§ 105. Relation between the Federal and State courts continued.--The United States may sue a State in its own courts and such suit may be commenced in the Supreme Court.117 147 The judicial machinery of a State cannot be used to interfere with the United States Government in any way, or to hamper it in any of its operations. In Tarble's case148 an attempt was made to determine by habeas corpus proceedings, under the laws of Wisconsin, the rightfulness of the detention of a person by an officer of the United States army under the claim that he was a duly enlisted soldier. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin granted an order for his release, and from this order the United States prosecuted a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States. The decision in this case was a most emphatic denial of the right of a State Court to interfere by a writ of habeas corpus with any person held in custody under the authority of the United States. The United States Courts have the right to try any person accused of a crime, which he attempts to justify on the ground that he was acting under the authority of the United States Government. If a prosecution is commenced against him in the courts of any State, it may be removed into the United States Courts.1 149 The United States cannot only protect its officials from prosecution in the State Courts but can also take means to protect them from bodily harm. The case of In re Neagle150 is one of particular importance on this point. Neagle, a United States Deputy Marshal, acting in pursuance of instructions from the Attorney General of the United States, had, in consequence of an anticipated attempt at violence on the part of one Terry against Justice Field of the Supreme Court, been in attendance upon the said Justice when a murderous assault was threatened upon the said Justice by the said Terry, and had then, in defense of Justice Field, shot and killed Terry. For this act Neagle was arrested by the authorities of the State of California on the charge of murder, and a petition for a writ of habeas 147 United States v. Texas, 143 U. S., 621. 148 13 Wallace, 397. 149 Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S., 257; In re Neagle, 135 U. S., 1. 50 135 U. S., 1. corpus was brought in the United States Court for the Northern District of California in behalf of the said Neagle. The writ was granted, the Court holding that the United States could take all necessary steps for the protection of its judges. This case also decided that a party held under the authority of a State may be released by a writ of habeas corpus from the United States Courts under proper circumstances. Controversies between different States can be tried and determined in the Courts of the United States.151 The question as to the rights of an inferior Federal Court to enjoin the enforcement of a State statute has come prominently before the public during the past year, and is as yet undetermined.15 15246 151 See Chapters X. and XIV. Questions arising between the State courts and United States courts, in regard to the rate bills, are productive of some very interesting questions. A very interesting question was the occasion of a difference of opinion on the part of the judges of North Carolina, which has a very able bench, in the case of the State v. Southern Ry. Co., 59 S. E. Rep., 570. "Before considering the question therein under dispute, we desire to call attention in a general way to the situation. There seems to be a great fear on the part of the States that the extension of the Federal authority over railroads is a direct blow at the rights of the States as sovereign States. It is true that the extension of the commerce clause of the Constitution has curtailed and will curtail the authority of the States with regard to railroads, telegraph lines, ship lines, express companies, etc. Great fear is aroused that this concentration of the powers of government will proceed to such an extent as to wipe out the lines of State jurisdiction altogether. Let us stop for a moment and consider the question from another standpoint. Our postal system is an affair which is operated by the government. It extends throughout the land, ramifying the counties and townships of every State in the Union. It is proctected by Federal laws. Our postal system is a national affair and the general welfare of the States is best promoted by having a system of uniform laws as well as one general management to guide its operations. It is a creature of the people of the whole nation, for the whole nation, by the people of the nation, and the people are satisfied with it as it is. A very significant suggestion came from an assembly of fruit merchants from all parts of the country, held in Chicago a few days ago. A resolution was passed by them favoring government control of the railroads. Had some § 106. The States in Federal elections.-The States, as such, play a prominent part in Federal elections. The Presidential of the contenders against the extension of the commerce clause asked the reason of one of those fruit merchants for the passage of such a resolution, he would have answered that such a system of distribution of the general produce of the nation could be had through one system of control of these great national systems of railroads than has ever been dreamed of by the people in general. "The general welfare of the people is so greatly bound up in a uniform system of distrioution of their products, that it is as certain of accomplishment in one way or another as that the night follows the day. In the meantime, what should be the policy of the national and State governments while the natural elements are working out destiny? Such conditions as gave rise to the principal case must be permitted to burn out their 'ineffectual fires,' as far as the growth of Federal control over railroads is concerned. While matters are being adjusted to the inevitable, there are means of settling the questions which are arising without resort to the Federal authority. "In the principal case we find the Federal authorities adopting means intending to force the issue, which are, on the contrary, caleulated to further increase whatever of estrangement or jealousy already existing between the Federal and State governments. In other States, besides North Carolina, we find Federal courts adopt ing the very unwise, if authorized, action of enjoining State officers from enforcing the criminal laws of the State, especially such laws as make it a misdemeanor to sell railroad tickets at more than the price per mile fixed by statute. The following paragraph will state briefly the situation as it arose in North Carolina: "On