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Page 8, note (X)—for “ entry on distress” substitute "entry or distress.”
Page 41, line 30---for “ trusts resulting on trusts of operation of law" substitute

" trusts resulting, or trusts by operation of law.”
Page 59, margin-for " Time does not run" substitute “Time did not run."
Page 61, last line but two-for "tit. AGREEMENTS” substitute “tit. LEASES."
Page 92, margin- for “ mortgagor's" substitute mortgagee's."
Page 97, line 2 et seq.-Sale by Trustees under a Trust for Sale-Consent of Tenant

one of

for Life-Settled Land Act, 1882.]-Devise of real estate upon trust after death of testator's wife with all convenient speed to sell the saine, and diride the proceeds among testator's fourteen children for their respective lives, with remainders over: Pearson, J., held, that under the absolute trust for sale the trustees had power effectually to sell and convey without the consent of the fourteen tenants for life, or any of them: his lordship said, “I am satisfied that the Act was never meant to interfere with the performance of a positive absolute duty, such as an absolute trust for sale. It is only intended to prevent trustees from exercising a discretionary trust or power vested in them, and to provide that such power and discretion shall not be exercised without the consent of the tenant for

life:" Taylor v. Poncia, 32 W. R. 335. Page 215, line 18-for “ tit. POWERS" substitute "tit. APPOINTMENTS.” Page 235, note (P)-for “one of the special commissioners substitute

the perpetual commissioners." Page 404, note (e) Claim for Compensation after completion of Purchase.]—

A. L. Smith, J., who took part in the decision of the case of Joliffe v. Baker, 11 Q. B. D. 225, in a recent case which came before him, sitting alone, on further consideration expressed his dissent from the observations of Watkin-Williams, J., quoted in this note, and stated that the ground of his own decision in Joliffe v. Baker was, that the action being an action for damages, the plaintiff could only succeed if he could establish a contract with the defendant and a breach of it by him, on an actionable tort committed by the defendant whereby the plaintiff had suffered damage; and his lordship held, in the case then before him, that he was bound by Bos v. Helsham, L. R., 2 Ex. 72, and Re Turner and Skelton, 13 Ch. D. 130°; and that the purchaser was not debarred from claiming damages against the vendor for misdescription under the contract contained in the particulars and conditions of sale by an acceptance of a conveyance of the property: Palmer v. Johnson, 25 Ch. D. 32. See also on this question, Per

riam v. Perriam, 49 L. T. 710. Page 418, note-Form of Notice under Sect. 45 of the Settled Land Act, 1882.]—

This question was recently discussed in the case of Re Ray's Settled Estates, 25 Ch. D. 464. This was a summons by the trustees of the settlement created by the will of H. B. Ray, that the notice given under sect. 45 of this Act on behalf of the tenant for life by his committee in lunacy, might be declared void as being too general in its terms. The notice was in the terms following:-" In the matter of the estates settled by the will of H. B. Ray, and in the matter of the Settled Land Act, 1882,—Take

notice that Herbert Reginald Ray (a person of unsound mind, by
H. C. Wheeler the committee of his estate duly appointed) intends to
make a sale or lease of all or any part of the said settled estate at any
time or times after the expiration of one month from the date of this
notice, as and when a proper opportunity for making any sale or lease in
accordance with the powers and provisions of the Settled Land Act shall
from time to time occur. The notice was held to be bad. Pearson, J.,
said: "I have come to the conclusion that the notice should be of a sale
or lease of a specific portion of the settled estate which is contemplated at
the time when the notice is given. I say that I have come to this con-
clusion on the words of the section, because those words are that the
tenant for life is to serve the notice on the trustees-not when he is
minded to exercise the powers given to him by the Act—but when he is
intending to make a sale, exchange, partition, lease, mortgage or
charge,' and this to my mind means a particular sale, exchange, lease,

mortgage or charge contemplated at the time when the notice is given.”
Page 467, note (a)—for “10 Geo. 4, c. 16” substitute “10 Geo. 4, c. 7."
Page 527, note-InfantCustody-Misconduct of Father-Right of Mother.]-A

discussion of the principles whereby the Court will be guided when the
application to remove children from the custody of their father is made
by the mother will be found in Re Elderton, 25 Ch. D. 220. The princi-
pal considerations are these, viz., the paternal right, the marital duty,

and the interest of the children. See also Re Clarke, 21 Ch. D. 317.
Page 532, line 18-after the words “decease of such survivoradd the words

“the person or persons to be nominated by him or her as aforesaid.'' Page 557, Clause 7-Restrictions put by Principal on Powers of Factor.]-A factor

entrusted with the possession of goods for the purpose of sale does not
lose his character as such, or the right of lien attached to it, by reason of
his acting under special instructions to sell in the name of and at prices

fixed by his principal : Stevens v. Buller (C. A.), 25 Ch. D. 31.
Page 767Fraud on Powers— Arrangement with Appointec. ]-In Re Kiruan's

Trusts, 25 Ch. D. 373, an appointment made in pursuance of an arrange-
ment between the appointor, his daughter, on her marriage, and her
intended husband, that a provision should be made out of the fund
appointed for the second wife of the appointor, was held to be void, as
being in fraud of the power.

