the Princess, after all the preliminaries were adjusted, and the marriage was fixed, to break it off, if she chose to decline it, taking on himself personally the whole responsibility of its failure. There remains still another important fact, which merits consideration. We have seen that Count Woronzoff originally maintained his Sovereign's innocence of the Princess's death, though he was afterwards induced to depart from that assertion: but when did he make such an admission? Much depends on the time; for Catherine died on the 6th of November 1796; and after her death, a crime more or less, might not appear to be of much consequence, where so many could be justly attributed to her. Certain it is that the negociation advanced much more rapidly after the decease of the Empress; and, on the 18th of May, 1797, the nuptials were solemnised. Over the nature, as well as over the author, of the first Princess of Wurtemburg's death, a deep or impenetrable veil is drawn. We must leave it to time to unfold, if it does not rather remain, as is more probable, for ever problematical." Upon the publication of this libel, the prosecutor wrote to the defendant to ask him who this "private agent" was, whom the author "personally knew"; and the answer which we received was, that it was so many years ago that he had forgotten; but that he never meant to libel the prosecutor, and if he would assure the author he was in error, he would expunge the whole story in a second edition of the work which was about to appear; he further promised to assert the want of its

foundation in the front of that second edition.

The Attorney-General said that this would be no satisfaction to the character of Count Woronzoff, or atonement for the injury he had sustained in the minds of those who had read only the first edition and the proposal constituted an aggravation of the libel.

The court being subsequently moved to make the rule absolute; after Mr. Scarlett had shewn cause against it on the ground that the defendant could not be supposed to have been actuated by malice, Lord Ellenborough said, the rule must be absolute. The ground upon which the Court is called upon to interpose is, that there was no motive of personal malice. If that was an excuse, it would excuse the greaterpart of the most pestilent libels. There is generally speaking no personal motive of malice in the libels brought before us; the object, in general, is to make that which is slander, and catches the itching ears of the public, most profitable. Whether the publication gives pain or pleasure, the object looked at is a lu crative sale of that which, from its malignity, is likely to be bought. I do not know whether that is the motive of Sir N. Wraxall, but it is with reference to one of the worst publications of the kind that we are desired to give way and not exert the arm of the law. Could the person libelled have forbore to make the complaint he has urged to our justice? He is a person representing once a great potentate, and he is libelled in respect of a communication of facts most injurious to his honour and character. Could he do otherwise

than come before the Court, and coming for the reparation of his fame, will the Court deny him those means which are necessary to him for the purposes of bring ing the person who has assailed his character before the tribunal of justice? It was the duty of Count Woronzoff towards himself to apply to the Court for redress, and it is the duty of the Court to grant him the effect of his application. There are a great number of anecdotes in this work, which may be entitled to a greater or less degree of respect; but the representation. I have pointed at is not of doubtful effect. It is a hardy and calumnious inference which the party chooses to draw. It states that Count Woronzoff had the baseness while his sovereign lived (and it was material to him to have her favour) to assert her innocence, but that he departed from the assertion as soon as she was dead, and he could expect no further advantage from her; that he admitted her to be criminal, considering that one crime more would not be much where there were so many. It is an imputation of that sort of baseness, which independent of the truth or improbability of the other passages, warrants Count Woronzoff in his application to the Court, and warrants the Court in saying, that his application ought not to be made in vain. The Court cannot discharge its duty to the public without making this rule absolute. The rule was made absolute accordingly.

