Statutes of different person: Llewellyn v. Mackworth, Barnard, Limitations. 445; Hopkins v. Hopkins, 1 Atk. 580. Concealed fraud. Express trusts. No statutory bar between express trus que trust. Concealed fraud within this section does not mean merely entering wrongfully without the owner's knowledge that adverse possession has arisen (see Rains v. Buxton, 14 Ch. D. 437); it means designed fraud, where a person knowing to whom the right belongs, conceals the circumstances giving that right, and by means of such concealment, enables himself to enter and hold. See Sugd. Vend. 485. See further as to what constitutes concealed fraud within the meaning of this section, Petre v. Petre, 1 Dr. 397; Dean v. Thwaite, 21 Beav. 621; Thurston v. Ansty, 27 Beav. 335; Sturgis v. Morse, 24 Beav. 541; Manby v. Bewicke, 3 K. & J. 342; Chetham v. Hoare, L. R., 9 Eq. 571; Willis v. Earl Howe, 50 L. J., Ch. 4; S. C. 29 W. R. 70. A purchaser, not having personal notice of the fraud, who contracts through an agent who knows of the fraud, is not protected by the section: Vane v. Vane, L. R., 8 Ch. 383. The effect of the 28th section, respecting mortgagees, will be considered in a subsequent volume, sub. tit. MORTGAGES. The decision in Cholmondeley v. Clinton (4 Bligh, 1), that there might be adverse enjoyment of an equity of redemption, which is a species of equitable interest arising by implication, applies equally to other cases of implied (Collard v. Hare, 2 R. & My. 675) and also to express trusts. In cases of implied trusts the 24th section operates; but where the trust is express, the statute, it tee and cestui has been seen, creates no inflexible bar to the remedies of the cestui que trust against the trusteeand volunteers claiming under him; and equity (which may shorten, though it may never add to the time allowed by the statute) will exercise its disexpress trust cretion, and determine from the particular circumstances in each case, whether or not the cestui que trust has been guilty of such laches as should preclude him from relief: Smith v. Clay, 3 B. C. C. 639; Pickering v. Lord Stamford, 2 Ves. J. 581; M'Donnell v. White, 11 H. L. C. 570. Remedy for breach of an may be lost by laches. Limitations. Upon the whole it appears that, excepting as to Statutes of cases of mistake or ignorance (Berrington v. Evans, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 434; Brooksbank v. Smith, 2 Y. & C. Ex. 58; Denys v. Shuckburgh, 4 Y. & C. Ex. 42), legacies, charitable trusts, charges, and mortgages, the statute has made no alteration in the rules of limitation which equity had already adopted; and has left many subjects of equitable cognisance unprovided for. As to the lapse of time and circumstances which will induce the court to refuse its assistance, see Wright v. Howard, 1 Sim. & St. 190; Pattison v. Hawkesworth, 10 Beav. 375; Sibbering v. Earl of Balcarres, 3 De G. & Sm. 735; and the remarks of Lord St. Leonards in Spackman v. Evans, L. R., 3 H. L. 220. title. statute. The effect of the 34th section, which enacts, that, Extinction of at the expiration of the period of limitation, the the right and right of the party in possession shall be extinguished, may not in all cases be of easy determination. Thus, Rights conif a tenant at will continues in possession for [eleven] ferred by the years after the determination of his tenancy, and is then turned out of possession by a stranger, and the owner suffers another year to elapse without asserting his right, he will be deprived both of his remedy and his title. It should seem that the original wrong-doer would then be entitled to recover the land from the person who had turned him out; for the title must be in some person, and can only be, it should seem, in him whose act has deprived the true owner of it (g); but see the judgment in Doe (9) Of course, if the wrong-doer has been in possession for twenty [now twelve] years, he has a prima facie title: Stocker v. Berny, I Ld. Raym. 741; Doe d. Danson v. Parke, 4 A. & E. 816; Doe d. Draper v. Lawley, 3 Nev. & M. 331. In a case before the statute (Doe d. Harding v. Cooke, 5 Moo. & Pay. 181), the lessor of the plaintiff relied upon the undisturbed possession of himself and father during twenty-three years, and the defendant relied on a possession during ten years succeeding the twentythree. The court decided in favour of the plaintiff. With regard to the nature of the title of the wrong-doer in possession, Mr. Hayes says, "The wrong-doer must be considered according to the prin eiple of the old law as claiming generally, and therefore as claiming the absolute property (unless indeed he expressly qualify his claim), and the statute as merely diminishing from time to time the danger of eviction, till at length his originally precarious fee Statutes of d. Thompson v. Thompson, 2 Nev. & P. 656; 6 Limitations. A. & E. 721, which seems not to favour this view. Other clauses in the act. St. 21 Jac. 1, c. 2. If the second wrongful claimant has originally come in under the first, of course he cannot dispute his title, and therefore may be turned out at any time within [twelve] years. See Doe d. Willis v. Birchmore, 9 A. & E. 662. The remaining sections of the act, which have not been noticed in this review of its more important provisions, relate to the claims of an administrator (sect. 6); acknowledgment of title (sect. 14); claims by spiritual and eleemosynary corporations sole (sect. 29); advowsons (sects. 30, 31, 32, 33, which by sect. 44, do not affect benefices in Ireland); abolition of certain real and mixed actions (sects. 36, 37, 38); descent cast, discontinuance, and warranty (sect. 39); arrears of rent and interest (sect. 42); and spiritual courts (sect. 43). See the notes to the different sections of the act, ante. The Crown. The rule "nullum tempus occurrit regi," (Litt. sect. 178), was first materially circumscribed, and the enforcement of the rights of the Crown limited in point of time, by the stat. 21 Jac. 1, c. 2, to sixty years from the commencement of the session of Parliament in which the act was passed (see Co. Litt. 119 a, n.; 3 Inst. 188),—a limitation which gradually became less effectual, St. 9 Geo. 3, until the statute of the 9th Geo. 3, c. 16 (h), usually c. 16, Nullum Tempus Act. becomes, by the exclusion of every stronger claim, a firm inheritance: 1 Hayes, Con. 270 (5th ed.); see also Dart, V. & P. 402, and 11 Jur., N. S. 151 (part 2). A person in possession of land even before he has acquired a title by virtue of the statute has a devisable interest (Doe v. Jauncey, 8 C. & P. 99; Asher v. Whittock, L. R., 1 Q. B. 1); and he may defend his possession against strangers other than the rightful owner: Doe v. Dyball, Mood. & M. 346. (h) The provisions of this statute were extended to Ireland by stat. 48 Geo. 3, c. 47. It would seem that such a title may be forced on a purchaser: Tuthill v. Rogers, 1 J. & L. 36. This statute is amended by the stat. