Proof of tative of A. (Williams on Executors, 258; Tingrey writings, &c. v. Brown, 1 Bos. & P. 310; Catherwood v. Chabaud, 2 Dowl. & R. 271; 1 B. & Cr. 150); because the power of an executor is founded upon the special confidence and actual appointment of the deceased; and such executor is therefore allowed to transmit that power to another, in whom he has equal confidence; but the administrator of A. is merely the officer or deputy of the court, prescribed to him by Act of Parliament (31 Edw. 3, stat. 1, c. 11), in whom the deceased has reposed no trust at all: and, therefore, on the death of that officer or deputy, it results back to the court to appoint another. And, with regard to the administrator of A.'s executor, he has clearly no privity or relation to A.; being only commissioned to administer the effects of the intestate executor, and not of the original testator, therefore, in both these cases, and whenever the course of representation from executor to executor is interrupted by any one administration, it is necessary to commit administration afresh, of the goods of the deceased not administered by the former executor or administrator. And this administrator de bonis non is the only legal representative of the deceased in matters of personal property, including chattels real: Ley v. Anderton, Styl. 225; Tingrey v. Brown, 1 Bos. & P. 310. But he may, as well as an original adminis- Limited adtrator, have only a limited or special administration ministration. committed to his care, viz., of certain specific effects, the rest being committed to others: Williams on Executors, 486. See also 1 Roll. Abr. 908 (D), pl. 1 ; Fawtry v. Fawtry, 1 Salk, 36, pl. 2; 2 Bla. Com. 506. Wills. The proper evidence of a will bequeath- Wills. ing chattels real and other personal property is the probate, bearing the seal of the Ecclesiastical Courts, if before 1857, or, since, then of the Principal Registry, or of a District Registry of the Court of Probate, until the reconstruction of the courts in 1875, and now of the Probate Division of her Majesty's High Court of Justice: Pinney v. Pinney, 2 Man. & Ry. 436; 8 B. & Cr. 335; Allen v. Dundas, 3 T. R. 125. Where the probate is lost, Proof of Writings, &c. Where a purchaser from devisees is entitled to the concurrence of the heir-at the proper evidence is an exemplification from the The probate of a will was formerly considered not admissible at all to prove any part of its contents that relate to real property, either of freehold or copyhold tenure,-not even as secondary evidence,— where the will itself was lost. But the probate, or an office copy thereof, is now sufficient evidence of the will as regards real estate, except when the validity of the will is put in issue: 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77, s. 64. In important matters, the copy should be examined with the original will. If the memorandum of attestation of a will of real estate (made before the operation of the Wills Act) does not state that the will was attested by the three witnesses in the testator's presence (or, in cases law, or to have within that Act, that it was attested by the two the will proved witnesses, in the presence of the testator, and in the per testes. presence of each other), though this statement is not essential to the validity of the will; yet it seems to be the better opinion, that the purchaser would be entitled to insist on the concurrence of the heir, or that the will should be proved per testes. And it is thought by some, that where the attestation is informal, it can be supported, if an affidavit by the witnesses that they subscribed the will in the testator's presence is produced: Coventry, Conv. Evid. 97. Sometimes an unproved will is in the hands of a third person. In such a case, the purchaser is entitled to have it proved, and the circumstance that the heir-at-law has joined in the conveyance does not negative this right; for it might happen that a devise had been made by the testator in favour of some other party; and, therefore, without seeing what the will contained, it would be impossible to say whether the vendors had a good title to the premises: Coppard v. Harrison, 2 Cox, 318. It does not appear in this case, that a covenant for the production of the will had been offered. If a purchaser were entitled to reject such a covenant, it would not be on the ground that the probate of it gives to the will additional value, as evidence of title relating to the real estate (which clearly it does not): but where it embraces personalty, as wills commonly do, it ought to be proved; and hence it is, that the Probate Registry is the general repository of wills, both of real and personal estate. Proof of Writings, &c. Deeds and other Private Documents.]