disabled from such entry after to be made." Real actions. 8, c. 2. Limi real actions. After the right of entry was lost, the true owner still retained, in most cases, a right of action, which was either possessory, as were all writs of entry and assize, or droitural, to which belonged the writ of right and its varieties: See Com. Dig. Assize, Droit, and the table, tit. Action. In all these, the demandant was required to prove a former seisin, either in himself, or in the ancestor or other person from whom he derived his title. It was sufficient for a remainderman or reversioner, or the assignee of such, to allege a seisin in the settlor, and in some person entitled under the settlement: F. N. B. 204, &c. And under a writ of dower, it was not necessary to allege any seisin. But it was not competent for a person claiming under a devise, either executory or in possession, to sue upon the seisin of the devisor; and, therefore, if he had never entered under the devise, he could not (except in case of land devisable by custom, F. N. B. 199) recover in a real action. And a devisee in remainder was in the same situation, until entry by the particular devisee. Whether the seisin conferred by the Statute of Uses was a sufficient foundation for a real action, without actual entry, does not seem to have been decided: See Cro. Jac. 604. At common law no period was fixed within which actions must be commenced, but important public events were from time to time stated as limits beyond which no actions could be brought: Shel. Stat. 32 Hen. R. P. 146. The time for enforcing these rights of tation of time action was limited by the statute 32 Hen. 8, c. 2, in for bringing case the action was founded on the demandant's own seisin, to thirty years (sect. 3); in case it was founded on the seisin of the demandant's ancestor or predecessor, to sixty years, if it were a droitural action, and to fifty years, if it were a possessory action (sects. 1, 2, 6). By sect. 4, no avowry or conusance could be made for any rent, suit, or service, after fifty years from the seisin upon which the claim was founded. The time for making a Statute of Limitations. men and reversions. prescription was also, by the first section, limited to sixty years. Real actions by remaindermen and assignees of reversions, were not within the letter of Remainderthe statute of Hen. 8 (for the word "predecessor" assignees of was considered to refer exclusively to corporations sole), but they were held to be within its spirit; and it was further laid down, that the statute in such cases limited the remedy to a period of fifty years from the seisin of the settlor, and not thirty from that of the tenant for life; so that, if the tenant for life lived more than thirty years after the making of the settlement, the remainderman's remedy by ejectment might have subsisted (even subsequently to the statute of James 1) after his right of action had been barred: Widdowson v. Earl of Harrington, 1 J. & W. 532. Both of the abovementioned statutes extended to lands of copyhold tenure (c). The disturbances of the civil wars, and the consequent necessity of quieting titles, led to the passing of the Statute of Fines, 4 Hen. 7, c. 24, the arbitrary provisions of which long survived the peculiar circumstances by which alone they were justifiable. That statute gave to a fine with proclamations levied by a person in possession, either rightfully or otherwise, of an estate of freehold, the effect of barring the rights of all persons having present rights of entry, and not being under disability, if they did not claim within five years after the last proclamation; and it barred all persons under disabilities when the fine was levied, if they did not claim within five years after their disabilities were removed; and all persons not having present rights, if they did not claim within five years after their rights of entry accruedunless they were under disabilities-and then within five Stat. 4 Hen. 7, c. 24. Bar by fine and nonclaim. years after such disabilities had ceased; or unless, in any of these cases, an entry or claim was made within the period. And the entry or claim Stat. 4 Anne, to exclude the bar under the above act, or under c. 16. Entry (e) The provisions of these two statutes were extended to Ireland by the Irish stat. 10 Car. 1, sess. 2, c. 6. or claim to preserve rights. Statute of Limitations. Obsolete Adverse pos session under the stat. 21 the statute of James 1, was required, by the stat. 4 Anne, c. 16, s. 16, to be followed up within the year by an action. The provision for disabilities in the Statute of Fines, was held not to extend to successive disabilities: Dillon v. Leman, 2 H. Bl. 584. The material inquiry as to the effect of a fine and non-claim generally was whether the party levying the fine had at the time an estate of freehold in the land-acquired either rightfully or by some one of the general modes of disseisin above mentioned,for if he were not in possession at all, or in possession as tenant at sufferance, or for any other merely chattel interest, the fine would be inoperative, as having been levied by a stranger to the freehold (d): See Davies v. Lowndes, 7 Scott, 21; Doe d. Burrell v. Perkins, 3 M. & S. 271; Carter v. Barnardiston, 1 P. Wms. 505. Other statutes respecting limitations, which are now obsolete, are the stat. 1 Mary, sess. 2, c. 5 (relating to advowsons); 10 & 11 Will. 3, c. 14 (writ of error for reversing a fine, recovery, or judgment); 7 Anne, c. 18 (advowsons); and 14 Geo. 2, c. 20 (relating to loss of recovery deeds or records). Actual seisin, it has been seen, was essential to the operation of a fine as a bar; and, upon prinJac. 