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 62. Sect. 1 of this act enacts that "The Queen's Majesty, her heirs and successors, shall not at any time hereafter sue, impeach, question, or implead any person or persons for or in anywise concerning any manors, lands, tenements, rents, tithes, or hereditaments whatsoever (other than liberties or franchises), which such person or persons, or his or their or any of their ancestors or predeces Limitations against the Crown. called the Nullum Tempus Act, was passed, which Statute of disables the Crown from suing for any manors, lands, tenements, rents, tithes, or hereditaments whatsoever (other than liberties or franchises, or the revenues, issues, or profits thereof), by reason of any right or title which shall not have first accrued and grown within sixty years before the commencement of the suit; unless the Crown, or those through whom the Crown claims, "shall have been answered, by force and virtue of any such right or title to the same, the rents, revenues, issues, or profits thereof, or the rents, issues, or profits of any honour, manor, or other hereditament, whereof the premises in question shall sors, or those from, by, or whom they do or shall claim, have, or shall have held or enjoyed or taken the rents, revenues, issues, or profits thereof by the space of sixty years next before the filing, issuing or commencing of every such action, bill, plaint, information, commission, or other suit or proceeding as shall at any time or times hereafter be filed, issued or commenced for recovering the same or in respect thereof, by reason only that the same manors, lands, tenements, rents, tithes, or hereditaments, or the rents, revenues, issues, or profits thereof, have or shall have been in charge to her Majesty or her predecessors or successors, or stood insuper of record, within the said space of sixty years, but that such having been in charge, and such stand insuper of record shall be, as against such person and persons, and all claiming by, from or under them or any of them, of no force and effect." Sect. 2 enacts that the provisions of this act apply to actions by the Duke of Cornwall, and to provisions of 7 & 8 Vict. c. 105, and 23 & 24 Vict. c. 53. By sect. 3 the Crown shall not be held, for the purposes Provision as of the act of the ninth year of king George the third, to have to answering been answered the rents, revenues, issues, or profits of any to the Crown. of rent, &c.,; lands, manors, tenements, rents, tithes, or hereditaments, which to the Crown. shall have been held or enjoyed, or of which the rents, &c. shall have been taken, by any other persons or person, by the space of sixty years next before the filing, issuing or commencing of any such action, suit, bill, plaint, information, commission, or other suit or proceeding for recovering the same or in respect thereof, as in the said act is mentioned, by reason only of the same lands, manors, tenements, rents, tithes, or hereditaments having been part or parcel of any honour or manor or other hereditaments of which the rents, &c. shall have been answered to her Majesty or her predecessors or successors, or some other person under whom her Majesty hath or lawfully claimeth, or shall thereafter have or lawfully claim as aforesaid, or of any honour, manor or other hereditaments which shall have been duly in charge to her Majesty, her predecessors or successors, or stood insuper of record as aforesaid. Sect. 4 preserves the right to reversionary interests. be part or parcel, within the said space of sixty years; or that the same shall have been duly in charge to his Majesty, or some of his progenitors, predecessors, or ancestors, heirs, or successors, or have or shall have stood insuper of record within the space of sixty years." The act then proceeds to give to adverse possessors for sixty years a title against the Crown and grantees under the Crown. Sects. 2 & 10 define what shall be held to be "being duly in charge;" as to which, see also AttorneyGeneral v. Lord Eardley, 8 Price, 39; 1 Daniel, 271; Attorney-General v. Maxwell, 8 Price, 76, n. Sects. 3 & 4 provide for cases of reversions and remainders vested in the Crown. Sect. 5 enacts that manors, &c., so gained by adverse possession, shall be held of the Crown upon the same tenure as if they had been had by grants from the Crown; which, in effect, amounts to an exception of services due to the Crown from the operation of the act. Sects. 6, 7, 8, & 2, contain certain reservations and savings of rights. The effect of the exception of liberties and franchises from the operation of the act is, to leave the majority of cases unprovided for; because, there are scarcely any lands not parcel of an honour which remain in the Crown and continue in charge, and the terms of the act do not seem well adapted to include advowsons. As to presuming grants of advowsons from the Crown, see Gibson v. Clark, 1 Jac. & W. 159. As to tithes, the Crown is limited by the 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 100, infra, p. 49. The commencement of suit is the issuing of process, and not the filing of the information: Att.-Gen. v. Hall, 11 Price, 760. By the stat. 21 Jac. 1, c. 14, s. 1, it is enacted "that whenever the King, &c., hath been or shall be out of possession by the space of twenty years, or shall not have taken the profits of land, &c., within the space of twenty years before any information of intrusion brought to recover the same, in every such case the defendant may plead the general issue, and shall not be pressed to plead specially; and that, in such cases, the defendant shall retain |