rative of a forced Journey through Spain," &c. in which his Lordship introduces the name of the plaintiff in this action, stating, that on his arrival at a certain village, he (Lord Blaney) was surprised to see, among other persons, the Duke of Sorentino (mentioning him by one of his inferior titles), whom he had formerly met at Lord Nelson's; at which time he was partner in a faro bank, and a collector of modern antiques; that he disposed of them to young travellers who wished to acquire the characters of cognoscenti, and as the Marquis always introduced them with a long harangue, he was represented as very successful: that he (Lord Blaney) had bought some of them, which, though at the time he wrote they were more ancient than when he bought them, he would willingly sell for less than prime cost; that the same Duke had been obliged, in haste, to quit Palermo, having been openly detected in cheating in his Lordship's presence at Sir W. Hamilton's, and that afterwards he (the Duke of Sorentino) had been turned out of the English fleet by Lord Keith, strongly suspected of being a French spy. The book went on to state, that Lord Blaney in the course of his forced journey, meeting with the Duke of Sorentino again, knowing him to be an entertaining fellow from whom he might derive information, his Lordship determined to overlook the slight blemish of the Duke's being a professed swindler, who, on this renewal of their acquaintance, had adverted to the affair at Palermo, and treated it as a mere bagatelle. His Lordship then proceeded in his work to notice the

removal of the plaintiff from Italy, his marriage with a Spanish lady, his attachment to the French au thorities, and his acquisition of property near the village in Spain, where his Lordship had then arrived. For this libel the Duke de Sorentino brought the present action.

The Attorney General in opening the case, reprobated the manner in which the writers of modern travels frequently attacked the characters and conduct of persons with whom they became acquainted. In this instance there was not a syllable of truth in the assertions of Lord Blaney; and as the statement was circulated on the Continent soon after its publication, it became important to the Duke de Sorentino to give it a direct positive and public contradiction; such was his motive for this proceeding. As early as possible he addressed a temperate but firm letter to Lord Blaney, charging his Lordship with having entirely mistaken the individual, declaring that he had never disposed of any antiques excepting two gems, which had been sold afterwards in England for 750l. to Mr. Payne Knight, and for which he took others in exchange; that he had never been turned out of the English fleet as a French spy; on the contrary, that he had been treated with the utmost attention by Lord Nelson, at whose house at Merton he spent some time and referring to the wounds he bore, as ample proof of his enmity to France; that the terrible imputation which made him shudder. that he had been detected in cheats ing at Palermo, was wholly false; and that Lord Blaney had con

founded him with an Italian Count, who had been so guilty, and expelled the city in consequence, and that he could establish his innocence of all these offences laid to his charge by many witnesses. The letter concluded in these words, "I know well the honour and the character of a Peer and an Englishman, and I am persuad ed that I risk nothing by referring to your Lordship the manner of doing me justice and of effacing the impression occasioned by an attack as outrageous as it is unjust." Such being the sentiments of his client, and being aware of the disposition of the noble defendant to make every reparation, the Attorney-General abstained from making those remarks upon the libel that, under other circumstances, he should think it well merited.

Before any witnesses were called, Mr. Scarlett, on behalf of Lord Blaney, expressed his readiness to admit all the facts necessary to entitle the plaintiff to a verdict. Lord Blaney was as sensible as the Duke of Sorentino of the injury he had done, and was, if possible, more anxious that it should be repaired. As soon as he was convinced, by the letter of the plaintiff, of the error into which he had fallen, he stopped the sale of his work, published a new and amended edition, with an advertisement stating his reasons, and doing justice to the plaintiff. As a nobleman and a soldier, Lord Blaney did not think it now unbecoming to make an apology by his Counsel, and to express his sincere regret at the unintentional mistake; it was impossible to say a single word in justification of the false

work.

The Attorney-General for his client, expressed himself satisfied with the apology, and as the object was only the vindication of character, a verdict was taken for the plaintiff.-Damages 40s.

COMMERCIAL CAUSES.

Burgess v. Clements.-This was an action tried before Mr. Baron Richards, at the last Oxford Assizes, by a traveller against the landlady of the Three Cups Inn, in that city, to recover the value of three boxes of Birmingham trinkets, which the plaintiff va lued at 600l. or 700l. and which were stolen from a room in the inn, while the plaintiff was there as a guest. The facts of the case were these: The plaintiff had been in the habit of frequenting the defendant's house: there was a common travellers' room, but the plaintiff, on this occasion, wished to have a private room, for the purpose of receiving customers who might come to pur chase his wares, and asked for a particular room up stairs for this purpose. The landlady shewed him into a private room, the door of which opened into the gateway, and the windows of which could be looked into from the street: she gave him the key of the room to lock it when he went out, and advised him to bolt the door: the loss happened at night; the plaintiff had a candle in his room, but the curtains of the windows were down. When the defendant's son left him, he was packing up his goods; he had been out two hours before the loss was discovered;

