date on the motion that the Committee of the Whole report the resolutions to the House as they stood before the introduction of the New Jersey plan. The vote on this motion stood seven states to three in favor of the Virginia plan.35

§ 72. The Connecticut Compromise. The period during which the Constitution was being discussed in the Committee of the Whole had been one characterized by bitter contests and by bigoted holding to individual opinions at all costs on the part of the delegates. The latter history of this convention is notable for its compromises, without which the Constitution could never have been adopted.

Among these compromises first in importance stands the so-called Connecticut compromise, which succeeded in bridging over that seemingly impassable chasm between the Virginia and the New Jersey plans, between the large and the small states. For this compromise, as for so many other things, the Constitutional Convention is indebted to a provision in one of the State Constitutions. The Constitution of Connecticut, while pro

monly mistaken for the general voice. He could not persuade himself that the State Governments and sovereignties were so much the idols of the people, nor a National Government so obnoxious to them, as some supposed. Why should a National Government be

unpopular? Has it less dignity? Will each citizen enjoy under it less liberty or protection? Will a citizen of Delaware be degraded by becoming a citizen of the United States? Where do the people look at present for relief from the evils of which they complain? Is it from an internal reform of their governments? No, sir. It is from the National Councils that relief is expected. For these reasons, he did not fear that the people would not follow us into a National Government; and it will

be a further recommendation of Mr. Randolph's plan that it is to be submitted to them, and not to the Legislatures, for ratification.

Mr. Pinckney: The whole comes to this, as he conceived. Give New Jersey an equal vote and she will dismiss her scruples and concur in the National system. He thought the convention authorized to go any length, in recommending what they found necessary to remedy the evils which produced this Convention. Madison's Journal of the Federal Convention, under date of June 16th.

35 Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-7; New York, New Jersey, Delaware, no-3; Maryland, divided.

viding for senatorial districts arranged according to population, divided the members of the lower house practically equally among the different towns. From the beginning of the convention Oliver Ellsworth and Roger Sherman, of Connecticut, seemed to have considered this plan of equal representation in one house and proportional representation in the other as a proper basis of compromise between the large and the small states. This proposition was first suggested in the convention by Mr. Sherman on June 11th. On the same day the vote of Connecticut was cast in favor of proportional representation in the lower house, and later in the day in favor of equal representation in the Senate. The six states, however, supporting the Virginia plan still maintained their unbroken ranks and the vote was in favor of proportional representation in both houses. On June 19th Connecticut was found voting for the Virginia plan, as a whole, as against the New Jersey plan. The Connecticut delegates were still, however, far from having abandoned their compromise and were prepared to offer it again at the earliest opportunity. The apparently uncompromising attitude on the part of the larger states, however, for a time threw Connecticut over entirely to the side of the smaller states, and on June 29th her vote was cast in the convention against proportional representation in the lower house.

On the second of July Connecticut's opportunity came at last. The growing discontent of the smaller states had at length begun to arouse the fear among some of the delegates from the "six" states that they were perhaps going too far. When, therefore, on this day Oliver Ellsworth moved for an equality of the voting power of the states in the upper branch Mr. Baldwin, of Georgia, divided the vote of that state by voting with the smaller states. The result was a tie and a deadlock. After a brief period of hesitancy the convention referred this whole matter to a committee of one from each, who, three days later (July 5th) reported as follows:

"The committee to whom was referred the eighth resolution of the report of the Committee of the Whole House and as much of the seventh as has not been decided on, submit the following report:

"That the subsequent propositions be recommended to the convention on condition that both shall be generally adopted.

1. "That in the first branch of the legislature each of the states now in the Union shall be allowed one member for every forty thousand inhabitants, of the description reported in the seventh resolution of the Committee of the Whole House; that each state not containing that number shall be allowed one member; that all bills for raising or appropriating money and for fixing the salaries of the officers of the government of the United States shall originate in the first branch of the legislature, and shall not be altered or amended by the second branch; and that no money shall be drawn from the public treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations to be originated in the first branch. 2. "That in the second branch each state shall have an equal Vote."36

After being debated for eleven days and somewhat amended 37

This report was found on a motion in the committee made by Dr. Franklin: "It was barely acquiesced in by the member from the States opposed to an equity of votes in the second branch, and was evidently considered by the members on the other side as a gaining of their point." A motion was made by Mr. Sherman (who acted in the place of Mr. Ellsworth, who was kept away by indisposition) in the Committee, to the following effect: "That each State should have an equal vote in the second branch; provided, that no decision therein should prevail unless the majority of the States concurring should also comprise a majority of the inhabitants of the United States." This motion was not much deliberated on, nor approved, in the Committee. A similar proviso had been proposed, in the debates on the Articles of Confederation, in 1777, to the ar

ticles giving certain powers to "nine States."' See Journals of Congress for 1777, page 462. Footnote to Scott's Edition of Madison's Journal of the Federal Convention.