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Statute of Limitations.


LIMITATIONS. It is proposed to introduce in this place a general view of the operation of the Statute of Limitations (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27), as altered by the Real Property Limitation Act, 1874 (37 & 38 Vict.

& c. 57). In order to ascertain the effect of these statutes it will be necessary first to consider how the law stood before the former act was passed.

The rightful seisin of an estate of freehold may be interrupted in various ways, which are all in- Disseisin or cluded in the general terms of disseisin or deforce- deforcement. ment. Disseisin also bears the special meaning of an eviction of a freeholder in possession; and deforcement, that of a wrongful holding over, after the determination of a rightful possession. The Abatement. other varieties of disseisin are: abatement, which is a wrongful entry against an heir, upon the vacant possession after the death of the owner of the fee; Intrusion. and intrusion, which is a similar entry against a





Statute of remainderman or reversioner, upon the death of the

particular tenant. There was also a disseisin of a Disseisin.

remainderman or reversioner, by tortious alienation, where the particular tenant conveyed the fee by feoffment, which amounted to a forfeiture of his own estate, and by reason of the privity and confidence between him and the reversioner, and the solemnity of the conveyance, disseised the reversioner. With respect to the circumstances which were essential to constitute a disseisin of this kind, or a disseisin by deforcement, the doctrines of disseisin at election and tenancy at sufferance have introduced considerable uncertainty (a). See Taylor d. Atkyns v. Horde, 1 Bur. 60; Doé d. Maddock v. Lynes, 5 Dowl. & R. 160; and Co. Litt. 330 b,

Butler's note. Rights of A disseisin put the true owner to his entry. A formerly lost. right of entry, upon which ejectment may be

brought, was formerly capable of being barred by

the effect of a descent-cast-a discontinuance-or a Warranty. warranty The effect of a warranty is noticed

elsewhere (infra, Vol. 2, sub tit. EXCHANGE). A Descent-cast. descent-cast was the defeating of the right of entry

of a person who had been disseised, by the death of the disseisor in possession, and the descent of the estate upon his heir—and this effect took place, however quickly the descent followed the disseisin, except where the disseisin was by eviction,-in which case, the stat. 32 Hen. 8, c. 33, made five years' quiet possession by the disseisor necessary before a descent could toil the disseisee's right of entry. The effect might also have been prevented by a formal claim upon or in view of the land, within the year in which the descent happened;

entry, how

Disseisin at election.

(a) Where a person entered by colour of a void grant, he was a disseisor (Buckler's case, 2 Co. 55 b; Cro. Eliz. 450); but where a grant is good in its inception, but is to be perfected by a subsequent ceremony, as if a feoffee enters before livery, he is no disseisor: 2 Co. 55. The term disseisin seems later to have been extended to almost every case of obstruction to an owner's full enjoyment of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, so as to enable the owner to elect to claim a remedy against the obstructor as a disseisor: Taylor d. Atkyns v. Horde, supra. See also Blunder v. Bangle, Cro. Car. 302 ; Pousley v. Blackman, Cro. Jac. 659.



and even that was unnecessary to save the right, Statute of where the true owner was under disability, or where the disseisor, being a relation, claimed as heir, or where the effect of tolling the right of entry would have been to deprive the true owner of all remedy, -as, if he claimed under a condition broken, or a will,—and so could not bring a real action: Matheson v. Trot, 1 Leon. 209, the decision in which case appears to have been misapprehended in Taylor d. Atkyns v. Horde, 1 Bur. 65.

Discontinuance was a tortious alienation of the Discontinufee by a tenant in tail in possession, by a bishop, &c., seised in right of his church, by a husband seised in right of his wife, or by a widow seised of an estate in dower; but since the stats. 11 Hen. 7, c. 20; 32 Hen. 8, c. 28; 1 Eliz. c. 19; 13 Eliz. c. 20; and i Jac. 1, c. 3, it did not, in the two latter cases, destroy the right of entry of the next claimant. If a tenant in tail, having been disseised, released his right to the disseisor, with a warranty binding his heirs, the effect of a discontinuance was also produced against all such of the heirs in tail of the party who made the warranty, as answered also to the description of his heirs general : such heirs in tail

, being deprived by the warranty of their right of entry, were put to their formedon. The true owner also lost his right of entry if he Stat: of

Limitations, did not prosecute his claim within the period pre- 21 Jac. 1, c. 16. scribed by the stat. 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, of which the first section, after limiting the period for bringing writs of formedon in descender, remainder, or reverter(6), to twenty years “next after the title and cause of action first descended or fallen,” enacted, that “no person or persons shall at any time hereafter make any entry into any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, but within twenty years next after his or their right or title which shall hereafter first descend

(6) The issue in tail were thus entirely barred under this statute, and had not, as was at one time supposed, successive rights : Tolson v. Kaye, 6 J. B. Moore, 542; 3 Brod. & B. 217; Cotterell v. Dutton, 4 Tau. 826; Doe d. Daniell v. Woodroffe, 15 M. & W. 769.

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