sure that he even shut the door; the key was found in it, the de fendant went into the room after the plaintiff went out, and put out the candle, which he had left burning: the defendant did not ob serve then whether the boxes were there. Under these circumstances

the learned judge left it to the jury, that an innkeeper was prima facie responsible for the goods of his guest; but the guest might discharge him from that liability by his own conduct, and left it to them whether the present plaintiff had not done so; the Jury being of that opinion, found their verdict for the defendant.

Mr. Jervis obtained a rule nisi last term, to set aside this verdict and grant a new trial upon the authority of the 4th Resolution in Calye's case, 8 Rep. 65, which declares "an innkeeper bound in law to keep his guest's goods and chattels safe, without any stealing or purloining; and it is no excuse for the innkeeper to say, that he delivered the guest the key of the chamber in which he is lodged, and that he left the chamber door open; but he ought to keep the goods and chattels of his guest there in safety."

After some pleadings, Lord Ellenborough said, we cannot see any ground for impeaching the finding of the jury in this case, although the facts of the case might have been commented on more at large by the learned Judge than appears from this report, and he might have availed himself more decidedly of the rights of his own province in laying down the law. But the question is, whether the Jury have rightly exercised their

province. An innkeeper is bound to keep the goods of his guest, hospitandi, so that no loss eveniat prodefectu hospitatoris. The court did not mean to say that where goods are stolen, it was not prima Jacie evidence of defect of care on the part of the landlord; but under circumstances, the landlord might no doubt be exempt; as in this, where the plaintiff's conduct not only concurred, but induced the loss. Calye's case allows that where the guest introduces the thief, the landlord shall not be answerable. The questions in this case were, therefore, 1st, whether the plaintiff took the apartment animo hospitandi; and 2ndly, whether his own conduct did not conduce to the loss. Upon the evidence it appeared that the plaintiff asked for a particular room to shew his goods; now a landlord is not bound to find his guest exhibit-rooms for the purpose of expanding his goods he is not bound to provide shops, but convenient lodging for his guests. The Court agreed with the case in Moor, that the mere delivery of the key of a room would not dispense with the care and attention due from the landlord, and that he could not exonerate himself by merely handing over a key to his guest; but if the guest takes the key, it is a proper question for the jury, whether he has taken it animo custodiendi, and for the purpose of exempting the landlord from his liability. Lord Coke also laid it down, that if the guest's servant, companion, or fellow-lodger rob him, the landlord is not liable; and in this case the plaintiff called strangers together for the purposes of a show, and invited

the admission of persons into the room, upon whose approach and access the landlord had no check. This was evidence of an user of the inn for purposes alien from those hospitandi; and it was hard to call upon the innkeeper to protect property in a room used for these purposes. It appeared that the defendant advised the plaintiff to bolt his door, for there were strangers about; and after this suspicion had been communicated to him, he was obliged to use diligence in protecting his own property; ordinarily, a guest certainly had a right to rest on the protection of his landlord; but after the latter's fears expressed and admonition given, he was bound to use some degree of caution himself.-Rule discharged.

Halman v. Whitmore.-This was an action on a policy of insurance on goods on board the Venus. The vessel had been captured and re-captured, and the salvage and charges which were incurred were sought to be recovered. The vessel belonged to a Dutch merchant of the name of Nolan, and the interest in the goods was averred to be in him. At the time the insurance was effected, the Dutch were alien enemies: but a licence had been procured for the voyage by a person of the name of Bin, to the following effect:-It was granted to C. Bin on behalf of different British merchants for the ship Venus to proceed with a cargo of certain specified articles to any port between the Texel and the Scheldt bearing any colours except the French. Upon the construction of this licence as to whether it covered the interest of Nolan, at the