The resolution, as passed, was as follows: "Resolved, That in original formation of the Legislature of the United States the first branch thereof shall consist of sixty-five members, of which number New Hampshire shall send 3, Massachusetts 8, Rhode Island 1, Connecticut 5, New York 6, New Jersey 4, Pennsylvania 8, Delaware 1, Maryland 6, Virginia 10, North Carolina 5, South Carolina 5, Georgia 3. But as the present situation of the States may probably alter in the number of their inhabitants, the Legislature of the United States shall be authorized, from time to time, to appoint the number of representatives, and in case any of the

D

this report, embodying the Connecticut compromise, was adopted by the narrow margin of five states to four. Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, against Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina and Georgia. Massachusetts was divided and New York was absent, as were also New Hampshire and Rhode Island. The importance of the Connecticut compromise can hardly be overestimated; it is not too much to say that without it the Constitution could not have been ratified. As it was two states, Rhode Island and North Carolina, rejected the Constitution, and a third, New York, would have done so if by so doing the adoption of the Constitution could. have been defeated. Adverse action by two more states would have defeated the adoption of the Constitution, and such adverse action would have been taken by Delaware and New Jersey had not equal representation in the Senate been conceded to them.

au

States shall hereafter be divided, or enlarged by addition of territory, or any two or more States united, or any new States created within the limits of the United States, the Legislature of the United States shall possess thority to regulate the number of representatives in any of the foregoing cases, upon the principle of the number of inhabitants, so according to the provisions hereafter mentioned; provided, always, that representation ought to be proportioned according to direct taxation. And in order to ascertain the alteration in the direct taxation, which may be required from time to time by the changes in the relative circumstances of the States.

"Resolved, That a census be taken within six years from the first meeting of the Legislature of the United States, and once within the term of every ten years

afterwards, of all the inhabitants of the United States, in the manner and according to the ratio recommended by Congress, in their resolution on the 18th day of April, 1783; and that the Legislature of the United States shall proportion the direct taxation accordingly.

"Resolved, That all bills for raising or appropriating money and for fixing the salaries of officers of the government of the United States shall originate in the first branch of the Legislature of the United States, and shall no be altered or amended in the second branch; and that no money shall be drawn from the public treasury, but in pursuance of appropriation to be originated in the first branch.

"Resolved, That in the second branch of the Legislature of the United States each State shall have an equal vote."

With the adoption of the Connecticut compromise the union of the small states and the extreme State Rights Party came to an end. Delaware and New Jersey became among the strongest supporters of a true national government and were two of the three states whose conventions ratified the new Constitution without a dissenting vote. The adoption of this compromise, however, aroused great bitterness on the part of Pennsylvania and Virginia and even rendered doubtful the ratification of the Constitution by the latter state.

§ 73. The Second Great Compromise. The second great compromise of the convention had relation, like the first, to the method of representation in Congress, being on the question as to how slaves should be counted in determining the population of a state, for the purpose of apportioning direct taxes and representation. The extreme South, the states of North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, insisted on full representation in Congress for the slaves. To such abolitionists as Governor Morris, or James Wilson, any additional representation granted to a state on account of people whom she not only did not permit to vote but even considered as mere chattels, seemed unjust and absurd. The compromise which settled this contest was one anticipated in part by a vote of the Continental Congress several years before. In 1783, when Congress was endeavoring to apportion the quotas of revenue among the different states, this same question arose, as to the weight to be given to the slave population. On this occasion James Madison. proposed a compromise, which was accepted by Congress, by which a slave was rated as equal to three-fifths of a freeman.

The Virginia plan had declared that the right of suffrage in the National Legislature ought to be proportioned to the quotas of contribution or to the number of free inhabitants as the one or the other rule might seem best in different cases;38 but during the debates in the Committee of the Whole this was changed to read: "Resolved, That the rights of suffrage in the first branch of the National Legislature ought not to be according to the rule established in the Articles of Confederation, but accord

as See Appendix F.