May 8, 1907, the defendant, Southern Railway Company, filed a bill in equity in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of North Carolina, on behalf of itself, as complainant, against Franklin McNeil et al., for an injunction against the enforcement of said act, and on that day his honor, J. C. Pritchard, United States Circuit Judge, issued a temporary restraining order, and required the said defendants to appear before him at Asheville on Wednesday, the 26th day of June, 1907, to show cause why an injunction pen dente lite should not be issued. On June 29th, after a hearing in which the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court was challenged by the defendants, an interlocutory injunction was granted upon the bill of complainant and the answer thereto treated as affidavits, and the cause was set down for hearing before the Circuit Court in the city of Asheville on the first Monday in October, 1907. In the meantime, at the July term, 1907, of the Wake Superior Court, the defendant having refused and failed to obey the said statute, the grand electors are apportioned among the several States, each State combined. Each State has the authority to appoint its electors jury indicted the defendant and its agent, for the violation of said act. At the trial of the indictment at said term, the defendant, Southern Railway Company, entered a plea to the jurisdiction of the Superior Court of Wake County, and put in evidence the proceedings of the Circuit Court of the United States, in which the injunction was granted. The defendant appealed and the conclusion of the State Supreme Court was to the effect that the proceeding was one that the Federal court had no jurisdiction to enjoin, but held that as no criminal offense was alleged in the indictment the motion in arrest should be sustained. "We heartily agree with the North Carolina court that the cases where the United States courts should exert their authority, as against a State court, should be of rare occurence and that the interference in the principal case, as we have said in our editorial, 65 Cent. L. J., 135, was unwarranted and a wrongful invasion upon the functions of the State. We think the matter stated in Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion, to which the North Carolina court refers, aptly sets forth the true doctrine as follows: 'In view of the relations existing under our present government between the judicial tribunals of the Union and of the several States, a Federal court or a Federal judge will not ordinarily interfere by habeas corpus with the regular course of procedure under State authority, but will leave the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus to exhaust the remedies afforded by the State for determining whether he is illegally restrained of his liberty. After the highest court of the state, competent under the State law to dispose of the matter, has finally acted, the case can be brought to this court for re-examination.' Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U. S., 179. "There is no doubt in our own mind, even though the question were a closer one than it appears to be, that the general welfare is best promoted by leaving the questions first to the State courts, and then, if a grievance st.ll be deemed to exist by either party, to take the matter thence to the Supreme Court of the United States. As to the question raised by the defendant railway company that the act was confiscatory, there is no reason why all the evidence could not be brought out in the State courts, which could be adduced in the Federal courts and a review had of the whole matter in the Supreme Court of the United States. The question is well presented by Mr. Justice Walker of the North Carolina court, where he says: 'Much is said in the briefs about the equity of the suit in the Federal court and the complainant's right to an injunction. We would not agree with the learned judge who issued the interlocutory injunction if that matter were strictly before us and we were required to pass upon it; for "in such a manner as the Legislature thereof may direct," and the electors from each State meet and vote by themselves.153 The United States Senate is distinctively the representative body of the States, each State having two members who are chosen by the State Legislatures.15+ In the Lower House the members are apportioned among the States according to their respective populations, and it is left to the States to arrange the Congressional districts. The Constitution provides that members of this House must be elected by the people in each State, but the qualifications necessary for voting for Representatives is left to each State to determine by the constitutional provision that the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for the electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature.155 "The times, places and manner of holding elections for Sena we do not think there was a sufficient disclosure of the facts, which are necessarily within the knowledge of the complainant in that suit (the defendant in this indictment), to entitle it to the favorable consideration of a chancellor. It is a very serious matter to suspend the operation of a public statute and to postpone the execution of the people's will at the instance of a private suitor, even upon the allegation that his property is about to be confiscated, or some other constitutional right is about to be impaired; and it should not be done except upon a full disclosure of all the facts in the complainant's possession, and upon the clearest showing that the threatened injury will at least probably result.' "It would be good policy on the part of Federal judges to follow the action of Judge Phillips, who, when considering the identical question presented in this case, held that it would be impossible to decide whether the reduction of a rate will be confiscatory in the absence of an actual test of the same. The learned judge further held that whether it would be so or not was speculative and mere guesswork, and that the testimony of an ordinary business man, expressing his opinion, or even of railway experts, also giving opinions and illustrating them by the use of many figures based upon past experience, was not satisfactory, and did not relieve the doubt and uncertainty sufficiently to warrant the issuing of a preliminary injunction. Railway Co. v. Gadley (C. C.), 155 Fed. at page 225." Central Law Journal, Vol. 66, pp. 87-89. 153 United States Constitution, Article I., Section I., Clause III. 15- United States Constitution, Article I., Section III., Clause I. 155 United States Constitution, Article I., Section II., Clause III. |