causes is found impracticable. The rule that the transportation rates are the same to every station in the group is one that is plain, simple and easily understood by all, as well as the business reasons upon which it is based. But it is a novel doctrine, and one that to my mind will be fraught with many difficulties and embarrassments to carriers and will result in serious injury to shippers and consignees, without any benefit to the carriers or the public, if the rule is to be announced by the Interstate Commerce Commission that the cost of transportation or even the terminal expenses incurred and terminal deliveries and receipts of freight as made by carriers must be exactly, or even substantially, the same at every station included within the group because the transportation rates are the same at each of these stations. When that is done in one instance, as is here proposed, I can readily see how and why the carriers would generally abandon the grouping system, and that would result in a raising of rates at these points where grouped rates now exist, and widespread general dissatisfaction on the part of the business interests served by the carriers. It will also result in many adjustments of rates under the long and short haul clause of the statute which have been made by carriers and which can not well be made in any other way being abandoned by them, and, as a result of that, numerous embarrassments, complaints and general dissatisfaction.

It will expose the Commission, the public and the carriers to the hazard of turning loose and losing the benefit of a great deal that has practically been accomplished in the administration thus far of the Act to regulate commerce. We had better, in my opinion, hold on to the practical results. thus accomplished and let the public have the benefit of them instead of losing them in an effort to correct inequalties. in transportation expense or in the terminal expenses and terminal deliveries and receipts at different stations within a group, when these as occurring at one station are not shown to operate any prejudice or injury to shippers or business at another station within the group and are easily and fairly accounted for by the disadvantage under which the carrier

labors of having its depot at one station located a long distance from the shippers and consignees at that station, while at another station its depot is located near the business it serves. If the circumstances and conditions being substantially different at the different stations in a group, so far as these relate to terminal expenses and deliveries, are to be considered of no consequence; and if, without regard to these different conditions and circumstances, the carrier is to incur the same measure of terminal expenses or charges at one station as another in the group, or to adopt the same methods of terminal delivery or receipt of freight at each station, or else to be considered as cutting the transportation rate, or of unlawful preference to the extent of the difference in the terminal expense or charge at one station as compared to another, then we are applying one rule as to the transportation rate under the statute by giving, as the statute directs, weight to "substantially different circumstances and conditions" where these are of controlling importance in the transportation rate, and applying a wholly different rule to terminal expenses in delivery and receipt of freight where the circumstances and conditions are equally substantially dissimilar.

Nor is there any evidence whatever in this proceeding which shows or tends to show that this method of business on the part of the defendant is either a "special rate, rebate, drawback or other device" made or intended to be made for the purpose of charging, demanding or collecting a greater or less compensation from any person or persons "for doing for him or them a like and contemporaneous service in the transportation of a like kind of traffic under substantially similar circumstances and conditions" as defined by section 2 of the Act to regulate commerce. It certainly is not a "special rate," because it is a published general rate at Grand Rapids in the tariffs of the defendant. It has no feature of a "rebate" because there is nothing refunded directly nor indirectly to the shipper. Nor has it one single element of a "drawback," which, in substance, is the same as a "rebate."

The question then arises whether it is a "device" within the meaning of section 2 of the Act to regulate commerce. From the connection in which the word "device" occurs in section 2 of the statute it is evidently used in a criminal sense, because it imputes to the carrier guilty of it conduct which is violative of law. It is used in the statute in the sense of being a crafty, shifty stratagem, project, scheme, design, invention, or contrivance to give one person an unlawful preference over another for doing on the part of the carrier "a like and contemporaneous service in the transportation of a like kind of traffic under substantially similar circumstances and conditions." The evidence in this proceeding shows without conflict that this method of doing business on the part of the defendant originated about twenty-five years ago and has been continued ever since. This evidence shows that all shippers at Grand Rapids, equally and alike, have the benefit of it, and that none of them are preferred over others. All the facts shown by the evidence in relation to the origin and continuance of this method of business on the part of the defendant are fully stated in a preceding part of this opinion and it is unnecessary to repeat them here. They utterly negative the idea that this is a "device" invented by the defendant for the purpose of avoiding the law or preferring one shipper over another, either at Grand Rapids or elsewhere on its line. They show that this method of business on the part of the defendant originated in good faith and has continued in good faith up to this time.

The intent with which a "device" is invented and perpetrated as declared and denounced by the statute is the very essence of the Act. I understand it to be a cardinal rule of the law that a criminal act in violation of law, such as this would be if it were really a device intended, designed, or perpetrated for the purpose of violating the second section of the Act to regulate commerce, can never be imputed to a party where all the facts and circumstances show that it is consistent with honesty and good intention. Again, it is equally as well settled a rule of law in a matter of this kind,

that if, upon all the evidence, there is an hypothesis that the act done was intended by the defendant in a criminal sense or in violation of law, and, on the other hand, that there is another hypothesis, equally reasonable and warranted by all the evidence, to the effect that the act done was not done for the purpose of violating law or in any criminal sense, then any tribunal which is to determine the question must proceed upon the rule that the act done was not done in a criminal sense or with any intent to violate law.

But aside from the fact of intent, the question arises, does it violate the statute; because if such is its effect then it can not stand. The grounds upon which it does not violate the statute have been fully set forth in a preceding part of this opinion and it is unnecessary to repeat them here in all their details. They bear quite as much upon the subject as to whether it is a "special rate, rebate, drawback, or device" as they do upon the question of whether it is a violation of the long and short-haul feature of the fourth section of the Act to regulate commerce, or whether it is a violation of the third section of that statute. They show that it is not "a like and contemporaneous service done under substantially similar circumstances and conditions" with the service rendered by the defendant in transporting freight to and from Ionia, but, on the contrary, that it results from circumstances and conditions which are substantially dissimilar at Grand Rapids to what they are at Ionia.

That it is not in violation of any public policy of the United States is equally true. The public policy of the United States is found in its laws as enacted by the law-making power or adopted by it, or in cases confided to the President and indicated in his proclamations, or to one of the great departments of the Government and established by its regulations. But if the statute which we are required to administer does not indicate what the public policy is to be upon any given point, then I do not understand that we have authority by any mere opinion of our own to create and declare what shall be the public policy upon that subject, and that an innocent and proper business method of a carrier

is in violation of the public policy that we have thus created and defined. Whatever public policy there is bearing upon this subject must be found in the Act to regulate commerce, and if it is not there, then it does not exist.

As to rates the only public policy indicated by the Act to regulate commerce is that these shall be reasonable and just, published and open alike to all, without unjust discrimination for a like and contemporaneous service in the transportation of a like kind of traffic under substantially similar circumstances and conditions; that there shall be no undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic, nor shall there be any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsover to any person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic; that a carrier shall not discriminate between connecting lines in receiving, forwarding, and interchanging freight; and that it shall be unlawful for a common carrier to charge or receive any greater compensation in the aggregate for the transportation of passengers or like kind of property under substantially similar circumstances and conditions for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line in the same direction, the shorter being included in the longer distance. The statute has left no doubt on the subject as to the public policy thus declared, because it is plainly expressed in the language of the statute. Whether a common carrier, subject to the provisions of the statute, has violated it in any of these respects depends upon the facts of each particular case, and severe penalties are provided in the event there is such a violation.

A feature of this statute that is manifest even upon a casual reading is that it expressly defines in its own language any act that shall be a violation of its provisions. To violate section one in any charge made for the service rendered or to be rendered in the transportation of passengers or property or in connection therewith, or for the receiving, delivering, storage, or handling of such property, such charge must be unreasonable and unjust. To violate section two there