-The practice Deeds, &c. of conveyancers with respect to the admission of documents proceeds upon the assumption that forgery has not been attempted. The proof of execution and handwriting is therefore dispensed with. But it is always necessary to see that the document has come from the proper custody. The well-known rule of law is, that every attested instrument must be proved by the attesting witness, if alive, unless thirty years have elapsed from the time of its execution. But if the instrument bears any material erasure or interlineation, or does not appear to have come from the proper custody, it should be proved, although thirty years old. A deed or will more than thirty years old, and not bearing erasures or alterations, is considered to prove itself, even though the witnesses may be living (Doe v. Burdett, 4 A. & E. 19); or in the case of a will, though the testator may have died within the thirty years: Marsh v. Collnett, 2 Esp. 665. As to what is proper custody, see Doe v. Samples, 8 A. & E. 151; Roe v. Rawlings, 7 East, 279. It is doubtful whether this rule applies to the seal of a corporation. See remarks of Lord Tenterden in R. v. Bathwick, 2 B. & A. 648. The rule that signatures and handwriting need not Proof of Writings, &c. Loss of deeds. Livery of seisin. Evidence of holds. be proved applies, not only to deeds and wills, but also to letters, receipts, and other written documents which purport to be more than thirty years old, and come from proper custody: Doe v. Beynon, 12 A. & E. 431; Wynne v. Tyrrwhitt, 4 B. & A. 376; Bertie v. Beaumont, 2 Pr. 308; and see Taylor, Ev. 106. The vendor must produce the original deeds, or explain the absence of them. Verified copies merely are inadmissible, unless the originals are lost. See Harvey v. Phillips, 2 Atk. 541; Southby v. Hutt, 2 Myl. & Cr. 207; Bryant v. Busk, 4 Russ. 1; Skeffington v. Whitehurst, 3 You. & C. 1. In the latter case, an entry in a solicitor's bill of costs was considered to furnish evidence of the execution of a release. If a deed has its seals torn off, evidence may be given to show that it was originally sealed: Argoll v. Cheney, Palm. 402; Matthewson v. Lydiate, Cro. El. 546; Bolton v. Bishop of Carlisle, 2 H. Bl. 259; see 5 B. & C. 231; Gilb. Ev. 96, 6th ed.; Crawford v. Lindsay, 2 H. L. Cas. 534, 543, 550; Taylor, Ev. 162. As to enrolled deeds, vide ante, p. 161. Livery of seisin may be presumed after twelve years' consistent possession: Rees v. Lloyd, Wightw. 123. See Jackson v. Jackson, Sel. Ch. Ca. 81. Copyholds.-The regular evidence of surrenders title to copy of, and admissions to, copyholds, are copies of court rolls, signed by the steward and duly stamped; but the requisitions of the General Stamp Act do not prevent the use of the original rolls: Doe d. Bennington v. Hall, 16 East, 208; Doe d. Garrod v. Olley, 12 A. & E. 481; 4 Jurist, 1084. The copy of a deed of surrender out of court is evidence, although the Stamp Act requires the original deed or memorandum of surrender to be stamped: Doe d. Hawthorn v. Mee, 1 Nev. & M. 424; 4 B. & Ad. 617. As to proving a surrender which has been omitted to be entered on the rolls, see Doe d. Priestly v. Calloway, 9 D. & Ry. 518; 6 B. & Cr. 484; Rex v. Thruscross, 3 Nev. & M. 284; 1 Ad. & E. 126. It seems a surrender may be presumed after long enjoyment (Wilson v. Allen, 1 Jac. & W. 611; Lyford v. Coward, 1 Vern. 195); and admission, in pursuance of a surrender, which is proved, may, in like manner, be inferred after enjoyment, particularly when coupled with proof of payment of the customary rents, and performance of the customary services: Blunt v. Clark, 2 Sid. 61; Roswell v. Welsh, 3 Bulst. 214; Rawlinson v. Grieves, Id. 239; Walk. Copyh. 269, n. Acceptance of a surrender by the surrenderee, or an enfranchisement to him, is evidence of the same kind: 3 Bulst. 237; Cookes v. Hellier, 1 Ves. sen. 234. As to the necessity of proving the steward's handwriting, see 1 Keb. 567, 720; Fortesc. 43; 1 Str. 654; 2 Atk. 44; Doug. 26; 6 M. & Sel. 38; 1 Jac. & W. 617. Evidence. Copyholds-Custom.]—In practice, the certificate Evidence of of the steward of the manor is generally considered custom. to be sufficient evidence of the custom of such manor, as to descents, &c.; but in court, the regular mode of proof is by the presentment of the homage, and evidence from the rolls of its having been followed in particular instances: Doe d. Foster v. Sisson, 12 East, 62. No inference can be drawn upon a trial, as to the existence of the custom in a particular manor, from the customs of adjacent manors: Lowther v. Raw, 2 B. P. C. 451; Doe d. Breber v. Parker, 5 T. R. 26; Locke v. Colman, 1 My. & Cr. at p. 430; but see Dean and Chapter of Ely v. Warren, 2 Atk. 189. The customary of a manor, which is usually made out by the steward, often from the presentment of the homage, but always expressed to be made ex assensu omnium tenentium, is admissible evidence (Denn d. Goodwin v. Spray,1 T. R.466); even without evidence of the custom having been followed in the particular point which it is produced to prove: Roe v. Parker, 5 T. R. 26. See Ratcliffe v. Chaplin, 4 Leon. 242. Evidence of reputation is also admissible: Doe d. Foster v. Sisson, 12 East, 62; Locke v. Colman, 1 Myl. & Cr. at p. 430. So, too, depositions purporting to have been made by copyholders in an ancient suit: Freeman v. Phillipps, 4 M. & S. 486. The custom will not, in any case, be extended any further than it is |