1, c. 16. ciple, it should seem that there could have been no adverse possession sufficient to bar the true owner's entry under the Statute of Limitations of Jac. 1, unless he was actually disseised, and the party in possession, therefore, seised in such manner as would have been sufficient support to a fine levied by him. Unless the true owner was dispossessed of his freehold, there could be no adverse possession of it against him. Accordingly, in Reading v. Rawsterne (2 Lord Raym. 829; 1 Salk. 242), it was held, that the Statute of Limitations does not bar a man, but where there is an actual disseising:" See Doe d. Dunraven v. Williams, 7 Car. & P. 332. In (d) Fines being now abolished by the stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 1, a title can no longer be obtained by fine and non-claim. Limitations. the case of Doe d. Parker v. Gregory (4 Nev. & M. Statute of 308), however, the law was stated otherwise. In that case, a husband had come in originally in his Adverse wife's right, and had not directly ousted the rightful possession. owner, but merely continued where he was to the exclusion of that owner; his interest having expired by his wife's death, it was held that the continuing of this possession for twenty years entitled the husband to the protection of the Statute of Limita tions. Will. 4, c. 27. The statute 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, intituled, "An Stat. 3 & 4 Act for the Limitation of Actions and Suits relating Royal assent, to Real Property, and for simplifying the Remedies July 24, 1833. for trying the Rights thereto," is as follows: Sect. 1, enacts, "That the words and expressions hereinafter Meaning of the words in mentioned, which in their ordinary signification have a more con- the act:fined or a different meaning, shall in this act, except where the nature of the provision or the context of the act shall exclude such construction (e), be interpreted as follows, (that is to say), the word 'land' (ƒ) shall extend to manors, messuages, and all "Land.” other corporeal hereditaments whatsoever, and also to tithes (g) (other than tithes belonging to a spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole), and also to any share, estate, or interest in them or any of them, whether the same shall be a freehold or chattel interest, and whether freehold or copyhold, or held according to any other tenure; and the word 'rent' (h) shall extend to all "Rent." (e) Acts imposing limitations on rights of action, being "statutes of repose," will receive a liberal interpretation: Tolson v. Kaye, 6 J. B. Moore, 558; see also Broom, Leg. Max. 343, 892. (f) Tolls payable in respect of a turnpike road are neither land Turnpike nor money charged upon or payable out of land, and, therefore, tolls. are not within the statute: Mellish v. Brooks, 4 Jur. 739. (g) As to the operation of the statute with regard to claims for tithes, vide infra, p. 49, note. (h) The term "rent" includes quit rents: De Beauvoir v. Owen, 5 Exch. 166; 19 L. J., Ex. 177; Lord Chichester v. Hall, 17 L. T. 121. A heriot may be defined as a right, arising in a manor upon death or alienation of a tenant, to take a specific chattel, e. g., the tenant's best beast. Heriots are of two kinds, viz., heriot service and heriot custom. The former are such as are due upon a special reservation in a grant or lease of lands, and, therefore, amount to little more than a mere rent; the latter arise upon no special reservation whatsoever, but depend merely upon immemorial usage and custom: 2 Bl. Com. 422. See also 2 Saund. Statute of Limitations. Person through whom another claims. "Person." Number and gender. When the right heriots, and to all services and suits for which a distress may be made, and to all annuities and periodical sums of money charged upon or payable out of any land (except moduses or compositions belonging to a spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole); and the person through whom another person is said to claim shall mean any person by, through, or under, or by the act of whom, the person so claiming became entitled to the estate or interest claimed, as heir, issue in tail, tenant by the curtesy of England, tenant in dower, successor, special or general occupant, executor, administrator, legatee, husband, assignee, appointee, devisee, or otherwise, and also any person who was entitled to an estate or interest to which the person so claiming, or some person through whom he claims, became entitled as lord by escheat; and the word 'persons' shall extend to a body politic, corporate, or collegiate, and to a class of creditors or other persons (i), as well as an individual (k); and every word importing the singular number only shall extend and be applied to several persons or things as well as one person or thing; and every word importing the masculine gender only shall extend and be applied to a female as well as a male." Sect. 2. [Repealed by 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57, s. 9. See the substituted section, 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57, s. 1, post, p. 23.] Sect. 3. "That, in the construction of this act, the right to shall be deemed make an entry or distress, or bring an action to recover any land or rent (1), shall be deemed to have first accrued at such time as to have ac crued : It would appear that heriots payable at uncertain intervals which might exceed twenty years are not within the meaning of the term: see Baron Parke's judgment in Owen v. De Beauvoir, 16 M. & W. 566. And see De Beauvoir v. Owen, supra. In the recent case of Lord Zouche v. Dalbiac (L. R., 10 Ex. 172), it was held that the seizure by the lord was not making an entry on distress, nor bringing an action to recover rent within the meaning of this act, and that the lord's title was not barred notwithstanding that a heriot became due more than twenty years since the last occasion of seizure occurred, and that the lord did not then enforce his right. (i) The poor of a parish are "a class of persons" within the meaning of this section as regards rents of land applicable for their benefit: Att.-Gen. v. Magdalen College, Oxford, 6 H. L. 189; S. C., 26 L. J., Ch. 620. () As to spiritual or eleemosynary corporations sole, see sect. 29. (1) Where a lord seized copyholds quosque, and held them for nearly forty years, a bill by the heir of the former tenant to compel admittance by the lord was held to be an action to recover land within this section and to be barred accordingly: Walters v. Webb, L. R., 5 Ch. 531. |